TITLE: B-297342, Alion Science & Technology Corporation, January 9, 2006
BNUMBER: B-297342
DATE: January 9, 2006
*****************************************************************
B-297342, Alion Science & Technology Corporation, January 9, 2006

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Alion Science & Technology Corporation

   File: B-297342

   Date: January 9, 2006

   L. James D'Agostino, Esq., Richard L. Moorhouse, Esq., David T. Hickey,
   Esq., John G. Stafford, Esq., and Andrew Belofsky, Esq., Greenberg
   Traurig, LLP; J. Scott Hommer III, Esq., and Kier X. Bancroft, Esq.,
   Venable LLP, for the protester.

   Thomas C. Papson, Esq., Jason N. Workmaster, Esq., and Kara M. Klaas,
   Esq., McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, for Advanced Engineering & Sciences, a
   division of ITT Industries, Inc., an intervenor.

   Flayo O. Kirk, Esq., Defense Information Systems Agency, for the agency.

   Glenn G. Wolcott, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protest is sustained where record does not support the agency's conclusion
   that awardee's conflicts of interest will be minimal, with limited impact
   on quality of contract performance, where awardee, a manufacturer of
   spectrum-dependent products, will perform analysis and evaluation and
   exercise subjective judgment regarding formulation of policies and
   regulations that may affect the sale or use of spectrum-dependent products
   manufactured by the awardee or the awardee's competitors, and those
   deployed by the awardee's customers.

   DECISION

   Alion Science & Technology Corporation protests the Defense Information
   System Agency's (DISA) award of a contract to Advanced Engineering &
   Sciences, a division of ITT Industries, Inc. (ITT), under request for
   quotations (RFQ) No. HC1047-05-R-4018 to provide spectrum engineering
   support services. Alion protests that, in light of ITT's significant
   involvement in the manufacture and marketing of spectrum-dependent
   products, the agency failed to reasonably consider the extent of
   organizational conflicts of interest (OCI) that are likely to impair ITT's
   objectivity in performing the contract requirements.

   We sustain the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   On March 15, 2005, DISA issued RFQ No. HC1047-05-R-4018 seeking quotations
   from holders of federal supply schedule (FSS) contracts[1] to provide
   spectrum engineering services to support DISA's Defense Spectrum Office
   (DSO) and to "facilitate improved DSO mission effectiveness." RFQ at 16.
   The solicitation advised contractors of DSO's "vision" to be recognized as
   the Department of Defense's (DOD) "focal point and expert" with regard to
   various policy-making activities including: "the establishment of
   policies, strategies, regulations and procedures to support the
   implementation and integration of spectrum efficient technologies into
   military systems"; "the establishment of plans and strategies, based on
   regulatory activities and technology development, to foster the
   development of DOD spectrum management policies"; and "the development of
   . . . spectrum allocation and reallocation long-term strategies." Id.

   The RFQ contained the following description of activities that the agency
   contemplated the contractor will perform:

   (1) perform technical studies and mathematical modeling and simulation of
   current and future operational environments to develop long-term spectrum
   allocation and reallocation strategies that are favorable to DOD
   operational needs: (2) devise long-term plans and strategies based on
   regulatory activities and technology development to foster the development
   of DOD policies; (3) advocate, based on technical analytical studies, and
   lead all DOD national/international technical and technology outreach
   efforts primarily when it relates to the NTIA [National Telecommunications
   and Information Administration] and FCC [Federal Communication Commission]
   forums and committees, International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
   activities, including future World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs)
   and other national/international efforts, in order to promulgate DOD
   spectrum policy and objectives that are linked to Joint Vision 2020 and
   are fully integrated in the DOD spectrum architecture; (4) develop and
   integrate enabling, spectrum efficient technologies into military systems
   to maximize spectrum utilization and to enable full spectrum
   transformation; (5) develop recommendations, based on technical analytical
   studies, for policies, strategies, regulations, and procedures to support
   the implementation and integration of emerging technologies to enhance
   spectrum utilization; (6) devise DOD spectrum management architecture
   based on proposed spectrum management transition strategies and a
   comprehensive roadmap to achieve this objective end-state.

   RFQ at 16-17.

   The solicitation asked FSS contractors to provide proposed solutions in
   the form of performance work statements (PWS) addressing the
   solicitation's stated objectives. As described by the contracting officer,
   the PWS provided by any contractor responding to this solicitation was
   anticipated to "identify the technical, functional and performance
   characteristics of agency requirements." Contracting Officer's Statement
   at 4.

   With regard to the basis for award, the solicitation stated, "The
   Government intends to award one GSA task order without discussions" and
   advised offerors that source selection would be made on a "best value"
   basis. In this regard, the RFQ established the three following evaluation
   factors: quality of service,[2] past performance and price. RFQ at 40-44.

   On or before the April 14, 2005 closing date, the agency received
   quotations from Alion and ITT. The submissions were evaluated and compared
   by a source selection evaluation board, source selection advisory council,
   and source selection authority.[3] Contracting Officer's Statement at 9.
   With regard to the quality of service evaluation factor, Alion's quotation
   was rated [deleted]; ITT's quotation was rated [deleted]. Contracting
   Officer's Statement at 10. With regard to the past performance factor,
   Alion's quotation was rated [deleted]; ITT's quotation was rated
   [deleted]. Id. Alion's evaluated price was [deleted]; ITT's evaluated
   price was $33,801,702. Id.[4]

   On August 31, the contracting officer requested that Alion and ITT submit
   OCI mitigation plans.[5] With regard to potential conflicts, publicly
   available information, including information contained on ITT's own
   Internet website, leaves no doubt that ITT has multiple financial
   interests with regard to manufacturing and marketing of spectrum-dependent
   products to the U.S. government, to foreign governments, and to commercial
   customers worldwide.[6] Further, ITT's own statements make clear that its
   financial interests and the success of its company are affected by a
   variety of factors, including both domestic and foreign government
   regulations.[7]

   Upon receipt and review of ITT's OCI mitigation plan, the contracting
   officer determined that ITT intends to segregate the contract requirements
   which create impaired-objectivity OCIs and have those requirements
   performed by "firewalled" subcontractors. Thereafter, the agency performed
   an assessment of ITT's proposed PWS with the stated objective of
   determining the extent of ITT's conflicts. Agency Report, Tab 10, Offeror
   B OCI Evaluation. Based on this assessment, the contracting officer
   concluded that "an impaired objectivity OCI [is] likely to occur [for ITT]
   approximately 7.3 percent of the time over the entire contract effort."
   Contracting Officer's Statement at 16. Based on the agency's assessment
   regarding the limited extent of OCIs, and ITT's stated intent to rely on
   "firewalled" subcontractors to perform conflicted portions of the
   contract, the contracting officer concluded that ITT's OCI mitigation plan
   was acceptable.

   On September 27, the contracting officer awarded a task order valued at
   more than $33 million to ITT. Alion was subsequently notified of the
   award; this protest followed.

   DISCUSSION

   Alion protests that the agency failed to reasonably recognize the extent
   of conflicts that will impair ITT's objectivity in performing the contract
   requirements, and failed to reasonably consider the effect that relying on
   "firewalled" subcontractors to perform conflicted portions of the contract
   will have on the quality of service that ITT provides. We agree.

   Contracting officers are required to identify and evaluate potential
   conflicts of interest as early in the acquisition process as possible.
   Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 9.504. The FAR provides that an
   OCI exists when, because of activities or relationships with other persons
   or organizations, a person or organization is unable or potentially unable
   to render impartial assistance or advice to the government. See FAR sect.
   2.101. Situations that create potential OCIs are further discussed in FAR
   subpart 9.5 and the decisions of our Office; specifically, what is
   frequently referred to as an "impaired objectivity" OCI is created when a
   contractor's judgment and objectivity in performing the contract
   requirements may be impaired due to the fact that the substance of the
   contractor's performance has the potential to affect other interests of
   the contractor. Id.; PURVIS Sys., Inc., B-293807.3, B-293807.4, Aug. 16,
   2004, 2004 CPD para. 177; Science Applications Int'l Corp., B-293601 et
   al., May 3, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 96; Aetna Govt. Health Plans, Inc.;
   Foundation Health Fed. Servs., Inc., B-254397.15 et al., July 27, 1995,
   95-2 CPD para. 129 at 13.

   In reviewing this protest, we considered the contract requirements, as
   reflected in the solicitation and ITT's proposed PWS tasks, and the basis
   for the agency's assessment that ITT was likely to experience
   impaired-objectivity OCIs only "7.3 percent of the time over the entire
   contract effort."[8] As discussed below, the agency's assessment regarding
   the extent and impact of OCIs with regard to ITT's contract performance is
   not reasonably supported by the record.

   The technical portion of ITT's submission responding to the solicitation
   was divided into [deleted] PWS tasks: [deleted]. Agency Report, Tab 14, at
   1-19, 1-33, 1-52, 1-89, 1-119, 1-133. Each proposed PWS task contained a
   narrative description of the activities that are anticipated.[9]

   ITT's PWS Task [deleted]

   With regard to ITT's proposed PWS task [deleted], ITT's submission
   responding to the solicitation states that ITT will perform the following
   activities:

   Develop recommendations based on technical analytical studies, for
   policies, strategies, regulations, and procedures to support the
   implementation and integration of emerging technologies . . .

   Devise DOD Spectrum management architecture . . .

   Develop integrated planning and support the development of long-term
   strategies . . .

   Enhance the ability to assess current and evolving spectrum policies,
   regulations, processes, and strategies that incorporate emerging spectrum
   technology. . . .

   Perform technical studies and mathematical modeling and simulation of
   current and future operational environments to develop long-term spectrum
   allocation and reallocation strategies . . . .

   Devise long-term plans and strategies based on regulatory activities and
   technology development . . .

   Foster Spectrum Management initiatives by evaluating the activities and
   trends in national and international government and non-government
   spectrum management policies, procedures, and plans to determine potential
   opportunities and obstacles regarding DOD's global access to the Spectrum.

   Agency Report, Tab 14, at 1-36 through 1-37.

   More specifically, ITT states that [deleted]. Further, ITT states that
   there is a close relationship between performance of PWS task [deleted]
   and performance of other proposed PWS tasks, elaborating that "close
   coordination with the [deleted] task [deleted] is an essential part of our
   technical approach [deleted], as well as coordination with the [deleted]
   tasks [deleted]. Agency Report, Tab 14, at 1-37.

   In assessing the potential for impaired-objectivity OCIs, the agency
   concluded that none of the work anticipated under PWS [deleted], created
   any potential OCIs for ITT. Agency Report, Tab 10, Offeror B OCI
   Evaluation, at 3. The record does not support the agency's conclusion in
   this regard.

   There is no dispute that, in recent years, the use of spectrum in wireless
   applications has expanded dramatically and that, with the increased
   demand, the spectrum has become crowded, leading to sometimes contentious
   disputes between government and commercial users over access to
   spectrum.[10] At the GAO hearing, the contracting officer referred to this
   situation, testifying that DOD competes with "the entire world" for
   spectrum access.[11] Nonetheless, the agency's procurement record is
   devoid of any meaningful analysis regarding the scope of
   spectrum-dependent products manufactured by ITT, the scope of such
   products manufactured by ITT's competitors, or any consideration of the
   composition of ITT's customer base, including foreign governments, and the
   spectrum-management interests of those customers. Rather, the entire
   documentation supporting the conclusion that ITT is likely to experience
   impaired-objectivity OCIs only "7.3 percent of the time over the entire
   contract effort" is a three-page document, consisting primarily of summary
   conclusions. Indeed, in that document, the agency expressly disclaims any
   specific knowledge of ITT's activities, stating that the agency's
   conclusions are based on "the SSEB [source selection evaluation board]
   members' knowledge of the SOO [statement of objectives] and limited
   knowledge of . . . Offeror B [ITT], their subcontractors, and their
   industry as a whole." Agency Report, Tab 10, Offeror B OCI Evaluation.

   Here, it is clear that ITT manufactures and markets multiple
   spectrum-dependent products to the U.S. government, foreign governments,
   and commercial customers worldwide. Further, where DOD is competing for
   spectrum access with "the entire world," it is clear that DOD's policies,
   strategies, regulations and procedures regarding contentious
   spectrum-related issues are likely to affect the sales or use of
   spectrum-dependent products manufactured by ITT or ITT's competitors, as
   well as such products deployed by ITT customers, including foreign
   governments. As discussed above, under this contract, ITT will "[d]evelop
   recommendations . . . for policies, strategies, regulations, and
   procedures," "[p]erform technical studies . . . to develop long-term
   spectrum allocation and reallocation strategies," "[d]evise long-term
   plans and strategies based on regulatory activities and technology
   development," and "evaluate[] the activities and trends in national and
   international government and non-government spectrum management policies,
   procedures, and plans to determine potential opportunities and obstacles
   regarding DOD's global access to the Spectrum." Agency Report, Tab 14, at
   1-36 through 1-37. It is clear that all of these activities involve ITT's
   exercise of subjective judgment, and that the results of such judgments
   may have a positive or negative effect on the sale or use of
   spectrum-dependent products manufactured by ITT, those manufactured by
   ITT's competitors, and those deployed by ITT customers, including foreign
   governments. On this record, we find no reasonable basis for the agency's
   conclusion that performance of such activities creates no potential for
   impaired-objectivity OCIs for ITT. Further, because of the interrelated
   nature of the activities involved, they do not appear, on this record, to
   reasonably lend themselves to segregation for performance by "firewalled"
   subcontractors.

   ITT's PWS task [deleted]

   With regard to proposed PWS task [deleted], ITT's submission responding to
   the solicitation states that the overall objective of this proposed task
   is to be an "advocate" and to "lead all DOD . . . outreach efforts" with
   regard to various controversial issues, and to "build strategic alliances
   with national and international spectrum management bodies, government
   agencies and Congress, industry and academia." Agency Report, Tab 14, at
   1-52, 1-54. More specifically, ITT acknowledges that the targets of its
   outreach efforts will include "DOD contractors developing new spectrum
   access technologies and other companies with similar interests in
   flexible, real-time access to additional spectrum." Agency Report, Tab 14,
   at 1-53.

   As discussed during the GAO hearing, it is clear that DOD's interests, the
   interests of other government agencies, the interests of industry and
   various components within industry, and the interests of foreign
   governments--all of whom compete for spectrum access--may be widely
   divergent. Tr. at 847, 852, 914-15, 924-27, 932-33.[12] Further, the
   agency engineer responsible for assessing the extent of ITT's OCIs
   testified that it was possible ITT's activities under PWS task [deleted]
   will involve situations in which the ITT personnel performing this
   contract are responsible for advocating DOD positions to industry
   personnel--including to other ITT personnel who represent positions
   contrary to those of DOD. Tr. 934.[13] The agency engineer further
   testified that the agency expects ITT to provide "on the fly"
   responses--that is, immediate responses--to issues raised during meetings
   with various "outreach" groups. Tr. at 919-20. The record contains no data
   regarding the basis for the agency's conclusions that such situations will
   rarely occur, nor any indication of how the agency could reasonably
   anticipate, or segregate, "outreach" activities in which such OCIs will
   occur.

   In addition to its "outreach" activities, ITT states that, in performing
   PWS task [deleted], it will "evaluate[] activities and trends in national
   and international government and commercial spectrum management policies,
   procedures, and plans to determine potential opportunities and obstacles
   regarding DOD's global access to the Spectrum." Agency Report, Tab 14, at
   1-55. In this regard, ITT states that it will "assess [NTIA initiatives
   that are [deleted]] . . . [and] develop draft positions on such
   initiatives." Id. at 1-56. ITT further states "[o]ne of the other agencies
   that we will actively monitor and evaluate is the FCC, whose activities
   cover . . . granting commercial licenses," and that ITT envisions a
   "proactive role in . . . [deleted]. Id. at 1-57.[14] Finally, ITT
   anticipates that, under PWS task [deleted], it will "identify potential
   technologies that could impact DOD systems," stating that "[a]ny
   technologies that are identified as part of this subtask will be provided
   to the [deleted] task [deleted] for further evaluation." Id. at 1-58.[15]

   In assessing ITT's potential OCIs, the agency concluded that most of the
   activities discussed above would create no OCIs for ITT. Agency Report,
   Tab 10, Offeror B OCI Evaluation, at 3. Specifically, the agency concluded
   that, in performing all of the outreach and evaluation activities
   anticipated under PWS task [deleted], ITT will experience
   impaired-objectivity OCIs less than 8 percent of the time. Agency Report,
   Tab 10, Offeror B OCI Evaluation, at 2, 3.[16] Further, the agency
   concludes that, in those limited instances where OCIs occur, they can be
   reasonably mitigated through contract performance by ITT's "firewalled"
   subcontractors.

   As noted above, the record provides no indication that, in projecting a
   minimal potential for OCIs, the agency considered the scope of the
   spectrum-dependent products manufactured and marketed by ITT, or ITT's
   competitors, or the identity and spectrum-management interests of ITT's
   customers--whose ongoing satisfaction is a significant factor affecting
   ITT's financial success. Further, the agency record provides no meaningful
   explanation with regard to how the agency intends to reasonably
   anticipate--and more important, rationally segregate and successfully
   perform--the conflicted portions of the contract.[17] In light of the
   nature of activities anticipated under this task, which clearly require
   analysis, evaluation, and subjective judgment in areas where widely
   divergent interests are likely to exist, we find no reasonable basis in
   the record for the agency's assessment that impaired-objectivity OCIs will
   occur with minimal frequency. Further, in light of both the scope of
   activities and the expressly acknowledged relationship between this task
   and other tasks, on the record here, it appears unrealistic to conclude
   that activities which create OCIs for ITT can be reasonably identified
   prior to performance, rationally segregated, and successfully performed by
   a "firewalled" subcontractor.

   ITT's PWS Task [deleted]

   With regard to proposed PWS task [deleted], ITT's submission responding to
   the solicitation states that, in performing this task, ITT will:

   Assess market and technology trends and determine the operational impact
   to DOD . . . .

   Make recommendations for long-term plans and strategies based on emerging
   spectrum technologies . . . .

   Develop enabling, spectrum efficient technologies for integration into
   military systems . . . .

   Perform technical analytical studies for policies, strategies,
   regulations, and procedures to support the implementation and integration
   of emerging technologies . . . .

   Agency Report, Tab 14, at 1-121.

   More specifically, ITT states that, in performing these activities, it
   will "[deleted] the entire field of spectrum related technologies to
   identify potentially significant technology advances," and, among other
   things, that ITT will [deleted] to identify the most significant spectrum
   technologies to [deleted]." Agency Report, Tab 14, at 1-123, 1-124.
   Further, ITT states that the criteria that will be used to select
   particular technologies for [deleted] will incorporate determinations as
   to whether a developing technology is "detrimental" or "beneficial" to DOD
   operations. Agency Report, Tab 14, at 1-124.

   In assessing the potential for impaired-objectivity OCIs, the agency
   concluded that ITT was likely to experience conflicts in performing this
   task only 20 percent of the time. Agency Report, Tab 10. As with the PWS
   tasks discussed above, the record contains no data supporting this
   assessment, nor does the record reflect any meaningful consideration
   regarding the potential spectrum-management interests of ITT, ITT's
   competitors, or ITT's global customers, including foreign governments.

   Here, it is clear that performance of PWS task [deleted] anticipates the
   ongoing monitoring and assessment of emerging technologies, including
   technologies being developed by ITT or by ITT's competitors. The ongoing
   monitoring, assessments and determinations as to which technologies
   incorporate "significant technology advances," the comparative
   determinations regarding which technologies are "most significant" so as
   to warrant [deleted], and the assessments regarding whether a developing
   technology is "detrimental" or "beneficial" all incorporate subjective
   judgments with regard to a universe of technology in which ITT and ITT's
   competitors have direct financial interests. Further, it is clear that the
   monitoring and assessments are inextricably intertwined; that is, the
   assessments are, of necessity, performed as part of the ongoing monitoring
   process. Accordingly, segregation and performance by a subcontractor do
   not appear reasonable or realistic. On this record, we find no reasonable
   support for the agency's conclusion that performance of this task will
   create only minimal OCIs for ITT, or that such OCIs can be reasonably
   addressed by use of subcontractors.

   Overall, as discussed above, the agency maintains that "an impaired
   objectivity OCI [is] likely to occur [for ITT] approximately 7.3 percent
   of the time over the entire contract effort." Contracting Officer's
   Statement at 16. Based on our review of the record, discussed above, the
   agency's assessment is not reasonably supported by the record.
   Specifically, the aggregate level of effort proposed with regard to only
   the PWS tasks discussed above make up more than [deleted] percent of the
   total level of effort proposed. Agency Report, Tab 10.[18] As discussed
   above, a significant portion of the activities described under each of the
   PWS tasks addressed above involve analysis, evaluation, and subjective
   judgment with regard to matters in which DOD, ITT, ITT's competitors, and
   ITT's customers are likely to have direct, and likely divergent,
   interests. Further, in light of the interrelated nature of the activities
   both within tasks and between tasks, it does not appear from the record
   here that the agency, or ITT, can expect to meaningfully identify
   potential conflicts prior to the time the specific activities are
   performed, rationally segregate such conflicted portions of the contract,
   and successfully perform those requirements with "firewalled"
   subcontractors.

   In short, the record shows that the agency failed to reasonably identify
   and evaluate the extent of OCIs associated with ITT's performance of this
   contract, as well as the effect of potential OCIs on contract
   performance.[19]

   The protest is sustained.[20]

   RECOMMENDATION

   We recommend that the agency reconsider its assessment regarding the
   extent of ITT's impaired-objectivity OCIs, taking into consideration the
   spectrum-management interests of ITT and ITT's competitors that flow from
   their manufacture and marketing of various spectrum-dependent products,
   along with the potential spectrum-management interests of ITT's customer
   base, and document its conclusions in that regard. We further recommend
   that the agency evaluate the reasonable impact on quality of service, in
   the context of the activities anticipated under this solicitation, that
   will be caused by an OCI mitigation plan that relies on "firewalled"
   subcontractors for performance of conflicted contract requirements.
   Following such reconsideration and evaluation, we recommend that the
   agency make a new source selection decision. We further recommend that the
   agency reimburse Alion for the costs of filing and pursuing its protest,
   including reasonable attorneys' fees. Alion's certified claim for costs,
   detailing the time spent and costs incurred, must be submitted to the
   agency within 60 days of receiving this decision. 4 C.F.R. sect.
   21.8(f)(1) (2005).

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] DISA conducted this procurement under Part 8 of the Federal
   Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and relied on the "GSA E-Buy" website to
   publicize the RFQ.

   [2] With regard to quality of service, the solicitation established three
   subfactors: technical excellence, personnel qualifications, and management
   capability. RFQ at 42-43.

   [3] The agency used a color rating/narrative assessment scheme to evaluate
   the quotations with regard to quality of service and past performance.
   With regard to quality of service, the following color ratings and
   associated narrative assessments were applied: "Blue" ("excellent
   understanding of objectives and approach significantly exceeds performance
   or capability"); "Green" ("demonstrates good understanding of objectives
   and approach exceeds objectives"); "Yellow" ("demonstrates an acceptable
   understanding of objectives and approach meets performance or
   capability"); "Orange" ("demonstrates a shallow understanding of the
   objectives and approach that only marginally meets performance or
   capability"); and "Red" ("fails to meet performance or capability.
   Objectives can only be met with major changes to the proposal"). RFQ at
   40-41. With regard to past performance, the following color ratings and
   associated narrative assessments were applied: "Blue" ("Highly
   relevant/very recent past performance in all proposed task order areas;
   predominantly excellent performance ratings"); "Green" ("Relevant/somewhat
   recent past performance in all proposed task order areas; acceptable
   performance ratings"); "Yellow" ("Somewhat relevant/not very recent past
   performance; mostly acceptable performance ratings"); "Orange" ("Little
   relevant/old past performance; mostly unacceptable performance ratings");
   "Red" ("Little relevant past performance; almost all unacceptable
   performance ratings"); and "White ("No past performance history"). Id.

   [4] The agency also performed a risk assessment with regard to quality of
   service and and price. Alion's quotation was rated [deleted]; ITT's
   quotation was rated [deleted]. Contracting Officer's Statement at 10.

   [5] This request was made following Alion's submission of another protest,
   raising OCI issues, that challenged DISA's award of another spectrum
   management contract to ITT under a different solicitation.

   [6] By way of example, ITT states that it provides single channel ground
   and airborne radios (SINCGAR), spectrum management systems, and several
   types of radar systems to DOD. Agency Report, Tab 20, ITT OCI Mitigation
   Plan, at 10-11. Additionally, ITT states that: "ITT Industries is a global
   engineering and industrial manufacturing company with leading positions in
   the markets that it serves. The company is a major supplier of
   sophisticated military defense systems, and provides advanced technical
   and operational services to a broad range of government agencies."
   www.itt.com/downloads/defense12pg.pdf. ITT elaborates that it has
   provided, or is providing, "Night vision equipment for Australian Defence
   Forces," "Imagers for Japanese weather satellites," "Airborne
   Self-Protection Jammers (ASPJ) for Republic of Korea," "Tactical
   communications systems for U.K. armed forces," and "Air traffic control
   radar systems for Brazilian Air Force." Id. ITT also states that it
   markets a variety of spectrum-dependent products to commercial customers.
   Id.

   [7] In a publication dated March 5, 2005, under the heading
   "Forward-Looking Statements," an ITT representative stated that ITT's
   future performance will be affected by various factors, including
   "government regulations and compliance therewith," "local regulations in
   the countries in which the Company conducts its businesses," "changes in
   technology," and "changes in . . . the identity of significant customers."
   Presentation of Hank Driesse, President, ITT Defense (Mar. 3, 2005),
   www.itt.com/ir/downloads/fbr_conference_05.pdf. More specifically, ITT
   stated: "Our Defense Electronics & Services business will be affected by
   factors including the level of defense funding by domestic and foreign
   governments; our ability to receive contract awards; and our ability to
   develop and market products and services for customers outside of
   traditional markets." Id.

   [8] As part of our review in this matter, we conducted a hearing at GAO
   during which testimony was provided by, among others, the contracting
   officer and agency engineer responsible for calculating the extent of OCIs
   that ITT will likely experience.

   [9] The contracting officer testified that a single task order has been
   awarded to ITT, [deleted]. Finally, the contracting officer testified that
   subcontractor payments are made by ITT, with no agency involvement, and
   that ITT is not required to provide the terms of its subcontracts to the
   agency. Tr. at 872-75.

   [10] See generally Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee - IRAC
   Representative Effectively Coordinate Federal Spectrum but Lack Seniority
   to Advise on Contentious Policy Issues, GAO-04-1028, September 2004;
   Spectrum Management - Better Knowledge Needed to Take Advantage of
   Technologies that May Improve Spectrum Efficiency, GAO-04-666, May 2004.

   [11] Specifically, the following exchange took place:

   Q.    Who are the United States forces competing with . . . for spectrum
   access?

   A.     The entire world.

   Q.    And that would include industry users of anything that operates via
   radio frequencies, is that correct?

   A.     As well as international, all the foreign governments.

   Q.    Both in terms of their commercial as well as military use of the
   spectrum?

   A.     And any other governmental use. There's just so much bandwidth.

   Tr. at 843.

   [12] In discussing spectrum access generally, ITT provides a candid
   assessment of current situation: "At the same time that DOD's spectrum
   access requirements are increasing, demands on spectrum access by non-DOD
   users is also rapidly increasing." Agency Report, Tab 14, at 1-119. The
   agency engineer that testified at the GAO hearing described ITT's proposed
   outreach efforts as involving a "technical adversary." Tr. at 921.

   [13] On the record here, it appears equally possible that ITT personnel
   performing "outreach" efforts may be responsible for advocating DOD
   positions to representatives of ITT's competitors who represent interests
   that conflict with both those of DOD and ITT. See id.

   [14] By way of example, ITT states that it anticipates "engagement [of]
   the FCC on troublesome issues such as [deleted]. Id. at 1-57.

   [15] With regard to the relationship of PWS task [deleted] to ITT's other
   proposed efforts under this contract, ITT states that "this task will be
   fully integrated and coordinated with the [deleted] task [deleted] and
   [deleted] . . . . The [deleted] task [deleted] will provide additional
   technical analysis expertise as required to help advocate[] DOD positions
   in national and international spectrum management forums." Agency Report,
   Tab 14, at 1-53.

   [16] At the GAO hearing, the agency engineer responsible for this
   calculation acknowledged that there is no empirical data to support this
   or the other agency projections regarding the portion of requirements
   under each proposed task that will create OCIs for ITT; rather, the agency
   engineer testified that the calculation was the product of the agency's
   experience gained, in part, under prior support contracts. Tr. at 956,
   958-61, 980-81, 1021-22, 1024-26. However, in this regard, the
   solicitation expressly described the activities contemplated under this
   solicitation as materially different from those performed under prior
   contracts. RFQ at 18. Similarly, the contracting officer specifically
   stated that "[t]hese objectives differ greatly from previous contract
   support efforts." Contracting Officer's Statement at 2. Accordingly, it is
   not clear that the agency's experience under prior support contracts
   provides a reliable basis for the agency's calculation.

   [17] In addition to the agency's failure to consider information that
   appears necessarily relevant to a meaningful assessment of potential OCIs,
   the record appears inconsistent regarding the portion of the contract
   effort that the agency anticipates will have to be subcontracted. In this
   regard, the contracting officer specifically stated that an
   impaired-objectivity OCI for ITT is "likely to occur approximately 7.3
   percent of the time over the entire contract effort," and that ITT could
   effectively mitigate such occurrences by subcontracting the conflicted
   portions of the contract requirements. Contracting Officer's Statement at
   16-17. In contrast, the engineer appearing on behalf of the agency at the
   GAO hearing testified that the agency's calculation of "7.3 percent" does
   not reflect the portion of conflicted contract requirements that will be
   subcontracted, Tr. at 959-61; rather, the engineer testified that this
   calculation was "just a probability assessment" regarding the likelihood
   that an OCI will occur. Tr. at 1022.

   [18] We do not view our discussion regarding PWS tasks [deleted] as a
   comprehensive analysis of all contract activities. In particular, our
   decision does not address any potential conflicts that may occur under the
   proposed tasks for [deleted].

   [19] We note that the FAR anticipates situations in which application of
   the OCI provisions contained in FAR subpart 9.5 may not be in the
   government's interest, and authorizes the waiver of such provisions by an
   authority at a level not lower than head of the contracting activity. FAR
   sect. 9.503. Here, no waiver was requested or approved.

   [20] Alion has also challenged the procurement on the basis of matters
   other than those related to the agency's OCI assessment, discussed above.
   We have considered all of Alion's assertions, and find no bases for
   sustaining the protest other than as discussed above.