TITLE: B-295990.4; B-295990.5, Cogent Systems, Inc., October 6, 2005
BNUMBER: B-295990.4; B-295990.5
DATE: October 6, 2005
*************************************************************
B-295990.4; B-295990.5, Cogent Systems, Inc., October 6, 2005

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Cogent Systems, Inc.

   File: B-295990.4; B-295990.5

   Date: October 6, 2005

   Ron R. Hutchinson, Esq., and Gerard F. Doyle, Esq., Doyle & Bachman LLP,
   for the protester.

   Capt. Geraldine Chanel, Lt. Col. Thomas C. Modeszto, and Raymond M.
   Saunders, Esq., Department of the Army, for the agency.

   David Apatoff, Esq., and Shannon R. Hall, Esq., Arnold & Porter LLP, for
   Motorola, Inc., the intervenor.

   Guy R. Pietrovito, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the
   General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   In a negotiated procurement that provided for award on the basis of a
   price/technical trade-off, the agency's determination that the protester's
   lower-priced proposal was unacceptable was unreasonable, where the
   agency's assessment of a significant weakness in the protester's proposal
   with respect to its proposal of a flatbed scanner was unreasonable and the
   agency failed to provide meaningful discussions to the protester on this
   point.

   DECISION

   Cogent Systems, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Motorola, Inc.
   under request for proposals (RFP) No. W9124Q-05-R-AFIS, issued by the
   Department of the Army for an Automated Fingerprint Identification System
   (AFIS) to be used by the government of Iraq. Cogent challenges the
   agency's technical and price evaluation and source selection decision.

   We sustain the protest.

   The RFP, issued under a combined synopsis/solicitation for a commercial
   item in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) part 12.6,
   provided for the award of a fixed-price contract for a turnkey AFIS for
   the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to be used by the Iraqi government.[1]
   Offerors were informed that the initial baseline system will have a
   "Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) capability with an added ability to read
   in transactions [from] CD-ROMs generated by livescan equipment procured
   under a separate contract." RFP at 2. The contract would also include
   options for three upgrades to the baseline system.

   Offerors were provided with a number of documents describing the system
   and services to be provided, including the SOW, the Requirement
   Specification for the Iraqi AFIS System, and the Iraqi National Electronic
   Fingerprint Transmission Specification (EFTS). Offerors were informed that

   [t]he initial delivery will be a tenprint AFIS capable of receiving
   transactions, per the Iraqi-EFTS, on CD-ROMs, storing and matching
   fingerprints, and outputting Hit and no-Hit reports both as SREs [System
   Response Electronics] and in paper reports[,]

   and that later upgrades of the system would provide the capability to
   process latent prints. RFP, Tab 71D, Requirement Specification for the
   Iraqi AFIS System, at 2. The solicitation also stated search rates and
   response times by task; the baseline system was required to be able to
   process 10,000 tenprint transactions daily. Shorter response times were
   identified for the upgrade options depending upon the task and priority
   assigned. Id. at 5.

   The RFP provided for award on the basis of a price/technical tradeoff and
   identified the following evaluation factors and subfactors:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |Technical/management                                                    |
   |------------------------------------------------------------------------|
   |                  |Experience                                           |
   |                  |-----------------------------------------------------|
   |                  |Integrated technical/management                      |
   |                  |-----------------------------------------------------|
   |                  |Design                                               |
   |                  |-----------------------------------------------------|
   |                  |Risk management                                      |
   |                  |-----------------------------------------------------|
   |                  |Key personnel                                        |
   |------------------------------------------------------------------------|
   |Past Performance                                                        |
   |------------------------------------------------------------------------|
   |Price                                                                   |
   |------------------------------------------------------------------------|
   |Subcontracting Plan                                                     |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   RFP, Tab 71A, Evaluation Plan, at 1, 3-4. Offerors were informed that the
   technical/management factor was more important than the past performance
   factor, and that both non-price factors were, when combined, more
   important than price. Offerors were also informed that the subcontracting
   plan factor would be evaluated on a pass/fail basis.

   The RFP also provided that proposals would be color rated under the
   technical/management factor as either purple (the highest rating), green,
   blue, yellow, or red (the lowest rating) and defined each rating. For
   example, green was defined as a "proposal that demonstrates competence and
   exceeds the minimum requirements of the [criterion]; has an above average
   probability of success; no significant weaknesses and only minor
   correctable deficiencies exist." Blue was defined as a "proposal that
   meets in all aspects the minimum requirements of the [criterion]; has a
   good probability of success; no significant weaknesses and any
   deficiencies can be readily corrected." Yellow was defined as a "proposal
   that fails to meet the minimum requirements of the criteria but may
   through negotiations; low probability of success; major weaknesses and/or
   significant number of deficiencies that may be improved or corrected
   through discussions."[2] Red was defined as a "proposal that fails to meet
   minimum requirements of the criteria; proposal needs major revisions; very
   low probability of success." RFP, Tab 71A, Evaluation Plan, at 2-3. The
   RFP also instructed offerors as to what was required to receive a blue
   (acceptable) rating under each of the subfactors to the
   technical/management factor. For example, offerors were instructed that,
   with respect to the design subfactor, they

   must identify the methods to be used to optimize the goals of standards
   compliance, ease of use, accuracy and the utilization of best practices in
   designing a requirements compliant AFIS system to be deployed across
   multiple tasks. Include a discussion of the finalizing of the Plans and
   the role of the Design Review. For each rated requirement in the
   Requirements Specification and each rated task in the Statement of Work
   provide a one to two page description of your approach in meeting the
   requirements. In order to get a blue rating, your proposal must present
   realistic approaches and practices.

   Id. at 3-4.

   The proposals received from Cogent and Motorola were evaluated by the
   agency's proposal evaluation board (PEB). Although no discussions were
   conducted, clarifications were obtained from the offerors before a final
   consensus judgment was made by the PEB. Motorola was found to have offered
   the only "fully acceptable technical/management proposal," while Cogent's
   proposal received a yellow rating under the technical/management
   evaluation factor. Agency Report (AR), Tab 86, Initial Price Objective
   Memo/Pre-Negotiation Memo, at 5, 13. On February 11, 2005, award was made
   to Motorola on the basis of initial proposals.

   Following a debriefing, Cogent protested to our Office, complaining that
   the Army had misevaluated Cogent's technical and price proposals. After
   submission of the agency's report, Cogent filed a supplemental protest,
   complaining that Motorola's proposal failed to conform to several material
   terms and conditions of the solicitation. Prior to submission of a report
   responsive to Cogent's supplemental protest, the Army informed our Office
   that it would take corrective action by amending the solicitation,
   conducting discussions with the offerors, and obtaining revised proposals.
   On April 12, we dismissed Cogent's protest as academic.

   By letters dated April 14, the Army informed Cogent and Motorola of
   certain evaluated weaknesses in the firms' technical/management and price
   proposals. On April 28, Cogent and Motorola submitted revised proposals.
   Although Cogent improved its proposal rating, its proposal was again rated
   yellow under the design subfactor of the technical/management factor and
   thus its technical/management proposal was considered yellow and
   unacceptable. See AR, Tab 25, PEB Consensus Evaluation of Cogent's Revised
   Proposal, at 9. Motorola's proposal was again found to be acceptable.

   On May 12, the Army amended the solicitation and provided the offerors
   with additional written discussions. The Army advised Cogent at this time
   that its "design still has several weaknesses that are considered
   significant enough to result in a less than acceptable rating." AR, Tab
   26, Army Letter to Cogent. On May 16, Cogent protested to our Office,
   complaining that the Army's discussions with the firm were not meaningful.
   We dismissed this protest as premature on May 19. On May 24, Cogent and
   Motorola submitted revised proposals; Motorola made no revisions to its
   technical proposal, submitting only price revisions.

   By letter dated May 31, the Army again reopened discussions (apparently
   because of Cogent's previously dismissed protest on this point). Cogent
   was informed of a number of areas of its proposal that were considered to
   be a significant risk under the design subfactor, including that the
   "design change required in REF requirement 2.2.2 is not adequately
   addressed," that the "radical change in performance in your revised
   proposal (9600 time slower) causes doubt as to the stability of the
   design," that there are "numerous disconnects between the calculations of
   response times in the revised proposal and the RFP and within other parts
   of your proposal," and that its "projection on page C.7 regarding Upgrade
   2 is based on equipment that is not currently available and is not
   supported in your [bill of materials]." The Army also advised Cogent that
   the firm had failed to provide adequate rationale for the tremendous price
   decrease for upgrades 1 and 2 nor had it supported "the relatively minor
   increase in the baseline system." Cogent was instructed to provide
   additional information such as priced bills of material for the original
   and upgrade systems. AR, Tab 41, Army Letter to Cogent (May 31, 2005).

   On June 8, Cogent filed an agency-level protest with the Army, complaining
   that the agency's May 31 letter reflected a lack of meaningful discussions
   because it was based upon an incomplete evaluation of the firm's May 24
   revised proposal. Cogent also complained that the request for additional
   price information was contrary to law and the solicitation requirements.
   The Army dismissed Cogent's protest "as being premature and without
   substance." AR, Tab 56, Decision on Agency-level Protest.

   On June 9, Motorola informed the Army that the firm's April 28 proposal,
   as revised by its May 24 pricing proposal of $22.8 million, was its final
   proposal. On that same date, Cogent submitted its final revised proposal.
   The PEB continued to rate Cogent's final revised proposal yellow and
   unacceptable under the design subfactor of the technical/management
   factor, and thus unacceptable overall. The Army also found that, despite
   the agency's request during discussions, Cogent had failed to provide cost
   information supporting the firm's significant decrease in its proposed
   price. Based upon the agency's determination that Cogent had not supported
   its price reduction, the Army ignored Cogent's final revised price of
   $16.6 million and instead used $20.2 million in the award evaluation.[3]
   AR, Tab 66, Final Price Analysis, at 3.

   Because Motorola was again found to have submitted the only acceptable
   technical proposal, the agency affirmed the award made to Motorola.
   Following a requested debriefing, Cogent filed this protest.[4]

   Cogent complains that the Army's evaluation of the firm's proposal under
   the design subfactor was unreasonable. Cogent challenges each of the
   evaluated weaknesses found in its design, arguing that the Army ignored
   information provided by Cogent in its final revised (fourth) proposal,
   "imposed requirements not provided for in the solicitation," and did not
   evaluate in accordance with the stated evaluation scheme. Protester's
   Comments at 12. In this regard, Cogent states that none of the weaknesses
   identified in its proposal under this subfactor shows Cogent's failure to
   satisfy the minimum solicitation requirements, but only "reflect areas in
   Cogent's proposal that offered to exceed the minimum requirements and the
   Army's alleged weaknesses are based on purported ambiguities or
   disconnects in the manner in which Cogent proposed to exceed the minimum
   requirements." Id. at 13.

   In reviewing protests of an agency's evaluation and source selection
   decision, we do not reevaluate proposals but examine the record to
   determine whether the evaluation and source selection decision are
   reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's evaluation criteria and
   applicable procurement laws and regulations. Abt Assocs., Inc.,
   B-237060.2, Feb. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 223 at 4.

   A hearing was conducted by our Office, at which testimony was elicited to
   explain the agency's evaluation of Cogent's and Motorola's proposals under
   the design subfactor. That testimony indicated that, although the PEB's
   consensus judgment was based upon a totality of the evaluated weaknesses
   in Cogent's final revised proposal under the design subfactor, see Hearing
   Transcript (TR) at 104, 232, some of the evaluated weaknesses were
   considered by the PEB to be more significant than others and that other
   weaknesses were considered to be fairly minor,[5] although the evaluators
   also testified that the PEB did not specifically identify in its consensus
   report which weaknesses were significant or minor. See TR at 104-06,
   200-01, 203-05. Specifically, the weaknesses that the evaluators
   considered significant were (1) that Cogent's calculations supporting its
   system's response capacity and the use of a peak load factor of three were
   confusing and unexplained, which raised concerns about the maturity of
   Cogent's design,[6] see TR at 55, 80-82, 200-01, and (2) that, although
   Cogent was now offering to provide a compliant scanner (in its initial
   proposal Cogent had not offered a scanner that satisfied the solicitation
   requirements), the firm did not explain how this was possible given the
   firm's earlier protest argument that a compliant scanner did not exist.
   See TR at 56, 59-60. There were no deficiencies, as defined in the
   solicitation, identified in the evaluation documentation.

   As indicated above, one of the weaknesses identified in the hearing
   testimony as being significant to the PEB's judgment that Cogent's
   proposal was unacceptable under the design subfactor concerned the firm's
   proposed flatbed scanner. The RFP provided that, with the second planned
   upgrade of the system, the AFIS would be able to communicate
   electronically with flatbed scanners. Offerors were informed that the
   scanners must be certified by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
   and be able to scan a fingerprint card at 1,000 pixels per inch (ppi)
   scanning in 90 seconds or less. RFP, Tab 71D, Requirement Specification
   for the Iraqi AFIS System, at 5.

   In its January 25, 2005 initial proposal, Cogent proposed an Epson
   Expression 1680 scanner, which it stated would scan 1,000 ppi in 100
   seconds or less. Cogent acknowledged in its proposal that its proposed
   scanner was not compliant with the solicitation requirements and stated
   that "[a]s soon as a commercial flatbed scanner becomes available that
   provides 1,000 ppi in 90 seconds or less, we will certify it through the
   FBI and provide it for the Iraq AFIS." AR, Vol. 6, Cogent Initial Proposal
   at C-21. The PEB considered this to be a minor weakness in Cogent's
   initial proposal. TR at 58.

   After the reopening of the competition following Cogent's initial
   protests, Cogent proposed in its April 28 revised (second) proposal to
   satisfy this requirement by providing the FBI-certified Epson Perfection
   4870 flatbed scanner, which it stated operated at 1,000 ppi and scans a
   fingerprint card in 90 seconds or less. Cogent also provided a copy of a
   December 2, 2004 letter from the FBI indicating that this scanner was
   certified.[7] AR, Tab 22, Cogent's Revised (Second) Proposal at C-18.
   Although Cogent's revised proposal was again rated yellow under the design
   subfactor, there was no discussion of Cogent's proposed scanner in the
   consensus evaluation report. See AR, Tab 25, Consensus Evaluation Report
   of Cogent's Revised (Second) Proposal.

   Subsequently, the Army sent Cogent two discussion letters, dated May 12
   and May 31, and received from Cogent revised proposals dated May 24 (third
   proposal) and June 9 (fourth and final proposal). Cogent's proposed
   scanner was not mentioned in either of these discussion letters, and both
   the third and final proposal offered the same scanner proposed in Cogent's
   second proposal.

   In its final consensus evaluation, the PEB identified Cogent's proposed
   scanner as a weakness under the design subfactor, and, as noted above, two
   of the Army's evaluators testified that this was considered to be a
   significant weakness. See TR at 45, 120, 214. In particular, the PEB noted
   that Cogent did not explain in its third or final proposal how it was now
   able to offer a compliant scanner, given the firm's earlier protest
   allegation that no FBI-certified scanner could satisfy all the
   solicitation requirements. With regard to this concern, the PEB noted:

   Not addressed in the third proposal--still a mystery. Casts serious doubt
   on their protest (now withdrawn--but the major contributor to our not
   having an operational system in Iraq at this point in time.) Fourth
   proposal page C-20 there is no change to their proposal in this area--in
   their first Protest they explained how they nor anyone else not meet this
   rated requirement (see Protest #1 letter). Since there was no change to
   their proposal (fourth submittal) in this area they have still not
   explained how they meet it now and there is still no AFIS in Iraq because
   they protested saying no such system existed. What are we to believe? When
   will we have permission to move on and meet our critical need?

   AR, Tab 54, Consensus Evaluation of Cogent's Final Revised (Fourth)
   Proposal, at 7.

   The hearing testimony evidences that the PEB erroneously believed that the
   scanner offered by Cogent in its final revised proposal was the same as
   the one offered by Cogent initially. Specifically, one of the Army
   evaluators testified that the basis for the evaluated significant weakness
   concerning Cogent's flatbed scanner was that Cogent (in its third and
   final proposals) had offered the same scanner as was proposed in the
   firm's initial proposal, but that Cogent asserted, without explanation,
   that the scanner now satisfied all the solicitation requirements. See TR
   at 59-60, 120. As described above, however, Cogent proposed a different
   Epson scanner in its second, third, and fourth proposals than was offered
   in the firm's initial proposal to satisfy this requirement. When
   confronted with this information, the evaluator acknowledged that Cogent
   had proposed a different scanner and that the "underlying mandatory
   requirement to scan was met," but complained that the firm still had not
   explained how the firm could offer a compliant scanner after protesting
   that no such scanner existed. TR at 122-24, 126-28.

   We find that the record does not establish a reasonable basis for the
   agency's assessment of a significant weakness with respect to Cogent's
   proposed scanner. First, as the record shows and the Army now admits (see
   Agency's Hearing Comments at 13-14), the evaluators failed to recognize
   that Cogent had proposed a different scanner in its revised proposals to
   satisfy the solicitation requirements--this failure itself renders
   unreasonable the agency's evaluation judgment concerning Cogent's proposed
   scanner. Despite the error, the Army's evaluator nevertheless asserted
   that the weakness was based upon Cogent's failure to explain how it could
   offer a compliant scanner when the firm had asserted in its initial
   proposal and earlier protest that no such scanner existed. TR at 122-24.
   However, even assuming this latter evaluation judgment was reasonable, the
   Army failed to provide Cogent with meaningful discussions with respect to
   this scanner.[8]

   The FAR requires at a minimum that contracting officers discuss with each
   firm being considered for award "deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and
   adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not yet had
   an opportunity to respond." FAR sect. 15.306(d)(3). Here, the Army twice
   provided Cogent with written discussions after it proposed the Epson
   Perfection 4870 scanner as a compliant product, but never identified its
   concern that Cogent had not explained how it was now able to offer a
   compliant product, even though the evaluators regarded this as a
   significant weakness.[9]

   In short, we find no reasonable basis in the record for the agency's
   judgment that Cogent's proposed scanner was a significant proposal
   weakness. We also find that, in any event, the Army failed to conduct
   meaningful discussions with Cogent with respect to this aspect of the
   agency's evaluation.

   The Army argues that, even assuming that it erred with respect to its
   evaluation of Cogent's proposed scanner and failed to provide Cogent with
   meaningful discussions with respect to it, Cogent was not prejudiced
   because this evaluated weakness was only one of a number of weaknesses
   assessed under the design subfactor. In the Army's view, since the PEB's
   judgment that Cogent was unacceptable under the design subfactor was based
   upon a totality of the identified weaknesses, the protester cannot
   demonstrate that it would have been found acceptable absent the Army's
   errors. See Agency's Hearing Comments at 10, 14.

   Prejudice is an element of every viable protest, and our Office will not
   sustain a protest unless the protester demonstrates a reasonable 
   possibility that it was prejudiced by the agency's actions, that is,
   unless the protester demonstrates that but for the agency's actions, it
   would have had a reasonable  possibility of receiving award). McDonald
   Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at 3; see Statistica,
   Inc. v. Christopher, 103 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

   While, as noted above, the contemporaneous documentation and hearing
   record evidence that the unacceptability of Cogent's proposal under the
   design subfactor was based upon a number of evaluated weaknesses, the
   record also shows that the PEB considered some weaknesses to be more
   material than others. That is, the hearing testimony evidenced that the
   PEB, in its contemporaneous deliberations, considered weaknesses
   assessed--in Cogent's design--with respect to its proposed scanner and its
   peak loading factor to be more significant than other identified
   weaknesses, even though the PEB did not specifically rank weaknesses.[10]
   See, e.g., TR at 47-50. Moreover, the Army admitted in its report that
   some of the weaknesses identified in the final consensus evaluation report
   actually concerned Cogent's earlier proposals and not the firm's final
   revised proposal. See AR at 29-34. The record shows that removing Cogent's
   proposed scanner from the list of evaluated weaknesses under the design
   subfactor would require the agency to reconsider whether Cogent's proposal
   remained unacceptable in light of the other evaluated weaknesses.
   Accordingly, we find from this record that there is a reasonable
   possibility, under a fair evaluation of Cogent's final proposal under this
   subfactor, that Cogent's proposal could be found acceptable. If Cogent's
   proposal were found acceptable, the agency then would be required to
   perform a price/technical tradeoff to determine whether Cogent's lower
   proposed price reflected the best value to the government.[11]

   In sum, we find a reasonable possibility that Cogent was prejudiced by the
   Army's evaluation errors and failure to conduct meaningful discussions
   with respect to the firm's proposed flatbed scanner. We sustain Cogent's
   protest on this basis.[12]

   Although we would ordinarily recommend, under these circumstances, that an
   agency reopen the competition, obtain revised proposals, and make a new
   source selection decision, here the Army reports that part of Motorola's
   baseline system has been delivered to the Army for shipment to Iraq and
   that the remainder of the system was to be delivered by September 27.
   Furthermore, the Army confirms that each offeror's proposed system upgrade
   is unique to that offeror's system and that Cogent could not upgrade
   Motorola's system. TR at 262-63. In light of these circumstances, we do
   not find it feasible to propose reopening the competition and performing a
   new source selection. Accordingly, we recommend that the Army reimburse
   Cogent both its costs of proposal preparation and of filing and pursuing
   the protest, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(d).
   The protester should submit its certified claim for costs, detailing the
   time expended and costs incurred, directly to the contracting agency
   within 60 days after the receipt of this decision. 4 C.F.R. sect.
   21.8(f)(1).

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The REF was formed to develop strategies and methodologies to swiftly
   introduce material innovations into the Army by taking emerging
   technologies to operational environments for initial field evaluation.
   RFP, Tab 71C, Statement of Work (SOW), at C.1.2.

   [2] The RFP defined a "deficiency" to be

   [a] material failure in the proposal to meet a requirement or a
   combination of significant weaknesses in a proposal that increases the
   risk of unsuccessful contract performance to an unacceptable level.

   "Weakness" was defined to be

   [a] flaw in the proposal that increases the risk of successful contract
   performance. A "significant weakness" in the proposal is a flaw that
   appreciably increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance.

   RFP, Tab 71A, Evaluation Plan, at 3.

   [3] The $20.2 million figure was derived from Cogent's earlier submitted
   price proposal.

   [4] The Army authorized Motorola's performance of the contract in the face
   of this protest based upon the agency's determination that "urgent and
   compelling circumstances that significantly affect the interest of the
   United States will not permit awaiting the decision of the GAO." AR, Tab
   97, Army Determination & Finding, Aug. 3, 2005.

   [5] We note, in this regard, that the agency's report was not consistent
   with the hearing testimony with respect to the significance of some of the
   weaknesses identified in the final consensus evaluation document. For
   example, although the agency asserted that the weakness associated with
   Cogent's proposed scanner did not affect Cogent's rating under this
   subfactor, see AR at 34, two of the agency's evaluators testified that
   this weakness was considered significant. See TR at 45, 120, 214.

   [6] The board assessed at least three weaknesses associated with its
   concern that Cogent's calculations regarding its system's response
   capacity and peak hour loading factor were confusing and unexplained. See
   TR at 203-06.

   [7] Cogent's proposed Epson Perfection 4870 scanner was also identified on
   the FBI's website as a product certified for compliance with the FBI's
   integrated automated fingerprint identification system image quality
   specifications. See http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis/cert.htm.

   [8] The Army argues that Cogent's allegation concerning the adequacy of
   discussions with respect to its scanner is untimely. Cogent filed an
   agency-level protest with the Army on June 8, alleging that the Army had
   failed to provide Cogent with meaningful discussions. See Agency's Hearing
   Comments at 10-12. On June 17, the Army dismissed Cogent's agency-level
   protest as premature and without substance. The Army argues that Cogent's
   June 28 protest to our Office challenging the conduct of discussions is
   untimely because it was not filed within 10 days of the date that the firm
   received the agency's dismissal of the agency-level protest. See 4 C.F.R.
   sect. 21.2(a)(3) (2005). We disagree. The agency's decision on the
   agency-level protest itself states that the firm's protest was dismissed
   as premature and therefore not a decision on the merits. Thus, there was
   no obligation for Cogent to file a protest within 10 days of the agency's
   dismissal of the agency-level protest.

   [9] The parties disagree as to whether the Army was required to address
   Cogent's third proposal in the May 31 written discussions provided to the
   firm. In the Army's view, the third proposal was not the subject of a
   consensus evaluation, and Cogent was informed that the Army would not be
   evaluating this proposal. Although we need not address this disagreement
   given our conclusions above, we note that the Army did in fact evaluate
   the third proposal, as evidenced by the final consensus evaluation
   document, which repeatedly references Cogent's third proposal. See AR, Tab
   54, Consensus Evaluation of Cogent's Final Revised (Fourth) Proposal, at
   3-7.

   [10] Cogent also protested that the Army failed to provide the firm with
   meaningful discussions with respect to its proposed peak hour loading
   factor. Although we need not address this allegation, the record evidences
   that Cogent first proposed this design approach in its April 28 second
   proposal, see AR, Tab 22, Cogent's Revised (Second) Proposal, at C-19-22,
   and that it is not at all clear that the firm was meaningful apprised of
   the evaluators' significant concerns with regard to Cogent's use of this
   peak hour loading concept.

   [11] We also find that the Army erred in ignoring Cogent's proposed
   reduction in its final fixed price. Where, as here, a solicitation
   provides for the award of a fixed-price contract, an agency is not
   permitted to make upward adjustments in an offeror's proposed fixed-prices
   that the agency may believe to be priced too low. See McDonnell Douglas
   Corp., B-259694.2, B-259694.3, June 16, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 51 at 9.
   Moreover, here the RFP did not provide for an assessment of the realism of
   proposed offerors' proposed fixed prices, which would have allowed the
   agency to assess Cogent's understanding of the solicitation requirements
   or to assess risk inherent in the offeror's proposal.

   [12] Cogent challenged numerous other aspects of the Army's evaluation,
   including the acceptability of Motorola's proposal. Given our decision
   sustaining Cogent's protest based upon the Army's errors with respect to
   that firm's proposed flatbed scanner, we need not address these other
   allegations. We note, however, that, as asserted by the protester in its
   supplemental protest, the record evidences that Motorola did not
   specifically offer to satisfy the solicitation's revised minimum number of
   daily fingerprint searches. See AR, Tab 23, Motorola Revised Proposal at
   4-24. This error was not contemporaneously recognized or considered by the
   PEB in its evaluation of Motorola's proposal. TR at 130, 149-50.