TITLE: B-296516.2; B-296516.3, Optical Systems Technology, Inc., March 17, 2006
BNUMBER: B-296516.2; B-296516.3
DATE: March 17, 2006
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B-296516.2; B-296516.3, Optical Systems Technology, Inc., March 17, 2006

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Optical Systems Technology, Inc.

   File: B-296516.2; B-296516.3

   Date: March 17, 2006

   Michael R. Charness, Esq., and Amy R. Napier, Esq., Vinson & Elkins, for
   the protester.

   James A. McMillan, Esq., Grayson & Kubli, for Knight's Armament Company,
   an intervenor.

   Maj. Peter H. Tran, and Raymond M. Saunders, Esq., for the agency.

   David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protest that rejection of proposal was based on unreasonable testing of
   protester's sample night sights for .50 caliber rifles is denied where,
   contrary to protester's assertion, record indicates that agency undertook
   reasonable efforts to ensure that sights were securely mounted and
   properly adjusted during testing; even if these efforts were not entirely
   successful (and there is no basis in the record for reaching such a
   conclusion), the agency could reasonably conclude that the susceptibility
   of protester's sights to significant damage and degraded performance,
   notwithstanding reasonable efforts to mount the sights correctly, rendered
   the sights technically unacceptable.

   DECISION

   Optical Systems Technology, Inc. (OSTI) protests the award of a contract
   to Knight's Armament Company (KAC) under request for proposals (RFP) No.
   H92222-05-R-0007, issued by the United States Special Operations Command
   for non-developmental Visual Augmentation System (VAS) In-Line Clip-on
   Night Sights. OSTI asserts that the agency's rejection of its proposal was
   based on unreasonable testing of its sample items. OSTI also challenges
   the evaluation of KAC's proposal.

   We deny the protest.

   The RFP contemplated award of an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity,
   fixed-unit-price contract for up to 3,000 VAS night sights over a 5-year
   period. The RFP's performance specification provided that the night sight
   shall be an in-line, clip-on image intensification sight, utilizing a GEN
   III/OMNI IV image intensifier tube as a minimum, mainly for use on Army
   XM107 and Navy M88PIP (Mk15) .50 caliber sniper rifles during nighttime
   operations. The night sight clips onto a mounting rail along the top of
   the weapon, directly in front of the existing dayscope, providing a quick
   attach/detach capability for nighttime operation while maintaining the
   dayscope boresight. Performance Specification sect. 3.2; VAS Night Vision
   Devices Sample Test Report sect. 1. The performance specification required
   use of an adjustable, locking single-throw lever-type mounting system, KAC
   Knightscope base assembly part No. 22097 or equivalent, allowing for
   single-hand operation and attachment/mounting on a Military Standard
   (MIL-STD) 1913 mounting rail. Performance Specification sect. 3.4.3.

   Among the several performance requirements set forth in the performance
   specification were requirements relating to accuracy and resistance to
   weapons shock. Regarding accuracy, the specification provided that the
   sight "shall allow a trained sniper to maintain his current level of
   accuracy as a (threshhold), and deliver precise fire within one minute of
   angle (1 MOA) (objective)." Id. sections 3.5.4, 4.5.4.[1] However, the
   specification further stated that "[a]ny sight placed on the weapon shall
   not degrade the shooters current level of accuracy"; according to the
   specification, "[i]f a weapon is accurate to 1 MOA accuracy, then with all
   other factors, environment, shooter, ammunition, etc., factored in, the
   shooter shall be able to maintain that level of accuracy or whatever
   accuracy he can attain with his current scope." Id. As for weapons shock,
   the performance specification provided as follows:

   The Sight in its operational configuration, shall not be damaged nor
   exhibit any degradation in performance when subjected to five groups of
   five rounds each. The Sight in its operational configuration, shall not be
   damaged nor exhibit any degradation in performance when subjected to a
   total of 300 rounds of equivalent shock on the .50 caliber sniper rifles.
   Equivalent shock is equal to [an] average peak acceleration height of
   4000gs for a mean duration of 1 millisecond half sine wave.

   Id. sections 3.5.15, 4.5.10.

   The solicitation required offerors to submit two sample sights
   "representative of production ready systems," and provided that "[t]he
   Government will test the samples requested and evaluate them for
   compliance with the Performance Specifications and Specification Matrix."
   RFP at 17. Award was to be made to the responsible offeror whose proposal
   was determined to represent the "best value" to the government based on
   three evaluation factors: (1) technical, including technical approach and
   management approach; (2) past performance; and (3) price. The technical
   approach subfactor included consideration not only of the extent to which
   the product sample met the performance specifications, but also of the
   extent to which the overall proposal demonstrated that the proposed night
   sight enhances the effectiveness of military units under a spectrum of
   operational conditions. RFP at 22. The technical evaluation factor was
   significantly more important than past performance, which was
   significantly more important than price.

   KAC and OSTI submitted proposals by the initial closing time. The agency
   then conducted discussions with the offerors and requested revised
   proposals. When award subsequently was made to KAC, on May 17, OSTI
   protested to our Office, alleging (among other things) that the agency had
   failed to test its sample sights in accordance with the requirements of
   the solicitation. In response, SOC undertook corrective action, opening
   discussions with KAC and OSTI, and requesting revised proposals. In its
   revised proposal, OSTI proposed its MUNS 911M night sight, and also
   proposed its MUNS 911XR sight; KAC proposed its UNS LR-LP sight. The prior
   product samples having been returned, the offerors submitted new product
   samples.

   During the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane's August testing of
   OSTI's sample MUNS 911M night sights, after the firing of 10 rounds by an
   XM107 .50 caliber rifle and 10 rounds by an Mk15 .50 caliber rifle, one of
   OSTI's two sights (serial number (S/N) 0060) sustained damage in the form
   of a crack at a notch at the bottom of the objective lens at the front of
   the sight. When the agency then resumed testing with the other OSTI MUNS
   911M sample (S/N 0061), that sight sustained damage in the form of a
   shattered image intensification tube after a total of 89 .50 caliber
   rounds were fired by the XM107 and Mk15 rifles. Since neither sample sight
   satisfied the performance specification requirement that the sight not
   suffer any damage when subjected to the firing of 300 rounds by a .50
   caliber rifle, the MUNS 911M was rated unacceptable under the technical
   factor. Likewise, during testing of one of OSTI's sample MUNS 911XR
   sights, the sight introduced an approximately 2.7 MOA shift with the Mk15
   rifle and up to a 4.1 MOA shift with the XM107 rifle between the groups of
   rounds fired with the dayscope and the groups fired when the dayscope and
   night sight were used in combination, thereby failing to meet the
   performance specification requirement that the current level of accuracy
   not be degraded by addition of the night scope. As a result, the MUNS
   911XR also was determined to be unacceptable under the technical factor.
   In contrast, KAC's UNS LR-LP sight was determined to be technically
   acceptable. Inasmuch as KAC's proposal was rated low risk under the past
   performance factor, and its price was evaluated as fair and reasonable,
   KAC's proposal, the only acceptable proposal, was determined to offer the
   best value to the government. Upon learning of the resulting award to KAC,
   and after being debriefed, OSTI filed this protest with our Office.

   SAMPLE TESTING

   OSTI challenges the evaluation of its sample items as unacceptable on the
   basis that the agency's testing was conducted improperly in that the
   testers failed to mount the sights properly. In this regard, OSTI
   furnished its sights to the agency mounted atop a KAC mount that had been
   modified by OSTI. The KAC mount was to be clipped onto the mounting rail
   on top of the rifle using a single mounting lever, followed by adjustment
   using a pair of adjustment screws to ensure a tight (but not too tight)
   fit, and tightening of a pair of locking (jam) screws to ensure that the
   adjustment screws would not come loose or back out under the significant
   recoil forces experienced during the firing of the .50 caliber rifle.
   Specifically, according to the laminated directions sheet furnished with
   the sights, in order "to install and lock" the sights onto the mounting
   rail atop the rifle, the shooter was to "push lever flat against mount
   base until it clicks," and then "adjust hex head screws to make sure the
   base is securely seated and tightened down onto the rail. (See adjustment
   instructions for base)." The referenced adjustment instructions panel on
   the laminated sheet read as follows:

   Adjusting Mount Base. (Mount should be adjusted for each weapon it is
   placed on.) To tighten the mount first loosen the two button head Allen
   [adjustment] screws. Turn the set [locking] screws on the opposite side of
   the mount clockwise slightly (making sure to turn in the set screws an
   equal amount). Retighten the two button head Allen screws. To loosen mount
   loosen the two button head Allen screws. Turn the set screws on the
   opposite side of the mount slightly counter-clockwise (making sure to turn
   out the set screws an equal amount). Retighten the two button head screws.
   Test mount on the rail to make sure adjustment is correct. MOUNT SHOULD BE
   VERY TIGHT ON RAIL.

   OSTI Laminated Directions Sheet; see Hearing Transcript (Tr.) I-149 to
   I-154.

   According to the testimony of OSTI's vice president for technology (and
   co-owner) at the hearing conducted by our Office in this matter, and as
   confirmed by the agency's night vision sight technical expert, in the
   event the mount was loose on the rail, the mount and sight could undergo a
   pitching or rocking motion during firing, with the front of the mount and
   sight rocking forward and down towards the mounting rail and then rocking
   back and upward. Tr. at I-153, II-307, II-345. The protester's vice
   president noted in this regard that the sight could appear to be tight on
   the rail if tested by attempting to move the sight back and forth, but
   still not be tight enough to be securely mounted. As support for the
   possibility that the sights were not securely mounted on the rail, the
   vice president testified that a locking set screw was missing on the
   tested MUNS 911XR sample sight returned at the conclusion of the
   procurement and that there did not appear to be the amount of wear on the
   heads of the mount screws on the returned sights that would be expected
   had the screws been repeatedly adjusted. The vice president concluded that
   the most likely cause of the up to 4.1 MOA shift in OSTI's MUNS 911XR
   sample sight was either the sight striking the mounting rail, or simply
   severe whiplash from the rocking motion during firing, causing an internal
   element of the sight to move. Similarly, according to the vice president,
   the most likely cause of the cracking of the objective lens on one of the
   sample MUNS 911M night sights and the shattering of the image intensifier
   tube on the other was either a rail strike or severe whiplash. Tr. at
   II-307 to II-310, II-321, II-336 to II-359. Since, according to the vice
   president, the night sight will not come loose during firing if properly
   mounted, he concluded that the mounting screws were improperly adjusted.
   Id. Specifically, as OSTI stated in its post-hearing comments,

   [d]espite the instructions provided by OSTI regarding the need for
   adjustments each time the nightsight is mounted onto a rail for the first
   time, the record demonstrates that the adjustments were not made as
   required by OSTI's instructions. As a result, OSTI's nightsights suffered
   physical damage and a degradation of performance, which caused the Army to
   exclude OSTI's proposal from final consideration for award.

   OSTI Comments, Feb. 17, 2006, at 35.

   Our Office will review an allegedly improper technical evaluation of
   product samples to determine whether the evaluation was fair, reasonable,
   and consistent with the evaluation criteria. We will not make an
   independent determination of the merits of an offeror's proposal; rather,
   we will review the evaluation record, including the results of any test
   demonstration, to ensure that the agency's technical judgment has a
   rational basis and is consistent with the stated evaluation criteria. USIA
   Underwater Equip. Sales Corp., B-292827.2, Jan. 30, 2004, 2004 CPD para.
   32 at 3; Sun Chem. Corp., B-288466 et al., Oct. 17, 2001, 2001 CPD para.
   185 at 7.

   We find no basis for concluding that the agency unreasonably failed to
   ensure that the night sights were securely mounted during testing. The
   XM107 and Mk15 .50 caliber sniper rifles used for testing were equipped
   with MIL-STD 1913 mounting rails, as specified in the performance
   specification, and the tests were conducted by experienced weapons testers
   and/or snipers, including (1) an engineer who served as the agency's
   technical expert for night vision weapons sights for special operations
   forces, (2) an experienced weapons test engineer, and (3) a retired Navy
   SEAL sniper. The agency's night vision sights expert testified that he
   initially mounted the sights on the rifles and adjusted them; he followed
   OSTI's written directions on the laminated sheet when mounting OSTI's
   sights and instructed the other two testers in how to mount the sights in
   accordance with OSTI's directions; the testers had OSTI's laminated
   directions card available next to the rifles and consulted it; he
   personally observed the other testers most of the time and saw them making
   adjustments consistent with OSTI's directions during the daytime shooting;
   and the screws on the mounts were adjusted when switching the sights to a
   new weapon or when the screws appeared loose. Although this expert stated
   he was unable to directly observe the adjustments made by the tester
   during the night accuracy shooting, he testified that this did not occur
   until the third day of testing, at which point the designated night
   shooter, the retired Navy SEAL sniper, was comfortable with the process.
   Tr. at I-156 to I-165, I-185 to I-200, I-248 to I-250. In any case, the
   record indicates that the damage to OSTI's MUNS 911M sights occurred
   during the preceding daytime shooting, not during the nighttime shooting
   on the third day of testing. Declaration of Agency Night Vision Weapons
   Sights Expert, Mar. 8, 2006; see VAS Night Vision Devices Sample Test
   Report sect. 3.3.4.2, MUNS Test Data Sheets. Thus, contrary to OSTI's
   position, eyewitness testimony supports the view that the agency's
   testers, all of whom were experienced, reasonably attempted to perform the
   adjustments in accordance with OSTI's written directions.

   The agency asserts that the damage to OSTI's sights and degredation in
   their performance more likely was caused by the unique characteristics and
   design of the sights, rather than by any testing errors. The record
   supports this view. In this regard, we note that the contemporanous
   records of the testing, as well as the declarations and testimony of the
   agency's night vision sights expert, indicate that the screws on the
   mounts of KAC's sights came loose as frequently as the screws on OSTI's
   mounts. Tr. at I-217. However, damage and degraded performance were
   experienced by OSTI's sights but not by KAC's sights. This appears
   especially significant in light of the fact that the mounts on KAC's
   sights were adjusted less frequently than those on OSTI's sights; KAC's
   mounts were adjusted only when they appeared loose, not also when the
   sights were transferred between rifles, as was necessary with OSTI's
   sights. Tr. at I-218, I-254 to I-257, I-281 to I-282.

   Further, by its own statements OSTI has essentially conceded that its
   design may have been responsible for damage to the MUNS 911M sights.
   Specifically, the MUNS 911M sight, which has a larger diameter objective
   lens than either OSTI's MUNS 911XR sight or the KAC sight, has a notch cut
   into the base of the lens that is contoured to allow the sight to fit
   closely around the MIL-STD 1913 mounting rail. The XM107 rifle, meanwhile,
   has a pop-up iron sight that, when raised, is directly in front of the
   objective lens. The agency's night vision sights expert testified that he
   believed that the objective lens on the MUNS 911M sight (S/N 0060) became
   cracked at the notch when the lens struck the iron sight, which was folded
   down during firing. Tr. at I-230, I-284 to I-287; Declaration of Agency
   Night Vision Sights Technical Expert, Feb. 24, 2006. [2] In a January 9,
   2004 memorandum to agency personnel, the subject of which was "MUNS
   Prototype Testing," OSTI's vice president recognized the risk posed by the
   front sight on the XM107, noting that it was necessary "to be careful that
   the units do not hit the front sight on the [XM107]. This can occur if the
   scope is mounted too far forward. It does not seem to be a problem when
   the sight is up." This memorandum lends support to the agency's expert's
   opinion regarding the cause of the damage to the MUNS 911M sight.

   OSTI asserts that the agency's decision to test the MUNS 911M with the
   sight folded down was unreasonable, stating its position as follows:

   Nothing in the Solicitation mentioned the fact that the offerors should be
   prepared for additional accessories to be located between the rail and the
   proposed sight. Based on these representations, OSTI offered the MUNS
   911M, which allowed enough space between the notched lens and the rail to
   permit limited pitching of the nightsight without striking the rail. OSTI
   did not expect or plan for enough space for additional equipment to be
   introduced between the nightsight and the rail.

   OSTI Comments, Feb. 17, 2006, at 46-47. As noted by the agency, however,
   front and rear pop-up/fold-down iron sights are a permanent part of the
   XM107 rifle, as specified in the official configuration for that weapon.
   Further, the agency tested the sights with the iron sight folded down,
   since it is positioned directly in front of the night sight's objective
   lens, and thus would obscure part of the lens if left in the raised
   position, thereby reducing the amount of incoming light and the resulting
   image quality. Tr. at I-289 to I-290, Declaration of Agency Night Vision
   Sights Technical Expert, Feb. 24, 2006. We see nothing unreasonable in the
   agency's testing methodology with regard to the iron sight.[3]

   We conclude that the agency undertook reasonable efforts to ensure that
   OSTI's night sights were securely mounted and properly adjusted during
   testing. Even if these efforts were not entirely successful (again, there
   is no basis in the record for reaching such a conclusion), we think the
   agency could reasonably conclude that the susceptibility of OSTI's sights
   to significant damage and degraded performance, notwithstanding reasonable
   efforts to mount the sights correctly, rendered the sights technically
   unacceptable. Certainly, we see nothing unreasonable in the agency's
   determining that the sights did not meet the agency's stated need for a
   rugged, reliable and accurate night vision sight that could be mounted on
   a special forces sniper's rifle at night and without detectable noise and
   light emissions. Performance Specification sections 3.5.3, 4.5.4, 4.5.10,
   4.6.1, 4.6.2.[4]

   MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION

   OSTI asserts that, during discussions, KAC made material
   misrepresentations in responding to the agency's expressed concerns
   regarding reported past performance problems. In this regard, in a July
   21, 2005 discussion letter to KAC, the agency noted that there had been
   performance problems under two prior (NSWC Crane) KAC
   contracts--N00164-02-D-8506 (8506) (night vision sights) and
   N00164-02-D-8512 (8512) (night vision sights plus dayscopes).
   Specifically, the agency noted that there had been intellectual property
   disputes with subcontractors under 8506 (including OSTI, its primary
   subcontractor for the night vision sights), delivery problems due both to
   these disputes and to a lack of image intensifier tubes (manufactured by
   another company), rejection of some units on account of quality or
   configuration concerns, and late delivery of logistics documentation and
   status reports. In KAC's proposal as revised, KAC explained the measures
   it had taken to ensure that there would be no problems under the
   contemplated contract, including ensuring a supply of image intensifier
   tubes and lens, reducing dependence on subcontractors, ensuring that KAC
   has ownership of the required intellectual property rights, negotiating
   agreements with proposed subcontractors to preclude the reoccurrence of
   the issues encountered with the subcontractors under the prior contracts,
   organizing a night vision division with oversight by a newly hired KAC
   vice president with significant experience with rifle-mounted night vision
   and thermal products, hiring additional personnel to manage logistics
   support and reporting, and obtaining a recommendation for approval for ISO
   9001:2000 certification. KAC Revised Proposal, Discussions Response at
   6-14, App. A, E, I, AF.

   However, as noted by the protester, in addition to explaining that changed
   circumstances made a reccurrence of the prior problems unlikely, KAC also
   responded in its August submission as follows:

   Most issues for nonperformance of the contract on 8512 and 8506 lie
   squarely at the feet of the subcontractor [OSTI]. In an attempt to sell
   the product direct to the government, the subcontractor initially refused
   to honor its verbal agreements with KAC resulting in problems on 8512. The
   subcontractor subsequently raised the price to KAC causing great financial
   loss to KAC as KAC continued to buy the product and resell it to the
   government at the contract price.

   KAC Discussions Response, Aug. 3, 2005, at 10. OSTI asserts that this
   statement included several misrepresentations: OSTI could not be blamed
   for most of KAC's performance problems, OSTI did not act inconsistently
   with its oral agreement with KAC, and OSTI's price increase to KAC was not
   unreasonable.

   An offeror's material misrepresentation in its proposal can provide a
   basis for disqualification of the proposal and cancellation of a contract
   award based upon the proposal. A misrepresentation is material where the
   agency relied upon it and it likely had a significant impact on the
   evaluation. Greenleaf Constr. Co., Inc., B-293105.18, B-293105.19, Jan.
   17, 2006, 2006 CPD para. __ at 4; Integration Techs. Group, Inc.,
   B-291657, Feb. 13, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 55 at 2-3.

   We need not consider whether the disputed statements constitute
   misrepresentations, since we agree with the agency that there is no basis
   in the record for finding that the agency relied upon the statements such
   that they had a significant impact on the evaluation. As noted by the
   agency, the record indicates that contracting officials carefully
   researched KAC's past performance, including conducting interviews with
   contracting officers, program managers and logisticians familiar with
   KAC's prior contracts, and reviewing the Contractor Performance Assessment
   Reports (CPAR) for the contracts. While the CPARs documented the problems
   encountered under the contracts, they also documented KAC's correction of
   many of these problems. The final CPAR for 8506 indicated that the
   assessing official "definitely would award" to KAC again, and the initial
   CPAR for 8512 indicated that the assessing official "probably would award"
   to KAC again. In addition, in evaluating KAC's proposal as low risk, the
   agency took into account the further measures, as discussed in KAC's
   proposal, that KAC undertook to preclude a reccurrence of the problems
   encountered under the prior contracts. Source Selection Decision at 1;
   Source Selection Evaluation Final Report at 10; Tr. at I-21 to I-37, I-48,
   I-54, I-77 to I-80, I-83. We conclude that there is no basis for finding
   that the statements in question had a significant impact upon the
   evaluation of KAC's proposal.

   OSTI asserts that KAC also misrepresented the role to be played in
   contract performance by a proposed subcontractor, Optics 1. In this
   regard, in response to the agency's notice during discussions that KAC's
   proposal failed to state what roles the contractor and subcontractors
   would serve in the production of the sights, KAC responded on March 8 that
   its proposed subcontractor "Optics 1 will be tasked with assembly and test
   of the optical subassemblies." KAC Discussions Response, Mar. 8, 2005.
   However, KACs vice president in charge of its weapons sight program
   testified during the hearing in this matter that Optics 1 "is a good
   optics facility that I use on various programs," but that it is one that
   he nevertheless "do[es] not currently intend to use" on this program. Tr.
   at I-356 to I-357. OSTI asserts that the testimony of KAC's vice president
   establishes that KAC misrepresented in its proposal Optics 1's expected
   role in contract performance.

   OSTI's argument is without merit. KAC's vice president testified that KAC
   intended as early as May 2004 to develop an in-house capability for optics
   assembly, but that it was not able to equip the necessary space and hire
   and train the necessary personnel to manufacture its sight in-house until
   the fall of 2005. Thus, when KAC submitted its proposal in January 2005,
   it fully intended to use Optics 1 for optics assembly, consistent with its
   proposal. Tr. at II-425 to II-438. In any case, KAC's final revised
   proposal, submitted in August 2005, advised the agency of KAC's intentions
   in this regard. Specifically, the proposal stated that

   it must be noted that KAC is only minimally dependent on subcontractors
   for successfully meeting the requirements of this solicitation. As
   previously stated, the mechanical design was done at KAC, the optical
   design was purchased, the parts are manufactured at KAC and currently
   assembled and tested at KAC. Tubes and lenses are currently 7 months ahead
   of the delivery schedule required by this solicitation if the order was
   placed today.

   KAC Revised Proposal, Aug. 3, 2005, at 13. While it appears that the
   agency may not have fully understood KAC's plans with respect to Optics 1,
   Tr. at I-372, the testimony of the SSEB chairman indicates that the agency
   did generally understand that "KAC was taking on a bigger role in the
   manufacturing of this sight." Tr. at I-375. At any rate, given the
   statement in its August 2005 final proposal that "the parts are

   manufactured at KAC and currently assembled and tested at KAC," there is
   no basis for concluding that KAC misrepresented its intention to assemble
   the parts in-house.[5]

   The protest is denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] MOA is a unit of angular measurement of the accuracy of a firearm,
   indicating that, under ideal conditions, the firearm is capable of
   repeatedly producing a group of shots that fit into a circle, the diameter
   of which can be subtended by that amount of arc. Thus, one MOA results in
   approximately a 1-inch circle at 100 yards.

   [2] The agency's night vision sights expert indicated that the iron sight
   was not a problem for the OSTI MUNS 911XR sight or the KAC UNS LR-LP
   sight, since they have smaller diameter objective lenses that do not wrap
   around the mounting rail. Although the KAC sight was tested with the iron
   sight folded down--just as with the MUNS 911M--it did not sustain damage.
   Tr. at I-288 to I-289; Declaration of Agency Night Vision Sights Technical
   Expert, Feb. 24, 2006.

   [3] We note that OSTI has made no showing that its MUNS 911M sights were
   mounted too far forward on the XM107's mounting rail.

   [4] OSTI asserts that the agency acted unreasonably in testing only one of
   OSTI's two sample MUNS 911XR sights for accuracy; according to the
   protester, since the tested sight had an unacceptable MOA, the agency
   should have tested the other sight. However, the solicitation did not
   provide that both sample sights would be tested, and the record indicates
   that the agency did not intend to fully test both samples; it requested
   the second sample only to accommodate the testing schedule and to cover
   the eventuality that one of the sights might obviously fail or break.
   Thus, while the agency tested the second OSTI MUNS 911M sample sight for
   weapons shock after the first broke, it conducted a full weapons shock
   test on only one of KAC's sample sights (351 rounds) and one of OSTI's
   MUNS 911XR sights (350 rounds) (it also shot 190 rounds with the other KAC
   and the other MUNS 911XR sight), and it only tested one of KAC's sample
   sights for accuracy. VAS Source Selection Evaluation Final Report, Test
   Results Matrix. The fact that the agency afforded a further opportunity
   for OSTI's MUNS 911M sight to demonstrate compliance with the weapons
   shock requirements did not require it to do the same with respect to
   OSTI's MUNS 911XR sight for the accuracy requirements.

   [5] OSTI also asserts that the low risk rating assigned KAC's proposal was
   unreasonable since KAC has limited experience in manufacturing night
   sights (since KAC had relied upon OSTI under the prior contracts for most
   of the components of the sight), and because there is a significant risk
   that KAC will be unable to perform the contract without infringing on
   OSTI's intellectual property rights. In order to maintain a protest in our
   Office, however, a firm must be an interested party, that is, an actual or
   prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest will be
   affected by the award of or failure to award a contract. 4 C.F.R. sect.
   21.0(a) (2005). A protester is not an interested party where it would not
   be in line for award were its protest to be sustained. Yoosung T&S, Ltd.,
   B-291407, Nov. 15, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 204 at 2 n.3. OSTI is ineligible
   for award here because, as discussed above, the agency reasonably found
   its proposal technically unacceptable. Thus, even if KAC's proposal were
   evaluated as having at least some risk of nonperformance or, consistent
   with the solicitation directions and the Federal Acquisition Regulation
   (FAR), were assigned a neutral rating for lack of relevant past
   performance, RFP at 23; FAR sect. 15.305(a)(2)(iv), KAC, which submitted
   the only technically acceptable offer, would still be in line for the
   award. OSTI therefore is not an interested party to raise this argument.