TITLE:  General Dynamics-Ordnance & Tactical Systems, B-295987; B-295987.2, May 20, 2005
BNUMBER:  B-295987; B-295987.2
DATE:  May 20, 2005
**********************************************************************
   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: General Dynamics-Ordnance & Tactical Systems

   File: B-295987; B-295987.2

   Date: May 20, 2005

   David A. Churchill, Esq., William R. Stoughton, Esq., and Kathy C.
Weinberg, Esq., Jenner & Block LLP, for the protester.

   Thomas P. Humphrey, Esq., Elizabeth W. Newsom, Esq. and Brian Roemer,
Esq., Crowell & Moring LLP, for Alliant Techsystems, Inc., an intervenor.

   Angela J. Cosentino, Esq., Naval Sea Systems Command, for the agency.

   Edward Goldstein, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1.  Protester's challenge that it should have been afforded the
opportunity to comment on negative past performance information, which the
protester had not previously had the opportunity to address, is denied
where the solicitation indicated that award could be made without the
benefit of discussions and there was no basis for the agency to have
questioned the validity of the information since it was based on the
agency's first-hand experience with the protester's performance.

   2.  Agency did not trigger requirement to hold discussions with all
competitive range offerors by communicating with awardee regarding its
subcontracting plan prior to award since these communications did not
pertain to evaluation of the awardee's proposal and therefore did not
constitute discussions.  Rather, the negotiation and ultimate approval of
a subcontracting plan involved a question of the awardee's responsibility.

   DECISION

   General Dynamics-Ordnance & Tactical Systems, Inc. (GD-OTS) protests the
Department of the Navy's award of a contract to Alliant Techsystems, Inc.
under request for proposals (RFP) No. N00164-04-R-4217 for the purchase of
MK 244 ammunition.  GD-OTS argues that the Navy's past performance
evaluation was improper; offerors were treated unequally with regard to
the conduct of discussions or clarifications; the awardee's proposal was
unacceptable for failing to include an adequate small business
subcontracting plan; the Navy failed to conduct a price realism analysis;
and the Navy's source selection decision was improper.

   We deny the protest.

   On August 13, 2004, the Department of the Navy, Naval Surface Warfare
Center, Crane Division, issued the RFP requesting offers for "first
article and production quantities of linked MK 244 Mod 0 Armor Piercing
Discarding Sabot (APDS) 20MM cartridges in accordance with referenced
specifications."  Agency Report (AR) at 2-3.  The RFP provided for the
award of a 5-year, indefinite-quantity contract with fixed unit-prices for
specified production quantities.  Offerors were permitted to submit
alternate offers since the RFP was divided between two lots.  Lot 1
included a line item for production of 800 "First Articles" for testing
and approval.  RFP at 2.  "First Articles" were required unless waived for
those offerors demonstrating that they had previously delivered the MK 244
or a similar item, and that the item had been accepted by the government. 
Where waiver was applicable, an offeror could submit a proposal for lot 2,
which did not include a line item for "First Articles."  While offerors
could submit offers for both lots, the RFP specified that the Navy would
make award under only one lot.  RFP at 4. 

   The RFP provided that award would be made to the firm submitting the
proposal "determined most advantageous to the Government, cost/price and
other factors considered" based on a consideration of two evaluation
factors:  past performance and cost/price--with past performance being
"significantly more important" than cost/price.  RFP at 57.  The RFP
further advised that the government "may award a contract on the basis of
initial offers received, without discussions."  RFP at 58. 

   With regard to the evaluation of past performance, the solicitation
required each offeror to submit a list of no more than five of its most
recent contracts "for the same/similar products."  RFP at 58.  Offerors
were "authorized to provide information relative to any problems
encountered on the identified contracts and any corrective actions taken
by the offeror."  Id.  The RFP further provided that the past performance
evaluation would be based on the information submitted by the offeror as
well as "other information obtained by the Contracting Officer," and the
offeror's past performance would be assessed by the "Source Selection
Authority (SSA)/Contracting Officer" and assigned an adjectival rating of
"highly favorable, favorable, neither favorable nor unfavorable,
unfavorable, or highly unfavorable."  Id.  Offerors without a history of
providing the same or similar products would be assigned a neutral rating,
which was neither favorable nor unfavorable.  Id.

   As to price, the RFP stated that "[p]roposed prices will be evaluated
based on an examination of the proposed price for the first article units
. . . and an average price for the five years for the production units . .
. ."  RFP at 58.  Although the RFP stated that "cost is not a weighted
evaluation factor," it further emphasized that "it will not be ignored,"
explaining that "[t]he degree of importance of the cost will increase with
the degree of equality of the proposals in relation to the other factors
on which selection is to be based . . . ."  RFP at 57.   

   The RFP also required offerors to include a subcontracting plan in
accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section 52.219-9. 
The plan was required to include a "mandated five percent (5%) goal for
small disadvantaged business concerns or a detailed explanation as to why
the goal cannot be included in the plan."  RFP at 55. 

   By the November 16 amended closing date for receipt of proposals, the
agency had received proposals from two firms--GD-OTS and Alliant.  GD-OTS
submitted offers for both lots, while Alliant submitted an offer only for
lot 1.[1] 

   For the purpose of evaluating its past performance, GD-OTS identified five
reference contracts in its proposal.  Three of the contracts were for
production of the identical round being procured under the RFP, the MK
244, and two were for the 20mm MK149, which GD-OTS identified as similar
to the MK 244.  See GD-OTS Proposal, Past Performance Information.  Of the
three MK 244 contracts identified by GD-OTS, two were Navy contracts (a
"Low Rate Initial Production" (LRIP) contract and a contract for "Full
Scale Production") and the third was with the government of Canada. 
GD-OTS Proposal, Past Performance Information, at 7, 10. 

   With regard to the LRIP contract, GD-OTS was involved as a subcontractor
to its "sister company," General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products
(GDATP), which was the prime contractor.  AR at 3.  According to GD-OTS,
in its subcontractor role, GD-OTS was "responsible" for the MK 244
ammunition produced under the contract.  Protester's Comments at 3.  The
LRIP contract was, in essence, a precursor to full-scale manufacture of
the MK 244--the MK 244 round had not been the subject of large-scale
manufacture at the time of the LRIP contract.  GD-OTS's proposal discussed
the LRIP contract at length, describing manufacturing challenges and their
resolution through what GD-OTS described as the cooperative efforts of the
Navy, GDATP, and the protester.  With regard to the Navy contract for
full-scale production, which specified delivery of 166,084 rounds in
January 2005, GD-OTS indicated in its proposal that it had requested a
schedule extension due to delays resulting from the LRIP contract. 
Protester's Proposal, Past Performance Information, at 10.

   Unlike the protester, Alliant had never manufactured the MK 244.  Thus,
Alliant's proposal listed four contracts where it had produced ammunition
that it identified as similar to the MK 244--production of the 20mm PGU-27
A/B, production of the 25mm M791 Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot with
Tracer Cartridge, and two contracts for production of the 20mm ZAP. 
Alliant Proposal, Past Performance Information.

   In evaluating past performance, the Navy considered whether the cartridges
produced under the contracts were the same as or similar to the MK 244. 
In addition, the Navy sought information from references for each of the
contracts listed by the offerors in their proposals.  Where a contract
identified by an offeror involved a Navy contract, however, the Navy
relied on its first-hand knowledge of the offeror's performance for that
contract.  For each of the contracts referenced, the Navy sought and
considered comments regarding how well the contractor performed, whether
the contractor met delivery schedules, whether it was "cooperative and
easy to work with," whether the contractor provided "a quality product,"
and whether the contractor performed "within original cost estimates" if
it was a cost-type contract.  AR, Tab 8, Past Performance Information, at
4.

   With regard to the evaluation of the protester's past performance, the
Navy assigned GD-OTS a rating of "favorable."  AR, Tab 9, Business
Clearance Memorandum, at 15.  In arriving at this rating, the Navy noted
that three of the contracts identified by GD-OTS were for production of
the exact cartridge as the subject procurement.  In addition, the Navy
concluded that the two contracts submitted by GD-OTS for production of the
MK149 were "similar" to the contracts for production of the MK 244, and
highlighted various similarities between the MK149 and the MK 244 as well
as several differences, including the fact that the MK149 has [deleted] as
in the MK 244."  AR, Tab 8, Past Performance Information, at 11. 

   The record reflects that GD-OTS received a "favorable" rating as opposed
to a "highly favorable" rating because, in the agency's view, the past
performance information for the protester demonstrated that GD-OTS was
late with delivery at times, although the Navy concluded that GD-OTS
"generally provide[d] a quality product" and was a good contractor
overall.  AR, Tab 9, Business Clearance Memorandum, at 15. 

   Specifically, under the LRIP contract, the Navy highlighted the fact that
there were "major delays," which the Navy attributed to both the
government and contractor performance--the Navy estimated that the
government was responsible for approximately 20 percent of the delays. 
AR, Tab 8, Past Performance Information, at 9.  For example, the Navy
noted that first article scheduling was delayed "due to GD-OTS [deleted]
delays" and that further delay was "due to GD-OTS delays in [deleted]." 
Id.  The Navy also noted delays resulting from the fact that "GD-OTS ran
into many issues including a [deleted]."  Id.    

   The Navy noted delays on other GD-OTS contracts as well, including the
fact that the LRIP contract delays had resulted in the delay of production
and delivery on the protester's contract with the Navy for full production
of the MK 244 cartridge.  The Navy also noted that the protester's first
delivery on one of its MK149 contracts was approximately 2-3 months late. 
AR, Tab 8, Past Performance Information, at 11.

   Alliant received a past performance rating of "favorable" as well. 
Because Alliant had not identified any contracts for production of the MK
244, the Navy compared the similarities and differences between all of the
cartridges produced under Alliant's referenced contracts with those of the
MK 244.[2]  For example, with regard to Alliant's contracts for production
of the 20mm ZAP, the Navy identified various similarities with the MK 244,
including the fact that the [deleted] is the same; they both use the
[deleted], and [deleted]; the [deleted]; and they use [deleted].  While
ultimately concluding that the 20mm ZAP cartridge was "similar" to the MK
244 for the purpose of evaluating Alliant's past performance, the Navy
also noted several differences between the two cartridges, including the
fact that the 20mm ZAP is a [deleted].  AR, Tab 8, Past Performance
Information, at 6-7. 

   In addition, as it relates to the protest, Alliant's proposal included a
subcontracting plan that neglected to provide dollar amounts or
percentages for subcontract placements (i.e., small businesses, small
disadvantaged businesses, women-owned small businesses, Historically
Underutilized Business Zone firms, veteran-owned firms, and
service-disabled veteran-owned firms), instead inserting an asterisk in
place of dollars and percentages.  The asterisk referenced a section of
its subcontracting plan which explained that Alliant intended to "issue an
intracompany subcontract to Alliant-Lake City Small Caliber Ammunition
Plan" (ATK-Lake City) for the total program requirements and that ATK-Lake
City would be "responsible for any outside purchasing activity and flowing
applicable program requirements to their suppliers . . . ATK-Lake City
will report small business placements as required."   Alliant Proposal,
Memorandum of Agreement for Master Subcontracting Plan at 5.  Because
Alliant intended to subcontract the program requirements in their
entirety, Alliant indicated that "ATK-Lake City operations are not used in
calculating goals for [Alliant] Small Business Plans" under the FAR.  Id. 

   Further, under the heading "Clause Flowdown," Alliant's proposal stated:

   Alliant Techsystems Inc. includes FAR 52.219-8, "Utilization of Small
Business Concerns", in all subcontracts over [deleted] when applicable. 
We require all subcontractors (except small business concerns) that
receive subcontracts in excess of [deleted] . . . to adopt a plan that
meets the requirements of 52.219-9, "Small Business Subcontracting Plan."

   Id. at 14.

   As evidenced by internal Navy correspondence, the Navy had some question
about whether Alliant's proposed plan was adequate.  Prior to award, the
Navy raised the matter with Alliant, indicating that the firm needed to
revise its subcontracting plan to expressly state subcontracting goals of
zero percent.  Alliant complied with the Navy's request and the Navy
documented its determination that Alliant's subcontracting plan was
acceptable.  In documenting the adequacy of Alliant's plan, the Navy noted
the explanation in Alliant's proposal as well as the fact that Alliant had
a successful record of small business contracting.  AR, Tab 4E,
Subcontracting Plan Information, Contracting Officer's Determination of
Adequacy.

   Because the past performance ratings for Alliant and GD-OTS were
essentially equivalent, and because Alliant's total evaluated price
($23,553,409) was approximately $5 million less than the total evaluated
price for GD-OTS ($28,691,160), the Navy concluded that Alliant's offer
represented the best value.  The Navy documented this decision in its
Business Clearance Memorandum, which included a summary of the Navy's past
performance evaluation.  AR, Tab 9, Business Clearance Memorandum.  In
making award, the contracting officer also concluded that Alliant's
pricing was "fair and reasonable" based upon a comparison with the prices
proposed by GD-OTS.[3]  Id. at 11. 

   After receiving a debriefing from the Navy, GD-OTS filed this protest with
our Office.

   In challenging the award to Alliant, GD-OTS argues that: (1) the Navy's
past performance evaluation was improper; (2) offerors were treated
unequally with regard to holding discussions or requesting clarifications;
(3) Alliant's proposal was unacceptable for failing to provide an adequate
small business subcontracting plan; (4) the Navy failed to conduct a price
realism analysis; and (4) the Navy failed to make a proper source
selection decision.

   Past Performance Evaluation

   GD-OTS contends that the Navy's evaluation of its past performance as
"favorable," rather than "highly favorable," was unreasonable because it
was based upon the erroneous assumption that GD-OTS was responsible for
delays under the LRIP contract.  GD-OTS also challenges Alliant's
"favorable" past performance rating since Alliant has never produced the
MK 244.

   The evaluation of past performance, including the agency's determination
of the relevance and scope of the offeror's performance history to be
considered, is a matter of agency discretion, which we will not find
improper unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the solicitation
criteria.  Acepex Mgmt. Corp., B-283080 et al.,

   Oct. 4, 1999, 99-2 CPD paragraph 77 at 3.  Moreover, an agency's past
performance evaluation may be based on a reasonable perception of
inadequate prior performance, regardless of whether the contractor
disputes the agency's interpretation of the underlying facts, Ready
Transp., Inc., B-285283.3, B-285283.4, May 8, 2001, 2001 CPD paragraph 90
at 5, and the protester's mere disagreement with the agency's judgment is
not sufficient to establish that the agency acted unreasonably.  Birdwell
Bros. Painting & Refinishing, B-285035, July 5, 2000, 2000 CPD paragraph
129 at 5.

   GD-OTS asserts that the delays attributed by the Navy to its performance
on the LRIP contract were not its fault, but rather the result of actions
taken by the government and the prime contractor.  For example, GD-OTS
contends that first article delays were caused in part by problems with
the government's technical data package for the MK 244 and
government-furnished equipment, and that shipping delays were the result
of the Navy's failure to provide timely "Hazard Classification."  GD-OTS
also identifies various delays that it contends were caused by the prime
contractor.  The protester, however, did not refute many of the delays
identified by the Navy's past performance evaluation and attributed to
GD-OTS (i.e., [deleted] delays, delays in [deleted], and a [deleted]
problem).  AR, Tab 8, Past Performance Information, at 9.  Moreover, the
Navy's conclusions about the protester's past performance were not based
exclusively on its performance of the LRIP contract.  Rather, the record
reflects that the Navy considered two other GD-OTS contracts that
experienced delays, which the protester has not disputed.  Based on our
review of the record and the protester's arguments, we conclude that the
protester's challenges constitute nothing more than disagreement with the
agency's evaluation judgment, and that they do not provide us with a basis
to find unreasonable the Navy's decision to assign the protester a past
performance rating of "favorable" as opposed to "highly favorable."

   With regard to the evaluation of Alliant's past performance, the protester
initially argued that Alliant should have received a "neutral" rating
because it had never produced the MK 244 and that no other contracts
should be considered "similar" because "no other round necessitates
[deleted] for the MK 244 round."  Protest at 10.  In response to the
agency report, which included the Navy's documented determination that the
contracts identified by GD-OTS and Alliant for production of ammunition
other than the MK 244 were in fact similar to the MK 244 for the purpose
of evaluating the firms' past performance, GD-OTS did not pursue its
initial challenge of the evaluation of Alliant's past performance. 
Instead, GD-OTS argued that the agency's past performance evaluation was
flawed because, in essence, the Navy failed to compare the relative
relevance of the contracts performed by Alliant with those performed by
GD-OTS.  According to the protester, its own proposal would have been
favored under such an analysis since it had more relevant past performance
where it had manufactured and produced the MK 244 and Alliant had "never
manufactured a round demanding the technical solutions GD-OTS identified
for the MK 244."  Protester's Comments at 12.

   The record establishes that the Navy's past performance evaluation was
reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation.  The Navy
expressly considered whether the contracts referenced by Alliant were for
production of ammunition that was the same as or similar to the MK 244. 
Based upon a comparison of the similarities and differences between the
ammunition produced under Alliant's referenced contracts, the Navy
concluded that Alliant's contracts were for production of ammunition that
was "similar" to the MK 244 and considered Alliant's performance on those
contracts.  Based upon this assessment, which reflected uniformly positive
reviews, the Navy assigned Alliant a "favorable" rating.  There simply was
no requirement for the Navy to compare the degree of similarity between
the offerors' past performance references and, as suggested by the
protester, to have credited GD-OTS with a higher past performance rating
based on its having actually produced the MK 244 round.  The protester's
argument is akin to the position of protesters who complain that they were
not given extra credit in an evaluation for their status as the
incumbent.  In such cases we have routinely found evaluations to be
reasonable where the agency did not provide such credit.  See, e.g., Weber
Cafeteria Servs., Inc. , B-290085.2, June 17, 2002, 2002 CPD paragraph 99
at 5.

   Discussions/Clarifications

   GD-OTS also contends that the Navy improperly failed to seek comment from
GD-OTS regarding adverse past performance information on the LRIP
contract--specifically, the delays attributed to GD-OTS by the Navy.  In
this regard, the protester argues that the Navy abused its discretion in
not affording it the opportunity to comment on the Navy's concerns about
the LRIP contract delays through discussions or clarifications.  Second,
the protester contends that the Navy treated offerors unequally because it
held discussions or clarifications with Alliant regarding its
subcontracting plan but did not hold discussions or clarifications with
GD-OTS regarding its past performance. 

   With regard to the first issue, the solicitation expressly provided that
the agency intended to make award without discussions.  FAR Section
15.306(a)(2), which addresses clarifications and award without
discussions, states in relevant part that where an award will be made
without conducting discussions, "offerors may be given the opportunity to
clarify certain aspects of proposals (e.g., the relevance of an offeror's
past performance information and adverse past performance information to
which the offeror has not previously had an opportunity to respond) or to
resolve minor or clerical errors."  Pursuant to this provision, an agency
has broad discretion to decide whether to communicate with a firm
concerning its performance history.  We will review the exercise of such
discretion to ensure that it was reasonably based on the particular
circumstances of the procurement.  NMS Mgmt., Inc., B-286335, Nov. 24,
2000, 2000 CPD paragraph 197 at 3; A.G. Cullen Constr., Inc., B-284049.2,
Feb. 22, 2000, 2000 CPD paragraph 45 at 5.   

   Regarding communications concerning adverse past performance information
to which the vendor has not previously had an opportunity to respond, we
think that for the exercise of discretion to be reasonable, the agency
must give the offeror an opportunity to respond where there clearly is a
reason to question the validity of the past performance information, for
example, where there are obvious inconsistencies between a reference's
narrative comments and the actual ratings the reference gives the
offeror.  In the absence of such a clear basis to question the past
performance information, we think that, short of acting in bad faith, the
agency reasonably may decide not to ask for clarifications.  NMS Mgmt.,
Inc., supra.

   Applying this standard here, we conclude that the agency reasonably
exercised its discretion in deciding not to communicate with GD-OTS
regarding the delays under the LRIP contract, since the information was
based on first-hand knowledge of Navy personnel who evaluated the
protester's past performance; thus, there was no reason for the Navy to
have questioned the validity of its own conclusions.  While the protester
clearly disagrees with the Navy's conclusions about the LRIP delays and
may have wished to respond to the information, that fact does not render
the agency's decision to make award without holding discussions or
clarifications unreasonable, given the permissive language of FAR Section
15.306(a)(2).  Id. 

   The protester's argument that offerors were treated unequally is similarly
unavailing.[4]  According to GD-OTS, when the Navy raised its concerns
with Alliant regarding its subcontracting plan, and afforded Alliant the
opportunity to revise its plan as directed by the agency, the Navy
effectively held discussions with Alliant, and thereby triggered a
requirement for the agency to hold discussions with GD-OTS as well.

   While the protester correctly points out that when the government conducts
discussions with one offeror, it must hold discussions with all offerors
in the competitive range, FAR Section 15.306(d)(1), in this case, the
exchange between the Navy and Alliant regarding Alliant's subcontracting
plan did not constitute "discussions" for the purpose of triggering the
requirement of Section 15.306(d)(1).  Specifically, because the
requirement for an acceptable small and disadvantaged business
subcontracting plan is applicable to the "apparently successful offeror,"
FAR Section 19.702, such a requirement relates to an offeror's
responsibility.  See AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., B-282271,
B-282271.2, June 21, 1999, 99-2 CPD paragraph 5 at 8; A.B. Dick Co.,
B-233142, Jan. 31, 1989, 89-1 CPD paragraph106 at 3.  A request for, or
providing of, information that relates to offeror responsibility, rather
than proposal evaluation,[5] does not constitute discussions and thus does
not trigger the requirement to hold discussions with other competitive
range offerors.  A.B. Dick Co., supra.  Thus, even where, as here, the
solicitation asks offerors to submit a subcontracting plan with their
proposals, and the agency engages in exchanges with an offeror regarding
its plan, those communications do not trigger the requirement for
discussions with all offerors.  AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc.,
supra; see also Consolidated Eng'g Servs. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl.
617 at ___ (Fed. Cl. 2005).

   Alliant's Subcontracting Plan

   The protester argues that the subcontracting plan submitted by Alliant
"made the subcontracting requirement vanish" and that the Navy thereby
improperly waived the subcontracting plan requirement for Alliant. 
Supplemental Protest at 5.  According to GD-OTS, Alliant effectively
eliminated the subcontracting plan requirement in two ways:  (1) it
indicated that the goals did not apply because ATK-Lake City would perform
the work; and (2) the plan proposed "zero" subcontracting goals.  We find
the protester's argument to be without merit. 

   Contrary to the protester's suggestions, as noted above, the Navy's
consideration of Alliant's subcontracting plan was not part of its
evaluation of Alliant's proposal for purposes of making an award
determination--the RFP included only two evaluation factors, past
performance and cost/price, neither of which provided for consideration of
an offeror's subcontracting plan.  As noted above, the requirement for a
subcontracting plan in this context related solely to an offeror's
responsibility; thus the Navy's consideration of the adequacy of Alliant's
plan was plainly in the context of its affirmative responsibility
determination for Alliant.  Because the determination that a particular
contractor is capable of performing a contract is largely committed to the
contracting officer's discretion.  Our Office will not consider a protest
challenging an affirmative determination of responsibility except under
limited circumstances not alleged or evident here.[6]  4 C.F.R. Section
21.5(c) (2005).

   Price Analysis

   According to GD-OTS, the Navy was required to conduct a "price realism"
analysis under the terms of the RFP, but failed to do so.  Protest at
11-12.  Generally, where, as here, a solicitation contemplates the award
of a fixed-price contract, the agency is not required to conduct a realism
analysis.  This is because a fixed-price (as opposed to a cost-type)
contract places the risk and responsibility for loss on the contractor. 
Rodgers Travel, Inc., B-291785, Mar. 12, 2003, 2003 CPD paragraph 60 at
2.  However, an agency may provide for a realism analysis in a competition
for a fixed-price contract to assess, among other things, the risk of poor
performance.  Dismas Charities, Inc., B-289575.2, B-289575.3, Feb. 20,
2004, 2004 CPD paragraph 66 at 4. 

   GD-OTS maintains that the agency stated its intention to consider realism
notwithstanding the fixed-price nature of the competition by providing in
the RFP that it "may accept other than the lowest priced offer if doing so
would result in greater value to the Government in terms of technical
performance, quality, reliability, life cycle cost, or lower overall
program risk."  RFP at 58.  We disagree.  The language cited by the
protester is contained within a paragraph discussing the agency's
evaluation of past performance, not price, and merely explains that the
award decision will be based on a best-value determination, and that in
making such a determination, a higher-priced offeror may be selected based
on a trade-off analysis.  Because the RFP did not require a realism
analysis, the Navy was not required to perform one.  Rather, the Navy
properly performed a more limited price analysis by finding Alliant's
price "fair and reasonable" based on a comparison of Alliant's price
information with that received in response to the solicitation.[7]   

   Best Value Determination

   As a final matter, the protester argues that the Navy's best value
determination was flawed since the Navy did not perform a proper trade-off
analysis.  In support of this contention, GD-OTS notes that the agency's
best-value determination is a mere two sentences.  Our review of the
record, however, reveals that the agency's award determination was
reasonable and consistent with the RFP.  Because there were only two
evaluation factors for the Navy to consider in making its award
determination--past performance and price--and because the Navy rated both
GD-OTS and Alliant as "favorable" for past performance, Alliant's lower
price obviously became the discriminating factor for award, such that a
tradeoff analysis was not required.  Where selection officials reasonably
regard proposals as being essentially equal technically, cost to the
government may become the determinative factor in making an award
notwithstanding that the evaluation criteria assigned cost less importance
than technical considerations.  See, e.g., AIROD Sdn. Bhd., B-294127, Aug.
16, 2004, 2004 CPD paragraph 156 (denying protest where solicitation
anticipated a past performance/price tradeoff, offerors received equal
past performance ratings, and agency made award based on price without
performing a tradeoff analysis).  

   The protest is denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel 

   ------------------------

   [1] GD-OTS submitted offers for both lots with the expectation that the
government would waive the first article requirement based on, as
discussed more fully below, its previous production of the 20mm MK 244,
albeit as a subcontractor, under a Navy contract.  Protest at 5; AR at 3. 
The agency notes that the protester's pricing information for production
units of the MK 244 was, nonetheless, the same for both offers.  AR at 3.

   [2] While Alliant submitted four references, the Navy also considered
Alliant's performance on a fifth Navy contract.  AR, Tab 8, Past
Performance Information, at 8.

   [3] In its Business Clearance Memorandum, the Navy concluded that prices
were fair and reasonable based on a comparison of prices received in
response to the solicitation in accordance with FAR Section
15.404-1(b)(2)(i), and that neither cost nor pricing data was required
because there was adequate price competition in accordance with FAR
Section 15.403-1(b)(1).  AR, Business Clearance Memorandum, at 2, 4, 5,
11.

   [4] While the protester argues, in the alternative, that the
communications between Alliant and the Navy regarding Alliant's
subcontracting plan constituted clarifications and that the Navy,
therefore, treated offerors unequally by not also engaging in
clarifications with GD-OTS regarding its past performance, clarifications,
in contrast to discussions, do not trigger a requirement that the agency
seek clarifications from other offerors.  See Landoll Corp., B-291381 et
al., Dec. 23, 2002, 2003 CPD paragraph 40 at 8; Priority One Servs., Inc.,
B-288836, B-288836.2, Dec. 17, 2001, 2002 CPD paragraph 79 at 5; Global
Assocs. Ltd., B-271693, B-271693.2, Aug. 2, 1996, 96-2 CPD paragraph 100
at 4.  While we recognize that there may be a rare situation where it
would be unfair to request clarification from one offeror but not from
another, the mere fact that an agency requests clarification from one
offeror and not another, does not constitute unfair treatment.  

   [5] The Navy's consideration of Alliant's subcontracting plan was not part
of its evaluation of Alliant's proposal for purposes of making an award
determination--the RFP included only two evaluation factors, past
performance and cost/price, neither of which provided for consideration of
an offeror's subcontracting plan.

   [6] As explained above, the Navy specifically considered and approved the
plan submitted by Alliant based on Alliant's representations that it
intended to subcontract performance entirely to ATK-Lake City, and that
the subcontracting goals and responsibility for compliance with the stated
subcontracting goals would flow down to ATK-Lake City by contract, as well
as the fact that Alliant had a successful record of small business
contracting. 

   [7] The FAR identifies a number of price analysis techniques that may be
used to determine whether prices are fair and reasonable, including
comparison of the proposed prices with each other, comparison with prior
contract prices for the same or similar services, and comparison with an
independent government estimate.  FAR Section 15.404-1(b).