TITLE:  HMR Tech, LLC, B-295968; B-295968.2, May 19, 2005
BNUMBER:  B-295968; B-295968.2
DATE:  May 19, 2005
**********************************************************************
   Decision

   Matter of: HMR Tech, LLC

   File: B-295968; B-295968.2

   Date: May 19, 2005

   Antonio R. Franco, Esq., Pamela J. Mazza, Esq., and Jennafer M. Seeley,
Esq., Piliero, Mazza & Pargament, PLLC, for the protester.

   Talbot J. Nicholas II, Esq., Department of Homeland Security, for the
agency.

   Linda S. Lebowitz, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Where proposals were reasonably evaluated as technically equal, agency
properly selected for award the proposal of the firm submitting the lower
price.

   DECISION

   HMR Tech, LLC protests the award of a contract to Enterprise Information
Services, Inc. (EIS) under request for proposals (RFP) No.
HSCG23-04-R-ADM003, issued by the United States Coast Guard (USCG),
Department of Homeland Security, for project/acquisition management
services for the USCG Acquisition Directorate.  HMR challenges the
agency's evaluation of the EIS price proposal.

   We deny the protest.

   The RFP, issued on July 9, 2004 as a competitive 8(a) set-aside,
contemplated the award of an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity
contract with fixed-price task orders for a 1-year base period and four
1-year option periods to the offeror whose proposal represented the best
value to the government, considering technical evaluation factors, price,
and past performance.  Schedule B of the RFP listed
23 labor categories; for each of these labor categories, the RFP also
listed an estimated number of labor hours.  Offerors were required to
insert a "loaded on-site [fixed-price] hourly rate" and a "loaded off-site
[fixed-price] hourly rate" for each labor category.  RFP S B.1.

   Section M of the RFP listed, in descending order of importance, the
following evaluation factors and subfactors:  (1) technical understanding
and capability (understanding the types of projects; technical capability;
management plan; and quality capability); (2) price (to "be evaluated to
determine price realism"); and
(3) relevant past performance (quality of service; timeliness of
performance; business relations; and customer satisfaction).  RFP S M.2. 
As relevant here, in order to evaluate whether an offeror understood the
government's technical requirements (the first subfactor under the
technical understanding and capability evaluation factor), the RFP
required offerors to provide a technical proposal for each of two sample
tasks.[1]  According to section M of the RFP, an offeror's technical
approach for each of the sample tasks would be evaluated to determine if
the offeror understood the government's technical requirements.  Section M
of the RFP did not require offerors to submit a "cost proposal" for either
of the sample tasks.  Id.[2]

   Finally, the RFP stated that the technical understanding and capability
evaluation factor was significantly more important than price, which was
significantly more important than the past performance evaluation factor. 
The RFP also stated that if the proposals of two or more offerors were
evaluated as approximately technically equal, then the price and past
performance evaluation factors would become more important, with price
being considered more important than past performance.
RFP S M.2.

   Twenty-eight firms,[3] including HMR (the incumbent contractor, which had
been awarded a sole-source 8(a) contract for $3 million) and EIS,
submitted proposals by the closing time on July 26.  HMR teamed with three
subcontractors, while EIS teamed with two subcontractors.  As relevant
here, the proposals of HMR and EIS were evaluated as follows:  

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|                            |HMR                  |EIS                  |
|----------------------------+---------------------+---------------------|
|Technical Understanding/    |                     |                     |
|                            |Blue/Superior        |Blue/Superior        |
|Capability                  |                     |                     |
|----------------------------+---------------------+---------------------|
|Past Performance            |Outstanding          |Outstanding          |
|----------------------------+---------------------+---------------------|
|Performance Risk            |Low                  |Low                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Agency Report (AR), Tab 12, Award Memorandum, at 13.

   The color/adjectival ratings were supported by narratives of the
strengths, weaknesses, and deficiencies in each offeror's proposal.[4] 
There were no weaknesses or deficiencies listed for either of the
proposals submitted by HMR or EIS.  AR,
Tab 10, Technical Evaluation Report, at 11-13, 17-21.

   Both HMR and EIS completed schedule B of the RFP by providing loaded
on-site and off-site hourly rates for each of the 23 labor categories. 
Using an offeror's
schedule B prices, the agency calculated an offeror's evaluated price
(i.e., the total price of the base year plus all option years) as
follows:  70 percent of the total number of hours for each labor category
per year was multiplied by the offeror's proposed on-site rate and 30
percent of the total number of hours for the same labor category was
multiplied by the offeror's proposed off-site rate.  Each extended price
was summed for each year of performance to determine a total price for
that year; then, each year's total price was summed to calculate an
overall total price for the entire contract.  AR, Tab 12, Award
Memorandum, at 11.  The total evaluated prices for all offerors ranged
from approximately $43 million to $100 million.  Id. at 13.[5]  The
government estimate (labor only) was approximately $53.5 million.  Id. at
4.  HMR's total evaluated price was approximately [deleted] percent higher
than the total evaluated price of EIS and approximately [deleted] percent
higher than the government estimate.  The EIS total evaluated price was
approximately [deleted] percent lower than the government estimate.  Of
the 28 firms submitting compliant proposals, HMR submitted the nineteenth
lowest evaluated price, while EIS submitted the second lowest evaluated
price. 

   In terms of price realism, the agency basically compared the schedule B
hourly rates proposed by HMR and EIS for five of the RFP's labor
categories (program manager, engineer, financial analyst, web specialist,
and document management specialist) against the government estimate, which
was based on HMR's prices as the sole-source incumbent contractor.  The
agency also used statistical analysis techniques (i.e., averages and
standard deviations) to evaluate price realism.  For HMR, the agency noted
that for three of the five labor categories, HMR's proposed hourly rates
were substantially lower than the government estimate and that for two of
the labor categories, HMR's proposed hourly rates were higher than the
government estimate.  The agency nevertheless concluded that, overall,
HMR's hourly rates were realistic.  Id. at 29.  For EIS, the agency noted
that for four of the five labor categories, the EIS proposed hourly rates
were substantially lower than the government estimate and that for one of
the labor categories, the EIS rate was slightly higher than the government
estimate.  While the agency recognized that the lower hourly rates
proposed by EIS represented a risk to the government in terms of the
firm's ability to hire and retain qualified personnel, the agency
nevertheless concluded that this risk was mitigated by the EIS proposed
technical approach.  Id. at 24.  (In its proposal, EIS detailed, among
other things, its recruiting processes and procedures in order to ensure
the availability of highly qualified resources.  See, e.g., EIS Proposal
at 2-1--2-2, 3-2.)

   In making the selection decision, the agency believed that the benefits
presented by the proposals of both HMR and EIS were "nearly comparable." 
AR, Tab 12, Award Memorandum, at 50.  The agency concluded that both HMR
and EIS demonstrated a solid, sound, and comprehensive understanding of
the RFP requirements.  While the agency noted some differences in the
capabilities of HMR and EIS (for example, that HMR, as the incumbent
contractor, would have a shorter learning curve than EIS), the agency
nevertheless determined that HMR and EIS were comparable under the RFP
evaluation factors.  Noting that HMR's price was substantially higher than
the EIS price, the agency concluded that the premium associated with HMR's
proposal "is unworthy of the potential benefits, which are nearly
comparable to EIS, to be gained if HMR were selected."  Id.  Accordingly,
the agency determined that the proposal submitted by EIS represented the
best value to the government, considering the technical evaluation
factors, price, past performance, and associated risk.  The agency awarded
the contract to EIS.

   HMR's primary complaint is that the agency did not reasonably evaluate the
EIS price proposal for realism.  In a fixed-price contract, including a
fixed-rate contract such as this one, an agency may provide, as here, for
the use of a price realism analysis in a solicitation for such purposes as
measuring an offeror's understanding of the solicitation's requirements
and for assessing the risk inherent in an offeror's proposal.  Star
Mountain, Inc., B-285883, Oct. 25, 2000, 2000 CPD P 189 at 4.  The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides a number of price analysis
techniques that may be used to determine whether prices are reasonable and
realistic, including comparison of the prices received with each other;
comparison of previously proposed prices for the same or similar items;
comparison with the independent government estimate; and analysis of
pricing information provided by the offeror.  FAR S 15.404-1(b)(2).  The
nature and extent of an agency's price realism analysis ultimately are
matters within the sound exercise of the agency's discretion, unless the
agency commits itself to a particular methodology in a solicitation.  Id.

   Here, section M of the RFP simply stated that an offeror's price would "be
evaluated to determine price realism."  RFP S M.2.  Section M of the RFP
provided no other information with respect to how the agency would
determine the realism of an offeror's price proposal.

   As described above, the agency evaluated the realism of an offeror's price
proposal by comparing prices for particular labor categories to the
government estimate and by using statistical analysis techniques.  As a
result of its analysis, the agency concluded that while the lower hourly
rates proposed by EIS posed a risk in terms of the ability of the firm to
hire and retain qualified personnel, the risk was mitigated by the
technical approach proposed by EIS.  (The agency also points out that the
government's estimated rates were based on HMR's higher, noncompetitive
rates as the sole-source incumbent contractor, and this may explain the
substantial difference between the lower EIS rates and the government's
estimated rates.  See Supplemental Contracting Officer's Statement, Apr.
14, 2005, at 4.)  In our view, the agency reasonably satisfied its
obligation under the FAR and the RFP to perform a price realism
evaluation.  HMR's mere disagreement with how the agency conducted its
price realism analysis for these requirements does not establish that the
agency's evaluation of the realism of proposed prices was unreasonable. 
See, e.g., Bevilacqua Research Corp., B-293051, Jan. 12, 2004, 2004 CPD P
15 at 8 n.8.

   HMR also contends that in determining that the EIS total evaluated price
was realistic, the agency failed to consider the EIS pricing for the
sample tasks.  HMR points out that while the total evaluated price for
EIS, based on its schedule B prices, was lower than the total evaluated
price for HMR, the EIS prices for the sample tasks were higher than HMR's
prices for the sample tasks.  Based on the higher prices submitted by EIS
for the sample tasks, HMR maintains that the agency should have been
concerned with whether the government would realize the savings associated
with the lower EIS total evaluated price.  HMR maintains that it was
unreasonable for the agency not to address this "pricing anomaly" as part
of its price analysis.  Protester's Comments, Apr. 7, 2005, at 9-10.

   As much as a challenge to the price realism analysis (which we find
unpersuasive, for the reasons set out above), HMR's contention appears to
challenge the reasonableness of the agency's conclusion that the EIS
proposal represented a lower evaluated cost to the government than the HMR
proposal.

   As a threshold matter, while agencies have considerable discretion in
determining the appropriate method for taking cost into account, agencies
must consider cost to the government in evaluating competing proposals. 
41 U.S.C. S 253(b)(1) (2000);  Scientech, Inc., B-277805.2, Jan. 20, 1998,
98-1 CPD P 33 at 7.  An agency must use an evaluation method that provides
a basis for a reasonable assessment of the cost of performance under the
competing proposals.  S. J. Thomas Co.Inc., B-283192, Oct. 20, 1999, 99-2
CPD P 73 at 3.  Here, while the RFP called for offerors to price their
responses to the two sample tasks and also required offerors to insert on
a schedule their fixed hourly rates for specified labor categories, which
included estimated hours for each labor category, section M of the RFP did
not state which information the agency would use, or how, to assess the
cost of performance to the government.[6]  Our Office has recognized that
an agency may assess the total cost to the government of competing
proposals for indefinite-quantity contracts either by evaluating prices
based on sample tasks or by evaluating the total cost based on estimates
of the quantities of labor to be ordered under each labor category (or
potentially by other methods).  Id.  As described above, although the
sample tasks were priced by offerors, the agency elected not to compare
offerors' prices for the sample tasks for the purpose of assessing the
cost to the government of competing proposals.  Rather, the agency
determined total evaluated cost to the government by multiplying offerors'
fixed hourly rates by the estimated quantities of labor hours for each
labor category and totaling the amounts.  As noted above, this latter
method is an acceptable basis for evaluating the total cost to the
government of each offerors' performance.  Scientech, Inc., supra, at 7-8.

   While HMR argues that the agency acted improperly in not considering the
prices associated with the sample tasks in its price evaluation, section M
of the RFP did not require that type of price evaluation.  For the first
subfactor under the technical understanding and capability evaluation
factor, the RFP required an offeror to provide a technical proposal for
each of two sample tasks in order for the agency to evaluate whether the
offeror understood the government's technical requirements.[7]  In the
absence of any language in the RFP specifying an evaluation method for
determining total cost, we think it was reasonable for the agency to
evaluate the total cost to the government based on an offeror's proposed
fixed hourly rate and the estimated number of labor hours contained in the
schedule. [8]

   In addition, as the higher-priced incumbent contractor, HMR objects to the
agency's decision to award this contract, under which fixed-price task
orders will be issued, to EIS at a substantially lower price.  However, an
agency is vested with broad discretion to determine the manner and extent
to which it will make use of evaluation results.  PharmChem, Inc.,
B-291725.3 et al., July 22, 2003, 2003 CPD P 148 at 9.  Where, as here, an
agency reasonably determines that proposals are essentially technically
equal, price becomes the determining factor in making the award,
notwithstanding that under the RFP, price is assigned less importance than
the technical evaluation factors.  Id.  In this case, the agency was aware
of the substantially lower EIS total evaluated price, but nevertheless
concluded that the EIS price, based on the firm's proposed approach for
performing the work, was fair and reasonable and presented low risk. 

   Since there is no basis on this record to question the reasonableness of
the agency's assignment of the same technical ratings to the proposals of
HMR and EIS, and where the agency concluded that both HMR and EIS
demonstrated their understanding of, and capability to perform, the RFP
requirements, we conclude that it was reasonable for the agency to
determine that the EIS technically equal,
lower-priced proposal represented the best value to the government in
accordance with the terms of the RFP.

   Finally, HMR has raised other collateral issues and arguments, each of
which we have considered and find without merit.  For example, HMR argues
that the EIS price proposal contained unbalanced pricing.  See FAR S
15.404-1(g)(1).  Even assuming, arguendo, that the EIS prices were
unbalanced, an agency's acceptance of a proposal with unbalanced pricing
is not, in and of itself, improper since an agency may lawfully award a
contract on the basis of a proposal with unbalanced pricing, provided it
has concluded that the pricing does not pose an unacceptable level of
risk, and the prices the agency is likely to pay under the contract are
not unreasonably high.  FAR S 15.404-1(g)(2); Crofton Diving Corp.,
B-289271, Jan. 30, 2002, 2002 CPD P 32 at 8.  Here, the agency made the
required showings in terms of the risks associated with the EIS
lower-priced proposal.

   As another example, HMR argues that the agency "improperly communicated
and improperly held discussions with EIS that were not meaningful." 
Protester's Supplemental Comments, Apr. 20, 2005, at 14.  The record shows
that prior to award, the agency asked EIS to explain how it calculated its
"per hour rate" for the labor categories and it asked the firm to confirm
that these rates were "fully burdened."  EIS Response to Agency Questions,
Dec. 17, 2004.  Again, even assuming, arguendo, that discussions occurred,
HMR has failed to demonstrate how it was prejudiced.  In this respect, HMR
states that if discussions with EIS had been meaningful, the agency would
have concluded that the EIS price "would have been much higher." 
Protester's Supplemental Comments, supra, at 15 n.10.  However, HMR's
position is based on its own speculation, unsupported by anything in the
record (for example, any evidence that EIS would have increased its price
by approximately 25 percent, the amount by which HMR's total evaluated
price exceeded the EIS total evaluated price).  Further, HMR states that
it does not object to "the [a]gency's failure to hold discussions with
[it]."  Id. at 16.  In other words, HMR does not contend that if
discussions had been held with it that it would have substantially reduced
its price since such a reduction would have been inconsistent with its
proposed technical approach.

   As discussed above, our review of the record shows that the agency's
evaluation was reasonable and in accordance with the terms of the RFP.

   The protest is denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The first sample task required the contractor to perform project
management services to support the HC-130J Procurement Project; under this
task, the services would be performed primarily off-site at the offeror's
facilities.  The second sample task required the contractor to provide
project management services to support the USCG Office of Acquisition
Resource Management and involved managing financial accounts for various
acquisition projects using the Financial Procurement Desktop System. 
Under this task, the services would be performed primarily on-site at the
USCG headquarters in Washington, DC.

   [2] Section L of the RFP, which contained proposal preparation
instructions, listed the four evaluation subfactors under the technical
understanding and capability evaluation factor and explained what the
agency would be evaluating in terms of the offeror's proposal in these
four areas.  Section L of the RFP then listed, without explanation,
"Sample Price Proposals for Sample task order 1 and task order 2" as a
fifth item to be included in an offeror's technical proposal.  RFP S L.7. 
The agency subsequently issued (on July 15) a set of questions and
answers.  One question noted that section L of the RFP included five items
under the technical understanding and capability evaluation factor, while
section M only included four items, omitting the reference to "Sample
Price Proposals for Sample task order 1 and task order 2."  The question
also noted that section M of the RFP stated that a "cost proposal" would
not be solicited.  The question contained a request for clarification
concerning what "appear[ed] to be a conflicting requirement concerning
cost information for the Sample Tasks."  RFP Question Set, July 15, 2004. 
In answering this question, the agency stated that "Section L lists what
is to be submitted.  Section M defines evaluations.  The sample proposals
will be used as part of the evaluation.  They will not be evaluated
separately."  Id.

   [3] Two other firms submitted proposals which the agency rejected as
non-compliant with the terms of the RFP.

   [4] As relevant here, a "blue/superior" rating assigned to a proposal
meant that the proposal "[e]xceed[ed] the requirements, which yields
significant benefits to the Government; weaknesses, if any, are of small
impact and [no] significant weaknesses or deficiencies."  AR, Tab 12,
Award Memorandum, at 10.  With respect to past performance, proposals
could receive one of the following ratings:  outstanding, satisfactory,
unsatisfactory, or neutral.  An "outstanding" rating was defined in terms
of an offeror's past performance "exceed[ing] requirements."  Id. at 11. 
Finally, the agency assigned a performance "risk" rating to each offeror's
proposal, with risk being defined as the agency's "confidence in an
offeror's ability to successfully perform the technical effort."  Id. at
12.  A "low" performance risk rating meant that an offeror's "proposed
approach has little potential to cause disruption of schedule, increase in
cost[,] or degradation of performance.  Normal contractor effort and
normal government monitoring will probably be able to overcome
difficulties."  Id.

   [5] The agency determined, based on having received adequate competition--
28 compliant proposals were submitted--that the prices of HMR and EIS were
reasonable.

   [6] While section M called for a price realism analysis, such an analysis
(in contrast to a cost realism analysis) does not lead to an estimated
cost to the government of performance under a proposal, but rather (as
discussed earlier) to an assessment of an offeror's understanding of the
government's requirements and to the risk inherent in an offeror's
proposal.

   [7] The record shows that the agency evaluated the sample tasks in
accordance with the terms of the RFP, that is, the agency evaluated the
offerors' responses to the sample tasks, as well as the other information
included in the HMR and EIS technical proposals, to conclude that both
firms understood, and were capable of performing, the government's
technical requirements.  We have no basis to question the reasonableness
of the agency's conclusion that both HMR and EIS demonstrated their
technical understanding of, and their capability to perform, the RFP
requirements.  Further, HMR does not meaningfully challenge any aspect of
the agency's evaluation of the EIS technical proposal, including its
record of past performance.

   [8] HMR points to language in section L of the RFP, as described above,
that refers to sample price proposals for the sample tasks in arguing that
the agency unreasonably failed to consider the EIS pricing for the sample
tasks in evaluating the EIS price proposal.  However, to the extent that
there is any inconsistency and/or ambiguity in the terms of sections L and
M of the RFP as far as what information, including prices for the sample
tasks, the agency would consider in evaluating an offeror's total
evaluated price or the realism of an offeror's price proposal, this matter
involves a defect in the terms of the solicitation that was apparent from
the face of the RFP.  Under our Bid Protest Regulations, a protest based
upon an alleged impropriety apparent from the face of the RFP must be
protested prior to the closing time for receipt of proposals.  4 C.F.R. S
21.2(a)(1) (2005).  HMR's post-award challenge in this regard is untimely.

   In any event, we point out that information requirements provided in
section L of an RFP are not the same as evaluation criteria in section M;
rather than establishing minimum evaluation standards, the instructions of
section L generally provide guidance to assist offerors in preparing and
organizing proposals.  The information required by section L does not have
to correspond to the evaluation criteria in section M.  All Phase Envtl.,
Inc., B-292919.2 et al., Feb. 4, 2004, 2004 CPD P 62 at 4.  As discussed
above, in this case, section M of the RFP did not state that prices for
the sample tasks would be evaluated as part of the agency's price
evaluation.