TITLE: B-296307; B-296307.2, Delta Dental of California, July 28, 2005
BNUMBER: B-296307; B-296307.2
DATE: July 28, 2005
***************************************************************
B-296307; B-296307.2, Delta Dental of California, July 28, 2005

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Delta Dental of California

   File: B-296307; B-296307.2

   Date: July 28, 2005

   Patricia A. Meagher, Esq., Neil H. O'Donnell, Esq., Thomas D. Blanford,
   Esq., Mark A. Kahn, Esq., and David F. Innes, Esq., Rogers Joseph
   O'Donnell & Phillips, and Robert S. Ryland, Esq., and Nicole E. Goldstein,
   Esq., Kirkland & Ellis, for the protester.

   David P. Metzger, Esq., Michele Mintz Brown, Esq., Anand V. Ramana, Esq.,
   and Stuart Turner, Esq., Holland & Knight, for United Concordia Companies,
   Inc., an intervenor.

   Rhonda L. Bershok, Esq., and Kenneth Lieb, Esq., TRICARE Management
   Activity, Department of Defense, for the agency.

   Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protester's allegation that the agency's evaluation of its proposal was
   unreasonable, unfair, and inconsistent with the stated evaluation criteria
   is denied where the record shows that the agency's evaluation was
   reasonable, and that the solicitation's evaluation criteria were fairly
   and consistently applied in the agency's assessment of both the
   protester's and the awardee's proposals.

   DECISION

   Delta Dental of California protests the award of a contract to United
   Concordia Companies, Inc. (UCCI), by the Department of Defense's (DOD)
   TRICARE Management Activity, pursuant to request for proposals (RFP) No.
   H94002-04-R-0002, issued to procure dental insurance services for eligible
   beneficiaries who volunteer to enroll in TRICARE's dental plan. Delta
   argues that the agency conducted a flawed evaluation of technical
   proposals, and failed to perform a reasonable price realism evaluation.

   We deny the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   Under 10 U.S.C. sect. 1076(a) (Supp. II 2002) the Secretary of Defense is
   authorized to establish a voluntary enrollment dental plan (hereinafter,
   the TRICARE dental program) for eligible family members of active duty
   uniformed services personnel, members of the Selected Reserve and the
   Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), their eligible family members, and certain
   eligible survivors. Agency Report (AR) at 1. For some program participants
   the government pays a share of the premiums assessed for enrollment in the
   program; for others, the government does not pay a share. Specifically,
   the government pays 60 percent of the premium for family members of active
   duty personnel, Selected Reserve members and mobilized members of the IRR,
   and 100 percent of the premiums for eligible survivor beneficiaries, but
   pays no share of the premium charged to non-mobilized IRR members and
   eligible family members of Reservists. Contracting Officer's (CO)
   Statement at 2-3.

   The RFP for a contractor to operate the TRICARE dental program was issued
   on September 15, 2004. The contractor will be required to provide dental
   insurance services, establish a network of participating dental providers,
   and provide claims processing and customer service functions. The RFP
   anticipated the award of a fixed-price plus award fee requirements
   contract for a base period followed by up to five 1-year options.[1] RFP
   at 2-8, 53, 72. The price for this contract, in essence, is the sum of the
   government's share of premiums charged by the contractor to enrolled
   beneficiaries.

   The range of dental benefits to be provided to eligible beneficiaries who
   elect to enroll in the TRICARE dental program are not only set forth in
   the solicitation, but are prescribed by the statute and by the
   implementing regulation, which were incorporated by reference into section
   C of the RFP. RFP at 9. In addition, section C included a statement of
   objectives representing "the desired outcomes of this contract." Id. The
   introduction to the statement of objectives explained that "[t]he
   objectives are supported by technical requirements throughout section C."
   The objectives of this contract are described as follows:

   Increase [TRICARE dental program] enrollment and increase utilization of
   diagnostic and preventive services by enrolled members.

   Increase enrollment of Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
   personnel in pay grades E-1 through E-4. The Government desires to
   increase access to dental care and to improve dental readiness of Selected
   Reserve and IRR members in pay grades E-1 to E-4.

   Establish and maintain enrollee and provider satisfaction at the highest
   level possible throughout the period of performance through the delivery
   of a world-class dental care program.

   Use a cost-effective management approach to provide the necessary
   services, incorporating commercial practices, when practicable.

   Provide ready access to data to support DOD's financial planning, health
   systems planning, medical resources management, clinical management,
   clinical research, and contract administration.

   Id.

   The solicitation advised that award would be made "to the offeror whose
   proposal represents the best overall value to the Government considering
   the evaluation criteria." Id. at 86. The evaluation criteria were:
   technical, performance risk/past performance, and price; the solicitation
   advised that the technical factor would be the most important, with the
   performance risk/past performance factor second, and the price factor
   third. Id. at 85.

   The technical evaluation factor was divided into four equally-weighted
   subfactors: (1) participating provider network access, (2) claims
   processing, (3) quality management/quality improvement program, and (4)
   customer service. Id. The basis for assessing each of these subfactors was
   set forth in detail in the solicitation, and will be described, as needed,
   within this decision. The RFP also provided that the technical factor, and
   its subfactors, would be evaluated for proposal risk, which the
   solicitation defined in detail. Id. at 87.

   Three proposals were received by the November 15 due date, one from Delta,
   one from UCCI, and one from a third offeror that is not a party to this
   protest. Each proposal was evaluated by three evaluation teams--the Source
   Selection Evaluation Team (SSET), the Performance Risk Assessment Group
   (PRAG), and the Price Evaluation Team (PET)--which, collectively, form the
   Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB). The SSET and the PRAG evaluated
   each offeror's proposal independent of the others and documented their
   findings in a separate report for each offeror. The PET analyzed the price
   proposals of all three offerors in a single report. AR at 2.

   After holding discussions with each offeror, the agency asked for and
   received final proposal revisions (FPR) on February 7, 2005. Again, the
   SSET, PRAG, and PET evaluated the proposals and prepared reports to
   document their findings. In assessing technical merit, the SSET assigned
   color ratings with the following meanings: blue, exceptional; green,
   acceptable; yellow, marginal; and red, unacceptable. These one-word
   adjectival ratings were supplemented with more detailed definitions, see
   CO's Statement at 8, which will be set forth as needed within the
   decision. The proposal risk ratings used by the SSET were high risk,
   moderate risk, and low risk. Id. at 8-9. Again, the more detailed
   definitions associated with the proposal risk ratings will be set forth
   below as needed.

   With respect to the PRAG review, a series of different ratings were used.
   First, referenced contracts were rated as very relevant, relevant,
   semi-relevant, or not relevant. In addition, performance ratings were
   given for each referenced contract. The performance ratings were
   exceptional, satisfactory, marginal, or unsatisfactory. Finally,
   performance risk ratings of high confidence, confidence, little
   confidence, no confidence, or neutral, were assigned. Source Selection
   Decision Memorandum at 5-6.

   With respect to the PET review, the total evaluated price was reviewed for
   reasonableness and for unbalanced pricing. In addition, the premiums
   charged for single and family enrollments in the dental plan were reviewed
   for price realism to determine whether the premium rates and assumptions
   used were realistic. CO's Statement at 10.

   At the conclusion of the reviews of the FPR by the SSET, PRAG, and PET, an
   SSEB report was prepared for the source selection authority (SSA) that
   consolidated all of the reviews. This report included a recommendation to
   the SSA from the SSEB Chairman. The final assessments of the SSEB, which
   reflect input from the SSEB Chairman (who made certain changes to the
   ratings assigned by the underlying panels in certain areas), are as
   follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                         |     DELTA     |     UCCI      |  OFFEROR A   |
   |-------------------------+---------------+---------------+--------------|
   |TECHNICAL (Merit / Risk) |  BLUE / LOW   |  BLUE / LOW   | GREEN / LOW  |
   |-------------------------+---------------+---------------+--------------|
   |-- Network Access        |   Blue/Low    |   Blue/Low    |   Blue/Low   |
   |-------------------------+---------------+---------------+--------------|
   |-- Claims Processing     |   Green/Low   |   Green/Low   |Green/Moderate|
   |-------------------------+---------------+---------------+--------------|
   |-- Quality Management    |   Blue/Low    |   Blue/Low    |  Green/Low   |
   |-------------------------+---------------+---------------+--------------|
   |-- Customer Service      |   Blue/Low    |   Blue/Low    |  Green/Low   |
   |-------------------------+---------------+---------------+--------------|
   |PERFORMANCE RISK         |HIGH CONFIDENCE|HIGH CONFIDENCE|  CONFIDENCE  |
   |-------------------------+---------------+---------------+--------------|
   |TOTAL                    |   [DELETED]   |$1.423 BILLION |  [DELETED]   |
   |                         |               |               |              |
   |EVALUATED PRICE          |               |               |              |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   AR, Tab 20, SSEB Report, at 10, 12, 32, 57, 83; Source Selection Decision
   Memorandum at 26.

   In his detailed review of the strengths of each of the offers under the
   technical subfactors, the SSEB Chairman decided that both Delta and UCCI
   had submitted exceptional technical proposals, but concluded that Delta's
   proposal was superior to UCCI's under the technical evaluation factor, the
   most important factor in this evaluation scheme. Id. at 84-88, 90
   (conclusion at 88). After recognizing that Delta and UCCI were equal under
   the performance risk factor, id. at 89, the SSEB Chairman decided that the
   ways in which the Delta proposal was superior to the UCCI proposal offered
   "significant additional benefits to the government over UCCI's proposal"
   and recommended award to Delta on the basis that the additional benefits
   were worth the relatively small ([deleted] percent) price differential.
   Id. at 90.

   In a similarly detailed decision document, the SSA elected not to adopt
   the view of the SSEB Chairman that the Delta proposal offered additional
   benefits that were worth the price differential. Source Selection Decision
   Memorandum at 1, 42-43. Specifically, the SSA did not agree with the SSEB
   Chair's view that Delta's proposal was superior to UCCI's proposal under
   the first technical subfactor, network access; he instead concluded that
   the proposals were essentially equal under this subfactor. Id. at 27-28.
   While the SSA agreed with the SSEB Chairman's view that Delta's proposal
   had an advantage under the third technical subfactor, quality management,
   he did not agree with the SSEB Chairman's view that the advantage was
   significant. Id. at 41. As a result, the SSA concluded as follows:

   As stated above, I do not find the technical advantage of Delta's quality
   proposal (Subfactor 3), specifically ISO certification, to warrant the
   additional $[deleted] million and recognize that this is contrary to the
   recommendation made by the SSEB. . . . Given the relative small
   differences in technical merit and proposal risk between Delta and UCCI,
   and the $[deleted] million higher overall price for Delta, UCCI's proposal
   represents the best value to the Government.

   Id. at 42.

   On April 6, the contract was awarded to UCCI. This protest followed.

   DISCUSSION

   Delta challenges the evaluation of proposals in three areas--two regarding
   the technical evaluation and one regarding the price realism review.[2]
   First, Delta argues that the agency did not consider in its evaluation of
   proposal risk the extent to which an offeror's proposed approach would
   further the agency's objectives in awarding this contract. Second, Delta
   argues that it should have received a rating of blue, not green, under the
   second technical subfactor, claims processing. Finally, Delta argues that
   the agency failed to determine, as part of its price realism review, that
   each offeror's administrative costs were consistent with its stated
   approach.

   Our standard in reviewing such challenges is to examine the record to
   determine whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and consistent with
   stated evaluation criteria, and with applicable statutes and regulations.
   ESCO, Inc., B-225565, Apr. 29, 1987, 87-1 CPD para. 450 at 7. For the
   reasons set forth below, we deny each of these bases for protest.

   Evaluation of Proposal Risk

   In its challenge to the evaluation of proposal risk, Delta argues that the
   evaluators failed to consider whether, and the extent to which, each
   offeror's proposed approach would help the agency meet the goals set forth
   in the solicitation's statement of objectives. In Delta's view, the
   evaluation criteria here advised offerors that the agency would consider
   this information in assessing proposal risk for each offeror. Delta argues
   that its proposal was prepared with the goal of demonstrating the ways in
   which its approach addressed the statement of objectives, and argues that
   if this information had been considered, its proposal would have been
   viewed as the best value to the government.

   In response, TRICARE argues that there was no requirement in the
   evaluation scheme that the agency consider--either generally or as part of
   its assessment of proposal risk--an offeror's ability to meet the goals
   identified in the statement of objectives. Instead, the agency contends
   that the statement of objectives was used to develop the contract
   requirements identified in the statement of work, and that the evaluation
   scheme measured an offeror's plan for meeting, and its ability to meet,
   those requirements. In addition, the agency argues that the solicitation
   allows evaluators the discretion to consider an offeror's ability to meet
   the statement of objectives in assessing proposal risk, but does not
   require it.

   As indicated above, section C of this solicitation opened with a statement
   of objectives representing "the desired outcomes of this contract," and
   advised that the objectives are supported by the solicitation's technical
   requirements. RFP at 9. As also set forth above (in full), these
   objectives included matters such as increasing enrollment in, utilization
   of the services of, and user-satisfaction with, the TRICARE dental
   program. See id. While there was no separate evaluation factor or
   subfactor dedicated to the assessment of proposals against the statement
   of objectives, there was a mention of the statement of objectives in the
   RFP's guidelines on the review of proposal risk. Here, in its entirety, is
   the solicitation's guidance in this area:

   M.7.1.5. PROPOSAL RISK EVALUATION -- The Government will evaluate Factor
   1, and the sub factors under Factor 1 for proposal risk. Proposal risk is
   the evaluation of risk and impact to the Government based on the proposed
   method of completing the task and the offeror's demonstrated experience in
   performing that task. Proposal risk relates to the identification and
   assessment of the risks associated with an offeror's proposed approach to
   performing the requirements of this solicitation and applies only to
   Factor 1 and each of its subfactors. Proposal risk may be associated with
   a particular approach, or proposed process, as it relates to the
   successful achievement of the Government's requirements and the ability to
   meet the Statement of Objectives, or the degree to which the Government
   must expend resources to monitor or manage the risk to avoid unsuccessful
   performance. Proposal risk may also be impacted by the amount of
   experience in performing dental insurance related services demonstrated by
   the offeror. Proposal risk will be considered in making the best-value
   analysis for award. Proposal risk will be considered at the factor and sub
   factor level in evaluating trade-off possibilities and determining the
   best-value proposal.

   Id. at 87 (emphasis added).

   As the provision indicates, the evaluators made assessments about the risk
   of each offeror's proposed approach under each of the technical
   subfactors--i.e., network access, claims processing, quality management,
   and customer service--and under the technical factor overall. These
   assessments are reflected, in detail, in the SSEB Report, AR, Tab 20, at
   15-16, 18-19, 22, 26-27 (for UCCI), and at 61-62, 65, 69, 74-75 (for
   Delta). As also specified in the evaluation provision, these assessments
   were used by the SSA in making his award decision. Source Selection
   Decision Memorandum at 38-42. On the other hand, while there are
   occasional references in the evaluation materials to the relationship
   between the statement of objectives and certain features of the proposals,
   there is no evidence in the record that the evaluation of proposal risk
   included any consistent consideration of an offeror's ability to meet the
   solicitation's statement of objectives.

   As a preliminary matter, we think the solicitation's stated requirements
   constitute the agency's detailed view of the kinds of services needed to
   achieve the contract's objectives. In this regard, and as quoted above,
   the introduction to the statement of objectives advised that the
   objectives were supported by the technical requirements identified
   throughout the statement of work. RFP at 9. In addition, section M of the
   solicitation, which contains the evaluation factors for award, explains
   that the government is seeking to evaluate the extent to which proposals
   demonstrate their ability "to meet or exceed the requirements defined in
   the statement of work and the quality of service that is likely to result
   from implementation of an offerors' proposed methods." RFP at 85.
   Moreover, the solicitation's instructions to potential offerors about how
   to structure and present their proposals to address each evaluation factor
   and subfactor reflect several of the stated objectives. Compare RFP at 77
   (the instructions addressing the first technical subfactor, network
   access, which require offerors to describe how their "participating
   provider network sizing model is designed to maximize enrollee access")
   with RFP at 9 (the first objective identified is increased enrollment in
   the TRICARE dental plan).

   As a result of our view that requirements in this solicitation are the
   agency's tangible definition of the services needed to achieve the
   contract objectives set forth at the beginning of the statement of work,
   we think the evaluation of each offeror's approach to meeting the
   requirements here, as measured by the evaluation factors and subfactors,
   implicitly captures an assessment of the way in which each proposal will
   achieve, or fail to achieve, the stated objectives. In this way, we read
   the solicitation as a whole, rather than as a disparate set of goals and
   requirements.

   That said, we do not agree with the protester's assertion that the agency
   was required to expressly consider an offeror's ability to meet the
   statement of objectives as part of its assessment of proposal risk. As
   quoted above, the RFP, at section M.7.1.5, advises offerors that the
   agency "will" assess proposal risk for each technical subfactor, and for
   the technical factor overall. The provision then defines proposal risk as
   "the evaluation of risk and impact to the Government based on the proposed
   method of completing the task and the offeror's demonstrated experience in
   performing that task." Id. at 87. The fourth sentence of section M.7.1.5
   contains the language that is the focus of Delta's arguments. This
   sentence reads:

   Proposal risk may be associated with a particular approach, or proposed
   process, as it relates to the successful achievement of the Government's
   requirements and the ability to meet the Statement of Objectives, or the
   degree to which the Government must expend resources to monitor or manage
   the risk to avoid unsuccessful performance.

   Id.

   Our reading of this complex sentence is that it contains two major clauses
   presented as alternative scenarios of risks that may be associated with an
   offeror's approach or process; we read these examples as alternatives due
   to the separation of the clauses by a comma and the word "or." The
   protester argues that the word "and" in the first alternative--i.e., risk
   may exist "as it relates to the successful achievement of the Government's
   requirements and the ability to meet the Statement of Objectives"--has
   been used to set out an additional possibility. Put differently, the
   protester argues this clause means that the agency will consider whether
   risk exists with respect to successful achievement of the requirements,
   and, separately, whether risk exists with regard to the ability to meet
   the contract objectives.

   We do not agree and do not think the context of this clause supports the
   protester's reading of the solicitation. As we indicated above, because
   the requirements and objectives are intrinsically related, the evaluation
   of each offeror's approach to meeting the requirements implicitly reflects
   the degree to which each proposal will achieve, or fail to achieve, the
   stated objectives. Thus, we read the language in section M.7.1.5 on which
   Delta relies as presenting a single scenario where risk might present
   itself--i.e., the agency will consider the risk that an offeror might not
   be able to meet the requirements, and in failing to do so, will affect the
   agency's ability to achieve its objectives.

   Accordingly, we do not think the agency was required by this solicitation
   to assess each offeror's ability to meet the statement of objectives in
   evaluating proposal risk under each of the technical subfactors.[3] Since
   we conclude that there was no such requirement in the evaluation scheme,
   we disagree with the protester's assertion that the agency erred in not
   making such an assessment as part of the evaluation of proposal risk.[4]
   In addition, our review has shown nothing unreasonable, or inconsistent
   with the solicitation's stated evaluation scheme, in the agency's
   evaluation of proposal risk.

   Evaluation of the Claims Processing Technical Subfactor

   Delta's second challenge to the evaluation focuses on the technical
   subfactor for claims processing, under which both Delta and UCCI received
   ratings of green, or acceptable, and low proposal risk. In essence, Delta
   argues that its proposal should have received a rating of blue under this
   subfactor, and that if it had, its proposal would have been evaluated as
   the proposal offering the greatest technical merit. Delta contends that
   its proposal was improperly evaluated because of unreasonable conclusions
   about the value to the agency of the ways in which Delta exceeded
   solicitation requirements, and because of unequal treatment of its and
   UCCI's proposals.

   In response, TRICARE contends that Delta is merely disagreeing with the
   agency's evaluation conclusions, that the agency's evaluation conclusions
   have a reasonable basis, and that Delta has failed to show that the
   evaluation conclusions were irrational. In addition, TRICARE argues that
   the agency has not treated Delta unfairly, or unequally, in its
   application of the evaluation criteria. For the reasons set forth below,
   we agree with the agency.

   Much of Delta's challenge in this area is based on the value agency
   evaluators placed on features in both Delta's and UCCI's proposals that
   exceeded certain minimum performance standards established in the RFP. Of
   relevance to this discussion are the minimum performance standards
   applicable to network access and claims processing, and certain
   performance guarantees set forth in section H of the solicitation. With
   respect to network access, the RFP required that

   Ninety-five (95) percent of enrollees shall have access to a general
   dentistry participating provider within 35 driving miles of their primary
   residence, and be able to obtain an appointment within 21 calendar days of
   requesting an appointment.

   RFP at 24. With respect to claims processing, the RFP required that

   Claims processing standards, measured on a monthly basis, shall be as
   follows:

   CATEGORY STANDARD

   Process Claim to Completion 90% within 14 calendar days of receipt

   98% within 30 calendar days of receipt

   100% within 60 calendar days of receipt

                                   * * * * *

   Payment and coding errors shall be corrected within 10 calendar days of
   identification of the error.

   Id. at 25. In addition to these minimum performance standards, the RFP
   also required that offerors agree to certain performance guarantees. With
   respect to the minimum performance standard for claims processing, the RFP
   stated that the government would "withhold a performance guarantee"--in
   essence, require payment of a penalty--of $1 per claim for every claim not
   processed in accordance with the standards requiring payment of 90 percent
   of claims within 10 days, and payment of 100 percent within 60 days. Id.
   at 43.

   The RFP anticipated that offeror responses in these areas would be
   assessed under the first and second technical evaluation subfactors,
   network access and claims processing. Although the RFP's section M
   evaluation guidance related to network access is not at issue in this
   protest, the guidance related to claims processing is relevant here.
   Specifically, the solicitation stated:

   Proposals will be evaluated to determine the offeror's ability to
   accommodate the anticipated [TRICARE dental program] claim volume,
   including the offeror's proposed staffing. . . . Proposals will also be
   evaluated for supporting accurate and timely claims processing in
   accordance with the minimum claims processing standards specified in
   Section C. Proposals will also be evaluated to assess the efficacy of the
   offeror's plan to identify problems and to implement corrective action.
   Plans guaranteeing standards superior to the minimum claims processing
   standards specified in Section C, without qualification, may receive
   higher merit ratings.

   Id. at 87 (emphasis added).

   In response to the claims processing requirement, Delta offered to process
   [deleted] percent of claims within [deleted] days of receipt, and 100
   percent of claims within [deleted] days. Delta offered a $[deleted] per
   claim performance guarantee that it would process [deleted] percent of
   claims within [deleted] days. AR, Tab 22 at Bates p. 270.[5] In contrast,
   UCCI offered to process [deleted] percent of claims within 14 days, and to
   meet the solicitation's requirement that it process 98 percent of claims
   within 30 days, and 100 percent of claims within 60 days. UCCI offered the
   required $1 per claim performance guarantee that it would comply with the
   RFP's stated minimums. AR, Tab 24 at Bates p. 336.

   Although both Delta and UCCI offered to exceed the minimum performance
   requirements for claims processing established in the RFP, both received a
   rating of acceptable, or green, under the claims processing subfactor.
   Moreover, despite the the SSEB's and the SSA's express recognition of the
   fact that both offerors proposed to exceed the minimum performance
   requirement in this area, neither proposal was assessed as providing
   additional benefit to the government. Source Selection Decision Memorandum
   at 10, 22-23; AR, Tab 20, at 17, 63. The basis for this judgment was set
   forth in detail in the SSEB's review of Delta's final proposal revision:

   The SSET does not consider the proposed standards to be strengths. Given
   the fact that 3.3 million claims are processed annually, under the current
   standard of 90% within 14 days is [sic] 2.97 million claims. The proposed
   [deleted]% within [deleted] days equates to [deleted] million claims. The
   [deleted]% increase (from 90% to [deleted]%) would be approximately
   [deleted] additional claims processed per year and equates to
   approximately 2 additional claims processed per provider location per year
   given Delta's proposed number of provider locations.[[6]] Given [that]
   many participating providers have 30 day billing cycles, the decrease from
   a 14 to [deleted] day timeframe would have minimal effect on the
   provider's practice. The SSET does not consider the percentage increase or
   the shortened time period to be significant enough to affect provider and
   beneficiary satisfaction. The SSET believes that the effect on providers
   and beneficiaries will be negligible.

   AR, Tab 22 at Bates pp. 270-71. The SSET expressed similar views about
   Delta's offer to pay 100 percent of claims within [deleted] days rather
   than the 60 day period required by the RFP. Again, the SSET points out
   that this offer only involves the remaining 2 percent of claims that the
   RFP allowed to be paid between 30 and 60 days after receipt. As a result,
   "the SSET does not consider the increase to be significant enough to
   enhance provider and beneficiary satisfaction." Id. at 271.

   With respect to Delta's first challenge in this area--that the agency's
   evaluation conclusions about the value of its offer to exceed the minimum
   performance requirements for claims processing established in the RFP are
   irrational and unreasonable--we disagree. In support of its arguments,
   Delta offers the opinion of its expert that the timeliness of claims
   processing is a matter of significant concern for providers, and that
   slower payments can have an adverse impact on provider and enrollee
   satisfaction. Protester's Comments, June 6, 2005, at 11. While we do not
   disagree with this proposition, the agency's judgment is that the facts
   here do not support a conclusion that the extent to which Delta proposed
   to exceed the required claims processing times is sufficiently significant
   to provide a benefit to the government.

   We note that this is not a situation where the agency has overlooked the
   benefits of an offeror's proposal, or misunderstood them. The agency here
   expressly considered the value of these benefits and decided that they did
   not significantly enhance the value of the Delta's proposal. In our view,
   Delta has offered little more than mere disagreement with the agency's
   judgment about the value of the enhancements in its proposal; Delta has
   not established that these judgments are unreasonable. A protester's
   disagreement with an agency's evaluation does not establish that the
   evaluation was unreasonable. The OMO Group, Inc., B-294328, Oct. 19, 2004,
   2004 CPD para. 212 at 5, 8.

   We also note that this is not a situation where the agency has rated the
   proposals inconsistently. As the agency points out, a rating of blue, or
   exceptional, was reserved for proposals that exceeded minimum requirements
   in a manner beneficial to the government. AR, Tab 20 at Bates p. 127.
   Given that the agency had a rational basis for its evaluation conclusion
   that neither of these proposals exceeded minimum requirements in a manner
   beneficial to the government, and, given that the agency consistently
   applied its evaluation methodology to both proposals, we think TRICARE
   reasonably evaluated both Delta and UCCI as acceptable under this
   subfactor. Interlog, Inc., B-282139, Apr. 27, 1999, 99-1 CPD para. 87 at
   3.

   Delta also argues that its rating under the claims processing subfactor
   was otherwise unfair for two reasons. First, Delta argues that it was
   treated unfairly because, under a different subfactor, UCCI received a
   strength for exceeding the minimum performance requirements by [deleted]
   percentage points. Delta contends that it was unreasonable for the agency
   to value a [deleted]-percent increase in network access in UCCI's proposal
   under the first technical subfactor, network access, and not to similarly
   value Delta's [deleted]-percent increase in claims processing.

   On this issue, the record shows that UCCI did, in fact, receive a
   strength--and subsequently, a rating of exceptional--for its proposal's
   representation that [deleted] percent of enrollees would have access to a
   participating provider within 35 driving miles of their primary residence,
   and would be able to obtain an appointment within 21 days of requesting an
   appointment. AR, Tab 24 at Bates pp. 333-34. As indicated above, the RFP
   required that offerors propose a network providing such access to at least
   95 percent of enrollees. RFP at 24. Delta's proposal represented that
   [deleted] percent of enrollees would have such access; and Delta, too,
   received a strength for this enhancement, and a rating of exceptional. AR,
   Tab 22 at Bates p. 254.

   In Delta's view, the fact that UCCI received a strength for exceeding
   Delta's proposed network access by [deleted] percentage points--and
   exceeding the RFP network access requirement by [deleted] percentage
   points--means that it was unreasonable for the agency not to accord Delta
   a strength for exceeding the RFP's claims processing performance
   requirement by [deleted] percentage points. We find this argument
   unpersuasive.

   In analyzing the UCCI proposal under the network access technical
   subfactor, the SSET observed that:

   With 1.7 million enrollees, a [deleted]% increase in the standard means
   that [deleted] additional enrollees shall have access to a participating
   provider within 35 driving miles. By proposing a higher access standard, a
   greater number of enrollees should have a greater choice of providers.
   This should increase the probability that a provider will be closer to the
   enrollee and therefore, should increase beneficiary satisfaction.

   AR, Tab 24 at Bates p. 328. While Delta is correct that the difference
   between its proposed level of network access and UCCI's is only [deleted]
   percentage points--the same relative difference as existed between the
   proposals in the area of claims processing--we know of no reason why a
   [deleted] percentage point difference in two entirely different areas must
   be valued in the same way. Moreover, we find reasonable the agency's view
   that a slight increase in the speed with which a small number of claims
   gets paid is not equivalent to an increase in the number of enrollees who
   have easy access to a participating dental provider. Given this reasonable
   basis for treating the proposals differently in these two areas, we do not
   agree that Delta has been treated unfairly.

   Delta's second contention that it was treated unfairly under the claims
   processing technical subfactor arises from its view that TRICARE
   considered quality aspects of UCCI's proposal under the claims processing
   subfactor, while it restricted consideration of Delta's favorable quality
   approach under the quality management subfactor. In this regard, Delta
   argues that the agency unfairly and unreasonably evaluated its
   certification as a high-quality contractor under the third subfactor,
   quality management, rather than under the claims processing subfactor.
   Supp. Protest at 33-37.

   The record here shows that Delta received a strength, and a rating of
   exceptional under the third technical subfactor, quality
   management/quality improvement program, because of the certification of
   its subcontractor, Delta Dental of Michigan, as an ISO 9001 contractor--a
   rigorous certification program for contractors with state-of-the-art
   quality programs. AR, Tab 22 at Bates p. 275. Delta contends that this
   strength should have been reflected under the claims processing technical
   subfactor, rather than the quality management technical subfactor, and
   that if the agency had done so, its strength in this area would have
   merited an exceptional rating under the second technical subfactor. Under
   this scenario, Delta argues it would have been the highest-rated offerer
   under the technical evaluation factor.

   A necessary component of Delta's argument is its claim that the agency
   assessed UCCI's quality approach under the second technical subfactor,
   claims processing. Thus, Delta contends that the agency's failure to
   assess its quality approach under the second technical subfactor as
   well--and in so doing, accord it the same evaluation strength (resulting
   in an exceptional rating) it received for its ISO 9001 certification under
   the quality management subfactor--means that the agency has engaged in
   unequal treatment. We are, again, unpersuaded.

   In our view, the record does not support Delta's contention that the
   agency treated UCCI and Delta unequally in evaluating the claims
   processing subfactor. The RFP here advised offerors that its evaluation of
   the second technical subfactor, claims processing, would include an
   assessment of "the efficacy of the offeror's plan to identify problems and
   implement corrective action" associated with processing claims. RFP at 87.
   As announced, the evaluation of both UCCI's and Delta's proposals included
   precisely this kind of review for both offers. Compare AR, Tab 24 at Bates
   p. 338 (the SSET assessed UCCI's approach to identifying problems and
   correcting them) with AR, Tab 22 at Bates pp. 266-67 (same for Delta's
   approach). We also agree with the agency's assessment that Delta's ISO
   9001 certification is a company-wide quality program, and is not tied only
   to the smaller subset of activities that constitutes claims processing.
   See Supp. Report, June 15, 2005, at 39. Finally, the agency points out
   that Delta's own proposal trumpets its ISO 9001 certification as part of
   its response to the quality management technical subfactor. Id. at 39-40.
   Under these circumstances, since the record shows that the agency did not
   evaluate UCCI's and Delta's proposals differently under the claims
   processing subfactor, we see nothing unfair or unreasonable about the fact
   that Delta's state-of-the-art quality management plan was evaluated under
   the quality management subfactor.

   Evaluation of Price Realism

   In its third, and last, challenge to the evaluation here, Delta argues
   that the agency failed to determine, as part of its price realism review,
   that each offeror's administrative costs were consistent with its stated
   approach. TRICARE answers that no such review was required by the RFP.

   The third evaluation factor under the evaluation scheme set forth in this
   RFP was total evaluated price. An offeror's evaluated price was calculated
   by multiplying each of the priced contract line items (CLIN) by the
   estimated quantities and adding all of the costs for each option period,
   including certain phase-in costs. RFP at 88. Among the CLINs were four
   requests for offerors to identify, as a unit price, the premium that would
   be charged for each enrollment in the TRICARE dental program. RFP at 2.
   These four premiums were for single enrollments, family enrollments,
   single survivor benefit enrollments, and family survivor benefit
   enrollments. Id.

   The RFP's evaluation scheme advised that all priced CLINs would be
   reviewed for reasonableness and unbalanced pricing, and that there would
   be a limited review of price realism. In explaining the intended review of
   price realism, the RFP stated:

   The premium build-up for the Single and Family enrollments (CLINs X001 and
   X002) provided by the offeror will be reviewed for price realism. This
   review will ascertain whether the proposed premium rates and the
   assumptions used in their build-ups are realistic. From an actuarial
   standpoint, the term "realistic," as it applies to an overall premium
   rate, means that the premium rate proposed is adequate to sustain the
   dental and administrative costs for the benefits proposed, given the
   offeror's approach. If the offeror's overall premium is determined to be
   unrealistic, the evaluator will calculate the net impact (dollar value) of
   the unrealistic assumption(s). The results of the price realism review
   will not be used to adjust the offeror's Total Evaluated Price. If the
   offeror's overall premium is determined to be unrealistic, the Government
   will assess price risk based on the net impact of unrealistic
   assumption(s), the financial strength of the offeror (and its parent or
   partner company(s) if applicable), and the source of the unrealistic
   pricing, i.e., network maintenance, claims processing, etc.

   RFP at 88 (emphasis added). To assist in this review, the RFP's
   instructions to offerors required a description of the build-up of the
   monthly premium rates and of the assumptions underlying the development of
   those rates.[7] Id. at 81.

   Upon receipt of the proposals, the PET reviewed the proposed premium
   prices of all three offerors under 10 criteria to determine if the
   proposed premium rates and the assumptions used in their build-ups were
   realistic. First Declaration of the Chairman of the PET, May 24, 2005, at
   2. These criteria (which closely track the categories of information
   requested from offerors in the RFP) were identified in the agency's
   internal Source Selection Evaluation Guide, AR, Tab 38 at Bates pp. 33-35;
   these criteria were not identified in the solicitation. Some of these
   criteria were:

   Does the premium build-up method conform to the solicitation
   specifications?

   Are the utilization rate assumptions realistic?

   Are the unit cost assumptions realistic?

   Are the proportion of participating and non-participating provider
   assumptions realistic?

   Are administrative cost assumptions realistic?

   Are the profit assumptions realistic?

   Id. The consensus views of the PET about how Delta's and UCCI's proposed
   premium rates fared under each of these ten criteria, and whether the team
   viewed the premium rates as realistic overall, were memorialized and
   provided with the agency record in this protest. AR, Tab 30 at Bates pp.
   220-27 (Delta's premium rates), 235-41 (UCCI's premium rates).

   Of relevance to this dispute are the views of the PET about UCCI's
   proposal under one of the criteria identified above, specifically, the
   PET's consideration of whether an offeror's administrative cost
   assumptions were realistic. On this issue, the PET's final consensus
   views, in their entirety, are set forth below:

   UCCI presents a great deal of data on administrative costs. A limited
   narrative is provided to describe the basis for these calculations.
   However, as the incumbent, the proposed administrative costs are based on
   actual costs under comparable circumstances. The premium load of about
   [deleted] percent is essentially the same as the IGCE load.

   UCCI's phase-in costs are somewhat lower than the IGCE estimate. However,
   this is realistic and expected, as the incumbent should have lower
   start-up costs than a new contractor.

   UCCI's administrative cost assumptions are realistic.

   AR, Tab 34 at Bates pp. 330-31.

   Delta contends that the agency cannot claim to have performed a reasonable
   evaluation of price realism because the analysis quoted above does not
   include evidence that the agency evaluated whether UCCI's "proposed
   administrative costs were consistent with the offeror's approach." Supp.
   Protest at 42. Delta argues that if the agency had performed this review
   properly, it would have realized that UCCI was "prepared to do far less
   than Delta Dental in attempting to meet the Government Objectives for this
   contract," and would have realized that Delta's higher administrative
   costs are tied to its effort to increase enrollment by reservists in the
   TRICARE dental program. Supp. Comments at 43.

   As a preliminary matter, we note that the purpose of the limited price
   realism review anticipated here was not to make assessments about which of
   these offerors plans to expend greater effort increasing the enrollment of
   reservists in this program.[8] Instead, the purpose of the review was to
   determine whether an offeror's premiums are adequate "to sustain the
   dental and administrative costs for the benefits proposed, given the
   offeror's approach." RFP at 88.

   In our view, the agency's price realism review was adequate for this
   purpose, and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria. As set forth
   in the analysis quoted above, the agency reviewed UCCI's administrative
   cost data, and the limited narrative provided with that data. In addition,
   the agency noted that UCCI based its proposed administrative costs on the
   actual costs it has been experiencing as the incumbent, and noted that the
   level of administrative costs anticipated is essentially the same as those
   in the government's estimate. Given that UCCI has been able to perform
   these services in the past at these costs, and given that the protester
   has offered nothing about UCCI's proposed future performance that suggests
   that the company's future administrative costs will be higher, we think
   the price realism review was reasonably performed.[9]

   Finally, to the extent that Delta is arguing that the analysis under the
   above-quoted criterion used by the PET to assess the price realism of each
   offeror's premium build-up was inadequate, we note that these criteria
   were never set forth in the evaluation scheme. Instead, they were internal
   guidelines used by the PET to structure its detailed review of each
   offeror's premium build-up. As a result, Delta's contention that the
   agency failed to perform an adequate analysis under one of these 10
   internal guidelines does not translate to an unreasonable evaluation, or
   to unfair treatment of Delta. It is the RFP, not internal evaluation
   materials, that forms the compact between the agency and offerors about 
   how proposals will be evaluated. Lear Siegler Servs., Inc., B-280834, 
   B-280834.2, Nov. 25, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 136 at 6; Loral Aeronutronic, 
   B-259857.2, B-259858.2, July 5, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 213 at 9. Internal 
   agency evaluation guidelines do not provide rights to outside parties. 
   Mandex, Inc.; Tero Tek Int'l, Inc., B-241759 et al., Mar. 5, 1991, 91-1 
   CPD para. 244 at 7.

   The protest is denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The RFP also included a small number of cost reimbursement contract
   line items that were neither priced nor evaluated; rather, the costs were
   estimated by the government and added to each offeror's proposed price.
   RFP at 3, 72.

   [2] In its initial and supplemental protest filings Delta raised
   additional issues that have since been expressly withdrawn. Protester's
   Comments, June 6, 2005, at 27; Protester's Supplemental Comments, June 22,
   2005, at 37, n.11.

   [3] In contrast to the clause here, in cases where agencies anticipate the
   evaluation of an offer's ability to meet a solicitation's statement of
   objectives, the evaluation schemes have clearly indicated the agency's
   intent. See, e.g., Science Applications Int'l Corp., B-293601 et al., May
   3, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 96 at 3; Raytheon Co., B-291449, Jan. 7, 2003,
   2003 CPD para. 54 at 3.

   [4] Given our conclusion, we also disagree with the protester's assertion
   that its interpretation of the solicitation clause addressing the
   evaluation of proposal risk is buttressed by language it finds in the
   Acquisition Plan (AR, Tab 37, at 13) that is omitted from the Source
   Selection Evaluation Guide (AR, Tab 38, at 39). The protester's consultant
   points out that the language of the Acquisition Plan very nearly mirrors
   the solicitation language quoted above, while the language of the Source
   Selection Evaluation Guide omits the phrase "and the ability to meet the
   Statement of Objectives." This omission leads the consultant to opine that
   the evaluators may have relied upon the Source Selection Evaluation Guide,
   thus failing to recognize that the evaluation scheme in the solicitation
   called for a review of an offeror's ability to meet the statement of
   objectives. Declaration of Protester's Consultant at 6. Since the agency
   has consistently argued that it had no such obligation, and since we
   agree, we think these arguments suggesting how the evaluators might have
   been misled into failing to follow the solicitation's evaluation scheme
   need no further consideration.

   [5] For ease of reference, the citation here is to the sequential "Bates"
   numbers stamped on pages in the record.

   [6] Delta proposed a participating provider network of [deleted] general
   and specialty dentist locations. AR, Tab 22 at Bates p. 254.

   [7] Among other things, this provision required offerors to provide
   detailed information on: enrollee assumptions, by type of enrollee;
   utilization rates by type of service or procedure by participating
   providers and non-participating providers; unit costs by type of service
   or procedure by participating providers and non-participating providers;
   the impact of differences in assumption by region; the impact of benefit
   changes on the premium; administrative loading; and profit. RFP at 81.

   [8] In fact, this argument suggests that Delta, in essence, is asking for
   a review of the technical merit of its proposal as part of the price
   realism review--a matter limited by the terms of the RFP to determining
   whether the proposed premium rates appear realistic. Moreover, Delta is
   again seeking credit for the ways in which it proposed to meet the
   objectives of this contract. As set forth above, we think the evaluation
   of Delta's proposal was properly limited to an assessment of whether and
   how well Delta proposed to perform the requirements of the contract.

   [9] Delta's concern is that its higher administrative costs will result in
   its greater ability to achieve the solicitation's objectives, and that the
   agency failed to recognize this fact. This concern does not translate to a
   conclusion that UCCI's lower administrative costs will be inadequate to
   sustain the dental and administrative costs for the benefits proposed.