TITLE: B-297889; B-297889.2, AshBritt Inc., March 20, 2006
BNUMBER: B-297889; B-297889.2
DATE: March 20, 2006
***************************************************
B-297889; B-297889.2, AshBritt Inc., March 20, 2006

   Decision

   Matter of: AshBritt Inc.

   File: B-297889; B-297889.2

   Date: March 20, 2006

   William J. Spriggs, Esq., Stephen A. Klein, Esq., and Sharon M. Mills,
   Esq., Spriggs & Hollingsworth, and David J. Taylor, Esq., Tighe Patton
   Armstrong Teasdale, for the protester.

   Shannon M. Elliott, Esq., Lanny R. Robinson, Esq., and Henry H. Black,
   Esq., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for the agency.

   Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Protester's contention that an agency improperly included a Mississippi
   set-aside in a solicitation for cleanup efforts in Mississippi associated
   with damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina is denied where a provision
   of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
   (the Stafford Act), 42 U.S.C. sect. 5150, requires the agency to provide a
   preference in debris removal contracts to firms residing, or primarily
   doing business, in the area affected by a major disaster, and a review of
   the statute and its legislative history does not show that the use of a
   set-aside to provide that preference, or the decision to provide the
   preference only to firms residing, or primarily doing business, in
   Mississippi--to the exclusion of firms located in other states affected by
   the same natural disaster--was an abuse of the agency's discretion to
   implement the statute's scheme.

   2. Contention that a Justification and Approval (J&A) does not properly
   support an agency's decision to limit a competition for debris cleanup
   under the Stafford Act to firms residing, or primarily doing business, in
   Mississippi is denied where the agency's J&A reasonably explains and
   justifies the actions taken, and where the record shows that those actions
   are within the discretion provided by the Stafford Act, even though the
   protester correctly points out minor errors in the J&A.

   DECISION

   AshBritt Inc. protests the terms of solicitation No. W912EE-06-R-0005,
   issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for demolition and debris
   removal from public, commercial, or private residential properties located
   in the state of Mississippi. The cleanup efforts covered by this
   solicitation are associated with damage to certain areas in Mississippi
   resulting from Hurricane Katrina, which were declared a major disaster
   area by the President on August 29, 2005, under the authority of the
   Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as
   amended, 42 U.S.C. sect. 5121 et seq. (the Stafford Act).

   AshBritt argues that the Corps's decision to limit the competition for
   this work to Mississippi firms improperly exceeds the authority granted
   under a provision of the Stafford Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. sect. 5150)
   to provide a preference to firms residing, or primarily doing business, in
   the area affected by a major disaster. AshBritt also argues that the
   solicitation is ambiguous in its guidance about what constitutes a
   Mississippi firm, anticipates an improper multiple-award contract, and
   fails to provide an estimate for the amount of demolition that will be
   required under this contract.

   We deny the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The storm that is now known as Hurricane Katrina--and is widely described
   as the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history--began as a
   tropical depression near the Bahamas around August 23, 2005.[1] Two days
   later, August 25, the storm made its first landfall in the United States,
   near the border separating the Florida counties of Miami-Dade and Broward.
   By this point Katrina had become a category 1 hurricane.[2] After crossing
   the southern end of Florida, Hurricane Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico,
   where it became a category 5 hurricane by August 28, when it was
   positioned approximately 250 miles south/southeast of the mouth of the
   Mississippi River.

   On the morning of August 29, Hurricane Katrina made landfall at
   Louisiana's Plaquemines Parish--a parish that forms a peninsula that juts
   into the Gulf of Mexico. The hurricane made a second landfall later that
   morning near the border of Louisiana and Mississippi. By the time of its
   second landfall, Katrina was a category 3 hurricane with winds near 125
   miles per hour. Hurricane Katrina caused substantial damage to the
   coastlines of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, with damage extending
   along the Gulf coast of Florida. In addition, as the hurricane traveled
   inland, it caused significant damage in non-coastal areas of Louisiana,
   Mississippi, and Alabama. Much of the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina
   was later exacerbated when Hurricane Rita made landfall east of the
   Texas/Louisiana border on September 24, and caused significant flooding in
   many of the same areas flooded by Katrina.[3]

   When a natural catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina overwhelms the ability
   of a state to provide aid, assistance, and emergency services, and to
   reconstruct and rehabilitate devastated areas, the process by which the
   federal government provides assistance is set out in the Stafford Act. 42
   U.S.C. sect. 5121. Upon a request from the governor of the affected state,
   the President can declare an "emergency" or a "major disaster" under the
   Stafford Act; both terms are defined at 42 U.S.C. sect. 5122. The type of
   request and declaration triggers specific types of federal relief. This
   bid protest decision involves a contract that provides disaster relief.[4]

   A governor's request to the President for federal disaster relief must be
   accompanied by a finding "that the disaster is of such severity and
   magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State
   and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is
   necessary." 42 U.S.C. sect. 5170. When a governor makes such a request,
   and the President declares that a "major disaster" exists, federal
   assistance follows. Id.

   The first Presidential Declaration of a Major Disaster under the Stafford
   Act in response to Hurricane Katrina was dated August 28.[5] This
   Declaration determined that damage in certain areas of the state of
   Florida, beginning on August 24, and continuing, was of sufficient
   severity and magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the
   Act. AR, Tab 5a. In particular, the initial Declaration determined that
   the Florida counties of Broward and Miami-Dade had been affected by a
   major disaster, and federal assistance for debris removal and emergency
   protective measures were authorized for those two counties.[6] As events
   unfolded, the Declaration for Florida was amended on August 30, September
   4, and twice on September 6. At the end of this process two more counties
   at the southern tip of Florida--Collier and Monroe--and seven counties
   along the Gulf of Mexico in Florida's "panhandle" region had been declared
   major disaster areas. Id.

   On August 29, the President issued Declarations of a Major Disaster for
   Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama (in response to requests from the
   governors of those states). AR, Tab 6a, 7a, 8a. With respect to Louisiana,
   the initial Declaration was amended 10 times; ultimately, every parish in
   the state was declared a disaster area. AR, Tab 6a. With respect to
   Mississippi, the initial Declaration was amended 12 times; ultimately,
   every county in that state was declared a disaster area. Id., Tab 7a. With
   respect to Alabama, the initial Declaration was amended 8 times, and
   ultimately 22 of 67 counties in Alabama were declared disaster areas. Id.,
   Tab 8a.

   In Mississippi, where the cleanup work covered by this solicitation is to
   occur, 775,000 residents, nearly 55 percent of the population, were left
   without power after the storm. The initial estimate was that more than 530
   homes had been destroyed and another 30,000 damaged, with more than 1,000
   businesses damaged; the Corps estimated that approximately 6,000 of these
   structures would have to be demolished, and 2.1 million cubic yards of
   material removed. Contracting Officer's (CO) Statement at 1. In response
   to this need, the Corps activated a previously awarded contract under what
   the agency terms its "Advance Contracting Initiative" (ACI); AshBritt was
   an ACI contractor and it was deployed to Mississippi to immediately begin
   helping in the cleanup effort. Id.

   The CO explains that shortly after AshBritt was deployed to Mississippi,
   the agency realized that its initial estimates were too low, and that its
   ACI contracts were inadequate for the volume of cleanup work that would be
   required. Id. at 2. Shortly thereafter, the Corps held a competition for a
   new contractor, and on September 15, AshBritt won that award as well.
   Thus, AshBritt has been performing these services since shortly after
   Hurricane Katrina struck the state. The current AshBritt contract covers
   all FEMA-related work[7] for debris removal in Mississippi and has a
   ceiling of $500 million, with an option for an additional $500 million.
   Protester's Comments at 3.

   Between the time that AshBritt received the current Mississippi cleanup
   contract, and the issuance of the instant solicitation on December 17,
   2005, the record here reflects numerous complaints about the award of this
   contract to a non-Mississippi firm. For example, the protester has
   provided copies of three articles from the Clarion-Ledger newspaper in
   Jackson, Mississippi (Protester's Comments, exh. D, E, and I), and one
   article from the Washington Post (Id., exh. C), detailing the complaints
   of Mississippi political and business leaders about the award of this
   contract to an out-of-state company. In addition, the protester provided
   the transcript of a hearing before the House Select Bipartisan Committee
   to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Oct.
   19, 2005. During this hearing, a member of the Mississippi Congressional
   delegation urged the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
   follow the requirement of the Stafford Act and "redirect" the cleanup
   contracts in Mississippi and Louisiana to local firms. Protester's
   Comments, exh. J.

   Approximately 2 months later, on December 17, the Corps issued the
   solicitation here. The RFP, as amended, anticipates a competition for the
   award of three indefinite-quantity contracts--one unrestricted as to size,
   one reserved for Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small
   businesses, and one reserved for 8(a) small businesses. In addition, the
   RFP limits competition for these three contracts "to firms residing or
   doing business primarily in the State of Mississippi pursuant to the
   Stafford Act." RFP, amend. 7, at 2-3.[8] The RFP explained that the
   maximum contract amount for the unrestricted portion of the work would be
   $150 million; the maximum contract amount for the HUBZone set-aside
   portion would be $125 million; and the maximum contract amount for the
   8(a) set-aside would be $25 million. Id. at 3.

   Four days later, on December 21, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
   approved a Justification and Approval (J&A) document authorizing less than
   full and open competition for this procurement. AR, Tab M. The Assistant
   Secretary's Approval Statement indicates that the J&A is based on
   authority provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(c)(5) (2000), and the
   Stafford Act. Id. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provision
   implementing the statutory authority at 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(c)(5)
   expressly identifies the Stafford Act as one of the statutes that may be
   used to support a decision to use other than full and open competition in
   a federal procurement. FAR sect. 6.302-5(b)(5).

   On January 17, 2006, 1 day prior to the due date set for the receipt of
   proposals, AshBritt filed the instant protest, which was amended on
   January 30 to address changes to the solicitation made after the initial
   protest was filed. AshBritt's amended protest also challenged the terms of
   the J&A, which the Corps provided to AshBritt, and to our Office, on
   January 24. On February 14, 1 day prior to the due date for the agency's
   report in answer to this protest, the agency issued another amendment to
   the solicitation. In the agency's view, this most recent amendment
   addresses AshBritt's challenges to the multiple-award nature of this RFP,
   and addresses the protester's assertions that, among other shortcomings,
   the solicitation provides inadequate guidance on what constitutes a
   Mississippi firm. As AshBritt does not accept the agency's
   characterization of the effect of this amendment, we set forth below our
   resolution of all the issues before us.[9]

   DECISION

   AshBritt's Challenges to the Mississippi Set-Aside

   AshBritt argues that the agency's decision to limit this competition to
   Mississippi firms exceeds the authority granted by the Stafford Act.
   Specifically, AshBritt contends that the "preference" envisioned by the
   Act does not include the authority to use a set-aside, and that the use of
   a set-aside, without express statutory authority, violates the Competition
   in Contracting Act. AshBritt also argues that the Stafford Act does not
   permit limiting the preference to firms located in only one state, to the
   exclusion of firms located in other states similarly affected by the same
   major disaster, in this case, Hurricane Katrina. Finally, AshBritt argues
   that the J&A prepared here does not support the agency's decision to limit
   competition to Mississippi firms.

   A threshold matter that must be addressed--and that relates to all that
   follows--is AshBritt's contention that the agency's decision to even
   conduct this competition, as well as its decision to limit the competition
   here to Mississippi firms, was, in essence, an abdication of its
   responsibilities in the face of Congressional pressure. In support of its
   contention, AshBritt points to evidence in the record, some of which is
   discussed above, related to criticism of the agency by certain Mississippi
   political leaders for the agency's use of out-of-state contractors to
   clean up disaster-related debris in Mississippi, and for not making full
   use of the Stafford Act authority to provide a preference for local
   contractors in cleaning up debris related to a major disaster.

   While the record here--especially documents produced by the agency late in
   our protest process--suggests that the inquiries and concerns expressed by
   Congressional representatives played a role in the agency's decisions,
   there is nothing per se improper about an agency decision made in response
   to views expressed by members of Congress. See Kenco Assocs., Inc.; Air
   Product and Chem., Inc., B-297503, B-297503.2, Jan. 25, 2006, 2006 CPD
   para. 24 at 4; Starfleet Marine Transp., Inc., B-290181, July 5, 2002,
   2002 CPD para. 113 at 9-10; Lackland 21^st Century Servs.
   Consolidated--Protest and Costs, B-285938.6, July 13, 2001, 2001 CPD
   para. 124 at 5. Rather, the standard of review we apply is whether the
   agency's procurement action complies with applicable procurement statutes
   and regulations, like those at issue here. Lackland 21^st Century Servs.
   Consolidated--Protest and Costs, supra. For the reasons set forth below,
   we think it did.

   The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984, 10 U.S.C.
   sect. 2304(a)(1), generally requires the use of full and open competition
   in federal procurements; however, CICA expressly anticipates that
   procedures other than full and open competition may be used when a statute
   expressly authorizes or requires that an acquisition be made from a
   specified source. 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304(c)(5). The Federal Acquisition
   Regulation (FAR) provisions implementing this authority expressly identify
   the Stafford Act, and cite to 42 U.S.C. sect. 5150, as one example of such
   a statute. FAR sect. 6.302-5(b)(5).

   In its entirety, the Stafford Act provision at issue here states:

   Use of local firms and individuals

   In the expenditure of Federal funds for debris clearance, distribution of
   supplies, reconstruction, and other major disaster or emergency assistance
   activities which may be carried out by contract or agreement with private
   organizations, firms, or individuals, preference shall be given, to the
   extent feasible and practicable, to those organizations, firms, and
   individuals residing or doing business primarily in the area affected by
   such major disaster or emergency. This section shall not be considered to
   restrict the use of Department of Defense resources in the provision of
   major disaster assistance under this chapter.

   42 U.S.C. sect. 5150 (emphasis added).

   We turn first to AshBritt's contention that the use of a set-aside is
   beyond the authority provided agencies by the Stafford Act.

   Generally, our Office will not question an agency's implementation of a
   statutory procurement requirement unless the record shows that the
   implementation was unreasonable or inconsistent with congressional
   intent--a matter best determined by the words of the statute itself, or by
   the statute's legislative history. See Harris Corp. Broadcast Div.,
   B-255302, Feb. 10, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 107 at 6. With respect to
   statutory procurement preferences, we have held that where a statute does
   not specify a particular way to give a provided preference to a class of
   potential contractors, agency acquisition officials have broad discretion
   in selecting the way to effectuate the statutory mandate. American Multi
   Media, Inc.--Recon., B-293782.2, Aug. 25, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 158 at 5
   (preference for nonprofit institutions concerned with the blind and other
   physically handicapped persons); HAP Constr., Inc., B-280044.2, Sept. 21,
   1998, 98-2 CPD para. 76 at 4 (preference for firms doing business in a
   disaster area under the Stafford Act); Appalachian Research Council,
   B-256179, May 20, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 319 at 15-16 (preference for
   agencies with demonstrated experience with the needs of youth in outreach
   contracts under the Job Training Partnership Act); and U.S. Def. Sys.,
   Inc., B-251544 et al., Mar. 20, 1993, 93-1 CPD para. 279 at 4-5
   (preference for U.S. firms in the award of contracts for guard services at
   overseas embassies).

   As we noted in our decision in HAP Constr., and as we have seen again
   here, neither the language of the statute, nor the legislative history of
   the Stafford Act, defines the terms "preference," "feasible," or
   "practicable." HAP Constr., Inc., supra, at 5. Without specific
   definitions to guide our review, we look to whether the agency's
   interpretation is contradicted by the plain meaning of the words used in
   the statute. In our view, it is not.

   The primary meaning of the word "preference" in Black's Law Dictionary
   1217 (8^th Ed. 2004) is "[t]he act of favoring one person or thing over
   another...." Our review of the bid protest decisions above, and other
   materials, shows that agencies have used a continuum of possible
   preferences to implement statutes that provide one class of contractor a
   preference over others. For example, in the U.S. Def. Sys., Inc. decision,
   cited above, the agency provided a preference in the form of five
   evaluation points to be added to an offeror's technical evaluation. In
   contrast, FEMA has opted to implement the provision of the Stafford Act
   under review here by providing a 30 percent price preference. 48 C.F.R.
   sect. 4452.217-70. While we have not previously seen a protest involving
   an agency decision to implement a preference using a set-aside, we think a
   set-aside can be viewed as, in effect, an absolute preference, located at
   one end of the continuum of possible preferences an agency might
   adopt.[10]

   In our view, we have no basis for questioning the broader definition of
   "preference" inherent in the agency's position in this case. Moreover, we
   think AshBritt misses the point when it argues that some form of
   preference short of a set-aside also implements the Stafford Act's
   preference for using local businesses to clean up disaster-related debris.
   The question here is not whether some lesser form of preference might have
   satisfied the Act's intent, but whether the preference chosen was an abuse
   of agency discretion. Since the language in the statute does not
   specifically restrict the application of the preference, and since the use
   of a set-aside is consistent with the statutory goal of assisting firms in
   the affected area, we do not view the Corps's decision to implement the
   Stafford Act preference with a set-aside as an abuse of the agency's
   discretion to implement this statutory scheme. See id. at 6; Appalachian
   Research Council, supra, at 16.

   We turn next to AshBritt's contention that the Stafford Act does not
   envision providing a preference (in this case, a set-aside) only to firms
   doing business in a particular state, to the exclusion of firms located in
   other states affected by the same natural disaster.

   As an initial matter, it is fair to note that AshBritt's interpretation of
   the geographic reach of 42 U.S.C. sect. 5150 appears to be supported by
   the portion of the statute that requires this preference be provided to
   firms "residing or doing business primarily in the area affected by such
   major disaster or emergency." To conclude, however, that the Corps abused
   its discretion by limiting the competition here to firms within a single
   state would require us to ignore the overall scheme of the Stafford Act,
   the legislative history of the Act explaining what Congress was trying to
   accomplish with this provision, and the simultaneously enacted title of
   the preference provision in the Act (which is now reflected in the U.S.
   Code). While we think an agency reasonably might elect not to adopt the
   kind of restriction used in this procurement, see, e.g., HAP Constr.,
   Inc., supra, we do not agree that the Corps acted improperly here by
   limiting this competition to Mississippi firms.

   The entire scheme of the Stafford Act contemplates a process by which
   states interact with, and seek assistance from, the federal government;
   this interaction does not cross state lines. For example, federal
   assistance under the Stafford Act is triggered by a governor's finding
   that a major disaster has overwhelmed the state's ability to provide aid,
   assistance, and emergency services, and to reconstruct and rehabilitate
   devastated areas. 42 U.S.C. sections 5121, 5170. When a governor presents
   such a finding to the President, and the President agrees, the President
   declares that a major disaster exists. 42 U.S.C. sect. 5170. This
   declaration identifies the specific areas within the state eligible for
   disaster relief, and specifies the type of relief available. 44 C.F.R.
   sect. 206.40; see also AR, Tabs 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a. In addition, the
   statute, on its face, identifies the limits of federal cost-sharing
   available to the state for different types of relief activities. See,
   e.g., 42 U.S.C. sections 5170b(b), 5170c(a), 5173(d). Moreover, as shown
   by the record in this protest, there are separate Presidential
   declarations for each state, see AR, Tabs 5a (Florida), 6a (Louisiana),
   7a (Mississippi), and 8a (Alabama); there is no unified disaster
   declaration addressing all damage done by Hurricane Katrina, which would
   be more along the lines of the scheme AshBritt posits.

   We turn next to the legislative history of the Stafford Act's preference
   provision. In this regard, we note that section 5150 of Title 42 was first
   enacted, in substantially similar form, as section 204 of the Disaster
   Relief Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744, 1748. The Senate
   Committee on Public Works, the committee that proposed the language,
   crafted this provision to favor the use of local businesses to perform
   debris clearance. The committee's report on the bill explained the
   provision as follows:

   Section 204 provides that in the expenditure of Federal funds, for
   example, for debris clearance and reconstruction of public facilities,
   preference is to be given to persons or firms who work or do business in
   the disaster area. One outstanding feature of the aftermath of a great
   disaster is the lack of ready cash. A Federal assistance program should be
   designed to revitalize the community by infusions of cash through the use
   of local people and business firms.

   S. Rep. No. 91-1157, at 12 (1970) (emphasis added). Based on our review of
   the language above, we think the agency's actions are supported by the
   legislative history of the provision.

   As a final matter, we note that section 5150 of Title 42 was enacted with
   a title, which we included with the provision when it was quoted above.
   Specifically, the title of this section was, and remains, "Use of Local
   Firms and Individuals." Moreover, FEMA's regulations interpreting the
   Stafford Act repeat the enacted title of the statute in its implementation
   of the Act. 44 C.F.R. sect. 206.10. Similarly, FEMA's contract clause
   implementing the regulation and statute describes the preference as
   available to "local firms" in the area affected by the disaster. 48 C.F.R.
   sect. 4452.217-70.

   We recognize that AshBritt, too, appears to be located in an area that was
   declared a major disaster by the President because of damage caused by
   Hurricane Katrina. Nonetheless, when we consider that the drafters of the
   Stafford Act fashioned this provision to help revitalize communities by
   using local businesses to clean up debris related to major disasters, we
   will not conclude that the agency abused its discretion to implement this
   preference by limiting the competition for cleaning up debris in
   Mississippi to Mississippi firms.[11]

   Finally, AshBritt mounts several challenges to the J&A used here to
   justify the agency's decision to limit competition. Specifically, AshBritt
   contends that the J&A does not fully comply with FAR requirements,
   contains factual errors, and does not logically support the limited
   competition approach selected by the agency. We have reviewed each of
   AshBritt's contentions in this area, and find that none of them lead to a
   conclusion that the agency has acted improperly here.

   The FAR regulations that implement CICA expressly anticipate limiting full
   and open competition to accommodate the Stafford Act's preference for
   using local businesses to clean up debris resulting from a major disaster.
   FAR sect. 6.302-5(b)(5). The FAR does not require the generation of a J&A
   when a statute expressly requires that a procurement be made from a
   specified source; rather, the FAR advises that "when the statute
   authorizes, but does not require, that the procurement be made from a
   specified source" the agency must prepare a J&A. FAR
   sect. 6.302-5(c)(2)(ii). As we hold in this decision, the Stafford Act
   authorizes, but does not require, that a procurement be made from
   specified sources (i.e., firms within the area affected by a major
   disaster). Accordingly, a J&A was required here.

   When a J&A is required to justify limiting full and open competition, the
   FAR sets out a general list of requirements about when a J&A must be
   prepared (FAR sect. 6.303-1), a list of the minimum amount of information
   the J&A must contain (FAR sect. 6.303-2), and the level at which the
   document must be approved (FAR sect. 6.303). These requirements generally
   apply without regard to which exemption from full and open competition
   resulted in the need to prepare a J&A. See generally FAR sect. 6.303.
   Among information that must be provided with each J&A is a contracting
   officer's certification that the justification is accurate and complete.
   FAR sect. 6.303-2(a)(12).

   As an initial matter, we note that the list of the minimum amount of
   information that must be provided in all J&A documents, mandated by FAR
   sect. 6.303-2, contains several items that simply do not fit well with the
   situation where competition has been limited as authorized or required by
   statute. For example, item number 11 on the list, FAR
   sect. 6.303-2(a)(11), requires the justification to provide a "statement
   of the actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any
   barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisition for the supplies
   or services required." Here, the agency simply advised that in the
   future--presumably after the time period stated in the disaster
   declarations has passed, see FAR sect. 26.201(b) (stating that the
   authority to provide a preference applies only to acquisitions conducted
   during the term of a major disaster declaration made by the President)--it
   would resume using full and open competition.

   Where, as here, a statute authorizes or requires that a procurement be
   made from a specified source, as anticipated by FAR sect. 6.302-5, there
   is little an agency can say about how it will avoid the situation in the
   future. Simply put, we fail to see how the J&A's statement about future
   competitions is, in any way, inadequate under the circumstances here. See
   PacOrd, B-238366, May 11, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 466 at 3-4 (an agency's
   failure to perform a market survey and describe the survey in its J&A, as
   required by FAR sect. 6.302-2(a)(5), did not provide a basis for
   overturning a sole source procurement where a Memorandum of Understanding
   between the United States and other nations, in essence, required the
   sole-source procurement by mandating that the item be purchased from a
   specified source).

   Similarly, AshBritt points to alleged "inaccuracies" in the J&A, including
   several which it says are found within the portion of the J&A document
   AshBritt describes as "the crux of the agency's justification."
   Protester's Comments at 12. This passage states:

   Currently major mission (debris, roofing, and temporary public buildings)
   obligations are in excess of $440,000,000. Of this amount, approximately
   80% is going to contactors who reside or are doing business outside of the
   State of Mississippi. The majority of prime contractors are either
   complying with or making a good faith effort to subcontract to local
   contractors. However, many local contractors have recovered from the
   initial impacts of the hurricane and are now eligible and willing to
   compete as prime contractors. Limiting competition to contractors residing
   in or doing business primarily in the State of Mississippi will ensure
   compliance with the Stafford Act.

   AR, Tab M (J&A), at 3. In this regard, AshBritt argues that this statement
   wrongly includes obligations for roofing and temporary building
   contractors as part of the justification for awarding a new contract for
   debris removal, and wrongly implies that local contractors were not ready
   to compete earlier but are ready now--even though AshBritt claims that two
   of the three large Mississippi contractors that the J&A identifies as able
   to compete here, in fact, submitted proposals in the earlier competition
   that AshBritt won.

   AshBritt's disagreement with the representations in the J&A described
   above does not raise questions about whether the agency acted properly
   here. The preference for local businesses in debris cleanup contracts in
   the Stafford Act is not tied to any amount of obligations. Whether the
   current obligations exceed $500 million, $50 million, or $1 million sheds
   no light on whether the agency acted properly in electing to provide the
   preference, or in justifying it. See AAI ACL Techs., Inc., B-258679.4,
   Nov. 28, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 243 at 7 n.5 (the existence of a technical
   error in a J&A does not necessarily result in a conclusion that the J&A is
   defective). Moreover, it does not appear that this justification is
   inaccurate in any meaningful way since we have been advised by the Corps
   during the course of this protest that it is nearing the ceiling amount of
   AshBritt's base contract, or $500 million. As a result, the Corps advised
   that it is exercising its option with AshBritt to order additional debris
   cleanup; the option amount contains an additional $500 million maximum.
   Thus, the real problem with the J&A may be that the stated obligations
   were too low, not too high.[12]

   We also disagree with AshBritt's contention that the J&A here does not
   justify limiting this competition because the Corps has only identified
   three large Mississippi businesses that can compete for the unrestricted
   award anticipated by this solicitation. As indicated above, the Stafford
   Act requires that agencies provide this preference to the extent
   "feasible" and "practicable." Given that the Corps has identified at least
   three large Mississippi businesses that it expects to compete for the
   work, we think the agency can reasonably justify its decision that
   providing the preference here is feasible and practicable. Cf. HAP
   Constr., Inc., supra, at 4-5 (agency reasonably concluded that recent
   procurement histories for disaster relief services in the areas involved
   did not provide a basis for concluding that there would be competition
   among local firms that would ensure reasonable prices). Since AshBritt has
   not argued that the agency erred in its conclusion about the amount of
   competition it will achieve (as opposed to AshBritt's assertion that three
   large Mississippi contractors is insufficient to support a limited
   competition), we need not consider this matter further.[13]

   Other Challenges to the Solicitation

   AshBritt raises three other challenges to the solicitation here. First, it
   contends that regardless of whether the agency acted within its discretion
   in conducting this procurement as a Mississippi set-aside, the
   solicitation is improperly ambiguous because it fails to provide clear
   guidance on what constitutes residing, or primarily doing business, in
   that state. Second, AshBritt argues that the agency has failed to comply
   with the FAR regulations that govern the use of multiple-award contracts.
   Third, AshBritt contends that the solicitation impermissibly fails to
   include an estimate for the demolition work that will be covered by the
   contract.

   AshBritt's initial contention that this solicitation is ambiguous about
   how the agency will decide whether a firm resides, or is primarily doing
   business, in Mississippi, has been addressed by the agency in amendments
   to the solicitation. As first issued, the RFP here stated only that this
   competition would be "limited to firms primarily doing business in the
   State of Mississippi pursuant to the Stafford Act." RFP at 2. After the
   protest was initially filed, this language was deleted and ultimately
   replaced with language that stated that the competition would be limited
   "to firms residing or doing business primarily in the State of
   Mississippi, pursuant to the Stafford Act." RFP, amend. 6, at 2. In
   addition, the agency added the following section to the solicitation:

   Guidance on What Constitutes a Firm Residing or Primarily Doing Business
   in the State of Mississippi

   In order to assist the offerors' understanding of what constitutes a "firm
   residing or primarily doing business in the State of Mississippi" the
   following non-exclusive list of factors which may be considered is
   provided:

   (a)  If incorporated, in which state is the firm incorporated and the date
   of incorporation;

   (b)  In which state(s), if any, does the firm maintain a permanent
   office(s) (if a permanent office is located in Mississippi, when was that
   office established);

   (c)  Does the firm have existing Mississippi state licenses, how many and
   for how long;

   (d)  What is the firm's record of past work in the state of Mississippi,
   how much and for how long; and what is the contractual history does [sic]
   the firm have with subcontractors and/or suppliers in the state of
   Mississippi;

   (e)  What percentage of the firm's gross revenues are attributable to work
   performed in the state of Mississippi;

   (f)    How many permanent employees does the firm have in the state of
   Mississippi;

   (g)  Is the firm a member of any state organizations (i.e. Mississippi
   Economic Council, Blueprint Mississippi, Local Chamber(s) of Commerce);

   (h)  Any other evidence submitted by an offering firm tending to establish
   that the firm resides or primarily does business in the State of
   Mississippi.

   If these factors establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
   firm in question resides or primarily does business in the State of
   Mississippi, then said firm shall be categorized as such.

   Id. at 7-8 (emphasis in original). In its supplemental protest and
   comments, AshBritt renews its challenge to this guidance on the grounds
   that the guidance improperly lumps together the criteria for establishing
   that a firm resides, and is primarily doing business, in Mississippi;
   improperly provides a non-exclusive list of factors that will be used by
   the agency; and impermissibly includes factors unrelated to the goal of
   the Stafford Act--such as the factors that consider where a firm is
   incorporated, where it holds licenses, how long it has held such licenses
   or has performed work in the state, and how many permanent employees it
   has within the state.

   In our view, the agency's identification of some of the factors it will
   use to assess whether a firm falls within the scope of the Mississippi
   set-aside in this solicitation adequately addresses any concern that the
   solicitation here is ambiguous. The non-exclusive list of factors, quoted
   above, appears to provide sound and specific guidance to potential
   offerors about whether they will be able to qualify under the set-aside
   used here. In addition, we are aware of no requirement that the guidance
   contain an exhaustive list of the factors that will be considered. As
   stated in the last factor quoted above, the agency is willing to consider
   any other evidence that an offeror submits that will establish that it is
   eligible for award under the terms of the set-aside.

   With respect to AshBritt's complaint that the factors in the solicitation
   are unrelated to the goal of the Stafford Act, we again disagree. While we
   have no doubt that the magnitude of AshBritt's current cleanup contract is
   sufficiently large that the company may argue that its "primary" business
   now occurs in Mississippi, we think the factors included in the
   solicitation will allow the agency to reach a considered judgment about
   whether AshBritt is a business that can reasonably claim to be "residing
   or doing business primarily in" the state. Since we have concluded that
   the use of a Mississippi set-aside was within the agency's discretion to
   provide a preference to local firms in the area affected by the disaster,
   we think the guidance here has been properly drawn to help the agency give
   effect to that preference.

   AshBritt next argues that the agency has failed to comply with the
   requirements of FAR sections 16.504(c)(1)(ii)(B)(3)-(4) governing the use
   of multiple-award contracts. These provisions are part of the FAR's
   implementation of a preference in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
   of 1994, 10 U.S.C. sect. 2304a(d) (2000), for awarding multiple task or
   delivery order contracts for the same or similar services or property;
   they establish criteria for determining whether multiple-award contracts
   would not be in the best interest of the government. One Source Mech.
   Servs., Inc.; Kane Constr., B-293692, B-293802, June 1, 2004, 2004 CPD
   para. 112 at 3. In particular, the cited provisions state that a
   contracting officer should not use a multiple-award approach if the
   expected cost of administering multiple award contracts outweighs the
   expected benefits of making multiple awards
   (sect. 16.504(c)(1)(ii)(B)(3)), or if the projected task orders are so
   integrally related that only a single contractor can reasonably perform
   the work (sect. 16.504(c)(1)(ii)(B)(4)).

   AshBritt's contention in this area is based on the premise that the agency
   is making multiple awards so that it will later be able to hold
   mini-competitions for this cleanup work. Under this rubric, AshBritt
   argues that the FAR restrictions above should have led the agency to
   conclude that it could not reasonably make multiple awards under this
   solicitation.

   While it is technically correct that the Corps is using a single
   solicitation here to make three distinct awards (and in that limited
   sense, the agency is making multiple awards), there is nothing in this
   record to suggest that the awards are overlapping in any way, that the
   agency intends to hold mini-competitions among the awardees for the award
   of task orders, or that any of the policy implications of FAR Subpart 16.5
   are at issue here. Instead, the solicitation anticipates awarding one
   contract to a large business, one to a HUBZone small business, and one to
   an 8(a) small business. In addition, the solicitation anticipates using
   each of these three contracts in a separate and discrete geographic area.
   RFP, amend. 7, at 2-3. Specifically, the RFP advises that "Contract Number
   1"--the contract which is unrestricted in size--"is for work in the
   counties of Hancock and Harrison only"; "Contract Number 2"--the contract
   reserved for HUBZone small businesses--"is for work in the county of
   Jackson only"; and "Contract Number 3"--the contract reserved for 8(a)
   small businesses--"is for work in Covington, Forrest, Lamar, Lincoln, and
   Perry (Northern Counties) only." Id.

   Not only is AshBritt's underlying premise at odds with the language and
   structure  of the solicitation, as shown above, but the agency explains
   that even if the identified FAR provisions applied to the situation here,
   there are beneficial effects associated with awarding three separate
   contracts for this work. Specifically, the agency explains that, among
   other benefits, these awards will help ameliorate the negative effect of
   Hurricane Katrina on the state's economy, lower the unemployment rate, and
   ensure that the agency has acted in compliance with the Stafford Act. AR
   at 16. In short, we see nothing in this record that leads us to conclude
   that the agency has violated the FAR restrictions AshBritt identified
   relating to multiple-award contracts.

   Finally, AshBritt complains that the solicitation here improperly fails to
   contain estimates for the amount of demolition work that will be required
   under each contract (as opposed to estimates for the amount of debris
   removal, which are provided in the RFP). According to AshBritt, "such
   quantity estimates are mandatory in order to permit the Agency to evaluate
   its total overall costs by applying unit prices to quantity estimates."
   Protester's Comments at 15. In support of its contention, AshBritt relies
   on our recent decision in Department of Agric.--Recon., B-296435.12, Nov.
   3, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 201.

   The Corps explains that it was able to provide overall estimates of debris
   in the RFP for each of the three contracts, but that it is not able to
   estimate the amount of demolition that will be required under each
   contract. AR at 20-23. It also pointed out that these estimates, together
   with the "detailed information on the type of work to be performed and the
   manner in which it is to be carried out," id. at 23, provided sufficient
   information to enable the offerors to compete intelligently and on a
   relatively equal basis. In addition, the Corps points out that AshBritt
   mischaracterizes the above-cited decision when it argues that the decision
   mandates that agencies prepare detailed quantity estimates in order to
   evaluate costs. We agree.

   As a preliminary matter, in the case AshBritt cites, we sustained a
   protest challenging the agency's evaluation of proposed prices under a
   solicitation for mobile food services at various locations. We concluded
   that the agency's evaluation method was flawed because, by considering
   only unit prices for the different services being procured, the price
   evaluation failed to reflect the actual cost to the government of
   different offerors' proposals. Contrary to AshBritt's position, we did not
   conclude that the agency was required to develop detailed quantity
   estimates; rather, we recommended that the agency reevaluate proposals
   using a price evaluation method that allows comparison of the relative
   cost to the government of the offerors' competing proposals. Department of
   Agric.--Recon., supra, at 4-5. 

   Also, contrary to AshBritt's contentions, our decision expressly
   recognized the difficulty involved in developing estimates in certain
   types of situations. Id. at 5. Consistent with this view, we have held
   that an agency may properly impose a certain amount of risk on
   contractors, and offerors are expected to use their professional expertise
   and business judgment in anticipating risks and preparing their offerors.
   AT&T Corp., B-270841 et al., May 1, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 237 at 8. The
   risk imposed on offerors under this RFP appears to affect all offerors
   equally, although we note that AshBritt, the incumbent providing these
   services, should be particularly able to calculate the risk factor in
   preparing its proposal. ARAMARK Servs., Inc., B-282232.2, June 18, 1999,
   99-1 CPD para. 110 at 5. In sum, on the record here, we see no basis to
   conclude that the solicitation is defective because it does not contain
   detailed estimates for the amount of demolition work required.

   The protest is denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The summary information about the progression of Hurricane Katrina set
   forth in this decision was obtained from the website of the National
   Hurricane Center within the National Weather Service, which is within the
   Department of Commerce, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration.
   Among other information, the website provides a monthly summary of
   tropical weather in the Atlantic Ocean. See
   http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/tws/MIATWSAT_aug.shtml?.

   [2] Hurricane intensity is rated by numerical categories using a construct
   known as the Saffir-Simpson scale. The ratings range from 1 to 5,
   indicating increased intensity, with a rating of 5 reserved for hurricanes
   with winds in excess of 155 miles per hour. See
   http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml.

   [3] See http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/tws/MIATWSAT_sep.shtml?.

   [4] Federal emergency relief is generally limited to $5 million, although
   the Stafford Act anticipates a process by which additional emergency
   assistance can be provided. 42 U.S.C. sect. 5193. As set forth in greater
   detail below, the disaster cleanup efforts covered by the solicitation
   here will total hundreds of millions of dollars. RFP at 2.

   [5] All Presidential Disaster Declarations, and all of the amendments to
   those Declarations, are set forth at the Federal Emergency Management
   Agency (FEMA) website (www.fema.gov). For ease of reference, this decision
   will cite to copies of the initial and amended Presidential Declarations
   provided in the Agency Report (AR) at Tabs 5a (Florida), 6a (Louisiana),
   7a (Mississippi), and 8a (Alabama).

   [6] We note for the record that AshBritt's home office is located in
   Broward County, Florida. Protester's Comments at 2, 10.

   [7] FEMA assigned the mission of debris removal to the Army Corps of
   Engineers on August 30, 2005. Id. at 1.

   [8] The solicitation as initially issued limited the competition "to firms
   primarily doing business in the State of Mississippi pursuant to the
   Stafford Act." RFP at 2. While the Corps has tinkered with this wording
   over the course of several amendments, the concept has not changed--the
   competition is limited to Mississippi contractors. The quotation in the
   text of the decision is the RFP's most recent version of the set-aside
   language.

   [9] At the request of the agency, we have handled this protest using our
   express option procedures set forth at 4 C.F.R. sections 21.9 and 21.10
   (2005). As a result, this decision addresses the initial protest, and all
   supplemental protest issues, within 65 days of the date the initial
   protest was filed.

   [10] AshBritt points out that Congress knows how to draft a set-aside
   statute when that is its intention, as evidenced by several statutory
   mandates for set-asides, such as those applicable to small businesses; in
   AshBritt's view, since Congress did not specify a set-aside here, the
   agency does not have authority to conduct a set-aside. In our view, there
   is considerable difference between mandating a set-aside, and drafting a
   statute that permits, but does not require, one. See HAP Constr., Inc.,
   supra, at 6.

   [11] We do not reach, in this protest, the question of whether it would be
   improper to limit a competition for the award of debris cleanup under the
   Stafford Act to firms residing, or primarily doing business, anywhere
   within a single state if not all parts of the state were affected by the
   disaster. Since every county in Mississippi was eventually identified by
   the President for some form of disaster relief, see AR, Tab 7a, this issue
   does not arise here.

   [12] We also note for the record that we have heard no suggestion from
   AshBritt that the exercise of this option by the Corps was improper or not
   needed because the Corps had wrongly determined that it was approaching
   the $500 million ceiling applicable to AshBritt's base contract.

   [13] AshBritt's challenge to the agency's conclusion about the presence of
   competition relates only to the unrestricted portion of the work. The
   Corps has located even more Mississippi businesses that will compete for
   the portions of the work reserved for the HUBZone and 8(a) small
   businesses.