TITLE: B-298411; B-298411.2, Advanced Systems Development, Inc., September 19, 2006
BNUMBER: B-298411; B-298411.2
DATE: September 19, 2006
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B-298411; B-298411.2, Advanced Systems Development, Inc., September 19, 2006

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Advanced Systems Development, Inc.

   File: B-298411; B-298411.2

   Date: September 19, 2006

   Paul E. Pompeo, Esq., Kara L. Daniels, Esq., and David J. Craig, Esq.,
   Holland & Knight LLP, for the protester.

   William L. Walsh, Jr., Esq., J. Scott Hommer, III, Esq., Peter A. Riesen,
   Esq., and Keir X. Bancroft, Esq., Venable LLP, for KENROB Information
   Technology Solutions, Inc., an intervenor.

   Andrew Blumenfeld, Esq., and Andy Bramnick, Esq., Washington Headquarters
   Services, Department of Defense, for the agency.

   Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Protester's contention that the agency conducted flawed discussions
   regarding price is sustained where (1) the agency corrected an error in
   the awardee's pricing; (2) the agency concluded that the awardee's price,
   as corrected, violated the solicitation's price target; (3) the agency
   advised the awardee in discussions that its price violated the
   solicitation's price target, though it did not, but never disclosed the
   upward adjustment it had made to correct the pricing error; (4) the
   awardee lowered its price in its final proposal, but repeated the pricing
   error it had made before; and (5) the agency selected that offeror for
   award after concluding that its significant price advantage offered the
   best value to the government. Thus, the record, as a whole, shows that the
   flawed discussions led the awardee to significantly lower its price, and
   the selection decision turned on the price differential between awardee
   and the protester.

   2. Protester's contention that the agency failed to evaluate price
   proposals for completeness is sustained where the record shows that: (1)
   the solicitation expressly advised that price proposals would be assessed
   for completeness, including an assessment of the traceability of price
   estimates, and required that offerors submit detailed pricing data showing
   the traceability of those estimates in a work breakdown structure; (2) the
   agency never performed the completeness review; and (3) it is reasonable
   to conclude that, had it not been compelled to structure its proposal to
   comply with this solicitation requirement, the protester could have
   employed a different approach to structuring its proposal which could have
   resulted in a lower price.

   3. Protester's contention that the evaluation of technical proposals was
   unreasonable is sustained where the record shows that the evaluation
   deviated from the stated evaluation criteria under one of the technical
   subfactors.

   DECISION

   Advanced Systems Development, Inc. (ASD) protests the award of a contract
   to KENROB Information Technology Solutions, Inc. by Washington
   Headquarters Services, Department of Defense (DOD), pursuant to request
   for proposals (RFP) No. HQ0034-06-R-1012, seeking information technology
   (IT) services, including hardware and software. ASD argues that the award
   to KENROB was improper because the agency conducted flawed discussions
   regarding price and performed an unreasonable price and technical
   evaluation.

   We sustain the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   Washington Headquarters Services is a field activity of the Department of
   Defense comprised of 11 directorates which provide support to the
   Secretary of Defense and other DOD activities. These activities are spread
   across the 280-acre Pentagon Reservation, as well as scattered throughout
   15 leased office buildings in Arlington, Alexandria, and Vienna, Virginia.
   Desktop IT support for these organizations and locations is currently
   provided under six separate support contracts held by five different IT
   support contractors. In addition, WHS currently operates five different IT
   help desks and four separate e-mail systems. Contracting Officer's (CO)
   Statement at 1-3.

   On March 9, 2006, WHS issued the solicitation here to consolidate these IT
   support services into a single, more efficient contract, and set aside the
   procurement for small businesses. The RFP anticipated the award of a
   performance-based services contract for a base period (of approximately 8
   months) followed by three 1-year options. RFP at 2-24, 42.[1] The RFP also
   contained three additional options, each of which contained a 2-year
   extension of performance--totaling almost 10 years of performance--to be
   awarded "if contractor performance is good/excellent." CO's Statement at
   3.

   The RFP identified six base period contract line items (CLIN) covering the
   different types of services sought here. The first five of the base period
   CLINs were repeated through the option periods; CLIN 0006, seeking a fixed
   price for IT Infrastructure Tools, was not repeated in the option
   periods.[2] With the exception of the CLINs for Surge and Special Support
   and Travel (CLINs 0002 and 0003), the RFP anticipated award of a
   fixed-price contract.

   Of relevance to this protest, the RFP provided specific instructions to
   potential offerors regarding their prices for CLINs 0001 and 0005 (and the
   option periods associated with those CLINs). First, section L of the RFP
   authorized offerors to propose an award fee pool associated with CLIN
   0001, and provided lower and upper limits on the amount of that pool.
   Specifically, the RFP advised that "[t]he contractor may propose an award
   fee pool, no less than 8% and no more than 10% of [the] proposed fixed
   price of CLIN 0001AA, in CLIN 0001AB (and corresponding option CLINs)."
   RFP at 73. Second, the same provision in section L provided "price
   targets" to offerors, based on agency budget estimates, and advised that
   the targets would increase by 1.7 percent per year. Id. This guidance is
   set forth below as it appeared in the RFP:

   CLIN                               Base Period          Annual Amount      
   0001AA plus 0001AB                 $8,1156,335[3]       $12,174,503        
   (and corresponding option CLINs)                        
   0005                               $390,873             $586,310           
   (and corresponding option CLINs)                        

   Id. at 74. In its report to our Office, the agency explained that basic
   requirements of this solicitation were identified in CLINs 0001, 0005, and
   0006, and that the agency had calculated a total estimate for the base
   period and all options of $125 million. CO's Statement at 3-4.

   To evaluate proposals to perform this work, the RFP identified three
   non-price evaluation factors--technical approach, management approach, and
   past performance--and advised that the non-price factors, when combined,
   would be significantly more important than price. RFP at 77. The RFP also
   advised that: (1) the technical approach factor would be more important
   than the management approach factor; (2) the management approach factor
   would be more important than the past performance factor; and (3) price
   would be the least important factor. Id.

   Under the technical approach evaluation factor, the RFP identified six
   subfactors: (1) enterprise services; (2) domain services; (3) initial
   transition; (4) information assurance program implementation and
   maintenance; (5) enterprise-wide configuration management; and (6)
   contractor's performance work statement and work breakdown structure. The
   solicitation advised that subfactors 1, 2, and 3 of the technical approach
   factor would be equal in importance and the most important of the
   technical subfactors; similarly, the solicitation advised that subfactors
   4, 5, and 6 would be equal in importance, but less important than the
   first three subfactors. Finally, the solicitation identified specific
   elements under the first two technical subfactors which need not be set
   forth here.

   Under the management approach factor, the RFP identified three subfactors
   of equal weight. These are: (1) program leadership; (2) human resource
   management; and (3) metrics and service level agreement reporting and
   management. Id. at 78-79.

   For both the technical and management approach evaluation factors, the
   solicitation advised that the agency would assign a merit rating
   (outstanding, excellent, acceptable, marginal, or unacceptable), and a
   confidence rating (high confidence, significant confidence, confidence,
   little confidence, or no confidence). Id. at 82-83. The solicitation
   further explained that merit ratings would be used to assess compliance
   with the requirements of the RFP, while confidence ratings would be used
   to assess the extent to which the agency concludes the offeror can do what
   it proposes. In addition, the RFP separately advised under each technical
   and management evaluation subfactor that the evaluators would "assess the
   soundness, credibility, quality and affordability of the Offeror's
   approach." RFP at 78-79.

   Under the past performance factor, the RFP advised that information
   received about an offeror's past performance would be assessed for its
   relevance and the quality of past performance. RFP amend. 1, at 2-5. To
   rate offerors under this factor, the RFP explained that each offeror would
   be assigned a confidence rating to assess "demonstrated ability to
   successfully perform the requirements of the [instant] contract based on
   how well they have performed on recent, relevant contracts." Id. at 4. The
   same confidence ratings identified above were to be assigned, with one
   difference: there was also a category of unknown confidence (UC), which
   was intended to be a neutral rating for offerors lacking relevant past
   performance. Id. at 5.

   As with the detailed instructions to offerors regarding the calculation of
   prices (set forth above), the RFP also contained detailed provisions
   related to the evaluation of prices. First, the RFP advised that price
   proposals would be evaluated for completeness and reasonableness. RFP at
   81. Completeness was defined in the RFP as an assessment of "the level of
   detail the offeror provided in cost information for all RFP requirements
   in the [Statement of Objectives] and technical documents, and assessing
   the traceability of estimates." Id. Reasonableness was to be assessed "by
   comparing the prices received in response to the RFP or comparing prices
   with other similar work." Id. Second, the RFP explained:

     For evaluation purposes, the proposed price will be calculated as
     follows:

         CLIN 0001AA  Total proposed amount for base period             
         CLIN 0001AB  Proposed award fee pool, assuming 100% award      
         CLIN 0002    The sum of each hourly rates [sic] for the five   
                      highest priced proposed labor categories times    
                      200 hours (e.g., labor category 1 x 200 hours +   
                      labor category 2 x 200 hours + labor category 3 x 
                      200 hours + labor category 4 x 200 hours + labor  
                      category 5 x 200 hours)                           
         CLIN 0003    Not included in calculation                       
         CLIN 0004    Not included in calculation                       
         CLIN 0005    Total proposed amount for base period             
         CLIN 0006    Total proposed amount                             
         Option CLINs Calculated similarly to corresponding base period 
                      CLINs                                             

   RFP amend. 2, at 6.

   By the April 12 initial closing date, the agency received five proposals,
   including those submitted by the awardee and protester here. The
   technical/management proposals were evaluated by a proposal evaluation
   board (PEB), which ultimately prepared a consensus report (the PEB Report)
   that was used to brief the source selection authority (SSA). At the same
   time, price proposals were evaluated by the Cost Team. The results of the
   review by the PEB and Cost Team were presented to the SSA, who decided
   that only the proposals submitted by ASD and KENROB should be retained in
   the competitive range. CO's Statement at 48. The results of the initial
   evaluation of these two proposals are set forth below:

                           INITIAL EVALUATION RESULTS

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                           |         ASD          |       KENROB        |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Technical Approach         |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |                           |                      |                     |
   |Factor -- Overall          |                      |                     |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Enterprise Services        |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Domain Services            |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Initial Transition Plan    |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Information Assurance      |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Configuration Mgmt.        |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Contractor's Perf. Work    |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |                           |                      |                     |
   |Statement and Work         |                      |                     |
   |                           |                      |                     |
   |Breakdown Statement        |                      |                     |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Management Approach        |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |                           |                      |                     |
   |Factor -- Overall          |                      |                     |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Program Leadership         |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Human Resources            |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Perf. Measurement          |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Past Performance           |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Price                      |  [deleted] million   |  [deleted] million  |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   CO's Statement at 26, 56.

   In order to evaluate KENROB's initial price proposal, it was necessary for
   the Cost Team to make a judgment about an error in the proposal. As quoted
   above, the RFP advised offerors that the price for CLIN 0004 would not be
   included in the calculation to determine total evaluated price. This
   provision in the RFP's evaluation scheme followed guidance in the agency's
   Industry Day presentation (held before the submission of offers) that CLIN
   0004 was not to be separately priced, although this instruction was not
   repeated in the RFP's Schedule B. Compare AR at 183 (the Industry Day
   slides) with RFP at 3 (CLIN 0004), 73-75 (instructions on preparing price
   proposals). Apparently forgetting the Industry Day instructions, KENROB
   priced CLIN 0004, and was the only offeror to do so. In response, the
   agency's Cost Team decided to correct the error by adding KENROB's price
   for CLIN 0004 ([deleted]) to its price for CLIN 0001 ([deleted]) to
   calculate a new total price for CLIN 0001 ([deleted]). CO's Statement at
   48. Having done so, however, the Cost Team noticed that its remedial
   action caused KENROB's price for CLIN 0001 to exceed the budget estimate
   for that CLIN established by the RFP ($8,156,335) by [deleted], or
   approximately [deleted] percent. Id.

   By letters dated May 10, the CO notified both ASD and KENROB that their
   proposals had been included in the competitive range. In addition the
   letters included an attachment advising each offeror of all of the
   weaknesses, significant weaknesses, and deficiencies that had been
   identified in that company's proposal. With respect to the pricing matter
   described above, the letter to KENROB advised that "[t]he Offeror's price
   for CLIN 0001 and corresponding first option item exceeds the target
   budget amount by [deleted]% and [deleted]%, respectively." AR at 1865.[4]
   The letter did not remind KENROB that the agency had asked offerors during
   the Industry Day Briefing not to enter a separate price for CLIN 0004, nor
   did the letter advise that the agency had corrected KENROB's error by
   adding its CLIN 0004 price to its CLIN 0001 price to calculate a new CLIN
   0001 price.

   In contrast, ASD's pricing for CLIN 001 did not exceed the target amount;
   however, ASD's proposal did exceed the RFP's target for CLIN 0005. In the
   May 10 letter to ASD, the agency attempted to advise the company of this
   matter, but included a typographical error in its reference to the CLIN.
   Thus, the letter to ASD stated that "[t]he price for CLIN 0006 (and
   corresponding option items) consistently exceeded the target budget." AR
   at 1563. Upon receipt of the letter, ASD noted that there was no target
   budget for CLIN 0006 in the solicitation and contacted the CO for
   clarification; the CO confirmed that the letter should have referenced
   CLIN 0005. CO's Statement at 49. The CO also explains that during this
   same conversation, ASD expressed concern about whether its proposed price
   for CLIN 0001 exceeded the budget, and the CO advised ASD that any item
   not specifically identified in the discussions letter was considered
   acceptable by the agency.[5] Id. Finally, the May 10 discussions letter to
   ASD and KENROB both contained the following guidance regarding revisions
   to their respective proposals:

     You may revise any portion of your original proposal, or nothing at all.
     If you decide to make no revisions to any portion of your proposal, you
     must submit a written statement by the deadline above stating that your
     original proposal dated 12 April 2006 is your final proposal. Since no
     further discussions will be allowed, [it is] critical that you conform
     to these directions and facilitate understanding by ensuring
     traceability from your original proposal to the [final proposal
     revision]. It is your responsibility to mark all changes in the manner
     described in this memo to indicate where you have made revisions from
     your basic proposal.

   AR at 1559 (Letter to ASD); AR at 1705 (Letter to KENROB).

   By the final closing date of May 17, both ASD and KENROB submitted revised
   proposals. The results of the final evaluation were summarized and
   presented to the SSA in the same format as the initial evaluation results,
   and are set forth below.

                            FINAL EVALUATION RESULTS

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                           |         ASD          |       KENROB        |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Technical Approach         |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |                           |                      |                     |
   |Factor -- Overall          |                      |                     |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Enterprise Services        |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Domain Services            |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Initial Transition Plan    |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Information Assurance      |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Configuration Mgmt.        |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Contractor's Perf. Work    |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |                           |                      |                     |
   |Statement and Work         |                      |                     |
   |                           |                      |                     |
   |Breakdown Statement        |                      |                     |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Management Approach        |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |                           |                      |                     |
   |Factor -- Overall          |                      |                     |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Program Leadership         |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Human Resources            |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Perf. Measurement          |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Past Performance           |      [deleted]       |      [deleted]      |
   |---------------------------+----------------------+---------------------|
   |Price                      |    $135.6 million    |   $124.3 million    |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   CO's Statement at 50.

   KENROB's ratings from the initial to the final evaluation were increased
   under two of the subfactors under the technical approach
   factor--enterprise services (from [deleted] to [deleted]), and
   contractor's performance work statement and work breakdown structure (from
   [deleted] to [deleted]). There was no change, however, to KENROB's rating
   under the technical approach factor overall, which remained at [deleted].
   Under the performance measurement subfactor of the management approach
   factor, KENROB's rating was increased from [deleted] to [deleted], but
   again, there was no change to the overall rating under the management
   approach factor. There also was no change to KENROB's rating under the
   past performance evaluation factor, but the company lowered its total
   evaluated price from [deleted] million to $124.3 million. CO's Statement
   at 26, 51.

   ASD's ratings from the initial to the final evaluation were increased
   under four of the subfactors under the technical approach factor--domain
   services (from [deleted] to [deleted]), initial transition plan (from
   [deleted] to [deleted]), information assurance services (from [deleted] to
   [deleted]), and contractor's performance work statement and work breakdown
   structure (from [deleted] to [deleted]). This led to an increased rating
   under the technical approach factor overall (from [deleted] to [deleted]).
   Under the performance measurement subfactor of the management approach
   factor, ASD's rating was increased from [deleted] to [deleted], but no
   change was made to ASD's overall rating for the management approach
   factor. There was also no change to ASD's rating under the past
   performance evaluation factor, but the company slightly lowered its total
   evaluated price from [deleted] million to [deleted] million. CO's
   Statement at 26, 57-59.

   In looking at the final evaluation results, the SSA concluded that
   KENROB's and ASD's proposals were essentially equal under the most
   important evaluation factor, technical approach, and that ASD's proposal
   under the management approach factor was only slightly better than
   KENROB's. Source Selection Decision Memorandum, May 24, 2006, at 17. The
   remainder of the SSA's analysis focused on differences in the proposals as
   assessed under the human resources management subfactor of the management
   approach factor, past performance, and price. Specifically, the SSA
   stated:

     The distinguishing subfactor was Human Resources Management where ASD
     received [deleted] rating while KENROB received [deleted] rating. ASD's
     [deleted] rating is attributed to the proposal for [deleted] reducing
     the risk to both the Government and the Contractor during transition.
     KENROB's lower merit rating results because their approach simply met
     the requirements with no identified strengths. Their lower confidence
     rating is due to what the PEB perceives is a low staffing level, which
     reduced confidence in KENROB's chances for successful performance. But,
     in my assessment, I considered that the resultant contract would be
     performance-based. KENROB will be held to performance standards that are
     results driven and not dependent on a particular level of effort. KENROB
     will have to provide whatever level of staffing is required to achieve
     the AQLs [acceptable quality levels]. ASD's past performance record
     resulted in a higher confidence rating, but KENROB's past performance
     leaves me with little doubt that they can perform successfully on this
     contract.

   Id. Based on the analysis above, the SSA ultimately concluded that
   KENROB's significantly lower price ($124.3 million versus ASD's price of
   $135.6 million) made it the proposal that offered the best value to the
   government. Id.

   On May 25, a contract was awarded to KENROB, and on June 9, the agency
   provided ASD with a debriefing. Five days later, on June 14, ASD filed the
   protest here, which was supplemented on July 10.

   DISCUSSION

   In its initial and supplemental protests, ASD argues that the agency held
   flawed discussions regarding price, and performed an unreasonable
   evaluation of the price and technical proposals. We agree.

   Meaningful Discussions

   In arguing that the agency failed to hold proper discussions, ASD raises
   several contentions. Specifically, ASD argues that: (1) it was unfair for
   the agency to point out the percentage by which KENROB's prices exceeded
   the CLIN 0001 target price, but not similarly point out the percentage by
   which ASD's price exceeded the RFP's target price for CLIN 0005; (2) the
   CO unfairly told ASD during a telephone conversation that it could not
   make changes to its final proposal except on matters that were raised
   during discussions; and (3) it was unfair to tell KENROB that its CLIN
   0001 prices exceeded the RFP target prices for CLIN 0001, when, in fact,
   they did not.

   WHS responds that: (1) there was nothing unreasonable about advising
   KENROB about the percentage by which its prices exceeded the RFP's CLIN
   0001 target, while only telling ASD that its CLIN 0005 price exceeded the
   CLIN 0005 target; (2) the CO did not tell ASD that it could not lower its
   price in its final proposal, and even if she had, it was unreasonable for
   ASD to rely on such a statement when the discussions letter clearly
   advised both offerors they could revise any portion of their initial
   proposal they wished; and (3) its actions to correct KENROB's pricing
   error were reasonable, and it was reasonable to advise KENROB that its
   price, as corrected, exceeded the RFP's target price.

   Before turning to the areas where we agree with ASD, we note that, as a
   general matter, agencies have broad discretion to determine the content
   and extent of discussions, and we limit our review of the agency's
   judgments in this area to a determination of whether they are reasonable.
   Creative Info. Techs., Inc., B-293073.10, Mar. 16, 2005, 2005 CPD
   para. 110 at 7. In this regard, we see nothing unfair about telling one
   offeror that its price exceeded the RFP's target amount, while telling
   another the percentage by which its price exceeded the target, when the
   target information is readily available in the RFP and either offeror
   could easily ascertain for itself the actual amount by which its price
   exceeded the target. We also disagree with ASD's contention that it was
   misled during a telephone conversation with the CO who allegedly advised
   ASD that its changes to its final proposal should be limited to areas
   raised in the discussions letter. The unambiguous written direction in the
   discussions letter advising offerors they could revise any portion of
   their proposals takes precedence over any perceived contradictory
   direction in an oral conversation. See Peckham Vocational Indus., Inc.,
   B-257100, Aug. 26, 1994, 94-2 CPD para. 81 at 8.[6]

   We turn next, however, to the area where we are troubled by the agency's
   discussions--the statement to KENROB that its CLIN 0001 price exceeded the
   RFP's target, when, in actuality, it did not. Federal Acquisition
   Regulation (FAR) sect. 15.306(e) specifies that discussions may not be
   conducted in a manner which "[f]avors one offeror over another." Here, we
   think the series of actions by the agency--(1) correcting an error in
   KENROB's pricing; (2) concluding--based on a correction about which KENROB
   was never informed--that KENROB's price, as adjusted, violated the price
   target in the RFP; (3) advising KENROB during discussions that its price
   for CLIN 0001 exceeded the RFP's target amount (when on its face it did
   not); (4) receiving from KENROB a final proposal that made significant
   reductions in its already under-target CLIN 0001 price, but continued to
   contain a price for CLIN 0004 (which again had to be added to CLIN 0001 to
   determine its price for that CLIN); and (5) making award to KENROB, in
   essence, because of its significantly lower price--was unfair and
   prejudicial to ASD. Our basis for these conclusions is set forth below.

   As explained above, the RFP here identified "price targets" for offerors
   to use in calculating the prices for CLINs 0001 and 0005 (and in
   calculating the prices for the corresponding option CLINs); these target
   amounts were stated for both CLINs for both the base period (approximately
   8 months) and in an "annual amount." RFP at 73. As also explained above,
   offerors were instructed during the agency's Industry Day presentation
   that they were not to separately price CLIN 0004, AR at 183, and were
   advised in the RFP that CLIN 0004 would not be included in the calculation
   to determine an offeror's total evaluated price. RFP amend. 2, at 6.

   Despite these instructions, KENROB's initial proposal included a price for
   CLIN 0004; no other offeror included a price for this CLIN. When the
   agency Cost Team encountered KENROB's price for CLIN 0004 (which,
   according to schedule B, was to cover data deliverables, RFP at 193), the
   team added KENROB's CLIN 0004 price to its CLIN 0001 price to arrive at a
   new CLIN 0001 price of [deleted]. It was this agency-calculated CLIN 0001
   price that exceeded the target identified in the RFP, not the price for
   CLIN 0001 found in KENROB's initial proposal.

   The agency's discussions letter to KENROB makes no mention of the remedial
   action taken by the Cost Team to calculate a new price for KENROB for CLIN
   0001. Instead, the letter's advice on this topic, in its entirety, was:
   "The offeror's price for CLIN 0001 and corresponding first option item
   exceeds the target budget amount by [deleted]% and [deleted]%
   respectively." AR at 1865.

   In the cover letter submitted with its final proposal revisions, KENROB
   responded to the agency's discussions question as follows:

     The evaluation team's comment on our pricing caused the KENROB Team to
     reevaluate this portion of our submission, and we think you will be
     pleased with the results. In addition to ensuring that we do not exceed
     the identified budget thresholds, we have evaluated and amended pricing
     for the remaining option years.

   AR at 1707. The cross-reference matrix appended to the final proposal
   cover letter further highlights the expansive scope of the actions taken
   by the company in response to the discussion question quoted above. Among
   other things, the letter explained:

     --Team KENROB is discounting previously proposed KENROB Direct Labor
     Costs by [deleted]% for all Labor CLINs (both Base and Option Years).

     --Team KENROB is discounting previously proposed NG-TASC Direct Labor
     Costs by [deleted]% for all Labor CLINs (both Base and Option Years).

     --Team KENROB is discounting previously proposed PESystems Direct Labor
     Costs by [deleted]% for all Labor CLINs (both Base and Option Years).

     --Team KENROB is reducing Award Fee from [deleted]% to [deleted]% for
     both Base and Option Years.

   AR at 1711. Tellingly, KENROB's final proposal did not correct the error
   in its initial proposal of providing a price for CLIN 0004. Thus, the Cost
   Team was required again to add KENROB's CLIN 0004 price to its CLIN 0001
   price to determine the total price for CLIN 0001, and to determine whether
   that price complied with the budget target identified in the RFP.

   As an initial matter, we question whether there was any reasonable basis
   on which to determine what KENROB's intended price for CLIN 0001 was,
   either before or after discussions. In this regard, while KENROB included
   its price for CLIN 0004 (and the corresponding option CLINs) in its price
   total, there is no indication that KENROB meant to include its CLIN 0004
   price in CLIN 0001. On the contrary, KENROB's approach to calculating its
   award fee strongly suggests that KENROB did not mean to do so. As noted
   above, the RFP here advised offerors that they could propose an award fee,
   under sub-CLIN 0001AB, of "no less than 8% and no more than 10%" (RFP at
   73), of the proposed price of sub-CLIN 0001AA. The prices for sub-CLINs
   0001AA and 0001AB added together generated an offeror's total price for
   CLIN 0001. RFP at 2. In its initial offer, KENROB proposed an award fee
   that was [deleted] percent of sub-CLIN 0001AA (KENROB's price for sub-CLIN
   0001AA was [deleted], its award fee in sub-CLIN 0001AB was [deleted]). AR
   at 674. If KENROB understood that its initial CLIN 0004 price of
   [deleted], AR at 675, was to be added to its price for CLIN 0001AA,
   KENROB's intended [deleted] percent award fee would have been higher.
   Further, the agency's assumption regarding KENROB's intended price was not
   confirmed by KENROB's response to the discussions letter--KENROB continued
   to propose a price for CLIN 0004, and continued to calculate its award fee
   in CLIN 0001AB without regard to the costs that should have been included
   in that calculation.

   In short, the record strongly suggests that KENROB never understood that
   the agency had added its CLIN 0004 price to its CLIN 0001 price to
   implement the instructions provided to offerors during the Industry Day
   Briefing.[7] As a result, based on the record here, it is in fact unclear
   what KENROB's intended price for CLIN 0001 was. This ambiguity raises a
   serious question as to whether KENROB's proposal properly could be
   selected for award. See Marine Pollution Control Corp., B-270172, Feb. 13,
   1996, 96-1 para. 73 at 2-3 (requirement for fixed prices is a material
   term of an RFP requiring such pricing, and a proposal that does not offer
   fixed prices cannot be accepted for award).

   With regard to this issue, WHS and KENROB argue that ASD cannot claim to
   have been prejudiced by these discussions. While WHS correctly points out
   that our Office will not sustain a protest unless the protester
   demonstrates that, but for the agency's actions, it would have had a
   substantial chance of receiving the award, McDonald-Bradley, B-270126,
   Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at 3; see Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher,
   103 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996), we do not agree that the protester
   was not prejudiced here. First, to the extent that the agency and
   intervenor argue that the impact of the discussions was not material
   because the issues raised concerned only the prices proposed for the base
   period and first full year option period, we find the argument
   unpersuasive. The RFP here expressly states that the target amounts apply
   not only to CLINs 0001 and 0005, but to the corresponding option CLINs.
   RFP at 74. In addition, KENROB's final proposal clearly indicates that it
   has reflected the reductions taken in response to the discussions question
   throughout all the option periods. AR at 1711.

   We also think there is a broader answer to the agency's and intervenor's
   claim that there was no prejudice as a result of these discussions. Simply
   put, any fair reading of the KENROB final proposal leads to the conclusion
   that the significant reductions in KENROB's total price followed directly
   from the agency's statement during discussions that its price for CLIN
   0001 and the corresponding option item exceeded the budget estimates set
   out in the RFP. See AR at 1707, 1711. We cannot know, and will not
   speculate about, what KENROB would have done if it properly was told the
   basis for the agency's conclusion that its CLIN 0001 price exceeded the
   RFP's target amount. Given that the only likely outcome of telling KENROB
   (inaccurately) that its price for CLIN 0001 exceeded the target amounts
   for that CLIN was the lowering of KENROB's prices, and given that the
   selection decision here ultimately turned on the price differential
   between these two offerors,[8] we think that the flawed discussions with
   KENROB resulted in prejudice to ASD because they caused KENROB to
   significantly lower its price and in effect secure award for KENROB.

   The Price Evaluation

   ASD next argues that the agency abandoned the price evaluation scheme
   identified in the RFP by not performing one of the two prongs of the price
   evaluation--i.e., by not performing a review of price completeness. As
   indicated above, the RFP here advised offerors that price proposals would
   be evaluated to determine if they were complete and reasonable. The
   evaluation section of the RFP also explained the nature of the intended
   completeness review: "Completeness is evaluated to assess the level of
   detail the offeror provided in cost information for all RFP requirements
   in the [Statement of Objectives] and technical documents, and assessing
   the traceability of estimates." RFP at 81.

   The indication that the agency would conduct an evaluation of price
   completeness did not occur in a vacuum. Section L of the RFP provided
   detailed instructions to offerors about the level of information they
   should include in their price proposals. Among other things, the RFP
   required submission of a "person loading schedule," broken down by work
   breakdown structure; back-up estimate sheets for the person loading
   schedule, also organized by work breakdown structure format; a schedule of
   hours by labor skill mix; a schedule of fully-burdened hourly labor rates;
   and a list of proposed probable subcontractors showing price and hours for
   each. RFP at 74-75; RFP amend. 2, at 5.

   During the debriefing, ASD asked if the agency had reviewed the requested
   level of detail in the price proposals for completeness, or to assess the
   traceability of the price estimates. According to ASD, the agency's
   representative admitted that no such review was done, and stated that the
   agency "asked for too much price information in the solicitation."
   Protester's Comments, Aug. 9, 2006, exh. 1 at 3.

   In its report to our Office, the agency complains that ASD does not argue
   that KENROB failed to provide the requested information, or that KENROB's
   information was incomplete, but ASD argues only that the review was not
   performed. Agency Memorandum of Law, July 28, 2006, at 3. In addition, the
   agency asserts that it did look at completeness, pointing to a comment on
   a slide in the PEB's report to the SSA indicating that ASD's proposal
   "appears to be complete." AR at 1976. Similarly, there is a comment--on
   the same slide--indicating that KENROB's price proposal "appears to be
   complete" with the exception of AQL measuring tools. Id. There is no other
   document in the record to support the agency's claim that it conducted an
   analysis to assess, among other things, "the traceability of estimates."
   RFP at 81.

   In our view, the record here lacks any persuasive evidence that the agency
   examined the completeness of the offerors' price proposals as called for
   by the RFP. We note that the solicitation here did not merely use the term
   "completeness" in setting out the parameters of the price evaluation, but
   explained, in detail, that the agency planned to evaluate completeness,
   and identified the kind of back-up pricing data that offerors needed to
   produce for the agency's evaluation; the agency's failure to conduct this
   review was clearly contrary to the solicitation's requirements. See
   OMNIPLEX World Servs. Corp., B-291105, Nov. 6, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 199 at
   10.

   In response to the agency's and intervenor's assertion that ASD was not
   prejudiced by any failure to analyze the completeness of price proposals,
   ASD argues that it spent significant resources to ensure that its prices
   were properly supported and that its estimates were traceable to the work
   breakdown structure. ASD also argues that  had it not been compelled by
   the solicitation's requirement to build traceable cost estimates by work
   breakdown structure, it "would have employed a different approach to
   structuring its proposal, which may have resulted in a lower proposed
   price." Protester's Comments, Aug. 9, 2006, at 18.

   We find that ASD has made a sufficient showing of prejudice  as a result
   of the agency's failure to evaluate the completeness of price proposals.
   By requesting in the solicitation that offerors provide detailed
   information showing how their price estimates were devised, and by
   advising them in the evaluation scheme that these estimates would be
   reviewed, WHS required offerors to be sure that their price proposals
   contained detailed and traceable estimates for all of the work involved.
   An RFP's stated evaluation scheme is the starting point for the
   development of proposals, and we think it is reasonable to assume that
   offerors, such as ASD, may have structured their proposals differently if
   they had known that the agency would not be assessing costs for
   traceability. See Rockwell Elec. Commerce Corp., B-286201 et al., Dec. 14,
   2000, 2001 CPD para. 65 at 9. Given the closeness of the evaluation
   results, and given that the award decision ultimately was largely driven
   by price, we think the agency and intervenor cannot convincingly claim
   that the failure to conduct the promised review here had no impact on the
   award decision.

   Evaluation of Non-price Factors

   ASD argues that the agency's evaluation of KENROB's technical proposal was
   unreasonable under five separate evaluation subfactors--four subfactors
   under the technical approach evaluation factor, and one under the
   management approach factor. The technical approach subfactors under which
   ASD contends that KENROB's proposal was unreasonably evaluated are: (1)
   enterprise services, (2) domain services, (3) initial transition plan, and
   (4) contractor performance work statement and work breakdown structure.
   Under the management approach evaluation factor, ASD contends it was
   unreasonably evaluated under the metrics and service level agreement
   reporting and management subfactor. In addition, ASD argues that the
   agency technical evaluators unreasonably failed to evaluate the
   affordability of technical proposals, despite an indication in the
   solicitation's evaluation scheme that they would do so.

   Our standard in reviewing a protester's challenges to an agency's
   evaluation of proposals is to examine the record to determine whether the
   agency's judgment was reasonable and consistent with stated evaluation
   criteria, and with applicable statutes and regulations. ESCO, Inc.,
   B-225565, Apr. 29, 1987, 87-1 CPD para. 450 at 7. After reviewing all of
   ASD's challenges to the evaluation of the technical and management
   proposals, we find that under one of the technical subfactors, initial
   transition plan, the agency evaluators deviated from the stated evaluation
   scheme; we disagree with ASD on the remainder of its challenges.

   As set forth above, the technical evaluation factor here identified six
   subfactors, the first three of which were equally weighted and more
   important than the second three, which were also equally weighted. One of
   the first group of three equally weighted and more important subfactors
   was an assessment of a proposal's initial transition plan. In this regard,
   the RFP advised potential offerors that the agency would "assess the
   soundness, credibility, quality and affordability of the Offeror's
   approach for achieving [Statement of Objectives] 6.0." RFP at 78.

   The Statement of Objectives guidance to potential offerors regarding the
   initial transition period was directed towards ensuring continuity of
   performance during the first 30 days after the beginning of performance.
   Specifically, this guidance, in its entirety, stated:

     Ensure all existing and applicable services and support are successfully
     transitioned from existing WHS incumbent contractors to the WITS [WHS
     Information Technology Support] Contractor within 30-days after
     notice-to-proceed on the contract in accordance with the Contractor's
     Initial Transition Plan. Ensure no significant disruptions to user
     services and support occur during the transition period. During the
     initial 30-day transition period, the WITS Contractor is fully
     accountable and responsible for successful performance of all objectives
     and requirements on the contract.

   AR at 340-41. In addition, section L of the RFP asked that offerors use
   this portion of their proposal to "clearly describe the specific actions
   you will accomplish in the first 30 days to achieve a non-disruptive
   transition of responsibilities from incumbent WHS contractors to the WITS
   contract." RFP at 72.

   KENROB's initial transition plan both addressed the steps it would take
   during the initial 30 days, and contained a significant discussion of
   things it would do after that time. See AR at 643-49. The agency
   evaluators assessed KENROB's transition plan as [deleted], and the
   following comments regarding the plan were included in the Source
   Selection Decision Memorandum:

     KENROB's Initial Transition Plan was thorough and addressed all normal
     transition issues as well as clearly defining when the transition
     process is complete and implementation begins. In addition, they
     described an excellent approach to transfer knowledge from incumbent
     employees and a methodical approach to transition from the current
     environment of [deleted]. KENROB's Initial Transition Plan contained
     significant detail and presented sound approaches for the various
     aspects of transition. Their proposal demonstrated an excellent
     understanding of the project and a sound approach leaving me certain
     that KENROB could successfully perform the proposed effort with little
     Government intervention.

   Source Selection Decision Memorandum at 4-5 (emphasis added).

   ASD argues that the agency's glowing evaluation of KENROB's initial
   transition plan focuses, in part, on matters that were not to begin until
   approximately 120 days after receipt of the notice to proceed--i.e., the
   transition from [deleted]. See AR at 647-48. Not only do we agree, but the
   agency concedes that it should not have assessed the transition from
   [deleted] under this subfactor, as this transition was part of KENROB's
   method of performance, not part of its plan for the first 30 days. Agency
   Memorandum of Law at 36. Nonetheless, the agency argues that ASD cannot
   claim to be prejudiced as a result of this error in the agency's
   evaluation, because KENROB's initial transition plan contained other
   strengths that still would have merited the rating of [deleted].

   We think ASD can reasonably claim prejudice as a result of the agency's
   admitted error in the evaluation of the initial transition subfactor.
   First, there is no way to ascertain from the record, at this juncture, if
   the agency would have rated KENROB's proposal [deleted] without reliance
   on the information about the later-scheduled transition from [deleted]. We
   give little weight to the agency's argument that this rating would not
   have changed when raised, as here, in the heat of litigation. See USA
   Fabrics, Inc., B-295737, B-295737.2 Apr. 19, 2005, 2005 CPD 82 at 6;
   Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997,
   97-2 CPD para. 91 at 15. Moreover, the record here shows that ASD also
   received a rating of [deleted] confidence under this subfactor. If the
   agency were to conclude that KENROB's rating should have only been
   [deleted], the SSA might have used that difference in ratings to
   distinguish between these proposals, instead of finding them essentially
   equal under the technical factor. As a result, we conclude that ASD has
   made an adequate showing of prejudice, and we sustain this basis of ASD's
   challenge to the agency's evaluation.

   Our review of the protester's remaining challenges to the technical
   evaluation leads us to conclude that several of them arise from the same
   operative facts and none of them states a basis for concluding that the
   agency's evaluation was unreasonable. For example, under the contractor's
   performance work statement (CPWS) and work breakdown statement (WBS)
   subfactor of the technical evaluation factor (hereinafter, the "CPWS/WBS
   subfactor"), ASD argues that the agency unreasonably raised KENROB's
   rating in the final evaluation. Under this subfactor, KENROB's proposal
   initially was assessed [deleted]; in the final evaluation, the proposal's
   rating rose to [deleted]. The basis for the agency's decision to raise
   KENROB's rating in this area is set forth in detail below.

   The initial evaluation of the KENROB proposal identified one significant
   strength and one deficiency under the CPWS/WBS subfactor. Specifically,
   the evaluators noted that KENROB was offering to staff its [deleted], and
   considered this a significant strength of the proposal. On the other hand,
   the evaluators also concluded that the PWS portion of KENROB's proposal
   simply repeated the language of the Statement of Objectives and did not
   contain a technical description of the work to be performed. AR at 1505.
   Because of the deficiency noted, the initial proposal was rated [deleted]
   under this subfactor.

   The noted deficiency was pointed out to KENROB during discussions, and its
   final proposal offered sufficient detail to address the evaluator's
   concerns. ASD does not challenge this conclusion. On the other hand, the
   evaluators noted that KENROB had significantly reduced the number of hours
   it was offering to staff its [deleted]--from [deleted], to [deleted]. AR
   at 2353. In addition, the record shows that several of the individual
   evaluators were concerned about this reduction and at least one wrote
   notes suggesting that the reduction in hours "qualifies at least as a
   significant weakness." AR at 2354.

   In the materials prepared by the evaluators for the SSA, the evaluators
   left intact the comment identifying KENROB's initial proposed approach of
   staffing [deleted], but struck a line through the comment. The materials
   for the SSA did not include any explanation of the amount by which the
   hours had been reduced; they also indicated that the previous deficiency
   had been addressed, and that there were no weaknesses in the final
   proposal. AR at 1951-52. As a result, KENROB's rating in this area was
   raised from [deleted] to [deleted]--an increase of two rating levels.

   ASD argues that comments reflected in a report prepared by the evaluators,
   labeled "KENROB Caucus," AR 2351-58 (but referred to by the parties as the
   "Caucus Report"), do not support the ultimate conclusions reflected in the
   briefing for the SSA, and do not support raising KENROB's score by two
   rating levels given the significant reduction in the number of hours
   proposed for KENROB's [deleted]. ASD also contends that the concerns about
   the final KENROB proposal were not adequately presented to the selection
   official.

   The agency responds that there was nothing unreasonable about the changes
   it made to KENROB's final rating under this subfactor, and that it did not
   fail to advise the SSA of the significant changes made by KENROB to its
   proposed proposal. It notes first that the Caucus Report relied upon by
   ASD in its arguments was not a consensus document, but was simply a
   compilation of all of the evaluators' individual views. In addition, it
   argues that its approach of striking a line through the significant
   strength identified in the initial proposal served the purpose of flagging
   the matter, and that the matter was discussed with the selection official
   during the briefing. CO's Statement at 52. Finally, the agency contends
   that since KENROB addressed the previously identified deficiency, and
   since there was no minimum requirement for the number of hours an offeror
   proposed [deleted], there was nothing unreasonable about the PEB's
   consensus conclusion, reflected in the briefing for the SSA, that the
   final proposal should be rated [deleted].

   We have reviewed all of the materials cited by the protester in the record
   here, and we agree with the agency. First, our review of the Caucus Report
   provided in the record leads us to conclude that the views expressed there
   are the views of individual evaluators about the changes they have seen
   from the initial to the final proposal; the views quoted by ASD do not
   appear to be consensus views. In addition, there is no requirement that
   each of the individual evaluator views must be reflected in the briefing
   for the selection official. The overriding concern in the evaluation
   process is that the final results accurately reflect the actual merits of
   the proposals, not that they be mechanically traceable back to the
   isolated comments or ratings of individual evaluators. Manufacturing Eng'g
   Sys., Inc., B-293299.3, B-293299.4, Aug. 3, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 194 at 6.

   Finally, we are not convinced by ASD's arguments that the approach used by
   the evaluators to brief the SSA resulted in obscuring the ways in which
   the assessments of the initial and final proposals changed. While the
   protester, and even our Office, might have found a narrative consensus
   report easier to review, we see nothing unreasonable about the approach of
   reflecting the changes from the initial to the final proposal on the
   briefing slides prepared for the selection official. In addition, we find
   credible the CO's representation that the approach generated discussion
   during the briefing for the SSA. Moreover, the agency points out that
   there seems to be very little difference in the hours ultimately proposed
   by KENROB for [deleted] services and those proposed by ASD, which also
   received a rating of [deleted] under this subfactor. Agency Memorandum of
   Law, July 28, 2006, at 28-30.

   In terms of the other challenges to the technical evaluation raised by
   ASD, most follow the same pattern as above. Specifically, ASD points to
   unfavorable comments in the Caucus Report, suggests that the comments are
   consensus views, and argues that the ultimate rating reflected in the
   briefing for the SSA is inconsistent with those views. We find nothing
   about these arguments that leads us to conclude that the evaluation here
   was unreasonable, other than our conclusion above regarding the evaluation
   of KENROB under the initial transition plan subfactor.

   Finally, ASD argues that the agency abandoned the evaluation scheme by not
   assessing affordability under each of the technical and management
   subfactors. In this regard, we note that the RFP indicates under each
   technical and management subfactor that the agency "will assess the
   soundness, credibility, quality and affordability of the Offeror's
   approach." RFP at 78-79. In response, the agency makes no credible
   argument that its technical evaluators (as opposed to the Cost Team)
   undertook a review of affordability, as the RFP stated it would. The
   agency argues, however, that ASD cannot claim to be prejudiced as a result
   of any failure in this area.

   We agree with the agency on the question of prejudice. While agencies
   should not include in their evaluation schemes reviews they do not intend
   to undertake, we can see no prejudice to ASD resulting from a failure of
   the non-price evaluators to conduct a review of affordability. At best,
   ASD asserts only that if the stated scheme had not referenced
   affordability it "likely would have structured its proposal differently
   and taken greater pricing risks." Protester's Comments, Aug. 9, 2006,
   at 53. Unlike the agency's abandoned assessment of "completeness" in the
   price evaluation--where offerors were required to provide pricing
   information sufficient to establish traceability to the work breakdown
   statement--we think there is no reasonable chance that ASD was harmed by
   the failure of the technical evaluators to assess affordability. As a
   result, we deny this contention as well.

   RECOMMENDATION

   We find that the agency conducted flawed discussions with KENROB regarding
   price, improperly abandoned the review of completeness in its price
   evaluation, and performed an unreasonable evaluation of the KENROB
   proposal under the initial transition plan subfactor of the technical
   evaluation factor. As a result, we recommend that the agency reopen
   discussions, request revised proposals, evaluate those submissions
   consistent with the provisions of the solicitation, and make a new
   selection decision.

   If, at the conclusion of the reevaluation, ASD's proposal is found to
   represent the best value to the government, we recommend that the agency
   terminate KENROB's award, and make award to ASD. We also recommend that
   the agency reimburse the protester the costs of filing and pursuing the
   protest, including reasonable attorneys' fees. Bid Protest Regulations, 4
   C.F.R. sect. 21.8(d)(1) (2006). As required by section 21.8(f) of our
   Regulations, ASD's claim for such costs, detailing the time expended and
   the cost incurred, must be submitted directly to the agency within 60 days
   of receiving this decision.

   The protest is sustained.

   Gary L. Kepplinger

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The agency report in this protest was provided on CD-ROM with "Bates
   Stamp" numbers at the bottom of each page. As with the citation to the RFP
   above, this decision will generally cite to the specific document
   involved. For certain materials less commonly encountered, or less easily
   cited, however, we will cite to the agency report's Bates Stamp number for
   the specific page of the document involved.

   [2] The CLINs were: Enterprise, Domain and Asset Management (CLIN 0001),
   which contained two sub-CLINs, one for all labor and materials necessary
   to accomplish the Statement of Objectives appended to the solicitation
   (CLIN 0001AA), and one for the award fee (CLIN 0001AB); Surge and Special
   Support (CLIN 0002); Travel (CLIN 0003); Data Deliverables (CLIN 0004);
   Life Cycle Replacement Support (CLIN 0005); and IT Infrastructure Tools
   (CLIN 0006).

   [3] The RFP's estimate of $8,1156,335 for the base period of CLIN 0001
   clearly contained a typographical error, which was later clarified by the
   agency in written responses to offeror questions; the correct amount was
   $8,156,335. AR at 597. These written questions and answers were later
   incorporated into the solicitation by reference. RFP amend. 2, at 6.

   [4] The agency's discussions letter to KENROB appears in the record at
   page 1704, but the version there omitted the second page of the 2-page
   attachment identifying weaknesses, significant weaknesses, and
   deficiencies. This matter was raised with the parties in this case, who
   directed our Office to another copy of the attachment found in KENBOB's
   final proposal revisions. This citation is to the attachment found there;
   when possible the citations will instead be to the letter itself as
   provided in the agency report.

   [5] The above description of the conversation during which ASD sought
   clarification from the CO is not in dispute. We will set forth later the
   areas where there is divergence between ASD's and the CO's description of
   this conversation.

   [6] With respect to the protester's contention that the rule in Peckham is
   inapplicable here because that case involved oral direction that was
   allegedly in conflict with the terms of a solicitation, rather than the
   terms of a discussions letter, see Protester's Final Comments, Sept. 1,
   2006, at 9-10, we would direct the protester to the full discussion in
   that decision at pages 6-9. The alleged oral direction there also
   contradicted the written discussions letter, as is the case here. We think
   application of a "bright-line" rule in this area is both fair and in the
   interest of the procurement system as a whole.

   [7] During the course of this protest, KENROB attempted to show that it
   anticipated the addition of CLIN 0004 to CLIN 0001 to determine the total
   cost for CLIN 0001 by pointing to a table in its final proposal which
   plots the cost of CLIN 0001, together with what it calls "Corresponding
   Optional CLINs 0002 thru 0004," against the cost of what it terms "Total
   Gov't Target Budget for CLINs 0001 - 0005." AR at 1820. In our view, this
   chart raises more questions than it answers, not the least of which is
   whether KENROB considered the data deliverables required here to be an
   optional requirement--a reading not supported by the RFP. This chart also
   does nothing to explain why KENROB failed to include its price for CLIN
   0004 in the calculation of its award fee.

   [8] The final judgment of the SSA was that these two proposals were
   essentially equal under the most important evaluation factor, technical
   approach, and that any perceived edge for the ASD proposal as a result of
   its [deleted] rating under the human resources subfactor under the
   management approach factor (as opposed to KENROB's rating of [deleted]
   under that subfactor), and its higher rating under the past performance
   factor, was not sufficient to offset KENROB's [deleted] lower price.
   Source Selection Decision Memorandum, supra. As a result, the SSA
   concluded that KENROB's lower price made its proposal the best value to
   the government. Id.