TITLE: B-298099.4; B-298099.5, Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc., November 28, 2006
BNUMBER: B-298099.4; B-298099.5
DATE: November 28, 2006
******************************************************************************
B-298099.4; B-298099.5, Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc., November 28, 2006

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc.

   File: B-298099.4; B-298099.5

   Date: November 28, 2006

   Drew A. Harker, Esq., Jennifer A. Frericks, Esq., Joan G. Ochs, Esq.,
   Matthew H. Solomson, Esq., and Chad E. Miller, Esq., Arnold & Porter, for
   the protester.

   Jessica C. Abrahams, Esq., and Jeniffer M. De Jesus Roberts, Esq., McKenna
   Long & Aldridge, for LinQuest Corporation, an intervenor.

   Michael J. O'Farrell, Jr., Esq., and Maj. Stacie A. Remy, Department of
   the Air Force, for the agency.

   Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Protester's contention that the agency failed to adequately mitigate
   the risk of organizational conflicts of interest (OCI) associated with the
   selection of the awardee is denied where the record shows that: the
   contracting officer reasonably concluded that the risk of a conflict of
   interest in this procurement is not great; the agency requested a detailed
   OCI mitigation plan from the awardee and sought additional information
   about, and modifications to, the plan; and the contracting officer
   reasonably concluded, after performing a detailed analysis, that the
   modified plan--together with certain steps designed to increase agency
   oversight of the contractor--was sufficient to protect the government's
   interest.

   2. Protester's contention that the agency improperly held discussions with
   only the awardee while exchanging information about the adequacy of the
   awardee's plan to mitigate the risk of an OCI, and thus should have held
   discussions with the protester as well, is denied; a contracting officer's
   consideration of whether a contractor is eligible for award despite an OCI
   is analogous to a responsibility determination, and the exchanges
   here--like a request for information that relates to an offeror's
   responsibility, rather than proposal evaluation--did not constitute
   discussions.

   DECISION

   Overlook Systems Technologies, Inc. renews its protest of the award of a
   contract to LinQuest Corporation by the Department of the Air Force
   pursuant to request for proposals (RFP) No. FA2550-05-R-2000, issued to
   procure support services for the Global Positioning System Operations
   Center located at Schriever Air Force Base (AFB), Colorado. This protest
   follows corrective action taken by the Air Force earlier this year in
   response to Overlook's contention that the Air Force failed to properly
   assess an organizational conflict of interest (OCI) presented by the award
   to LinQuest. The Air Force has now completed its review of the alleged OCI
   and reaffirmed its earlier selection decision. In response, Overlook again
   argues that the LinQuest mitigation plan does not adequately address the
   OCI here. In addition, Overlook argues that the agency's evaluation of
   LinQuest's past performance was unreasonable, the selection decision was
   improper, and exchanges with LinQuest regarding the OCI issue constituted
   discussions that also should have been held with Overlook.

   We deny the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based position,
   velocity, and timing information system that broadcasts simultaneously to
   an unlimited number of military and civilian users based on land and in
   space. RFP, Statement of Work (SOW), at 3. The GPS Operations Center
   (GPSOC) monitors and analyzes the GPS satellite signal 24 hours per day, 7
   days a week, "to ensure optimal data, products and services support to GPS
   users." Id. Since 1999, Overlook has been the contractor supporting the
   GPSOC.

   On December 22, 2005, the Air Force issued the RFP here to hold a
   competition for these services, limited to small businesses. The RFP
   anticipated the award of a fixed-price incentive fee contract for a
   6-month base period, followed by four 1-year options, to the offeror whose
   proposal presented the best value to the government "based upon a
   trade-off between past performance and price." RFP at 54. In this
   tradeoff, the RFP advised that past performance would be "significantly
   more important" than price. Id. at 53. Although the RFP requested
   technical proposals, they were only to be evaluated on a pass/fail
   basis--i.e., rated either acceptable or unacceptable; offerors submitting
   unacceptable technical proposals were excluded from further consideration.
   Id. Finally, the RFP indicated that the agency intended to make award
   without discussions, if possible. Id. at 54.

   With respect to past performance, the solicitation anticipated that the
   agency would assign an overall performance confidence rating, based on the
   agency's assessment of the relevance and recency of the offeror's past
   performance. The performance confidence ratings were: high confidence,
   significant confidence, satisfactory confidence, unknown confidence,
   little confidence, or no confidence. Id. at 53.

   To prepare the performance confidence ratings set forth above, the RFP
   explained that the Air Force would consider customer past performance
   questionnaires, contractor assessment surveys, Contract Performance
   Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) records, and "any other information
   available." RFP at 53. The RFP defined "recent" contracts as those
   completed within the last 3 years and "relevant" contracts as those
   calling for "performance of efforts involving mission analysis of the GPS
   constellation or relevant system that are similar or greater in scope,
   magnitude and complexity than the effort described in this solicitation."
   RFP at 54. In addition, the RFP identified three different "degrees of
   relevance"--relevant, somewhat relevant, and not relevant--and indicated
   that the government reserved the right to give greater consideration to
   information on those contracts deemed "most relevant to the effort
   described in this RFP." Id. "Relevant" past performance was defined by the
   RFP as efforts involving "much of the magnitude of effort and complexities
   this solicitation requires;" "somewhat relevant" was defined as efforts
   involving "some of the magnitude of effort and complexities [] this
   solicitation requires." Id.

   With respect to the price evaluation, the RFP required offerors to propose
   "all target costs, target profits, target prices, ceiling prices and
   sharing ratios for overruns/ underruns (i.e. example format 80/20 refers
   to, contractor's share of 80%/government's share of 20%)." RFP at 51.

   The RFP also contained an attached memorandum advising that certain
   potential offerors might have an OCI due to their involvement with other
   GPS efforts. Offerors were asked to notify the contracting officer (CO) of
   any possible OCI, and to do so not later than January 3, 2006.

   In response to this request, LinQuest advised the agency, by letter dated
   January 3, that it anticipated submitting a proposal with two
   subcontractors, one of whom, General Dynamics Advanced Integration Systems
   (GDAIS)--a business unit of General Dynamics Corporation--would be
   responsible for the GPS Interference and Navigation Tool (GIANT) software,
   which was identified in the RFP (in the Statement of Work at 16) as
   government-furnished equipment. LinQuest's letter to the agency explained
   that GDAIS had been supporting the GPS Joint Program Office for 9 years,
   and that other General Dynamics divisions were performing other
   GPS-related work. Initial Agency Report (AR), Tab 29.[1] In addition, the
   LinQuest letter advised that GDAIS had been operating under an approved
   OCI plan for the GPS Joint Program Office and would develop an additional
   plan, if need be, for this work. By letter also dated January 3, the CO
   acknowledged receipt of LinQuest's letter, and advised the company that no
   further action was required to address the OCI clauses in the RFP. Id.

   The agency received four offers--including the offers received from
   Overlook and LinQuest--by the January 27 due date for the receipt of
   initial proposals. Upon completion of the initial review, the evaluators
   concluded that additional discussions and submissions were not needed, and
   none were requested or received.

   With respect to Overlook, the evaluators concluded that its proposal was
   technically acceptable, and that its past performance as the incumbent
   currently providing these services was "relevant." In addition, since
   Overlook's past performance questionnaire scores had no unsatisfactory or
   marginal scores, and had a majority of scores in the exceptional
   category,[2] the company received a performance confidence assessment of
   "high confidence." Overlook's target price was $14.047 million, its
   ceiling price was $14.546 million, and it proposed a 50/50 share ratio for
   both cost overruns and underruns from the target price. AR, Tab 13, at 11.

   With respect to LinQuest, the evaluators concluded that its proposal was
   also technically acceptable, and that LinQuest's past performance involved
   matters analogous, though not identical, to the services required here. As
   a result, LinQuest's past performance was rated as "somewhat relevant." In
   reaching this conclusion, the evaluators considered a total of 15 past
   performance customer questionnaires, 12 contractor assessment surveys, and
   2 CPARS records for LinQuest and its subcontractors. As with Overlook, the
   questionnaires, surveys, and CPARS records reflected a majority of scores
   in the exceptional category, with no unsatisfactory or marginal ratings.
   Based on this information, the Air Force assigned LinQuest the second
   highest performance confidence rating of "significant confidence."

   LinQuest's target price was $12.860 million, its ceiling price was $14.5
   million, and it proposed separate share ratios for cost underruns and
   overruns--for cost underruns up to the target price, LinQuest proposed a
   30/70 contractor/government share ratio; for cost overruns from the target
   price up to the price ceiling, LinQuest proposed a 70/30
   contractor/government share ratio. Thus, under the LinQuest proposal, the
   government would enjoy a greater share of the savings when costs are lower
   than the target price, and a smaller share of the burden when costs exceed
   the target price.

   On February 16, the evaluators provided a briefing for the source
   selection authority (SSA); a summary of the results presented to the SSA
   are set forth below.

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |OFFEROR    |  TECHNICAL   |PAST PERFORMANCE CONFIDENCE|      TOTAL      |
   |           |              |                           |                 |
   |           |    RATING    |                           |     TARGET      |
   |           |              |                           |                 |
   |           |              |                           |      PRICE      |
   |-----------+--------------+---------------------------+-----------------|
   |Offeror A  | Unacceptable |            N/A            |       N/A       |
   |-----------+--------------+---------------------------+-----------------|
   |LinQuest   |  Acceptable  |  Significant Confidence   | $12.860 million |
   |-----------+--------------+---------------------------+-----------------|
   |Offeror B  |  Acceptable  |  Satisfactory Confidence  | $13.652 million |
   |-----------+--------------+---------------------------+-----------------|
   |Overlook   |  Acceptable  |      High Confidence      | $14.047 million |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Initial AR, Tab 13, at 11 (as corrected by the Memorandum to the Air Force
   Counsel from the Contract Specialist, Apr. 24, 2006). Although the
   evaluators concluded that award could not be made to Offeror A due to its
   unacceptable technical rating, and ruled out an award to Offeror B's
   proposal, they had no recommendation about whether award should be made to
   LinQuest or Overlook at the February 16 briefing for the SSA. Declaration
   of the SSA, May 9, 2006, at 1. Over the course of several days after the
   briefing, the SSA met with evaluators to discuss the results of the
   competition. By memorandum dated February 21, the SSA decided that the
   difference between the confidence ratings given Overlook and LinQuest did
   not warrant the higher price in the Overlook proposal. Initial AR, Tab 15,
   at 2. That same day, the agency provided written notice to the
   unsuccessful offerors of its intent to award this contract to LinQuest.
   Id., Tab 20.

   On February 24, Overlook requested a debriefing, which was provided on
   March 8. On February 28, Overlook filed a size protest with the Small
   Business Administration (SBA) arguing that LinQuest was not a small
   business for purposes of this procurement. On March 16, the SBA denied
   Overlook's size protest and determined that LinQuest was eligible for
   award; later that day, the contracting officer (CO) awarded the contract
   here to LinQuest. CO's Statement, Apr. 6, 2006, at 2. The next day, March
   17, Overlook filed a protest with our Office, which it supplemented with
   additional arguments after receipt of the initial agency report.

   Events Related to the Previous Protests

   In its initial protest (B-298099), Overlook argued that LinQuest was
   precluded from performing this contract due to an OCI stemming from
   LinQuest's inclusion of GDAIS as a member of its team. Overlook alleged
   that GDAIS would have an impaired objectivity OCI when asked to evaluate
   problems with, and the performance of, GPS in equipment manufactured by
   General Dynamics or manufactured by General Dynamics' competitors. As
   described by Overlook, General Dynamics "manufactures GPS equipment . . .
   as well as commercial aircraft . . . and many multi-million dollar weapon
   systems and munitions that depend upon GPS for their proper operation."
   Protest B-298099, Mar. 17, 2006, at 6. In addition, Overlook argued that
   the agency improperly concluded LinQuest's past performance was relevant
   to the contract here, and argued that the Air Force's best value decision
   was arbitrary.[3]

   On April 14, the Air Force filed a report addressing the issues raised by
   Overlook. With regard to the OCI issue, the Air Force maintained that the
   GPSOC contracter does not analyze the performance of weapons systems (or
   other GPS-based devices), and therefore the alleged OCI is unfounded.
   According to the Air Force, the GPSOC contractor is responsible solely for
   analyzing and evaluating problems with the GPS signal as caused by
   satellite issues, signal strength, signal gaps, or environmental issues,
   such as interference and space weather, or "some outside cause such as the
   receiver failure, operator error, etc." Air Force Memorandum of Law, Apr.
   14, 2006, at 7. Regarding its evaluation of LinQuest's past performance,
   the Air Force provided our Office with the record of its past performance
   review, which reflected the agency's deliberations about whether
   LinQuest's past performance should be considered relevant to the effort
   here. In its report, the agency explained that while LinQuest's record of
   contract performance was largely exemplary, its team's experience was
   considered only "somewhat relevant" based on the fact that it lacked
   experience in "a very small number of the areas related to performance of
   the GPSOC contract." Id. at 12. The agency also disputed Overlook's
   allegation that its best value determination was unreasonable.

   Overlook's comments disputed the agency's characterization of this
   contract as not requiring analysis or evaluation of GPS-dependent systems.
   According to Overlook, the GPSOC contractor is required to "troubleshoot"
   the cause of GPS signal failures, which are ultimately attributed to
   either the GPS signal or the GPS-dependent system itself. Overlook argues
   that allowing GDAIS to participate in providing these services means the
   company will be evaluating the GPS performance of systems built by General
   Dynamics or its competitors. Overlook buttressed its contention by
   submitting a declaration from its chief engineer, who serves as the
   program manager for the GPSOC under Overlook's current contract.
   Overlook's chief engineer explained that the GPSOC contractor evaluates
   problems with GPS signal failure using a checklist that includes assessing
   the operational status of the GPS satellites, space weather conditions,
   atmospheric conditions, and terrain. He indicated that after all the items
   above have been excluded, the weapon system itself becomes the subject of
   further investigation. Protester's Comments, Tab 1, Declaration of Chief
   Engineer, Apr. 27, 2006, at 3.

   Overlook's comments also raised a supplemental OCI protest issue regarding
   the reasonableness of the Air Force's analysis of potential conflicts
   resulting from GDAIS's and General Dynamics' involvement in five other
   GPS-related procurements. These procurements were raised by LinQuest in a
   letter to the Air Force, dated January 3. In this letter, LinQuest
   represented that GDAIS "does not believe it has any OCI issues" resulting
   from its involvement in other GPS-related procurements. Initial AR, Tab
   29. The Air Force accepted this representation; Overlook disagrees.[4]

   In answer, the Air Force again disputed its incumbent contractor's
   representations about the nature of the work under the GPSOC contract.
   According to the agency, the GPSOC contractor only analyzes GPS signals,
   and does not perform an analysis of the system receiving the signal. In
   support of its position, the Air Force submitted an additional response
   from the contracting officer and declarations from the Commander of the
   Air Force's 2^nd Space Operations Squadron, the Deputy Commander of the
   50^th Space Operations Group, and the head of the Source Selection
   Evaluation Team.

   To resolve the factual dispute between the Air Force and its incumbent
   contractor about the scope of the contractor's responsibilities under the
   GPSOC contract, our Office convened a hearing with the parties on
   June 5-6. After the hearing, but prior to the submission of post-hearing
   comments, the Air Force elected to take corrective action to further
   evaluate the impaired objectivity OCI issue raised by Overlook to
   determine "whether the Air Force should take appropriate steps to avoid,
   neutralize or mitigate any significant potential conflicts of interest
   before contract award . . . ." Letter from the Air Force to GAO, June 9,
   2006. Based on this proposed corrective action, our Office dismissed
   Overlook's protest as academic on June 13; our decision dismissing
   Overlook's protest expressly reserved the company's right to again seek
   review of any previously-raised issue that was not superseded by the
   corrective action, or had not been expressly withdrawn. Overlook Sys.
   Techs., Inc., B-298099, B-298099.2, June 13, 2006, at 2.

   Events Related to the Agency's Corrective Action

   Shortly after dismissal of the earlier protests, the Air Force requested
   that LinQuest address any possible actual or potential OCIs that could
   arise during its performance of this contract. The request advised that if
   LinQuest decided no actual or potential conflicts exist, the company
   should explain the basis for its determination. On the other hand, the
   request stated that if there was a potential OCI, LinQuest should advise
   what steps would be taken "to avoid, neutralize or mitigate any
   significant potential conflicts of interest, in accordance with Federal
   Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9.5." Supp. AR, Tab 5.

   On July 6, LinQuest provided the requested plan to the Air Force. The plan
   included 10 pages of narrative, followed by 8 attachments, one of which,
   attachment 4, was specific to GDAIS. Supp. AR, Tab 6. Of particular
   interest here, the GDAIS portion of the plan stated:

     General Dynamics is a large business involved in the development,
     production, support, and analysis of numerous DoD weapon systems, as
     described throughout this document. These development efforts do not
     constitute a real OCI since the GPSOC Statement of Work does not include
     evaluating the adequacy of these systems against their specifications or
     other contractual requirements and does not involve source selection
     support to the government for these systems. However, there may be the
     appearance of an OCI and, in extremely remote circumstances, the GPSOC
     may be asked to help in the evaluation of a system that GD is the
     developer [sic] or a major contributor.

   Id., attach. 4, at 1.

   The Air Force did not accept LinQuest's post-protest mitigation plan as
   originally tendered and opted to request additional information. By letter
   dated July 27, the agency asked LinQuest to address six specific issues in
   an addendum to the mitigation plan. Of particular relevance to this
   dispute, the letter asked:

     Both LinQuest and GDAIS reference the Statement of Work (SOW) as not
     requiring "evaluation" of systems against specifications; however, the
     SOW does anticipate troubleshooting that may require LinQuest or GDAIS
     to assist a user by providing information regarding a GPS receiver or to
     discuss issues related to GPS receiver integration. Request LinQuest
     clarify how it intends to address any potential OCI issues that may
     arise in this context.

   Supp. AR, Tab 7.

   The LinQuest response to this request begins by disputing the agency's
   premise that OCI issues could arise during troubleshooting, and contends
   that there is no evaluation of GPS-based systems taking place because the
   GPSOC contractor is "not performing a formal test under controlled
   conditions." Supp. AR, Tab 9, at 2. The response continues by stating:

     Due to the sensitivity of OCI on this procurement, however, GDAIS will
     implement the OCI Mitigation Plan measures from the first day of
     performance. The implementation of these OCI mitigation measures allows
     GDAIS GPSOC personnel to support any and all GPSOC activities by
     protecting sensitive information and eliminating any incentives that
     might bias the actions of these personnel.

   Id. at 3.

   On August 21, the CO prepared an Analysis and Recommended Course of Action
   Document. Supp. AR, Tab 13. In this document, the CO included a
   Determination and Findings (D&F) regarding the adequacy of LinQuest's
   Mitigation Plan. The D&F noted that: (1) there are an "incalculable"
   number of systems with GPS components that could be the subject of some
   level of analysis under the GPSOC contract; (2) the predominant type of
   analysis performed by the GPSOC contractor will be objective in nature,
   and will not involve subjective judgments; (3) the types of analysis that
   might require subjective judgments appear to account for less than 10
   percent of the inquiries to the GPSOC; and (4) the judgments provided by
   the GPSOC contractor do not involve recommendations for procurement
   decisions, do not involve determinations about whether a system complies
   with its specifications, and do not involve the intake, disassembly or
   repair of GPS equipment. Id. at 24-25.

   Based on these findings, the CO concluded that "a substantial majority of
   the work reasonably contemplated under the GPSOC contract creates no
   potential conflict of interest," but LinQuest's reliance on GDAIS as a
   teaming member does create a slight potential for a conflict. Id. at
   25-26. As a result, the CO further concluded that the risk of conflict is
   sufficient to require adequate safeguards, and that "the OCI Mitigation
   Plan submitted by LinQuest Corporation coupled with Government oversight
   is more than adequate to mitigate any OCI concern related to performance
   of the GPSOC contract." Id. at 26. Accordingly, the CO concluded that
   LinQuest was eligible for award.

   In addition to the mitigation considerations set forth above, the CO
   reexamined the source selection process and reaffirmed the earlier
   selection decision. Supp. AR, Tab 11. On August 21, the Air Force provided
   notice to Overlook that it had completed its corrective action, and this
   protest followed.

   DISCUSSION

   Overlook's renewed protest reiterates its earlier arguments that LinQuest,
   through its reliance on GDAIS as a teaming member, has an OCI that cannot
   be mitigated. Overlook also renews its earlier challenges to the
   evaluation of past performance and to the decision to select LinQuest for
   award. In addition, after receipt of the documents generated by the agency
   in its reassessment of LinQuest's eligibility for award, Overlook raised
   two supplemental protest issues. Specifically, Overlook argues that the
   agency improperly failed to make a new award decision considering the
   impact on LinQuest's technical proposal of the company's plan to mitigate
   any OCI, and that the agency's exchanges with LinQuest regarding the
   adequacy of its mitigation plan constituted discussions, which also should
   have been held with Overlook.

   The Revised OCI Review

   As discussed earlier, Overlook's arguments that LinQuest (through its
   teaming member, GDAIS) has an OCI that cannot be mitigated have both a
   macro and micro component. We turn first to the macro component of
   Overlook's challenge--i.e., that allowing GDAIS to help provide these
   services will place the company in the position of analyzing the GPS
   performance of systems built by its General Dynamics affiliates, or those
   built by competitors of General Dynamics and its affiliates. The Air Force
   responds that the record here supports its conclusion that the risk of a
   conflict of this type is small, and that the combination of LinQuest's
   Mitigation Plan--as amended after the agency first opted not to accept it
   as written--and increased government oversight, is sufficient to
   adequately mitigate the risk of a conflict of interest. We agree with the
   Air Force.

   The regulatory guidance governing OCIs that may arise in the performance
   of government contracts is set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
   (FAR) at subpart 9.5. One of the situations that creates a potential OCI
   is where a firm's work under a government contract entails evaluating
   itself or its own products. FAR sections 9.505, 9.508, PURVIS Sys., Inc.,
   B-293807.3, B-293807.4, Aug. 16, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 177 at 7. The
   concern in such situations is that a firm's ability to render impartial
   advice to the government will be undermined, or impaired, by its
   relationship to the product or services being evaluated; as a result, such
   situations are often referred to as "impaired objectivity" conflicts of
   interest. Aetna Gov't Health Plans, Inc.; Foundation Health Fed. Servs.,
   Inc., B-254397.15 et al., July 27, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 129 at 13.

   When the facts of a procurement raise a concern that a potential awardee
   might have an OCI, the FAR requires the agency to determine whether an
   actual or apparent OCI will arise, and to what extent the firm should be
   excluded from the competition. Id. at 12. The specific responsibility to
   avoid, neutralize or mitigate a potential significant conflict of
   interest--and to do so as early in the acquisition process as
   possible--lies with the CO. Id.; see FAR sect. 9.504.  

   As a prelude to addressing the adequacy of the Air Force's decision that
   the conflict here can be mitigated--and that the actions taken are
   sufficient to do so--we note first that the dispute between Overlook and
   the Air Force is not the same dispute that was before us at the start of
   these protests. Prior to taking corrective action, the Air Force view was
   that its GPSOC contractor does not perform analysis of the GPS components
   of systems, and thus no conflict arises regardless of who built the
   system. During its corrective action review, the Air Force concluded that
   "there is a slight potential for a situation to occur that could create
   the appearance of a potential conflict." Supp. AR, Tab 13, at 26. While
   Overlook contends that this does not constitute sufficient recognition of
   a conflict to change the analysis, we think the disagreement between these
   parties is now a matter of degree. To address the dispute over the degree
   to which a conflict could arise here, we set forth below certain
   information in the record about the GPSOC workload.

   The record developed during the course of these protests, including the
   hearing held prior to the agency's decision to take corrective action,
   shows that the GPSOC both monitors performance of the GPS system, and
   responds to telephone and e-mail inquiries from military users and
   military testing organizations. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 210-11, 345.
   User inquiries range from simple questions quickly answered, to questions
   regarding anomalies in the operation of GPS-based systems that require
   nuanced judgments and analysis. For example, the Commander of the 2^nd
   Space Operations Squadron testified that one inquiry was answered by
   advising the caller to switch on his GPS device, Tr. at 26, while another,
   from officials testing an Army mobile launch rocket system in White Sands,
   New Mexico--who were attempting to understand why the rocket was routinely
   missing its target by significant distances--required considerably more
   analysis. Id. at 97-103. Ultimately, the GPSOC was able to help the
   testing officials determine that the GPS device at issue was properly
   receiving signals from the GPS satellite array, but a problem with the
   software that translated those signals was causing the rocket to veer
   off-course. Id. at 97.

   We found the testimony of the Air Force Commander about the range of
   activities performed by the GPSOC contractor to be consistent with the
   testimony of all of the witnesses, both those presented by the Air Force,
   and the testimony of Overlook's Chief Engineer and Program Manager. In his
   own way, each of them described a spectrum of possible activities ranging
   from those that required little more than objective answers to
   straightforward questions, to those that required more subjective
   judgments about the operation of the GPS equipment involved, and the
   conditions under which it was being used. Additional testimony (as well as
   data developed by the Air Force after the hearing) helped quantify and
   organize the range of activities provided by the GPSOC contractor.

   Specifically, the hearing revealed that user inquiries to the GPSOC can be
   categorized as requests for information (RFI) or requests for anomaly
   analysis (RAA). Id. at 27, 208 (Air Force witnesses), 389-90 (Overlook
   witness). RFIs can be further categorized according to the amount of
   effort required to answer the request. An RFI that can be answered during
   the course of the call, or in approximately 15 minutes, is termed a Level
   1 RFI; an RFI that requires a more in-depth review is termed a Level 2
   RFI. Id. at 203.

   While RAAs are not categorized by the amount of effort required to answer
   them, there seemed to be a consensus that an RAA requires a more nuanced
   analysis and possible exercise of judgment. Id. at 61, 215-21 (Air Force),
   392-98 (Overlook). Even so, this analysis begins with a standard set of
   cascading inquiries, beginning with considering whether the GPS satellite
   array is operational, then considering any atmospheric or geographic
   conditions that might be causing the anomaly, and ultimately, considering
   the specific GPS device and how that device is integrated into the system
   at issue. Id. at 63-64 (Air Force, referencing witness's earlier
   Declaration), 392-95 (Overlook). Notably, all of these inquiries are
   user-driven; in many cases the user does not desire additional assistance
   and the contact with the GPSOC ends. Id. at 36, 54.

   As mentioned above, the Air Force also developed additional data regarding
   the workload of the GPSOC contractor after the hearing. Specifically, the
   CO's D&F document advises that:

     From the period 1 January 2005 to 31 July 2006 (a year and a half),
     there have been 721 Level 1 & 2 [RFIs]. Conversely, there have been only
     61 RAAs within that same period. Of the 61 RAAs reported, 16 RAAs were
     for assistance related to space segment anomalies.

   Supp. AR, Tab 13, at 25. (The CO notes that the 16 RAAs related to the
   space segment are not at issue here, as they are not handled by the GPSOC
   contractor, id.; Overlook has not disputed this assertion.) Although the
   CO's D&F did not elaborate on how many of the 721 RFIs since January 1,
   2005, were Level 1 versus Level 2 inquiries, the record contains
   additional analysis that provides this breakdown. Specifically, the Air
   Force's on-site manager of the GPSOC advised the CO, via e-mail, that in
   2005, there were 308 Level 1 RFIs, 159 Level 2 RFIs, and 28 RAAs; he
   advised that as of July 31, 2006, there were 175 Level 1 RFIs, 79 Level 2
   RFIs, and 33 RAAs. Supp. AR, Tab 20, at 22.

   In our view, the data above helps illuminate the extent to which the GPSOC
   contractor might be involved in rendering judgments about equipment that
   the contractor (or its competitors) provided to the government. First,
   there seems to be no dispute here that answering a Level 1 RFI should not
   raise any significant concern about a conflict of interest. This is
   because Level 1 RFIs usually involve objective answers to straightforward
   inquiries that are quickly resolved during the course of a telephone call.
   In addition, there is little dispute that a significant majority of the
   inquiries to the GPSOC take the form of Level 1 RFIs. We think the CO
   acted reasonably when he concluded that there is almost no possibility of
   an impaired objectivity conflict of interest related to answering a Level
   1 RFI. D&F, Supp. AR, Tab 13, at 24.

   With respect to Level 2 RFIs, and the 45 RAAs that were not related to
   anomalies in the space segment (which are not reviewed by the GPSOC
   contractor), we think there is little evidence in this record to support a
   conclusion that any significant percentage of this minority portion of the
   workload raises concerns about an OCI. We note first that both the Air
   Force and Overlook described a cascading checklist of what, essentially,
   seem to be troubleshooting questions that are used to help resolve these
   more detailed inquiries. Tr. at 63-64 (Air Force), 392-95 (Overlook).
   These questions included looking into the operation of the GPS satellite
   array, considering conditions in space and in the atmosphere, considering
   geographic conditions (such as operation of the GPS device in geologic or
   urban canyons), and then turning to questions about the GPS antenna, the
   GPS device itself, and the integration of the GPS device into the overall
   system (including software that translates properly received GPS signals
   into useable information. Id. at 58-64 (Air Force), 392-95 (Overlook). In
   our view, some portion of these troubleshooting analyses--such as
   considerations of the operation of the satellite array, conditions in
   space and the atmosphere, and geographic conditions--present a smaller
   risk of impaired objectivity than considerations related to the equipment
   itself. Thus, we think this minority portion of the workload is reduced
   even more.[5]

   In addition, we found particularly telling the Air Force's review of all
   45 of the non-space segment RAAs since January 1, 2005. At the conclusion
   of this review, the agency was unable to identify a single RAA that
   involved equipment developed by General Dynamics.[6] Supp. AR, Tab 20, at
   19 (e-mail to the CO from the on-site Air Force manager of the GPSOC). To
   be fair, we note that this finding does not answer the question of whether
   General Dynamics' competitors were involved; does not conclusively
   establish that General Dynamics (or its competitors) were not
   involved--only that there is no record of it; and does not address the
   question of whether any Level 2 RFIs might have involved General Dynamics
   (or its competitors). On the other hand, we note that Overlook, the
   long-standing incumbent contractor here, has also provided little hard
   evidence to establish a high risk that GDAIS will face significant
   conflicts performing this work.[7]

   In summary, given: (1) the consensus in this record that the RAAs are the
   inquiries most likely to involve an exercise of judgment by the GPSOC
   contractor (Tr. at 61, 215-21 (Air Force), 392-98 (Overlook)); (2) the
   data developed that shows that RAA's account for approximately six percent
   (45/721) of all inquiries to the GPSOC since January 1, 2005; and (3) the
   fact that neither party has yet identified a specific RAA or Level 2 RFI
   that posed the risk of an impaired objectivity OCI for LinQuest/GDAIS, we
   think the evidence here supports the CO's conclusion that the risk of an
   impaired objectivity OCI for LinQuest is not great, and can be mitigated.

   For the record, we do not want to leave the impression that we were not
   concerned about the possibility of an OCI in this procurement. Simply put,
   we were. Overlook provided pleadings, and credible testimony, that raised
   the possibility of the GPSOC contractor being drawn into situations where
   it had the ability to exercise judgment that could be impaired by a
   conflict of interest. On the other hand, this testimony was cast in doubt
   by the serious dispute between the Air Force and its incumbent contractor
   about the extent of the analysis required of its contractor. By the end of
   the hearing before our Office, it was apparent that this dispute extended
   into the Air Force as well.[8] Our Office never reached a conclusion on
   this question because the Air Force elected to take corrective action
   after the hearing.

   As indicated at the outset of this analysis, the dispute now before our
   Office turns on the degree of risk present, not on whether there is, or is
   not, a possibility of a conflict of interest. As discussed above, the
   evidence in the record leads us to conclude that the risk of a conflict of
   interest here is not so great that the agency was barred from reasonably
   concluding that it could be mitigated. We turn next to the adequacy of the
   CO's determination that the possibility of a conflict here has been
   mitigated.

   As set forth earlier, the Air Force returned to LinQuest after the initial
   protest was dismissed and asked for a revised review of any possible OCIs.
   The review it received was not ideal. For example, LinQuest (and GDAIS)
   produced a report to the agency that argued there was no OCI because the
   GPSOC contractor was not engaged in advising the agency on source
   selection decisions, and was not evaluating these systems against their
   specifications or any other contractual requirements. Supp. AR, Tab 6,
   attach. 4, at 35. Later, LinQuest argued in response to a request for
   additional information from the Air Force that there was no possible OCI
   because the company was not "performing a formal test under controlled
   conditions." Supp. AR, Tab 9, at 2.

   LinQuest's arguments in the face of the agency's attempts to address these
   allegations were not persuasive--not to the Air Force, and not to our
   Office. We have previously held that a contractor need not be involved in
   providing source selection information to an agency to have an impaired
   objectivity OCI. See PURVIS Sys., Inc., supra, at 11. In addition, we know
   of no reasonable basis to argue that a situation does not create an
   impaired objectivity OCI because the assessment was not tied to whether
   the system complied with its own specifications, or because the assessment
   was not part of a formal test under controlled conditions. In short, an
   impaired objectivity OCI is created whenever a contractor's judgment and
   objectivity in performing contract requirements may be impaired due to the
   fact that the substance of the contractor's performance has the potential
   to affect other interests of the contractor. Alion Science & Tech. Corp.,
   B-297342, Jan. 9, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 1 at 6; PURVIS Sys., Inc., supra;
   Science Applications Int'l Corp., B-293601 et al., May 3, 2004, 2004 CPD
   para. 96 at 4; Aetna Gov't Health Plans, Inc.; Foundation Health Fed.
   Servs., Inc., supra.

   Despite LinQuest's arguments, this review did not end with the first
   version of the LinQuest Mitigation Plan. As reflected above, the Air Force
   requested additional information in several areas, and asked that the plan
   be modified. Upon receipt of the additional information, the CO prepared a
   detailed analysis of the LinQuest Mitigation Plan, as modified. In this
   analysis, the CO concluded that the modified plan--together with certain
   steps designed to increase Air Force oversight of the GPSOC contractor,
   and with the factual information produced showing "that a substantial
   majority of the work reasonably contemplated under the GPSOC contract
   creates no potential conflict of interest"--was sufficient to protect the
   Government's interest here. Supp. AR, Tab 13, at 25-26. We agree.

   While Overlook raises numerous complaints about the plan, and points out
   its disagreement with several of the plan's assertions, once an agency has
   given meaningful consideration to potential conflicts of interest, our
   Office will not sustain a protest challenging a determination in this area
   unless the determination is unreasonable or unsupported by the record.
   Alion Science & Tech. Corp., B-297022.4, B-297022.5, Sept. 26, 2006, 2006
   CPD para. 146 at 8; SRS Techs., B-258170.3, Feb. 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD
   para. 95 at 9. In this regard, COs are allowed to exercise "common sense,
   good judgment, and sound discretion" in assessing whether a potential
   conflict exists and in developing appropriate ways to address it. FAR
   sect. 9.505; Epoch Eng'g, Inc., B-276634, July 7, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 72
   at 5. Here, given the limited possibility of serious OCIs demonstrated in
   this record, the agency's comprehensive approach to addressing any
   conflicts that might arise, and the protester's failure to establish that
   these actions were unreasonable, we think the CO acted appropriately in
   mitigating the risk of macro OCIs that could arise from allowing LinQuest
   (and its teaming member GDAIS) to serve as the GPSOC contractor.[9]

   With respect to the small number of GPS procurements that LinQuest
   identified for the agency in its January 3 disclosure letter--i.e., the
   micro OCI issues Overlook raised in its earlier protests--the protester
   again argues that the agency failed to take adequate steps to mitigate
   those conflicts. During the agency's corrective action, the CO reviewed
   again the procurements disclosed prior to the submission of proposals, and
   again concluded that either no conflict was presented, or that any
   conflict was adequately mitigated. In response, Overlook states:

     Although the new CO appears to have attempted to remedy that problem
     since the hearing, the CO's conclusion with respect to [General
     Dynamics]'s participation in the upcoming [deleted] procurement is based
     on an erroneous premise and is thus arbitrary and capricious.

   Overlook's Comments, Oct. 11, 2006, at 38-39. Overlook raises no challenge
   to any of the other procurements identified by LinQuest that were reviewed
   by the CO during the course of the corrective action. As a result, we view
   the challenges to any of the other disclosures (and the agency's
   conclusions about them) as abandoned.

   With respect to the protester's remaining OCI challenge, the CO noted that
   LinQuest had previously disclosed that General Dynamics C4 Systems
   (GDC4S), an affiliate of GDAIS, planned to pursue the award of the
   [deleted] contract as a prime contractor, and might propose using
   [deleted] as a subcontractor. AR, Tab 13, at 11. The CO noted that an RFP
   for this effort had not yet been released, and that the development of the
   [deleted] work was not scheduled to be completed until 2013. Id. The CO
   also noted that the [deleted] contractor would interface with [deleted].
   As a result, the CO concluded that there was no risk of an OCI on the
   GPSOC contract, and that the CO for the [deleted] contract would make an
   assessment of whether an OCI exists at the time that contract is awarded.
   Id.

   Overlook points to industry news items indicating that the draft RFP for
   the [deleted] contract has been recently released, and that the [deleted]
   effort may not be as far in the future as the CO thought. In addition,
   Overlook argues that a prior decision of our Office, Washington Util.
   Group, B-266333, Jan. 29, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 27 at 6, suggests that the
   CO should find the existence of an OCI here based on the possibility of
   future conflicts.

   Assuming, arguendo, that the [deleted] contract may, in fact, get underway
   sooner than the CO believed at the time he prepared his most recent
   analysis of the possible OCIs disclosed by LinQuest, the fact remains that
   there is, as yet, no competition underway. In addition, any award of the
   [deleted] contract, even under Overlook's scenario, seems to remain one or
   several years in the future.

   We also disagree with Overlook's assertion that our decision in the
   Washington Utility Group protest controls the situation here. In that
   case, a CO excluded a protester from a competition for support services
   after determining that professional and business relationships disclosed
   by the protester and its proposed subcontractor, had the potential for
   impairing the protester's ability to provide objective and impartial
   advice to the agency. Washington Util. Group, supra, at 4. In denying the
   protest, our Office held that the CO's actions were reasonable because the
   protester "had several past, present, or currently planned interests that
   are inextricably related to the work to be performed under the
   contemplated contract." Id. at 6.

   In Overlook's view, our holding in Washington Utility Group means the CO
   here acted improperly when he failed to exclude LinQuest (and GDAIS) from
   this procurement because a GDAIS subsidiary hopes to submit a proposal in
   a future competition for the [deleted] contract. In our view, the
   conflict, if any, between GDAIS's performance of the GPSOC contract, and
   GDC4S's performance of the [deleted] contract, will arise with the award
   of the [deleted] contract, not with the award of this one.

   Evaluation Issues

   Overlook reasserts several of the challenges to the evaluation conclusions
   that were raised in its earlier protests, and also raises new issues.
   Among the issues raised earlier were assertions that it was unreasonable
   to assign LinQuest a performance confidence assessment (PCA) rating of
   "significant confidence," that the best value decision failed to comply
   with the RFP, and that the agency's Proposal Analysis Report was an
   unreliable "post hoc" justification. In the current protest, Overlook
   argues that the previous past performance evaluation and source selection
   decision cannot provide a basis for a reasonable award decision because of
   the agency's allegedly profound misunderstanding of the work required of
   the GPSOC contractor. In addition, Overlook complains that the agency
   improperly failed to make a new best value tradeoff that considered the
   impact of the LinQuest Mitigation Plan, which in Overlook's view, will
   significantly reduce the technical merit of the awardee's proposal.

   Although we will not address each of these issues separately, we have
   reviewed the entire record, including all of Overlook's allegations, and
   find no basis for concluding that the award decision was unreasonable, or
   in any way violated the stated evaluation scheme. For example, with
   respect to the agency's evaluation of LinQuest's past performance, the
   agency explained that the solicitation did not require GPS experience per
   se, but rather defined relevant past performance information to include
   performance of efforts "that are similar or greater in scope, magnitude
   and complexity than the effort described in this solicitation." RFP at 54.
   Moreover, the record reflected that the Air Force rated LinQuest's past
   performance as only "somewhat relevant" since its past performance
   information reflected only "some of the magnitude of effort and
   complexities" required under the RFP. Initial AR, Tab 14, at 44. Given the
   largely exceptional reviews of its somewhat relevant past performance, the
   Air Force concluded that LinQuest deserved a PCA rating of "significant
   confidence." Id. In our view, this conclusion was both reasonable, and
   consistent with the stated evaluation scheme.

   For a second example, we disagree with Overlook's assertion that the
   agency acted unreasonably by not conducting a new best value tradeoff to
   consider the effect of the LinQuest Mitigation Plan on the technical merit
   of the awardee's proposal. The RFP here required only that technical
   proposals be evaluated on a pass/fail basis; it then anticipated a
   tradeoff between past performance and price. RFP at 53-54. There is no
   suggestion in this record that LinQuest's proposal was rendered
   technically unacceptable because of its mitigation plan. In addition, if
   the tradeoff Overlook seeks had been made, the best value decision would
   have violated the stated evaluation scheme.[10] Accordingly, we conclude
   there was nothing unreasonable about the agency's decision not to conduct
   a new best value tradeoff as urged by Overlook.

   Exchanges Regarding OCI Mitigation

   Finally, Overlook argues that the exchanges between the Air Force and
   LinQuest regarding the company's mitigation plan constituted discussions,
   which, therefore, should have been held with Overlook as well. We
   disagree.

   As a general rule, discussions occur where the government communicates
   with an offeror for the purpose of obtaining information essential to
   determine the acceptability of a proposal, or provides the offeror an
   opportunity to revise or modify its proposal in some material respect.
   Priority One Servs., Inc., B-288836, B-288836.2, Dec. 17, 2001, 2002 CPD
   para. 79 at 5. In situations where there is a dispute regarding whether
   communications between an agency and an offeror constituted discussions,
   the acid test is whether an offeror has been afforded an opportunity to
   revise or modify its proposal. TDS, Inc., B-292674, Nov. 12, 2003, 2003
   CPD para. 204 at 6. Where an agency engages in discussions, it must afford
   all offerors in the competitive range an opportunity to engage in
   meaningful discussions. FAR sect.15.306(d)(1).

   We note first that the exchanges between LinQuest and the Air Force
   regarding the mitigation plan did not result in changes to the company's
   proposal, which, as indicated above, is the acid test for determining
   whether discussions have occurred. TDS, Inc., supra. In addition, we think
   the language of the FAR requiring COs to resolve OCIs supports our view
   that these exchanges were not discussions. Specifically, the FAR requires
   that:

     The [CO] shall award the contract to the apparent successful offeror
     unless a conflict of interest is determined to exist that cannot be
     avoided or mitigated. Before determining to withhold award based on
     conflict of interest considerations, the [CO] shall notify the
     contractor, provide the reasons therefor, and allow the contractor a
     reasonable opportunity to respond.

   FAR sect. 9.504(e). This scheme contemplates a review that occurs after
   evaluations are completed and after an apparent awardee has emerged.
   Nothing about this scheme suggests that the CO would then be required to
   reopen discussions with all offerors.[11]

   Consistent with the FAR scheme described above, and consistent with the
   placement of this scheme in Part 9 of the FAR (which, as its title
   indicates, addresses contractor qualifications), we think a CO's
   consideration of whether a contractor is eligible for award despite an OCI
   is analogous to a responsibility determination. As we have noted, concerns
   about OCIs call into question the integrity of the competitive procurement
   process, see Aetna Gov't Health Plans, Inc.; Foundation Health Fed.
   Servs., Inc., supra, at 19, and matters of integrity are more closely
   related to matters of responsibility than evaluation matters. We have also
   held that a request for information that relates to an offeror's
   responsibility, rather than proposal evaluation, does not constitute
   discussions, and does not trigger the requirement to hold discussions with
   other offerors in the competitive range. General Dynamics--Ordnance &
   Tactical Sys., B-295987, B-295987.2, May 20, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 114 at
   10. Accordingly, we think the facts here, the nature of the concerns
   involved, and the regulatory framework that applies to these situations,
   supports a conclusion that the exchanges here did not constitute
   discussions.

   The protest is denied.

   Gary L. Kepplinger

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] This decision references materials from both the agency report
   produced in response to the earlier protest, and the report produced in
   answer to the current protest, filed after the agency completed its
   corrective action. We will refer to the former as the Initial AR, and the
   latter as the Supplemental (Supp.) AR.

   [2] The past performance questionnaire used here asked respondents to rate
   the offerors in several areas as either unsatisfactory, marginal,
   satisfactory, very good, exceptional, or neutral. Initial AR, Tab 14, at
   7.

   [3] Overlook also challenged the Air Force's determination that LinQuest's
   proposal was technically acceptable. After receipt of the agency report,
   however, Overlook expressly withdrew this basis of protest. Protester's
   Comments, Apr. 28, 2006, at 2.

   [4] The difference between Overlook's initial allegation that LinQuest
   would have an impaired objectivity OCI, and the related allegation in its
   supplemental protest filing, was one of magnitude. The initial protest
   allegation involved every instance where GDAIS might be involved in
   troubleshooting a problem with GPS in equipment provided by General
   Dynamics or equipment provided by one of its competitors, and hence can be
   described as the macro OCI allegation. The supplemental protest was
   limited to the adequacy of the agency's OCI review related to the five
   GPS-related procurements disclosed by LinQuest in its January 3 letter to
   the CO, and thus is more of a micro OCI allegation.

   [5] We also think there is no inconsistency between this conclusion and
   the credible testimony of Overlook's Chief Engineer that he spends
   approximately 25 percent of his time on RAAs. Tr. at 347. Overlook's Chief
   Engineer is not the only person in the GPSOC. As he, and the Air Force
   explained, numerous inquiries are resolved without the involvement of more
   senior people; it is the more difficult inquiries that are passed to
   people like Overlook's Chief Engineer. Id. at 82-87 (Air Force), 353-54
   (Overlook). In addition, Overlook's Chief Engineer testified that he has
   had single inquiries that have taken him months to answer. Id. at 354.

   [6] The Air Force review was limited to the 45 RAAs because in its
   view--and the record supports this view--RAAs are the inquiries most
   likely to involve the exercise of judgment and analysis by the GPSOC
   contractor. Tr. at 61, 215-21 (Air Force), 392-98 (Overlook). In resolving
   this protest, however, we were persuaded by Overlook that any analysis of
   these issues should also consider Level 2 RFIs. See Tr. 389-90 (where
   Overlook's witness describes certain complex RFIs). Even so, there is
   little evidence in the record of any significant risk of the conflicts of
   interest that Overlook contends cannot be mitigated.

   [7] During the hearing, Overlook's witness provided one example of a
   General Dynamics weapons system on which a GPS device had been evaluated.
   Tr. at 456. Given Overlook's long-standing incumbency and presumed
   knowledge of the systems it has reviewed, and given that it has identified
   only one General Dynamics system on which it has conducted a GPS-related
   review--and it has provided no explanation of whether that review was
   straightforward or involved a subjective judgment--we think Overlook has
   not made the case that any conflict here cannot be adequately mitigated
   despite being in an excellent position to do so.

   [8] Although Air Force pleadings indicated that the GPSOC contractor did
   not provide any analysis of weapons systems that could lead to a conflict
   of interest, testimony from the agency's own credible and authoritative
   witness described situations that clearly included judgments about how the
   GPS components of systems were performing. This apparent disconnect
   between the agency's pleadings and its witness led the GAO hearing officer
   to ask, at the end of the first day of testimony, if there was "some kind
   of dispute within the Air Force about what should be required of the
   contractor in performing this contract?" Id. at 108. Although the first
   Air Force witness advised there was not a dispute, id. at 113, the CO had
   a different view. During the second day of the hearing, the CO testified
   that he disagreed with the Commander's description of the requirements of
   this work, id. at 304, and testified that he had raised with the Commander
   "on more than one occasion" the issue of whether the contractor was
   providing services beyond the scope of the contract. Id. at 325.

   [9] Overlook contends that it was unreasonable for the agency to allow
   LinQuest to address an impaired objectivity OCI through the use of the
   firewall arrangement proposed by GDAIS. We share Overlook's skepticism in
   this area, and have noted that while walling off employees using a
   firewall arrangement (sometimes also referred to as a "Chinese wall"
   arrangement) may resolve other types of conflicts of interest (such as
   those involving unfair access to information), it does not resolve an OCI
   involving potentially impaired objectivity. Aetna Gov't Health Plans,
   Inc.; Foundation Health Fed. Servs., Inc., supra, at 16. This is because
   the conflict at issue pertains to the organization, and not the individual
   employees. Id.; see FAR sect. 9.501. On the other hand, we note that the
   LinQuest Mitigation Plan, as modified, did not limit its mitigation
   approach to the use of firewalls for GDAIS employees. The CO noted that
   the plan also included OCI training on an annual basis, and a reassignment
   of tasks from GDAIS to LinQuest personnel when questions arise about the
   ability of a GDAIS employee to be objective. Supp. AR, Tab 13, at 15-16.
   In addition, the CO took steps to ensure increased government oversight of
   GPSOC activities. Id. at 16-17. Finally, the CO examined the risk of a
   conflict of interest posed by most of the work contemplated here and
   concluded that a substantial majority of the work did not raise a
   conflict. In our view, these considerations together rendered reasonable
   the CO's decision that the minimal risk of an OCI here was adequately
   mitigated.

   [10] We recognize that Overlook bases this argument on an e-mail in the
   record wherein an Air Force official questions whether the mitigation
   approach taken by LinQuest will dilute the strength of the company's
   technical approach. Supp. AR, Tab 20, at 4. These deliberations, and
   others like them in the record, contribute to our view that the mitigation
   approach here received careful consideration by the agency. We do not read
   the question raised in this e-mail to support a conclusion that the agency
   should have undertaken a new best value tradeoff, which per the RFP, was
   limited to the consideration of price versus past performance.

   [11] We note also that the RFP here contained an attached memorandum
   requesting information about any potential OCIs by January 3, a date well
   in advance of the January 27 due date for the receipt of initial
   proposals. If this exchange had been sufficient to resolve concerns about
   any OCIs, it would have been completed before proposals were even
   received. Thus, the fact that OCIs can be resolved before the submission
   of proposals, or after evaluations are completed, further suggests that
   these exchanges should not be considered discussions.