TITLE: B-297078; B-297078.2, Lifecare Management Partners, November 21, 2005
BNUMBER: B-297078; B-297078.2
DATE: November 21, 2005
*********************************************************************
B-297078; B-297078.2, Lifecare Management Partners, November 21, 2005

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Lifecare Management Partners

   File: B-297078; B-297078.2

   Date: November 21, 2005

   Janine S. Benton, Esq., H. Scott Johnson, Jr., Esq., Seth C. Berenzweig,
   Esq., Heather A. James, Esq., and Sarah T. Zaffina, Esq., Albo & Oblon,
   L.L.P., for the protester.

   Capt. Joseph V. Fratarcangeli, Department of the Army, for the agency.

   Louis A. Chiarella, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the
   General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Protest that agency improperly relaxed solicitation's requirement that
   offerors be able to commence contract performance by the start date by
   delaying the start date is denied where the agency decision to alter the
   contract start date was based upon delays in contract award, including an
   agency-level protest filed by the protester.

   2. Protest of agency's technical evaluation is denied where record shows
   evaluation was reasonable and consistent with evaluation criteria; mere
   disagreement with agency's evaluation is insufficient to show it was
   unreasonable.

   3. Protest filed with Government Accountability Office is untimely where
   filed more than 10 days after protester became aware of initial adverse
   agency action on agency-level protest.

   DECISION

   Lifecare Management Partners protests the award of a contract to Wright
   Solutions, Inc. under request for proposals (RFP) No. W91YTZ-05-R-0004,
   issued by the North Atlantic Regional Contracting Office, Department of
   the Army, for certified medical record coding services at the Walter Reed
   Army Medical Center (WRAMC), located in Washington, District of Columbia.
   Lifecare argues that various agency actions, including the evaluation of
   Wright's proposal, were unreasonable, and that the resulting award
   decision was improper.

   We deny the protests in part and dismiss them in part.

   BACKGROUND

   The RFP, issued on May 4, 2005, contemplated the award of a fixed-price,
   indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for a base year with four
   1-year options to provide certified medical record coding services. The
   solicitation established three evaluation factors: technical; past
   performance; and price.[1] RFP at 26. The RFP also informed offerors that
   the technical factor was more important than either the past performance
   or price factors, which were of equal importance. Id. at 27. Award was to
   be made to the responsible offeror whose proposal was determined to be
   "most advantageous" to the government, all factors considered. Id. at 26.

   Seven offerors, including Wright and the incumbent Lifecare, submitted
   proposals by the May 20 closing date. Agency Report (AR), Tab 10, Source
   Selection Decision, at 2. The contracting officer determined that five
   offerors were within the competitive range. The Army then received
   individual oral presentations from the offerors in the competitive
   range.[2] An agency technical evaluation panel (TEP) evaluated offerors'
   written proposals and oral presentations using an adjectival rating
   system: excellent, good, satisfactory, marginal, or unsatisfactory for the
   technical evaluation factor; and good/low risk, satisfactory/medium risk,
   unsatisfactory/high risk, and neutral/ unknown performance risk for the
   past performance evaluation factor. Concurrent with the technical
   evaluation, the agency separately evaluated offerors' prices and
   calculated an overall evaluated cost to the government for each offeror.

   After completion of its evaluation, the TEP provided the contracting
   officer with its consensus evaluation ratings of offerors' proposals,
   including those of Lifecare and Wright, which were as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |             Factor             |     Lifecare      |      Wright       |
   |--------------------------------+-------------------+-------------------|
   |Technical (Overall)             |     Excellent     |     Excellent     |
   |--------------------------------+-------------------+-------------------|
   |Technical Capability            |     Excellent     |     Excellent     |
   |--------------------------------+-------------------+-------------------|
   |Organizational Experience       |     Excellent     |       Good        |
   |--------------------------------+-------------------+-------------------|
   |Personnel Qualifications        |     Excellent     |     Excellent     |
   |--------------------------------+-------------------+-------------------|
   |Past Performance                |   Good/Low Risk   |   Good/Low Risk   |
   |--------------------------------+-------------------+-------------------|
   |Evaluated Price                 |    $24,138,510    |    $12,869,512    |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Id. at 4, 11-14.

   On July 21, after having reviewed the evaluation ratings and findings, the
   contracting officer determined that Wright's proposal, which was
   lowest-priced among offerors with equivalent technical and past
   performance ratings, represented the best value to the government.[3] Id.
   at 16.

   The agency provided Wright as well as all unsuccessful offerors with
   notice of its award determination on August 1.[4] AR, Sept. 21, 2005, at
   3; Lifecare Protest, Aug. 19, 2005, at 5-6. On August 5, the Army provided
   Lifecare with a postaward debriefing. At the debriefing Lifecare
   questioned, among other things, Wright's ability to successfully perform
   the contract and comply with the Service Contract Act prevailing wage
   determination at the awarded contract price. Subsequent to the Lifecare
   debriefing, the agency issued an amendment to the solicitation. RFP amend.
   0002. The amendment stated that the solicitation was being re-opened in
   order to clarify the pricing unit for various contract line items (i.e.,
   "hours," and not "records").[5] The agency informed offerors that the
   response date for the submission of price clarifications was August 9, at
   4 p.m.

   On August 9, Lifecare did not provide the Army with a price clarification
   in response to the amended RFP;[6] however, Lifecare did file an
   agency-level protest challenging the solicitation amendment.[7] AR, Tab
   15, Lifecare Agency-Level Protest. Despite Lifecare's protest, the agency
   proceeded with the procurement and received price clarifications from
   other offerors as scheduled. On August 17, the contracting officer denied
   Lifecare's protest. AR, Tab 16, Agency-Level Protest Denial. On August 18,
   based upon its evaluation of offerors' price clarifications, the agency
   again selected Wright for award. AR, Tab 17, Source Selection Decision
   Addendum. On August 22, Lifecare protested to our Office.[8]

   ANALYSIS

   Lifecare's protests raise numerous issues that can be grouped into three
   categories. First, Lifecare alleges that the Army improperly relaxed the
   solicitation requirements in favor of Wright. Second, Lifecare contends
   that the Army's evaluation of Wright's proposal was flawed. Third,
   Lifecare alleges that the agency's conduct during the course of the
   solicitation was in various ways improper. Although we do not here
   specifically address all of Lifecare's arguments about the evaluation of
   proposals and other agency actions, we have fully considered all of them
   and find that they afford no basis to sustain the protest of the selection
   decision here.

   Relaxation of Requirements

   Lifecare first protests that the Army improperly relaxed material
   requirements of the solicitation for Wright. Specifically, Lifecare
   alleges that although the RFP required offerors to have sufficient
   accredited personnel to commence contract performance on the August 15
   start date, the agency delayed the start date until September 1 for the
   benefit of Wright. The protester also alleges that its incumbent personnel
   were solicited by Wright after the August 1 initial award decision as
   evidence that the awardee did not have adequate personnel to perform the
   contract. The protester argues that by not requiring Wright to have
   adequate personnel on hand to commence performance by the contract start
   date, and by altering the contract start date for Wright's benefit, the
   agency failed to treat all offerors equally.

   It is a fundamental principle of government procurement that competition
   must be conducted on an equal basis, that is, offerors must be treated
   equally and be provided with a common basis for the preparation of their
   proposals. Continental RPVs, B-292768.2, B-292768.3, Dec. 11, 2003, 2004
   CPD para. 56 at 8; Systems Mgmt., Inc.; Qualimetrics, Inc., B-287032.3,
   B-287032.4, Apr. 16, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 85 at 8. Our Office will sustain
   a protest that an agency improperly relaxed its requirements for the
   awardee where the protester establishes a reasonable possibility that it
   was prejudiced by the agency's actions. Datastream Sys., Inc. B-291653,
   Jan. 24, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 30 at 6. We find that the Army did not
   improperly relax the solicitation requirements for the benefit of Wright.

   The RFP as originally issued established a base period of performance
   commencing on June 1. RFP at 3. The solicitation also required that, with
   regard to an offeror's medical record coding personnel, the "Contractor
   shall provide copies of credentials and a resume to include three years of
   current coding experience within the last five years for all personnel
   prior to assignment at WRAMC." RFP sect. C.1.1.6.

   The Army did not complete its award determination here by the June 1
   contract start date. As a result, the agency modified its incumbent
   contract with Lifecare and extended the end date of performance from May
   31 until August 31. AR, Tab 9, Contract No. W91YTZ-05-P-0060, Mod. P0005,
   at 1. Additionally, on August 5, when amending the solicitation here in
   order to clarify offerors' prices, the Army changed the contract start
   date to Monday, August 15.[9] RFP amend. 0002, at 2. In denying Lifecare's
   agency-level protest of the amended solicitation on August 17, the agency
   stated that the start date for the new contract would be "on or about 1
   September."[10] AR, Tab 16, Agency-Level Protest Denial, at 1. In fact,
   the contract issued to Wright on Friday, August 19, had a period of
   performance commencing on Monday, August 22. AR, Tab 18, Contract to
   Wright, at 1, 15.

   We find Lifecare's argument that the agency improperly relaxed material
   solicitation requirements for the awardee to be without merit. First, as
   the protester itself acknowledges, the solicitation did not require that
   the successful offeror have all of its employees on hand prior to contract
   award, Lifecare's Comments, Oct. 3, 2005, at 5; rather, the RFP
   requirements mandated only that the awardee have sufficient accredited
   medical coding personnel to begin performance by the contract start
   date.[11] Second, the record reflects that the agency had a valid reason
   for altering the August 15 contract start date, namely, delays in the
   contract award process.

   As set forth above, given that it was required to reevaluate offerors'
   clarified prices and resolve Lifecare's agency-level protest, the Army did
   not make its final award decision until August 18 and did not issue a
   contract to Wright until August 19. In light thereof, we fail to see, and
   the protester fails to explain, how Wright or any other offeror could have
   begun contract performance on August 15. Moreover, notwithstanding the
   agency's statement that the start date would be "on or about" September 1,
   the actual contract start date was August 22, the first business day after
   the Army issued the contract to Wright--a fact which Lifecare ignores. In
   sum, we find that there was a reasonable basis for the agency's decision
   to extend the start date for commencement of contract performance; it was
   not done to improperly relax the requirements for the awardee. See
   Military Waste Mgmt., Inc., B-240769.3, Feb. 7, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 135
   at 3. Lifecare, the incumbent contractor, cannot protest the solicitation,
   delay the agency's ability to award a contract, and then reasonably argue
   that any alteration of the planned contract start date constitutes a
   relaxation of the requirements in favor of the new awardee.

   Evaluation of Wright's Proposal

   Lifecare also protests that the agency's evaluation of Wright's technical
   proposal was unreasonable. Specifically, Lifecare alleges that the Army
   overlooked the deficiency in Wright's proposal with regard to the
   solicitation requirement concerning the designation of a site manager.[12]
   Lifecare also contends that the agency ignored other significant, material
   deficiencies in Wright's proposal that were identified by the TEP when
   performing its evaluation. The protester argues that the agency's flawed
   evaluation process resulted in the improper selection of Wright for
   contract award.

   In reviewing an agency's evaluation, we will not reevaluate technical
   proposals; instead, we will examine the agency's evaluation to ensure that
   it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's stated evaluation
   criteria and procurement statutes and regulations. Urban-Meridian Joint
   Venture, B-287168, B-287168.2, May 7, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 91 at 2. An
   offeror's mere disagreement with the agency's evaluation is not sufficient
   to render the evaluation unreasonable. Ben-Mar Enters., Inc., B-295781,
   Apr. 7, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 68 at 7. Our review of the record here finds
   the agency's evaluation of Wright's proposal to be unobjectionable.

   The RFP stated, in relevant part:

   The Contractor shall designate a Site Manager. The Site Manager shall be
   responsible for the performance of the work activities of all contracted
   coding staff. . . . The Contractor shall designate this individual in
   writing to the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) and the
   Contracting Officer before the contract start date.

   RFP amend. 0001, sect. C.1.1.2.

   Wright submitted its written proposal by the original closing date.
   Wright's proposal set forth the manner in which the offeror planned to
   perform the required medical coding services. Wright's proposal stated,
   with regard to its on-site management plan, that the plan would be
   submitted to the agency within 30 days of contract award. AR, Tab 6,
   Wright's Technical Proposal, at 15. Wright's written proposal did not
   identify the proposed site manager. The agency subsequently received
   individual oral presentations from the offerors. At its oral presentation,
   Wright's president introduced its proposed on-site project manager, who
   then proceeded to conduct a substantial portion of the oral presentation,
   including a lengthy discussion of the site manager's own experience,
   qualifications, and management philosophy. AR, Tab 6, Wright's Proposal,
   Audiotape of Oral Presentation. In its evaluation of Wright's entire
   proposal (i.e., both the written proposal and oral presentation), the TEP
   determined that the awardee had complied with the RFP requirement
   regarding designation of a site manager. AR, Tab 8, TEP Consensus
   Evaluation of Wright, at 12.

   As a preliminary matter, it is not clear that the solicitation required
   that offerors designate their proposed site managers in their proposals.
   As noted above, the relevant RFP provision states only that the
   "contractor" is to designate a site manager to the agency "before the
   contract start date." Rather than clearly establishing a proposal
   requirement, this language suggests that the requirement was only to
   designate the site manager before the start of performance. See Citrus
   College; KEI Pearson, Inc., B-293543 et al., Apr. 9, 2004, 2004 CPD para.
   104 at 3. In any event, we find Lifecare's assertion that Wright failed to
   designate a site manager in its proposal to be factually inaccurate. The
   record clearly establishes that Wright's oral presentation included the
   designation of its site manager. The RFP also informed offerors that the
   agency would consider an offeror's oral presentation to be part of its
   proposal. Such treatment is entirely consistent with the relevant FAR
   provision, which provides that "oral presentations by offerors as
   requested by the government may substitute for, or augment, written
   information." FAR sect. 15.102. The fact that Wright's initial written
   proposal did not include the designation of a site manager is simply not
   determinative of whether Wright in fact designated a site manager in its
   proposal.

   Lifecare also alleges that the agency ignored significant deficiencies in
   Wright's technical proposal that were actually identified by the TEP when
   performing its evaluation. Lifecare contends that all TEP members who
   reviewed Wright's proposal identified deficiencies in the areas of project
   management plan quality, allocation of personnel and resources, and
   organizational experience. Lifecare argues that notwithstanding these
   noted deficiencies, the TEP improperly rated Wright's proposal as
   excellent overall under the technical evaluation factor.

   As set forth above, the RFP informed offerors that the technical
   evaluation factor was comprised of three, equally-important subfactors:
   technical capability; organizational experience; and personnel
   qualifications. In turn, the technical capability subfactor consisted of
   five, second-tier criteria all of equal importance, one of which was
   quality of the project management plan and allocation of personnel and
   resources. RFP at 26. When performing its evaluation, the TEP rated
   offerors' technical proposals by having each member individually review
   and assign an adjectival rating to each subfactor and criterion, as well
   as an overall evaluation rating. The TEP then developed consensus ratings
   based upon discussions among the members of the strengths and weaknesses
   of each proposal.

   The TEP members each individually rated Wright's proposal as good under
   the project management plan criterion. AR, Tab 8, TEP Evaluation of
   Wright. The agency evaluators each found Wright to have strengths here
   (e.g., on-site management was extremely involved in all projects), but
   also believed that concerns regarding the immediately availability of
   Wright's on-site management and/or the timely allocation of personnel
   constituted weaknesses.[13] The TEP consensus evaluation also rated Wright
   as good under the project management plan criterion. Based upon its
   ratings of Wright's technical proposal under each stated evaluation
   criterion, the TEP rated Wright's proposal as excellent as to technical
   capability, good as to organizational experience, excellent as to
   personnel qualifications, and excellent overall. Id.

   We find Lifecare's assertion that the agency ignored the deficiencies
   which the TEP identified in its review of Wright's proposal to be without
   merit. The record indicates that when assigning an evaluation rating to
   the technical merits of Wright's proposal, the TEP properly considered all
   aspects of the awardee's proposal--both those aspects identified as
   weaknesses to which Lifecare refers, as well as the many aspects
   identified as strengths which Lifecare does not mention. Based upon a
   consideration of relative strengths and weaknesses, the TEP reasonably
   rated Wright's proposal as either good or excellent under each technical
   factor and criterion. The existence of isolated weaknesses in an otherwise
   favorable assessment does not preclude or make unreasonable an overall
   favorable evaluation rating. See Metro Mach. Corp., B-295744, B-295744.2,
   Apr. 21, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 112 at 25. Under the circumstances here, we
   have no basis to find the agency's evaluation unreasonable.[14]

   Untimely Issues

   Lifecare also protests that the Army actively attempted to hinder its
   participation in the solicitation by "tortiously interfering" with
   Lifecare's employee contracts and trying to recruit Lifecare personnel for
   the follow-on contract. Lifecare states that it maintains non-competition
   agreements with its employees who have worked at WRAMC. The protester
   contends that various Army procurement officials talked to Lifecare
   employees, both before and after the agency's initial award decision, and
   questioned whether Lifecare's non-competition agreements were enforceable.
   Lifecare argues that the agency efforts to undermine the contractual
   relationship between Lifecare and its employees had the effect of
   hindering Lifecare's participation in the competition. The Army contends
   that agency officials did not interfere with the Lifecare employment
   agreements, or try to persuade Lifecare's employees to leave their
   positions with the firm.

   We find this issue to be untimely. As set forth above, offerors were given
   until August 9 to clarify their prices in response to RFP Amendment 0002.
   Lifecare chose not to submit a price clarification by the revised closing
   date; instead, it filed a protest with the agency contending that the
   solicitation was defective in that it failed to remedy, among other
   things, the agency's interference with Lifecare's employee contracts. As
   noted above, despite Lifecare's protest, the Army proceeded with the
   procurement and received offerors' price clarifications as scheduled. On
   August 17, the contracting officer denied Lifecare's protest and, on
   August 18, the Army made a new award determination. On August 22, Lifecare
   protested this issue to our Office.

   Where a protest initially has been filed with a contracting activity, any
   subsequent protest to our Office, to be considered timely under our Bid
   Protest Regulations, must be filed within 10 days of actual or
   constructive knowledge of initial adverse agency action. 4 C.F.R. sect.
   21.2(a)(3). The term "adverse agency action" is defined in our Bid Protest
   Regulations to include the agency's proceeding with the receipt of
   proposals in the face of the protest. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.0(f); Carlisle
   Tire & Rubber Co., B-235413, May 12, 1989, 89-1 CPD para. 457 at 2.[15]
   Thus, it is our general view that once the contracting activity proceeds
   with accepting offers, the protester is on notice that the contracting
   activity will not undertake the requested corrective action; consequently,
   timeliness is measured from this point rather than from the receipt of a
   subsequent formal denial of the agency-level protest. Scopus Optical
   Indus., B-238541, Feb. 23, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 221 at 2.

   Since Lifecare learned of the initial adverse agency action on August 9,
   but did not file its protest with our Office until August 22, more than 10
   days later, its protest is untimely under our Bid Protest Regulations.[16]
   4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(a)(3). These timeliness rules reflect the dual
   requirements of giving parties a fair opportunity to present their cases
   and of resolving protests expeditiously without unduly disrupting or
   delaying the procurement process.[17] Air Inc.--Recon., B-238220.2, Jan.
   29, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 129 at 2.

   The protests are denied in part and dismissed in part.

   Anthony H. Gamboa
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The solicitation also set forth various evaluation subfactors of equal
   importance to each other within each prime evaluation factor. RFP at
   26-27. The technical evaluation subfactors were: technical capability;
   organizational experience; and personnel qualifications. Id. at 26.

   [2] The RFP established that the oral presentations, including copies of
   slides used to support the oral presentations, would be considered part of
   the offeror's proposal. RFP at 24. The agency also prepared audiotape
   recordings of each offeror's oral presentation.

   [3] The Army determined that another offeror's proposal, whose price was
   lower than that of Wright with equivalent technical and past performance
   ratings, was ineligible for award because it had failed to provide prices
   for all contract line items. Id. at 14.

   [4] The record indicates that the Army did not actually issue a contract
   to Wright at the time of the August 1 award determination.

   [5] Based upon the Lifecare debriefing, the Army concluded that offerors
   did not have a common understanding of the solicitation's intended pricing
   unit, and that seeking price clarifications was necessary in order to put
   all offerors on an equal plane for price evaluation purposes. AR, Sept.
   21, 2005, at 3; Tab 16, Agency-Level Protest Denial, at 1.

   [6] The record reflects that Lifecare's original price proposal had been
   based upon the intended pricing unit (i.e., hours). AR, Tab 15, Lifecare
   Agency-Level Protest, at 3-4; Tab 17, Source Selection Decision Addendum,
   at 1.

   [7] Lifecare argued that Amendment 0002 was defective insofar as it failed
   to correct the following alleged improprieties: (1) the agency's tortious
   interference with Lifecare's employee contracts; and (2) Wright's
   defective prices and the agency's defective price evaluation. AR, Tab 15,
   Lifecare Agency-Level Protest, at 3-6.

   [8] Lifecare's protest to our Office was delivered by e-mail on August 19
   after 5:30 p.m., and thus is considered filed on August 22, the next
   business day. See 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.0(g) (2005).

   [9] It is unclear when Wright was to commence performance as a result of
   the August 1 initial award determination, as no contract was actually
   issued to the awardee at this time, and the RFP's original start date of
   June 1 had passed.

   [10] The agency also noted that it was relying upon incumbent Lifecare to
   fulfill the terms of its modified contract, which had an end date of
   August 31. Id.

   [11] Whether Wright may have solicited Lifecare's incumbent personnel
   after the initial award decision and prior to the contract start date, as
   Lifecare alleges, is therefore irrelevant to our determination here.
   Moreover, we note that it is neither unusual nor inherently improper for
   an awardee to recruit and hire personnel previously employed by an
   incumbent contractor.

   [12] As a preliminary matter, we note that the protester alleges that the
   agency should have rejected Wright's proposal as "nonresponsive." The
   record is clear, however, that the solicitation here employed negotiated
   procedures pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15.
   Accordingly, the protester's references to "nonresponsiveness" are
   inappropriate (and its reliance upon FAR Part 14 and our decisions in
   sealed bidding procurements is misplaced), since this concept is not
   applicable to negotiated procurements. See Marshall-Putnam Soil & Water
   Conservation Dist., B-289949, B-289949.2, May 29, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 90
   at 4-5. We interpret Lifecare's protest as contending that Wright's
   proposal should have been rejected as technically unacceptable because
   the firm's offer allegedly did not comply with the RFP requirements.
   Accordingly, we analyze the protester's contention by the standards
   applicable to negotiated procurements.

   [13] While the RFP did not require the submission of an on-site management
   plan before the contract start date, Wright's proposal to provide the
   agency with a management plan within 30 days of contract award was seen by
   the TEP as a weakness. Likewise, the TEP identified other weaknesses in
   Wright's proposal under the organizational experience subfactor.

   [14]In its initial protest Lifecare also asserted that the agency failed
   to perform an adequate price realism determination of Wright's proposal as
   required by the solicitation. Protest, Aug. 19, 2005, at 10-12. The Army
   specifically addressed this protest issue in its report, discussing the
   agency's price realism evaluation of both Wright's initial and clarified
   price proposals, and the protester's comments offered no substantive
   rebuttal of the agency's position. (Lifecare argued only that the Army had
   not canceled its initial contract award at the time it evaluated offerors'
   price clarifications, a fact wholly irrelevant to whether the agency's
   price realism evaluation was proper.) Where, as here, an agency provides a
   detailed response to a protester's assertions and the protester either
   does not respond to the agency's position or provides a response that
   fails to substantively rebut the agency's position, we deem the
   initially-raised arguments abandoned. L-3 Communications Westwood Corp.,
   B-295126, Jan. 19, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 30 at 4; Citrus College; KEI
   Pearson, Inc., supra, at 8 n.4. In any event, our review of the record
   indicates that the agency's price realism evaluation of Wright's proposal
   was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria.

   [15] In addition, the written guide describing our Office's bid protest
   process, which is posted on GAO's website, explicitly warns potential
   protesters that they "should keep in mind, however, that GAO views as
   adverse agency action any action that makes clear that the agency is
   denying the agency-level protest. Examples of adverse agency action
   include the agency's proceeding with . . . the receipt of proposals . . .
   despite the agency-level protest." Bid Protests at GAO: A Descriptive
   Guide (7th ed. 2003) at 12. See
   http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/bid/bibreg.html.

   [16] Similarly, Lifecare's protest that the Army improperly considered its
   agency-level protest of the amended solicitation to be a confirmation of
   the offeror's original price, rather than suspending the procurement
   pending the protest's outcome as the agency should have done, is also
   untimely. Lifecare was aware as of August 9 that the Army had decided not
   to postpone the receipt of offerors' price clarifications, notwithstanding
   its agency-level protest. However, it was not until October 3--almost 2
   months after this adverse agency action--that Lifecare first raised this
   protest issue with our Office. Moreover, contrary to the protester's
   assertion, although an agency generally may not award a contract while a
   preaward protest is pending, an agency is not also required to suspend the
   closing date for the receipt of proposals or its evaluation of offerors'
   proposals. See FAR sect. 33.103(f)(1); Ann Riley & Assocs., Ltd.,
   B-237365, Nov. 15, 1989, 89-2 CPD para. 463 at 2; see also 31 U.S.C. sect.
   3553(c) (2000); FAR sect. 33.104(b)(1); 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.6; Northwest
   Express Ltd., B-246431, Feb. 28, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 244 at 2 n.1.

   [17] In any event, our bid protest jurisdiction is limited to review of
   whether agencies' procurement actions complied with procurement statutes
   and regulations, 31 U.S.C. sect. 3551-3552 (2000); determining whether the
   agency improperly interfered with Lifecare's employee contracts is not a
   matter within the scope of our bid protest jurisdiction. Further, the
   protester has failed to show how it was prejudiced in any manner by the
   alleged agency action.