TITLE: B-297374; B-297374.2, Remington Arms Company, Inc., January 12, 2006
BNUMBER: B-297374; B-297374.2
DATE: January 12, 2006
********************************************************************
B-297374; B-297374.2, Remington Arms Company, Inc., January 12, 2006

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Remington Arms Company, Inc.

   File: B-297374; B-297374.2

   Date: January 12, 2006

   Michael R. Charness, Esq., Amy R. Napier, Esq., and Amanda J. Kastello,
   Esq., Vinson & Elkins LLP, for the protester.

   James A. McMillan, Esq., Melissa A. Roover, Esq., and Alan M. Grayson,
   Esq., Grayson & Kubli, P.C., for Knight's Armament Company, an intervenor.

   Capt. Victor G. Vogel, Vera Meza, Esq., and Col. Thomas A. Goonan,
   Department of the Army, for the agency.

   Louis A. Chiarella, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the
   General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Failure to file a protest within 10 days of a preaward debriefing does
   not render the protest untimely when the agency, after the preaward
   debriefing, reinstated protester in the competitive range and continued to
   consider the protester's proposal for award.

   2. Protest of agency's reliability testing of offerors' bid samples is
   denied where the record shows the evaluation was reasonable and consistent
   with the evaluation criteria; protester's disagreement with agency's
   evaluation is insufficient to show it was unreasonable.

   3. Protest challenging the evaluation of technical proposals is denied
   where the record, including post-protest explanations of the rationale for
   the agency's contemporaneous conclusions, establishes that the agency's
   evaluation was reasonable and in accord with the stated evaluation
   criteria.

   4. Agency's decision to make award based on a higher technically-rated,
   higher-priced proposal is unobjectionable where the agency reasonably
   determined that the awardee's greater weapon accuracy, reliability, and
   higher user assessment were worth the price premium.

   DECISION

   Remington Arms Company, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Knight's
   Armament Company under request for proposals (RFP) No. W15QKN-05-R-0433,
   issued by the Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command-Picatinny, Army
   Materiel Command, Department of the Army, for semi-automatic sniper
   systems (SASS). Remington argues that the agency's evaluation of offerors'
   proposals was unreasonable and that the resulting award decision was
   improper.

   We deny the protests.

   BACKGROUND

   The SASS is a semi-automatic, 7.62 millimeter caliber weapon system,
   designed to address the shortcomings in the Army's older M24, bolt-action
   sniper weapon system. The intended purpose of the SASS is to support
   offensive and defensive combat operations by delivering rapid, accurate,
   long-range, direct fire to kill enemy personnel targets and to penetrate
   light-armored vehicles. Agency Report (AR), Tab 4, Source Selection Plan,
   at 1.

   The RFP, issued on December 6, 2004, contemplated the award of a
   fixed-price contract for 30 SASS units together with spare parts, operator
   and maintenance training, manuals, and data requirements, as well as
   options for up to 3,220 additional units. The solicitation established six
   evaluation factors: bid sample; technical; price; government purpose
   license rights (GPLR) availability; past performance; and small
   disadvantaged business (SDB) participation. RFP amend. 5, sect.M, at 82.
   The RFP informed offerors that bid sample was more important than
   technical, and that bid sample and technical, when combined into an
   overall merit rating, were significantly more important than price, GPLR
   availability, past performance, and SDB participation.[1] Id. Award was to
   be made to the responsible offeror whose proposal was determined to be the
   "best value" to the government, all factors considered. Id.

   The RFP required offerors to submit SASS bid samples, as well as written
   proposals addressing the remaining evaluation factors. The solicitation
   established that bid samples were to be evaluated in three categories:
   essential criteria not requiring live-fire testing; essential criteria
   requiring live-fire testing; and "rated requirements." Id. at 83. The
   essential criteria (a total of 17 items) constituted "pass/fail"
   requirements: if an offeror's bid sample failed to comply with any
   essential criterion, the offeror's proposal would be considered
   technically unacceptable and eliminated from further consideration for
   award. Id. By contrast, the bid sample rated requirements (8 items) were
   to be evaluated using an adjectival rating system.[2] One of the bid
   sample essential criteria was a weight limit of not more than 16 pounds.
   Id. at 84. Additionally, as detailed below, weapon reliability was both an
   essential criterion and a rated requirement.

   Five offerors, including Remington and Knight's, submitted proposals by
   the March 11, 2005, closing date. The agency's evaluation of initial
   proposals determined that only the Knight's proposal was acceptable and
   that the remaining four offers were unacceptable. AR, Tab 11, Agency
   Competitive Range Determination, at 10-11. The Army determined that
   Remington's proposal was unacceptable because its bid sample exceeded the
   solicitation weight requirement. AR, Tab 10, Agency Technical Evaluation
   of Initial Proposals, at 25-26.

   The Army notified Remington that it had been excluded from the competitive
   range on August 23, and subsequently provided the offeror with a preaward
   debriefing on September 14. At the debriefing the agency informed
   Remington why its bid sample had been found unacceptable (i.e., failure to
   comply with the bid sample essential weight criterion). AR, Tab 16,
   Remington Debriefing Presentation. The Army also provided Remington with
   its evaluation ratings for all other bid sample requirements, including
   weapon reliability.

   Remington questioned the agency's weight test determination of its bid
   sample, believing that it had been performed improperly and had included
   various SASS items that should not have been part of the weight test. On
   September 16, the Army informed Remington that it had re-weighed the bid
   sample and determined that it complied with the RFP's weight requirement.
   Protest, Oct. 6, 2005, attach. 4, Contracting Officer's Letter to
   Remington, Sept. 16, 2005, at 1. As a result, the agency now considered
   Remington's proposal to be within the competitive range. Id.

   The Army held discussions with Knight's and Remington, and received final
   proposal revisions (FPR) from the offerors on September 23.[3] The agency
   then completed its evaluation of the offerors' FPRs, which were rated as
   follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |               Factor               |    Knight's    |    Remington     |
   |------------------------------------+----------------+------------------|
   |Bid Sample                          |      Good      |  Unsatisfactory  |
   |------------------------------------+----------------+------------------|
   |Technical                           |      Good      |       Good       |
   |------------------------------------+----------------+------------------|
   |Combined Bid Sample & Technical     |      Good      |  Unsatisfactory  |
   |------------------------------------+----------------+------------------|
   |Evaluated Price                     |  $16,561,656   |   $10,919,716    |
   |------------------------------------+----------------+------------------|
   |GPLR Availability                   |   Submitted    |    Submitted     |
   |------------------------------------+----------------+------------------|
   |Past Performance                    |    Low Risk    |     Low Risk     |
   |------------------------------------+----------------+------------------|
   |SDB Participation                   |   Excellent    |    Excellent     |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision, at 2-3.

   After having reviewed the evaluation ratings and findings, the contracting
   officer determined that Knight's higher technically-rated, higher-priced
   proposal represented the best value to the government. Id. at 5-6. These
   protests followed.

   DISCUSSION

   Remington raises four separate bases of protest. First, the protester
   argues that the Army's evaluation of its bid sample with regard to weapon
   reliability was improper. Second, Remington argues that the agency failed
   to document the evaluation of offerors' proposals with regard to the GPLR
   availability and SDB participation factors. Third, the protester alleges
   that the evaluation of the Knight's proposal under the technical factor
   was unreasonable. Fourth, Remington contends that the agency's source
   selection decision was flawed insofar as the Army failed to consider all
   evaluation factors and failed to perform a meaningful price/technical
   tradeoff in its award determination.[4] We have considered all of
   Remington's arguments and find that they afford no basis to sustain the
   protest of the award decision here.

   Reliability Testing

   Remington first protests the agency's reliability evaluation of its bid
   sample. Specifically, Remington argues that one of the six failures
   identified by the Army upon which its reliability score and rating were
   based was unreasonable because the Army improperly deviated from the terms
   of the solicitation. The protester contends that had the agency's testing
   been performed in accordance with the RFP, Remington would have been found
   to have only five failures, thereby resulting in a reliability evaluation
   rating of at least satisfactory. Moreover, had Remington received a
   reliability rating of at least satisfactory, that would in turn have
   resulted in both its overall bid sample rating and its combined bid sample
   and technical merit rating also being elevated to at least satisfactory.

   In reviewing an agency's evaluation, we will not reevaluate offerors'
   proposals; instead, we will examine the agency's evaluation to ensure that
   it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's stated evaluation
   criteria and procurement statutes and regulations. Urban-Meridian Joint
   Venture, B-287168, B-287168.2, May 7, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 91 at 2. An
   offeror's mere disagreement with the agency's evaluation is not sufficient
   to render the evaluation unreasonable. Ben-Mar Enters., Inc., B-295781,
   Apr. 7, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 68 at 7.

   As set forth above, the RFP informed offerors that reliability was both an
   essential criterion and a rated requirement in the evaluation of bid
   samples. Specifically, the solicitation established that, as a minimum
   requirement, an offeror's bid sample was to be able to fire a basic load
   of 100 rounds of ammunition without incurring a critical failure at least
   80 percent of the time. Further, the solicitation informed offerors that
   weapon reliability would also be rated as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |    Rating    |                       Definition                        |
   |--------------+---------------------------------------------------------|
   |  Excellent   |The weapon fires at least 95 percent of rounds without   |
   |              |incurring a critical failure.[5]                         |
   |--------------+---------------------------------------------------------|
   |     Good     |The weapon fires between 90 and 95 percent of rounds     |
   |              |without incurring a critical failure.                    |
   |--------------+---------------------------------------------------------|
   | Satisfactory |The weapon fires between 87 and 90 percent of rounds     |
   |              |without incurring a critical failure.                    |
   |--------------+---------------------------------------------------------|
   |Unsatisfactory|The weapon fires less than 87 percent of rounds without  |
   |              |incurring a critical failure.                            |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   RFP amend. 5, sect. M, at 86.

   Thus, if an offeror's bid sample was determined to have a reliability
   score of at least 80 percent but less than 87 percent, it would be rated
   as acceptable, but unsatisfactory. Moreover, given the relative importance
   of reliability as a bid sample requirement, both the offeror's overall bid
   sample rating as well as its combined bid sample and technical merit
   rating would be "unsatisfactory," notwithstanding the ratings received on
   all remaining bid sample rated requirements and the technical proposal.
   See id. at 88-91.

   The solicitation also set forth a definition of critical failure as, among
   other things:

   a.   Any stoppage that cannot be corrected by the operator within
   10 seconds (hereinafter, a Type A critical failure).[6]

   b.   Any parts that are replaced.[7] Each part that is replaced shall be
   counted as one failure, except where the parts failures are interrelated.
   In this case, all the parts failures that are interrelated shall be
   counted as one failure. . . . (hereinafter, a Type B critical failure).

   RFP, amend. 5, sect. M, at 84-85.

   The Army performed the reliability testing by firing a total of 6,000
   rounds from each offeror's bid samples. For each round, the agency
   determined if any critical failures occurred before or after firing.[8]
   For example, on four occasions (rounds 705, 725, 1,145, and 1,495),
   Remington's bid sample failed to properly advance, or "feed," the
   ammunition round and, because each stoppage took the operator longer than
   10 seconds to correct, the agency considered each instance to be a
   critical failure. AR, Tab 10, Agency Technical Evaluation of Initial
   Proposals, at 39-40.

   The following sequence of events is relevant to the protest here. After
   firing round 685 from Remington's bid sample, the agency tester observed
   that the weapon's bolt catch had broken and the outside half of the bolt
   catch had fallen off.[9] Contracting Officer's Statement, Dec. 22, 2005,
   at 1. In order to determine whether any additional pieces of the broken
   bolt catch were within the weapon's chambering and firing mechanisms, the
   tester then stopped firing. This was done as a safety precaution:
   splintered or sheared pieces of internal weapon components in a
   rapid-fire, precision weapon can lead to even greater and possible
   catastrophic system failures. Id; Agency Test Director's Statement, Dec.
   22, 2005, at 2. Upon disassembly of Remington's bid sample, the agency did
   not find any other pieces of the broken bolt catch but it did find a
   broken extractor.[10] The Army replaced the broken extractor with a spare
   part that Remington had provided with its bid samples. The agency was
   unable to replace the broken bolt catch, however, because Remington had
   not provided a spare one with its bid samples.[11] The Army subsequently
   continued the reliability testing of Remington's bid sample without a
   working bolt catch, and considered the broken bolt catch to be a critical
   failure.

   Remington does not contest the agency's determination that a bolt catch
   broke during reliability testing. Rather, Remington argues that the broken
   bolt catch here was improperly identified as a critical failure by the
   agency because it did not constitute a critical failure as defined by the
   solicitation. Remington asserts that the broken bolt catch did not cause a
   stoppage in the ability to fire the weapon, as evidenced by fact that the
   Army continued testing the weapon afterwards, and was therefore not a Type
   A critical failure. Remington also asserts that the broken bolt catch was
   not a broken part that was actually replaced, and was therefore not a
   Type B critical failure.

   As a preliminary matter, the Army argues that Remington's protest of the
   weapon reliability testing is untimely. Specifically, the agency asserts
   that Remington learned at the preaward debriefing on September 14 that the
   broken bolt catch was considered to be a critical failure but did not
   protest the issue until October 6, more than 10 days after the debriefing
   occurred.

   Our Bid Protest Regulations require that protests not based upon alleged
   improprieties in a solicitation be filed not later than 10 days after the
   basis of protest is known or should have been known. 4 C.F.R. sect.
   21.2(a)(2) (2005). More specifically, a protest based upon information
   provided to the protester at a statutorily-required debriefing is
   generally untimely if filed more than 10 days after the debriefing. The
   New Jersey & H St. Ltd. P'ship, B-288026, B-288026.2, July 17, 2001, 2001
   CPD para. 125 at 2; Clean Venture, Inc., B-284176, Mar. 6, 2000, 2000 CPD
   para. 47 at 4 n.5.

   Here, during the preaward debriefing, the protester was informed of the
   specific critical failures upon which its bid sample reliability rating
   was based, including the broken bolt critical failure which it now
   challenges. Subsequent to the debriefing, however, the agency reinstated
   Remington in the competitive range and continued to consider Remington's
   proposal for contract award. It is clear, we think, that once the Army
   reinstated Remington's proposal in the competitive range of offerors to be
   further considered for award, there was no agency action prior to the
   award determination that was prejudicial to, and protestable by,
   Remington. In fact, had Remington filed a protest here challenging the
   agency's reliability testing after being reinstated in the competitive
   range and before award, the protest would have been speculative and
   premature because it would have merely anticipated prejudicial agency
   action. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., B-292077.2, Sept. 4, 2003, 2003
   CPD para. 157 at 4; Parcel 47C LLC, B-286324, B-286324.2, Dec. 26, 2000,
   2001 CPD para. 44 at 10 n.13. Thus, we find Remington's protest here,
   filed within 10 days after Remington was advised of the award decision, to
   be timely.

   We find the agency's determination that Remington's broken bolt catch
   constituted a critical failure for reliability testing purposes to be
   reasonable and consistent with the solicitation. First, the record
   supports the Army's conclusion that the broken bolt catch was a Type A
   critical failure because it necessitated a stoppage in firing which could
   not be remedied by the operator within 10 seconds. After observing that
   part of the bolt catch had broken off, it was reasonably necessary to
   determine whether any additional pieces of the bolt catch were within the
   weapon's chambering and firing mechanisms before continuing firing. We
   consider the safety concern articulated by the agency's test director to
   be eminently reasonable--as cited above, the concern that splintered or
   sheared pieces of internal weapon components in a rapid-fire, precision
   weapon can lead to even greater and possible catastrophic system failures.
   The fact that no additional pieces of the broken bolt catch were found
   upon disassembly is irrelevant, as the operator was unaware of this when
   safety concerns necessitated that firing stop. Moreover, Remington's
   assertion that the weapon could still be fired afterwards with a broken
   bolt catch does not negate the reasonableness of the Army's decision to
   first determine whether the weapon remained safe to fire.

   We also find reasonable the Army's conclusion that Remington's broken bolt
   catch constituted a Type B critical failure, as the only reason the Army
   did not actually replace the broken bolt catch is because Remington failed
   to provide a spare bolt catch with its bid samples.[12] As set forth
   above, the solicitation expressly instructed offerors to provide
   sufficient spare parts with bid samples to support evaluation testing. RFP
   amend. 5, sect. L, at 75. While Remington did provide certain spare parts
   (e.g., an extractor), it did not provide a spare bolt catch. If Remington
   had provided a spare bolt catch with its bid samples, the agency would
   have replaced the broken part (and again considered this to be a critical
   failure) even if weapon firing was possible without the part replacement.
   Further, when an offeror failed to furnish a spare for a broken part, the
   agency considered this to be a critical failure notwithstanding its
   inability to perform the actual replacement.

   We reject Remington's argument that the broken bolt cannot be considered a
   critical failure unless it was actually replaced. The record reflects that
   the agency decided to continue reliability testing of Remington's bid
   sample notwithstanding Remington's failure to provide sufficient spare
   parts. Under the circumstances here, it would be inappropriate to
   essentially penalize the agency for continuing testing instead of waiting
   for Remington to furnish the necessary spare part, just as it would be
   inappropriate to essentially reward Remington for failing to furnish all
   necessary spare parts and thereby precluding actual replacement. Quite
   simply, the determining factor of what constitutes a critical failure
   should not be based upon what spare parts an offeror decided to provide.

   Evaluation of GPLR Availability and SDB Participation

   Remington also protests the agency's evaluation of offerors' proposals
   with regard to the GPLR availability and SDB participation factors. The
   protester contends that the agency record contains no documentation
   indicating how the agency reached the evaluation ratings that it did for
   both offerors for both of these evaluation factors.

   In order for us to review an agency's evaluation of proposals, an agency
   must have adequate documentation to support its judgment. Northeast MEP
   Servs., Inc., B-285963.5 et al., Jan. 5, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 28 at 7.
   While an agency is not required to retain every document or worksheet
   generated during its evaluation of proposals, the agency's evaluation must
   be sufficiently documented to allow review of the merits of a protest. KMS
   Fusion, Inc., B-242529, May 8, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 447 at 10. Where an
   agency fails to document or retain evaluation materials, it bears the risk
   that there may not be adequate supporting rationale in the record for us
   to conclude that the agency had a reasonable basis for the source
   selection decision. Southwest Marine, Inc.; American Sys. Eng'g Corp.,
   B-265865.3, B-265865.4, Jan. 23, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 56 at 10.

   In determining the rationality of an agency's evaluation and award
   decision, we do not limit our review to contemporaneous evidence, but
   consider all the information provided, including the parties' arguments,
   explanations, and/or hearing testimony. Id. While we consider the entire
   record, including the parties' later explanations and arguments, we accord
   greater weight to contemporaneous evaluation and source selection material
   than to arguments and documentation prepared in response to protest
   contentions. Northeast MEP Servs., Inc., supra; Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft
   Support, B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 91 at 15.

   The RFP informed offerors that the agency considered the SASS program to
   be essential to national defense, and that the Army required the ability
   to acquire the legal rights to all technical data and software (including
   proprietary data and software) to permit future competitive
   reprocurements. RFP amend. 5, sect. L, at 79. Consequently, the RFP
   established that the agency would evaluate the availability of GPLR
   necessary for the competitive reprocurement of SASS program end items:
   less restriction on the data rights, and a smaller quantity of proposed
   units to obtain data rights, would be given a more favorable evaluation.
   Id., sect. M, at 92.

   The RFP also set forth an adjectival rating system for the evaluation of
   GPLR availability as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |    Rating    |                       Definition                        |
   |--------------+---------------------------------------------------------|
   |  Excellent   |Government Purpose License Rights are received upon award|
   |              |of the contract.                                         |
   |--------------+---------------------------------------------------------|
   |     Good     |Government Purpose License Rights are given upon         |
   |              |completion of the basic contract.                        |
   |--------------+---------------------------------------------------------|
   | Satisfactory |Government Purpose License Rights are given upon         |
   |              |completion of the basic contract and a maximum quantity  |
   |              |of 50,000 under options and/or new contract.             |
   |--------------+---------------------------------------------------------|
   |Unsatisfactory|Government Purpose License Rights are not given.         |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Id.

   Both Knight's and Remington addressed GPLR availability in their
   proposals. The Knight's proposal stated that "[t]he data rights are
   available to the government at the time this contract is issued or at any
   time an option is completed or issued," and also set forth a data rights
   purchase price.[13] AR, Tab 8, Knight's Proposal, GPLR Availability, at 1.
   Remington's proposal stated only that the technical data rights for its
   SASS submission were available to the government at the listed price. AR,
   Tab 9, Remington's Proposal, GPLR Availability, at 1. The agency
   subsequently rated both the Knight's and Remington proposals as
   "submitted" with regard to the GPLR availability factor, an evaluation
   rating that was not among those set forth in the solicitation. AR, Tab 17,
   Source Selection Decision, at 2.

   With regard to the SDB participation evaluation factor, the RFP required
   offerors to address the extent of planned SDB participation within their
   proposals. RFP amend. 5, sect. L, at 81. Specifically, offerors were to
   set forth SDB target participation in both dollars and percentages of
   total contract value, describe their plans to utilize SDBs, and explain
   how the SDB utilization percentage was appropriate. Id. The RFP also
   established that SDB participation would be evaluated using an adjectival
   rating system (i.e., excellent, good, satisfactory, and unsatisfactory)
   based upon the quality of the offeror's rationale (i.e., strong, adequate,
   weak, and none, respectively) to support the percentage of SDB utilization
   proposed. Id., sect. M, at 93.

   The Knight's proposal included a subcontracting plan which set forth an
   SDB target participation of 4.5 percent of contract value by the end of
   the contract. AR, Tab 8, Knight's Proposal, SDB Subcontracting Plan, at 2.
   Remington's proposal included a subcontracting plan, which set forth an
   SDB participation goal of 5 percent of total planned subcontracting
   dollars (Remington's proposal did not express an SDB participation goal as
   a percentage of total contract value).[14] AR, Tab 9, Remington's
   Proposal, Subcontracting Plan, at 2-3. The agency rated both the Remington
   and the Knight's proposals as excellent under the SDB participation
   evaluation factor. AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision, at 2.

   We requested additional information from the agency, because the
   evaluation documentation prepared and retained by the Army did not
   adequately explain the agency's evaluation of the Knight's and Remington
   proposals with regard to the GPLR availability and SDB participation
   factors. In response to our inquiry, the contracting officer stated that,
   with regard to GPLR availability, "when both proposals were reviewed for
   compliance to the subject solicitation, it was determined that the GPLR
   rights proposed by both companies did not strictly fall within the
   criteria of the four possible rating categories described in the
   solicitation." Contracting Officer's Statement, Dec. 27, 2005, at 1.
   Apparently, although both companies addressed the issue of data rights,
   the agency determined that GPLR availability would be negotiated with the
   successful offeror after contract award. Thus, the agency decided that a
   neutral rating of "submitted" should be assigned to both proposals. Id.
   With regard to the SDB participation factor, the contracting officer
   stated that Remington's plan to award 5 percent to SDBs, as well as
   Knight's plan to award up to 4.5 percent to SDBs, were each found to
   provide a strong rationale to support an appropriate percentage of SDB
   utilization and thus warranted ratings of excellent. Id.

   While we generally give little weight to reevaluations prepared in the
   heat of the adversarial process, post-protest explanations that provide a
   detailed rationale for contemporaneous conclusions, as is the case here,
   simply fill in previously unrecorded details, and will generally be
   considered in our review of the rationality of selection decisions, so
   long as those explanations are credible and consistent with the
   contemporaneous record. NWT, Inc.; PharmChem Labs., Inc., B-280988,
   B-280988.2, Dec. 17, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 158 at 16. Based on the entire
   record in this case, we conclude that, while not recorded at the time, the
   agency did compare the GPLR availability and SDB participation levels
   offered by Knight's and Remington prior to the selection decision.
   Accordingly, we view the post-protest documentation as merely a
   memorialization of contemporaneous analysis and judgment. See id.

   We find the agency's evaluation of proposals as to GPLR availability does
   not provide a basis upon which to sustain the protest. The record shows
   Remington was not prejudiced by the agency's decision to rate both
   offerors as essentially neutral, given that the proposals of Knight's and
   Remington both indicated that technical data rights were available to the
   government. In fact, the Knight's proposal was superior to Remington's in
   this area in that Knight's offered to provide the data rights at the time
   of contract award (an offer which warranted a rating of excellent under
   the RFP), while Remington failed to specify at what stage it would give
   the data rights to the government. With respect to the SDB participation
   factor, we find the agency's evaluation to be reasonable and consistent
   with the solicitation. Based upon the approximately equal participation
   percentages proposed by the offerors here, the agency's determination that
   both Knight's and Remington offered strong rationales to support
   appropriate percentages of SDB utilization was not improper.

   Evaluation of Knight's Technical Proposal

   Remington also protests that the agency's evaluation of the Knight's
   technical proposal was unreasonable. The protester contends that the Army
   upgraded the awardee's technical rating from satisfactory to good despite
   the firm's failure to address any of the significant concerns and
   weaknesses that the agency had identified in its initial technical
   proposal. Remington argues that the lack of evidence that Knight's
   addressed the technical weaknesses cited by the Army suggests that the
   subsequent change in the awardee's evaluation rating lacked any reasonable
   basis.

   The RFP informed offerors that the technical evaluation factor consisted
   of four subfactors: projected production capabilities; quality assurance
   plan; supportability and maintenance plan; and configuration management
   plan.[15] RFP amend. 5, sect. M, at 90. The solicitation also established
   an adjectival rating system for each subfactor --very low risk, low risk,
   medium risk, and high risk--and a separate adjectival rating system for
   the overall technical evaluation factor--excellent, good, satisfactory,
   and unsatisfactory. Id.

   The agency rated the Knight's initial technical proposal as low risk under
   the projected production capability subfactor; medium risk under the
   quality assurance plan, supportability and maintenance plan, and
   configuration management plan subfactors; and satisfactory overall. AR,
   Tab 10, Technical Evaluation of Initial Proposals, at 20. The agency's
   initial evaluation report also identified various weaknesses (i.e., areas
   that were not included or adequately addressed) in the Knight's initial
   technical proposal. Id. Among the cited weaknesses were: handling of
   incoming material; handling of critical characteristics; quality control
   of incoming products from other vendors; handling of nonconforming
   material; handling of customer complaints; and handling of hazardous
   materials. Id. The identified weaknesses became the subject of written
   discussions that the agency subsequently held with Knight's. AR, Tab 21,
   Agency Discussions with Knight's, at 2.

   The FPR submitted by Knight's consisted of a revised price proposal and a
   separate revised technical proposal. AR, Tab 12, Knight's FPR (Pricing);
   Tab 22, Knight's FPR (Technical).[16] The awardee's revised technical
   proposal totaled 77 pages and contained 18 attachments, including select
   pages from the firm's quality procedure plan, quality work instruction,
   quality work procedure, and hazardous chemical communication plan manual.
   AR, Tab 22 Knight's FPR (Technical). The Knight's revised technical
   proposal also "cross-mapped" each of the various attachments contained in
   its submission to the specific technical weaknesses identified by the
   agency. Id. at 1-2. For example, in response to the "handling of incoming
   material" weakness, Knight's submitted various documents demonstrating the
   firm's internal plans and procedures for the handling of incoming
   material.[17] The agency then evaluated the Knight's revised technical
   proposal, rating it as low risk under the projected production capability
   and the supportability and maintenance plan subfactors, very low risk for
   the quality assurance plan and the configuration management plan
   subfactors, and good overall. AR, Tab 14, Technical Evaluation of FPRs, at
   22.

   Contrary to the protester's assertions, the awardee's revised technical
   proposal did address each of the weaknesses that were originally cited by
   the agency. As shown above, Knight's provided the agency with additional
   information in response to each area which the awardee's initial technical
   proposal either did not include or adequately address. We realize, as
   explained above, that Remington was unaware of the existence of the
   Knight's revised technical proposal when raising this protest issue.
   Nonetheless, as Knight's did in fact address each of the weaknesses
   originally identified by the Army, the agency did have a reasonable basis
   for its higher evaluation ratings of the awardee's revised technical
   proposal.[18]

   Source Selection Decision

   Lastly, Remington protests the agency's source selection decision. The
   protester asserts that the Army improperly deviated from the terms of the
   solicitation by failing to consider three of the six stated evaluation
   factors (i.e., GPLR availability, past performance, and SDB participation)
   in the award determination. In support of its position, Remington contends
   that the source selection decision mentions only the bid sample,
   technical, and price evaluation factors. Remington also argues that the
   agency failed to perform a meaningful price/technical tradeoff as required
   by the solicitation. The protester contends that the Army's source
   selection decision fails to document why the supposed technical
   superiority of the Knight's higher-priced proposal warranted the
   additional cost involved.

   An agency may not announce in the solicitation that it will use one
   evaluation plan and then follow another; once offerors are informed of the
   criteria against which their proposals will be evaluated and the source
   selection decision made, the agency must adhere to those criteria or
   inform all offerors of significant changes. American Guard Servs., Inc.,
   B-294359, Nov. 1, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 225 at 6; DynCorp, B-245289,
   B-245289.2, Dec. 23, 1991, 91-2 CPD para. 575 at 5. Where solicitations
   provide for award on a "best value" or "most advantageous to the
   government" basis, it is the function of the source selection authority to
   perform a price/technical tradeoff, that is, to determine whether one
   proposal's technical superiority is worth the higher price, and the extent
   to which one is sacrificed for the other is governed only by the test of
   rationality and consistency with the stated evaluation criteria. See
   Chenega Technical Prods., LLC, B-295451.5, June 22, 2005, 2005 CPD para.
   123 at 8; Leach Mgmt. Consulting Corp., B-292493.2, Oct. 3, 2003, 2003 CPD
   para. 175 at 3-4. Where a price/ technical tradeoff is made, the source
   selection decision must be documented, and the documentation must include
   the rationale for any tradeoffs made, including the benefits associated
   with additional costs.[19] Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
   sections 15.101-1(c), 15.308; All Star-Cabaco Enter., Joint Venture,
   B-290133, B-290133.2, June 25, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 127 at 8-9.

   In conducting the tradeoff here, the contracting officer premised her
   determination upon review and acceptance of the evaluation findings and
   ratings of the offerors' proposals under all stated evaluation factors,
   including the GPLR availability, past performance, and SDB participation
   evaluation factors where Remington and Knight's were equivalently rated.
   AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision, at 2. The contracting officer then
   reviewed both offerors' evaluation ratings under the bid sample essential
   criteria, the bid sample rated requirements, and the offerors' technical
   ratings, as well as the combined bid sample and technical merit ratings.
   Id. at 3-5.

   The contracting officer then considered the "significant, key aspects
   differentiating the bid samples" of Knight's and Remington, in the areas
   of weapon accuracy, weapon reliability, and user assessment, which the RFP
   had established were the three most important bid sample rated
   requirements. Id. at 5. As to accuracy, the contracting officer found that
   Knight's had a discernable technical advantage over Remington (36 percent
   more accurate), notwithstanding equivalent ratings. With regard to
   reliability, the contracting officer found that there was a substantial
   difference in scores and ratings: no critical failures and 97.3 percent
   computed reliability for Knight's, in comparison to six critical failures
   and 86.0 percent computed reliability for Remington.[20] Under user
   assessment, the contracting officer determined that actual snipers in
   various operational environments and scenarios had found the Knight's bid
   sample superior to Remington's in five of the six assessment
   subcategories.

   The contracting officer then determined that although Remington's total
   evaluated price was $5,641,938.95 less than the evaluated price of
   Knight's, the bid sample and technical evaluation factors when combined
   were significantly more important than price and, as such, the Knight's
   proposal represented the best value. Id. at 6. The contracting officer
   concluded as follows:

   A weapon with unsatisfactory reliability could possibly be detrimental to
   a sniper's ability to successfully engage targets and complete missions.
   The Government is not willing to risk failure during tactical engagements
   due to the failure of an unreliable weapon. The survival of the sniper,
   and the soldiers that depend on him is a more important factor in relation
   to the cost difference.

   Id.

   Contrary to Remington's assertions, we find that the record demonstrates
   that the contracting officer did take all evaluation factors--including
   GPLR availability, past performance, and SDB participation--into account
   in making her source selection decision. There is simply no requirement
   that a source selection authority restate every evaluation factor in the
   tradeoff determination, and nothing unreasonable about a decision not to
   discuss the evaluation factors that did not amount to discriminators
   between the offerors' proposals. Here, the source selection authority
   found Remington and Knight's to be equivalent under the GPLR availability,
   past performance, and SDB participation factors. As these factors were not
   deemed to be discriminators between the offerors' proposals, the
   contracting officer's decision not to further discuss these criteria in
   the tradeoff determination does not support the conclusion that they were
   not in fact considered.

   We also find, contrary to the protester's assertions, that the source
   selection decision adequately documented the agency's rationale for the
   tradeoff made, including the benefits associated with the higher price.
   The propriety of such a price/technical tradeoff decision turns not on the
   difference in the technical scores or ratings per se, but on whether the
   selection official's judgment concerning the significance of the
   difference was reasonable and adequately justified in light of the RFP's
   evaluation scheme. Chenega Technical Prods., LLC, supra; Johnson Controls
   World Servs., Inc., B-289942, B-289942.2, May 24, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 88
   at 6. Here, the contracting officer properly looked behind the evaluation
   ratings and considered the underlying qualitative merits that
   distinguished the offerors' proposals--accuracy, reliability, and user
   assessment. Consistent with the RFP's provision that bid sample and
   technical merit were significantly more important than price, the
   contracting officer reasonably concluded that the price premium associated
   with Knight's proposal was justified by its greater technical merit. As
   the contracting officer stated, "The Government is not willing to risk
   failure during tactical engagements due to the failure of an unreliable
   weapon. The survival of the sniper, and the soldiers that depend on him is
   a more important factor in relation to the cost difference." Id. at 6. We
   do not agree with the protester that the agency was required to do more in
   its tradeoff of Remington's lower price and lower technical quality. Under
   these circumstances, we see no basis to question the agency's decision to
   make award to Knight's.

   The protests are denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] Price was in turn significantly more important than the GPLR
   availability, past performance, and SDB participation factors, which were
   of equal importance to each other. Id.

   [2] The solicitation also set forth the adjectival rating systems that the
   agency intended to use for all other nonprice evaluation factors. Id. at
   90-93.

   [3] Offerors were able to address the agency-identified weaknesses as well
   as to revise any other areas of their initial written proposals. FPRs did
   not involve the submission of additional bid samples, and the Army's
   subsequent evaluation of FPRs did not involve the reevaluation of bid
   samples.

   [4] Remington's original protest also raised two additional issues: (1)
   the Army misled Remington and did not evaluate its FPR in good faith; and
   (2) the agency's evaluation of the Knight's proposal as to past
   performance was unreasonable. Protest, Oct. 6, 2005, at 12-15. The Army
   specifically addressed these protest issues in its report, discussing why
   the agency's actions were reasonable and consistent with the solicitation.
   The protester's comments offered no rebuttal of the agency's position
   regarding the first issue; Remington expressly withdrew the second issue.
   Comments, Nov. 14, 2005, at 25 n.4. Where, as here, an agency provides a
   detailed response to a protester's assertions and the protester either
   does not respond to the agency's position or provides a response that
   fails to substantively rebut the agency's position, we deem the
   initially-raised arguments abandoned. L-3 Communications Westwood Corp.,
   B-295126, Jan. 19, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 30 at 4; Citrus Coll.; KEI
   Pearson, Inc., B-293543 et al., Apr. 9, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 104 at 8 n.4.

   [5] The RFP is imprecisely worded here: consistent with other parts of the
   solicitation a more accurate wording would have been that "the weapon
   fires at least 95 percent of 100-round basic loads without incurring a
   critical failure."

   [6] Stoppage was in turn defined as "any incident resulting in unplanned
   cessation in firing or inability to commence firing. This includes
   stoppages traceable or chargeable to an unserviceable part. Descriptions
   include, but are not limited to, failures to feed, extract, eject, close,
   fire, or failure to function of the magazine." RFP amend. 6, sect. C, at
   14.

   [7] The RFP instructed offerors to submit a quantity of spare/repair parts
   with their bid samples sufficient to support the agency's evaluation,
   without specifying exact parts or quantities. RFP amend. 5, sect. L, at
   75.

   [8] The agency later applied a "chi squared" distribution methodology to
   the recorded critical failures to determine the offeror's reliability
   score. Remington does not challenge the Army's reliability methodology.

   [9] A bolt catch holds the weapon's bolt in the rearward position when the
   magazine is empty and no round is automatically chambered. Depressing the
   bolt catch release lever releases the bolt, thereby allowing it to slide
   forward and chamber the first round of a loaded magazine. Without a
   functioning bolt catch, the operator must chamber the magazine's first
   round by pulling the charging lever (and bolt assembly) to the rear and
   then releasing it.

   [10] An extractor is a hook-like piece that removes the expended cartridge
   case from the weapon chamber by catching onto the cartridge rim. The
   cartridge case is then ejected from the weapon through the ejection port.
   Remington does not protest the Army's determination that the broken
   extractor constituted a critical failure.

   [11] The agency states that had Remington provided a spare bolt catch with
   its bid samples, it would have replaced the broken part (even if weapon
   firing was possible without the replacement). Contracting Officer's
   Statement, Dec. 22, 2005, at 2; Agency Test Director's Statement, Dec. 22,
   2005. Further, in those instances when an offeror failed to furnish a
   spare for a broken part, the Army considered this to be a critical failure
   notwithstanding its ability to perform the actual replacement, and
   continued reliability testing if possible. Id.

   [12] We also find no evidence that the broken bolt catch and broken
   extractor were interrelated part failures and, as such, should have been
   considered as one Type B critical failure.

   [13] While the RFP required, as a contract line item, a price for the
   delivery of a technical data package, the solicitation did not also
   require the submission of a price for GPLR availability. RFP, sect. B, at
   8; AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision, at 2.

   [14] Both the Knight's and Remington subcontracting plans also set forth
   separate participation percentage goals for other socio-economic business
   concerns (e.g., women-owned small businesses, historically underutilized
   business zone companies, service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses).

   [15] The first two technical subfactors were of equal importance to each
   other, and both were more important than the remaining two subfactors,
   which also were of equal importance to each other. RFP amend. 5, sect. M,
   at 90.

   [16] The Army's initial agency report filed with our Office contained only
   the awardee's revised price submission, and failed to include the firm's
   revised technical submission. Thus, Remington was unaware of the Knight's
   revised technical proposal when it protested that the awardee had not
   addressed the weaknesses identified in its initial technical plan but the
   agency had nonetheless raised Knight's technical evaluation rating.

   [17] Similarly, in response to the "handling of hazardous materials"
   weakness, the Knight's revised technical proposal included its Hazardous
   Chemical Communication Plan Manual, which set out in detail the company's
   program responsibilities as well as the procedures for identification,
   handling, and removal of hazardous substances.

   [18] Remington in its comments also argued that the agency's evaluation of
   the Knight's technical proposal was inadequately documented. As stated
   above, where an agency fails to document or retain evaluation records, it
   bears the risk that there is inadequate supporting rationale in the record
   for its evaluation and source selection decision and that we will not
   conclude that there is a reasonable basis for the agency's evaluation or
   decision. Southwest Marine, Inc.; American Sys. Eng'g Corp., supra.
   However, we will not disrupt an agency's procurement merely because the
   agency has failed to adequately document its evaluation or source
   selection decision where the record otherwise shows the evaluation or
   source selection decision to be reasonable. Id. Here we do not find on
   this record that the agency's evaluation of Knight's technical proposal
   was unreasonable.

   [19] This explanation can be given by the source selection authority in
   the award decision, or it can be evidenced from the documents on which the
   source selection decision is based. TRW, Inc., B-260788.2, Aug. 2, 1995,
   96-1 CPD para. 11.

   [20] The contracting officer also took into account that the statement of
   work established a 90 percent reliability requirement for contract
   deliverables. Id. at 5.