TITLE: B-298543; B-298543.3, STG, Inc., October 30, 2006
BNUMBER: B-298543; B-298543.3
DATE: October 30, 2006
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B-298543; B-298543.3, STG, Inc., October 30, 2006

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: STG, Inc.

   File: B-298543; B-298543.3

   Date: October 30, 2006

   Claude P. Goddard, Jr., Esq., Daniel J. Donohue, Esq., J. Michael
   Littlejohn, Esq., and Steven J. Koprince, Esq., Akerman Senterfitt
   Wickwire Gavin, for the protester.

   Paul E. Pompeo, Esq., Joseph P. Hornyak, Esq., and Stuart W. Turner, Esq.,
   Holland & Knight LLP, for Beta Analytics, Incorporated, an intervenor.

   Mary E. Clarke, Esq., Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, for the
   agency.

   Edward Goldstein, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the
   General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Protest alleging "bait and switch" where awardee requested permission
   from the agency to substitute nine personnel after award is denied where
   the record does not establish that the awardee knowingly or negligently
   misrepresented its intent to furnish the nine individuals for whom
   substitution was sought.

   2. Protest challenging proposal evaluation and source selection is denied
   where record shows evaluation and award decision were reasonable and
   consistent with solicitation's evaluation terms and applicable procurement
   rules.

   DECISION

   STG, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Beta Analytics, Incorporated
   (BAI) under solicitation No. HR0011-06-R-0001, issued by the Defense
   Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for support services for the
   Security and Intelligence Directorate, under the Office of Management
   Operations at DARPA. STG challenges the agency's evaluation of its
   proposal and the agency's source selection decision, and alleges that BAI
   engaged in a "bait and switch" by substituting less qualified personnel
   after award as compared to the more highly qualified personnel identified
   in its proposal.[1]

   We deny the protest.

   DARPA's mission is to serve as the central research and development
   organization of the Department of Defense with primary responsibility to
   maintain U.S. technological superiority over potential adversaries. As a
   consequence, DARPA is responsible for a number of secret and top secret
   programs. Agency Report (AR) at 2. DARPA's Security and Intelligence
   Directorate (SID) supports this mission by "planning, executing, and
   directing the information, personnel, industrial, information assurance,
   and physical security programs at DARPA and at specified contractor
   sites." RFP at 8.

   On February 13, 2006, DARPA issued the RFP, which provided for the award
   of a cost-plus-award-fee contract with 1 base year and four 1-year options
   for services in support of the mission of SID. Specifically, DARPA sought
   a contractor to provide a "high quality professional security staff" to
   partner with SID in accomplishing its mission. RFP at 8. To accomplish
   this goal, the RFP's statement of work identified and described a total of
   37 tasks required of the contractor in the areas of "security operations,"
   "program security," and "security program planning and execution." RFP
   9-21. Offerors were advised of the estimated level of effort needed to
   perform the tasks required under the statement of work and support SID in
   performing its mission for each contract period (base and options). In
   this regard, DARPA provided a list of required labor categories, the
   estimated hours for each labor category, and the estimated full time
   equivalents (FTE) for each labor category. In sum, DARPA estimated a need
   for 69 FTEs for the base and each option year. RFP at 75.

   Under the RFP, award was to be made on a "best value" basis with proposals
   evaluated under the following factors: (1) technical approach, (2)
   personnel, (3) past performance, and (4) cost/price. Regarding the
   non-cost factors, the RFP provided that the technical approach and
   personnel factors were of equal importance and both were more important
   than the past performance factor. The best value determination was to be
   made using a trade-off process where the >non-cost factors, when combined,
   were significantly more important than cost/price. The importance of
   cost/price, however, would increase as non-cost factors were determined to
   be closer in merit. RFP at 77, 81.

   Under the personnel factor, the RFP required offerors to demonstrate that
   the personnel they proposed to staff the contract met minimum
   qualification requirements for education and experience. For example, the
   RFP provided for a "program manager" position, which was considered a key
   personnel position, and indicated that the individual proposed for this
   position was required to have a bachelor's degree as well as 10 years of
   "qualifying, related experience," 5 years of which "shall be in the
   direction and management of Government funded programs in industry or
   within government entities, with 20 or more individuals under their
   cognizance." RFP at 31. For the purpose of evaluating proposals under the
   personnel factor, the RFP indicated that, where the quality of personnel
   was considered equal, an offeror proposing currently employed personnel
   would be deemed equal to an offeror proposing personnel under letters of
   intent or commitment.

   Past performance, the least important non-cost factor, included the
   following four equally weighted subfactors: (1) timeliness, (2) quality,
   (3) cost control, and (4) customer satisfaction. RFP at 80. The RFP
   directed offerors to submit past performance information concerning their
   performance of recent (within the past 5 years) and relevant contracts and
   subcontracts. For each contract identified, offerors were to include,
   among other things, total award value, contact information for the
   government technical point of contact and/or the contracting officer's
   representative for the contract, a brief description of the types of tasks
   involved under the contract as well as details on the tasks under the
   contract that were relevant to the tasks of the RFP. RFP at 71. As
   provided in the RFP, past performance information was deemed relevant if
   the information related to the offeror's performance of "similar tasks
   found in this RFP's Statement of Work and was performed for [the
   Department of Defense], one of the services, or the intelligence
   community." RFP at 71.

   The solicitation further informed offerors that DARPA could obtain and
   consider past performance information from other sources such as the
   Defense Contract Management Agency, Contractor Performance Assessment
   Reporting System (CPARS), the Department of Defense's Past Performance
   Information Retrieval System, and "other past performance information
   provided by a Government employee (including those persons referenced in
   the Offeror's Past Performance proposal), etc.) to supplement or validate
   the information in the Past Performance proposal." RFP at 72.

   Regarding the evaluation of cost/price, the RFP, as amended, provided that
   DARPA would evaluate proposed cost/price for reasonableness and realism
   and indicated that a cost realism evaluation would be performed to
   determine each offeror's most probable cost to the government and to
   assess the offeror's understanding of the requirements of the RFP. The
   evaluated cost was to be the higher of either (a) the sum of the offeror's
   proposed total estimated cost and fee or (b) the government's
   determination of the offeror's most probable total cost and fee.

   Five offerors, including STG and BAI, submitted timely proposals by the
   solicitation's March 16, 2006 closing date. To evaluate proposals, DARPA
   convened a technical evaluation panel (TEP), a past performance evaluation
   panel (PPEP) and a cost/price evaluation panel (CPEP). With regard to the
   non-cost factors, the evaluators ranked each proposal under the various
   factors and sub-factors utilizing the following color/adjectival ratings,
   blue/exceptional, green/acceptable, yellow/marginal, red/unacceptable, and
   grey/neutral (past performance only). Based on initial proposals, the
   agency rated STG and BAI as "green" overall for "technical approach," with
   each receiving "green" ratings for all of the "technical approach"
   subfactors.

   Under the past performance factor, STG received an overall rating of
   "green" or acceptable, with ratings of "green" under each subfactor, while
   BAI received an overall rating of "blue" or exceptional, with "blue"
   ratings under 3 of the 4 subfactors and a "green" rating for the remaining
   subfactor. As it relates to the protest, STG identified four contracts as
   "most relevant" to the RFP's statement of work and provided details on
   four other "relevant successes" as well. STG Proposal, Vol. II, at 4. The
   contracts identified as "most relevant" were as follows: (1) SC-19 and
   SC-31 "Presidential Helicopters Program Operations Security" (initial task
   order and follow-on contract), total value approximately $3.8 million, STG
   was a subcontractor;[2] (2) Contract GS-35F-4951H, "Program Protection
   Plan" and "Security Classification Guide," total value of $320,000, STG
   performed as a prime contractor (3) Contract GS-35F-4951H, "Classified
   Document Accountability System (CDAS)," work totaling $44,000 performed by
   [deleted] as a subcontractor; and (4) Contract GST0404BF0081, work
   totaling $940,000 performed by [deleted] as a subcontractor.

   For contract GS-35F-4951H, "Program Protection Plan" and "Security
   Classification Guide," under which STG performed as a prime contractor,
   the PPEP sought and obtained a contractor past performance questionnaire
   (CPPQ) evaluating STG's performance from the contracting officer's
   technical representative under the contract, the individual STG had
   identified as the point of contact for the contract. He evaluated STG as
   "green" or acceptable for timeliness, quality, cost control, and customer
   satisfaction. In addition, he indicated that the contract was only
   relevant to 3 of the 37 tasks set forth in the statement of work.[3]

   With regard to the other contracts listed, under which either STG or
   [deleted] had performed as subcontractors, DARPA was unable to "verify" or
   "validate" through a government source STG's or [deleted] performance
   under those contracts. Specifically, the PPEP noted that they were unable
   to obtain CPARS information regarding the firms' performance for any of
   the contracts. AR, Tab 12, PPEP Consensus Evaluation Report for STG, at 4.
   For contracts SC-19 and SC-31, while the PPEP was able to contact the
   prime contractor and confirm that STG was a subcontractor, it did not
   contact the government point of contact identified by STG. With regard to
   contract GS-35F-4951H, "Classified Document Accountability System (CDAS),"
   the record reflects that the PPEP called the government point of contact,
   but the call was not returned. Because the contract was for a very short
   duration and low dollar value (4-month performance period for $44,000) and
   was almost 5 years old, the agency did not make any further effort to
   contact the government point of contact to verify STG's performance. With
   regard to contract GST0404BF008, the PPEP sent the government point of
   contact listed in STG's proposal a CPPQ form and requested an evaluation
   of [deleted] performance under the contract. In responding to the request
   for information, the point of contact did not complete the questionnaire.
   Instead, he indicated that the work was not relevant to the work under the
   RFP. Agency Response to GAO Questions, Attach. 3.

   In evaluating STG's past performance, the record further reflects that the
   PPEP considered four additional contracts where STG had performed as a
   prime contractor. The PPEP concluded that the four contracts were relevant
   in task experience, although not relevant to the level of effort required
   under the solicitation. AR, Tab 19, PPEP Presentation to SSEB at 5.
   Specifically, despite concluding that STG had failed to provide required
   information, the PPEP considered two contracts identified by STG as
   "relevant successes"--two separate task orders under a single umbrella
   contract, one for the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and a second for the
   Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC). AR, Tab 12, PPEP Consensus
   Evaluation of STG, at 4. With respect to these task orders, the PPEP
   obtained completed CPPQs from government officials and a CPARS report for
   the ATEC contract. In addition, the PPEP considered STG's performance on
   two other contracts not identified in its proposal, also obtaining CPPQs
   completed by government officials, as well as CPARS reports. The CPPQs and
   CPARS reports provided assessments of STG's performance under these four
   contracts with respect to timeliness, quality, cost control, and customer
   satisfaction.

   Overall, the PPEP found that STG's past performance demonstrated "a
   general compliance to contract requirements and a desire to provide
   consistent customer satisfaction," STG's "submission of applicable past
   performance work taken together . . . addresses the tasks required in the
   RFP," however, STG's proposal "lacked adequate detail and was not
   complete." AR, Tab 12, PPEP Consensus Evaluation of STG, at 5. In
   addition, the PPEP indicated that STG cited only one contract that
   involved work it performed as a prime contractor, which "significantly
   limited the availability of government past performance evaluations." Id.
   Further, in the PPEP's view, the tasks under this contract suggested an
   effort that did not equate to the "size and scope of the work articulated
   in the RFP," and "[f]or some of the experience cited, the performance more
   closely amounts to analytical and assessment efforts in developing and
   assessing plans, guides, programs, etc." AR, Tab 12, PPEP Consensus
   Evaluation Report for STG, at 4.

   Under the personnel factor STG and BAI were both initially rated as
   "yellow" or marginal, principally due to the fact that many of their
   proposed personnel did not meet qualification requirements set forth in
   the RFP. DARPA determined that [deleted] of STG's 69 personnel did not
   meet the RFP's qualification requirements and that [deleted] of BAI's 69
   personnel were not qualified. Because none of the offerors met the RFP's
   qualification requirements for all 69 FTEs, and recognizing that, based on
   its knowledge of the labor market, "it is unlikely that any offeror can
   propose personnel for all 69 FTEs meeting the minimum requirements
   specified," DARPA amended the solicitation to specify that offerors
   submitting "a preponderance of resumes meeting the FTE's position
   requirements" would be evaluated as "minimally compliant" under the
   personnel factor. RFP amend. 4.

   After issuance of the amendment, DARPA held discussions with the offerors,
   including STG and BAI, during which DARPA specifically informed STG and
   BAI of the proposed personnel who were deemed unqualified and the basis
   for that determination. In response, STG and BAI both submitted revised
   proposals with revised personnel. Based on its evaluation of the revised
   personnel, DARPA rated both STG and BAI as "green" or acceptable under the
   personnel factor. In rating STG and BAI as acceptable, the TEP found that
   [deleted] of STG's 69 revised proposed personnel met the solicitation's
   stated qualification requirements and that [deleted] of the 69 individuals
   proposed by BAI met the qualification requirements.

   The evaluation teams submitted their evaluation results to the source
   selection evaluation board (SSEB), which reviewed the reports and agreed
   with all of the ratings. Based on its assessment of the proposals, the
   SSEB concluded that BAI's proposal, with an evaluated cost of $65.8
   million, was the best value. In its consideration of STG, which had a
   lower evaluated cost of $61 million, the SSEB noted that STG proposed only
   [deleted] individuals who met the RFP's qualification requirements while
   BAI proposed [deleted] and that "[m]ost of STG's experience related to
   this effort was performing small analytical and information technology
   efforts." AR, Tab 28, SSEB Report, at 9. It was the SSEB's opinion that
   "BAI's additional strengths in its technical proposal, higher rating in
   past performance, and lower overall proposal risk" outweighed BAI's
   additional cost. Id.

   The source selection authority (SSA) agreed with the SSEB's recommendation
   for award to BAI, explaining that STG's performance record was "the least
   relevant . . . in terms of the context of the work performed (more policy
   and information assurance than program security) and the role played by
   [STG] (more frequently as a sub-contractor than as a prime contractor)."
   AR, Tab 29, Source Selection Decision at 5. The SSA more specifically
   indicated that STG's cited past performance information demonstrated
   experience as a prime contractor on one contract valued at $320,000 and
   two task orders valued at $2.1 million each, while the contract to be
   awarded under the RFP had an approximate value of $12 million per year. In
   addition, the SSA noted, among other things, that STG had proposed only
   [deleted] personnel who met the RFP's qualification standards.

   Upon learning of the agency's decision to make award to BAI, and after
   receipt of a debriefing, STG filed the subject protest with our Office. In
   its protest, STG alleges that BAI engaged in an improper "bait and switch"
   by substituting less qualified personnel after award as compared to the
   more highly qualified personnel identified in its proposal, the agency
   failed to properly evaluate its proposal, and that the best value decision
   was unreasonable.

   "BAIT AND SWITCH"

   STG argues that BAI engaged in an impermissible "bait and switch" by
   substituting nine personnel identified in its proposal with less qualified
   personnel. To establish an impermissible "bait and switch,"  a protester
   must show that a firm either knowingly or negligently represented that it
   would rely on specific personnel that it did not expect to furnish during
   contract performance, and that the misrepresentation was relied on by the
   agency and had a material effect on the evaluation results. Computers
   Universal, Inc., B-292794, Nov. 18, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 201 at 3. Where
   an offeror provides firm letters of commitment and the names are submitted
   in good faith with the consent of the respective individuals, the fact
   that the offeror, after award, provides substitute personnel does not make
   the award improper. RONCO Consulting Corp., B-280113, Aug. 11, 1998, 98-2
   CPD para. 41 at 6.

   The record reflects that approximately 8 days after contract award, BAI
   requested permission from DARPA to substitute 9 of the 69 personnel whom
   BAI had proposed in its revised proposal with individuals who were
   originally proposed by BAI and found to lack the RFP's qualification
   requirements. BAI had provided supporting letters of commitment/intent
   signed by each of the nine individuals for whom substitution was proposed.
   In its letter to DARPA requesting approval of the substitution[4]--all
   personnel changes required DARPA's pre-approval--BAI explained its reasons
   for the substitutions, indicating that six of the nine personnel had
   decided to accept other employment or decided to remain with their current
   employer; in this regard, BAI noted that the contract announcement was
   delayed well beyond the original April 10 award date. Two of the nine
   requested substitutions were the result of movement of personnel within
   BAI; the record reflects that one of these substitutions was directed by
   DARPA. The final personnel substitution resulted from BAI's determination
   that it was more cost-effective to replace the proposed individual, who
   lived in California and thus required relocation expenses, with an
   incumbent employee who received a lower salary and did not require
   relocation. In its request to substitute personnel BAI further highlighted
   the need to retain incumbent employees due to the compressed transition
   period implemented by the agency.[5] Given these facts, there is no basis
   to conclude that BAI knowingly or negligently misrepresented its intent to
   furnish the nine individuals sought for substitution.[6]

   EVALUATION OF STG'S PROPOSAL

   STG challenges the agency's evaluation of its proposal under the
   personnel, past performance, and cost factors.

   Personnel

   As a general matter, under our Bid Protest Regulations, protests based on
   other than solicitation improprieties must be filed within 10 days of when
   the protester knew or should have known its bases of protest. 4 C.F.R.
   sect. 21.2(a)(2). Moreover, where a protester initially files a timely
   protest, and later supplements it with independent grounds of protest, the
   later-raised allegations must independently satisfy the timeliness
   requirements, since our Regulations do not contemplate the unwarranted
   piecemeal presentation or development of protest issues. FR
   Countermeasures Inc., B-295375, Feb. 10, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 52 at 9.

   Here, while STG generally alleged in its protest that DARPA had improperly
   found some of its personnel to be unqualified, in its September 15, 2006
   comments on the agency report STG specifically challenged, for the first
   time, DARPA's conclusion that [deleted] of its proposed personnel did not
   meet the RFP's qualification requirements.[7] The record, however,
   demonstrates that STG knew or should have known of DARPA's concerns with
   respect to these particular [deleted] personnel as a result of the
   debriefing it received from DARPA on July 26, 2006, in which DARPA
   provided to STG the names of the personnel in its proposal who were
   determined to be unqualified and the basis for that determination. See AR,
   Tab 32, STG Debriefing, Slide 16. Because STG first challenged DARPA's
   evaluation of these [deleted] individuals in its September 18 comments on
   the agency report, more than 10 days after it learned of its bases for
   protest, STG's challenges to the evaluation of its personnel are untimely.

   Moreover, where a protester, as in this case, raises a broad ground of
   protest in its initial submission but fails to provide details within its
   knowledge until later, so that a further response from the agency would be
   needed to adequately review the matter, these later, more specific
   arguments and issues cannot be considered unless they independently
   satisfy the timeliness requirements under our Bid Protest Regulations.
   Biospherics, Inc., B-285065, July 13, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 118 at 12-13.
   In this regard, we have found supplemental protest grounds untimely which
   present "examples" of flaws in the agency's evaluation generally alleged
   in the initial protest since such staggered presentation of "examples,"
   each of which involves different factual circumstances and requires a
   separate explanation from the agency, constitutes precisely the piecemeal
   presentation of issues that our timeliness rules do not permit. QualMed,
   Inc., B-257184.2, Jan. 27, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 94 at 12-13.

   Past Performance

   In challenging DARPA's evaluation of its past performance, STG principally
   argues that DARPA failed to consider those contracts where it, or its team
   member [deleted], performed as a subcontractor--specifically, contracts:
   (1) SC-19 and SC-31, (2) GS-35F-4951H, "Classified Document Accountability
   System (CDAS)," and (3) GST0404BF0081. As noted above, DARPA did not
   consider these contracts in its evaluation of S because DARPA could not
   "verify" STG's or [deleted] performance under these contracts with a
   government employee. By failing to consider these contracts, STG argues,
   DARPA effectively required government employee verification, and thereby
   established an unstated evaluation criterion. In addition, STG contends
   that the agency did not make a reasonable effort to obtain verification of
   STG's or Dynology's performance by a government employee, and that the
   resulting failure to consider these contracts was unreasonable.

   Where a solicitation requires the evaluation of offerors' past
   performance, we will only examine the agency's evaluation to ensure that
   it was both reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's evaluation
   criteria, since determining the relative merits of offerors' past
   performance information is primarily a matter within the contracting
   agency's discretion. See Metro Mach. Corp., B-295744, B-295744.2, Apr. 21,
   2005, 2005 CPD para. 112 at 21; Hanley Indus., Inc., B-295318, Feb. 2,
   2005, 2005 CPD para. 20 at 4.

   We conclude that DARPA did not employ an unstated evaluation criterion by
   discounting STG's past performance information if it could not be
   confirmed through government sources. As noted above, the RFP stated that
   an offeror's past performance would be deemed relevant only if it related
   to similar tasks performed under government contracts. Consistent with
   this definition of relevance, the RFP instructed offerors to identify the
   government point of contact for each contract the offeror identified.
   Further, the RFP expressly advised that DARPA could seek out past
   performance information from other government sources. Given this
   framework, it clearly was consistent with the RFP for the agency to limit
   its review to information obtained from government sources.

   To the extent the protester also objects to the extent of the agency's
   efforts to obtain information from government sources, we think the record
   shows that the agency's actions, described in detail above, were
   reasonable. Moreover, contrary to STG's assertions, the agency did not
   altogether disregard the contracts where STG or Dynology performed as
   subcontractors. Rather, the record reflects that these contracts were
   considered as a part of the overall assessment of STG's lack of relevant
   experience, the primary weakness attributed by the agency in its
   evaluation of STG's past performance.

   Specifically, with respect to contracts SC-19 and SC-31, one of the
   evaluators commented that these efforts were relevant to only 7 of the 37
   tasks identified in the RFP's statement of work, and another explained
   that STG's overall rating of "acceptable" was based on the description of
   the contracts contained in STG's proposal, specifically noting that STG's
   described experience related to the Presidential Helicopter Program, the
   program involved in contracts SC-19 and SC-31. AR, Tab 12, PPEP Evaluator
   Rollup for STG, at 6. The two [deleted] subcontracts were similarly
   considered to be of limited relevance--one was for a $44,000 task order
   and the other, which had a dollar value of $960,000, was assessed as not
   relevant by the government point of contact which STG had identified, as
   well as by one of the evaluators. The contract to be awarded here has a
   substantially higher dollar value, approximately $12 million per year,
   and, in concluding that STG's proposal reflected "the least relevant" past
   performance, the SSA noted the disparity in dollar value between the
   current contract and STG's other prime contracts. Further, the SSA
   specifically relied on STG's subcontracts to conclude that its past
   performance reflected a lack of relevant prime contractor experience.
   Based on this record we have no basis to conclude that the agency's
   consideration of STG's past performance was inconsistent with the RFP or
   otherwise improper.

   Cost

   STG argues that DARPA's cost realism analysis was improper. STG contends
   that DARPA applied incorrect escalation rates for its option year pricing
   for the "Program Security Representative (PSR) labor category."
   Protester's Comments at 18. According to STG, in calculating its cost of
   performance, it utilized an escalation rate of approximately [deleted]
   percent across all labor categories for the purpose of calculating its
   option year pricing. STG notes that the CPEP, in calculating STG's "risk
   adjusted cost model," generally applied STG's rate, except with respect to
   the PSR labor category, to which it applied higher rates of [deleted]
   percent in option year 1; [deleted] percent in option year 2; [deleted]
   percent in option year 3; and [deleted] percent in option year 4. STG
   maintains that absent this error, its evaluated price would have been
   reduced by more than $1 million.

   In analyzing this issue, we note that STG does not provide any discussion
   of the method it used to calculate the elements of its own cost, or the
   method utilized by DARPA to calculate STG's risk adjusted model. Rather,
   STG reaches its conclusion that DARPA applied the incorrect escalation
   rate by calculating, with respect to DARPA's risk adjusted cost for STG,
   the percentage change in the amount of the cost for the PSR positions for
   each year of the contract (base plus 4 option years). Based on this simple
   percent difference, STG concludes that DARPA's cost analysis was
   inconsistent with an escalation rate of approximately [deleted] percent,
   which STG used in proposing its cost, and which DARPA indicated it had
   applied. Utilizing STG's own method of analysis, however, it appears that,
   with respect to the PSR positions, STG in fact used an escalation rate
   substantially higher rather than the [deleted] percent it claims to have
   used in calculating its cost. For example, as reflected in STG's proposal,
   option year one reflects an escalation rate of [deleted] percent and
   option year two reflects an escalation rate of [deleted] percent. See AR,
   Tab 27, CPEP Report, Table 6, at 13. Given STG's lack of explanation on
   this issue and the fact that the analysis upon which it relies in
   attributing error to the agency is inconsistent with fundamental aspects
   of its own proposal, we have no basis to conclude that the agency's cost
   evaluation was flawed in the manner described by STG.[8]

   BEST VALUE DECISION

   As a final matter STG asserts that the agency's best value decision was
   flawed due to the alleged evaluation improprieties discussed above.
   According to STG, the decision was unreasonable because its proposal was
   lower in price and "essentially equal" to BAI's proposal, and the SSA
   failed to properly consider the strengths of its proposal.

   In a best value procurement such as this, a procuring agency properly may
   select for award a higher-rated technical proposal with a higher cost,
   where the agency determines that the cost premium is justified considering
   the technical superiority of the selected proposal. WPI, B-288998.4,
   B-288998.5, Mar. 22, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 70 at 10. DARPA performed a
   price/technical tradeoff here, as required, and reasonably concluded that
   BAI's proposal offered the best value to the government. The source
   selection report shows that the agency considered the ratings of the
   proposals and, more specifically, concluded that STG's proposal was
   inferior to BAI's proposal with respect to the past performance and
   personnel factors since STG has less relevant past performance and
   proposed fewer qualified personnel. Given that the technical factors had
   more weight in the award decision, there is no basis for objecting to the
   selection of BAI's higher-rated, higher-priced proposal.

   The protest is denied.

   Gary L. Kepplinger

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] STG expressly withdrew its allegation that DARPA failed to properly
   consider organizational conflicts of interest involving BAI. Protester's
   Comments at 2.

   [2] STG notes that the PPEP mistakenly referred to SC-19 and SC-31 as one
   contract, and explains that they were in fact two separate contracts.
   While the record in several instances refers to these contracts together,
   it further reflects that the agency understood that SC-19 and SC-31 were
   in fact separate, involving an initial task order and a follow-on
   contract.

   [3] The CPPQ provided a description of the 37 tasks required under the
   subject RFP and also described the subfactors for evaluation and defined
   the adjectival ratings to be used for their evaluation. AR, Tabs 12 and
   13, CPPQ Form.

   [4] The RFP expressly stated that "replacements for all personnel shall be
   approved by the COR [Contracting Officer's Representative] and Contracting
   Officer prior to their assumption of duties on the contract." RFP amend. 4
   para. C.9.1(b).

   [5] The RFP contemplated a 1-month "transition period" during which the
   incumbent and awardee would be under contract and performing contract
   duties. However, upon award, BAI was instructed to begin full performance
   of all contractual duties within 5 business days.

   [6] In arguing that BAI engaged in a "bait and switch," the protester
   maintains that DARPA improperly allowed BAI to substitute the nine
   individuals identified in its proposal with less qualified personnel. STG
   does not argue, and there is no indication in the record, that, at the
   time DARPA evaluated BAI's proposed personnel, DARPA's evaluation was
   inconsistent with the stated evaluation criteria, or that DARPA waived the
   RFP's personnel requirements with respect to BAI. Rather, STG bases it
   protest on DARPA's and BAI's actions during BAI's performance of the SID
   contract, specifically, DARPA's approval of BAI's request to substitute
   certain personnel identified in its proposal, with less qualified
   individuals. The propriety of this approval, however, presents a matter of
   contract administration which our Office will not review. 4 C.F.R. sect.
   21.5(a) (2006); RONCO Consulting Corp., supra, at 6.

   [7] In its initial protest, STG did specifically challenge DARPA's
   evaluation of the qualifications of one of its proposed personnel,
   however, the evaluation of this individual was not discussed by STG in its
   comments despite the fact that the agency, in its report, specifically
   addressed the evaluation of this individual. We therefore deem STG to have
   abandoned its challenge regarding DARPA's evaluation of this individual.
   Citrus College: KEI Pearson, Inc., B-293543, et al., Apr. 9, 2004, 2004
   CPD para. 104 at 8 n.4.

   [8] In a footnote to its comments, STG describes another alleged cost
   evaluation error, which STG argues improperly increased its evaluated cost
   in the amount of $172,467. Assuming STG is correct in this regard, given
   the relatively low dollar amount resulting from the alleged error, we
   conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that this difference
   would have had any effect on the award decision in this case.