TITLE:  AIA-Todini-Lotos, B-294337, October 15, 2004
BNUMBER:  B-294337
DATE:  October 15, 2004
**********************************************************************
   Decision

   Matter of:   AIA-Todini-Lotos

   File:            B-294337

   Date:              October 15, 2004

   Michael A. Lewis, Esq., Braude & Margulies, for the protester.

   Damon Martin, Esq., Department of the Navy, for the agency.

   Jonathan L. Kang, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protest challenging agency*s evaluation of protester*s joint venture
proposal is denied where agency (1) reasonably identified risk based on
the new joint venture partners* lack of experience working together; (2)
reasonably identified risk consistent with the evaluation criteria
concerning lack of coordinated oversight among the joint venture partners;
and (3) reasonably disregarded two of protester*s alternative construction
schedules that did not follow the critical path method prescribed in the
solicitation.  Record does not indicate whether agency adequately
considered protester*s third early completion schedule; however, even
maximum credit for that schedule would not sufficiently raise protester*s
score to establish prejudice.

   DECISION

   AIA-Todini-Lotos (ATL) protests the award of a contract under request for
proposals (RFP) No. N33191-02-R-1078, issued by the Department of the
Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering Command to the Cooperative Muratori e
Cementisi-C.M.C. di Ravenna (CMC) for construction of the MEGA 4 project
at the Naval Support Activity, Sigonella, Italy.  ATL challenges the
Navy*s evaluation of its proposal and the source selection decision.

   We deny the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The RFP was issued on May 6, 2004 and contemplated the award of a
fixed-price contract for construction of a new elementary and high school
facility, temporary classrooms, a base operations support building, and a
public works administration building, and for demolition of existing
facilities.  The RFP identified the following  four technical evaluation
factors:  (1) organizational experience; (2) organizational past
performance; (3) engineering-construction plan (ECP); and (4) schedule. 
RFP amend. 2, S 202, at PP 1.1--1.3.  The technical evaluation factors
were equal in importance and together were approximately equal to price. 
Available ratings for the technical evaluation factors were excellent,
good, satisfactory, marginal, and poor.  Award was to be made to the
offeror who provided the best value to the government.  The RFP advised
offerors that *an acceptable proposal with the lowest price may not be
selected if award to a higher-priced proposal affords the Government a
greater overall benefit.*  Id. at P 1.1.  The RFP also advised that the
agency intended to award without discussions. 

   The agency timely received four technical proposals (a fifth was rejected
as untimely), including proposals from ATL and CMC.  ATL is a joint
venture formed by three construction companies, Todini Costruzioni
Generali S.p.A., A.I.A. Costruzioni Generali S.p.A., and Lotos S.r.l.  CMC
is a single-entity offeror.

   The technical evaluation panel (TEB) reviewed offerors* past performance
and experience references and developed technical ratings for all
evaluation factors.  The TEB ranked the offerors, finding CMC *excellent*
and ranked first overall and ATL *satisfactory* and ranked second
overall.  Agency Report (AR), Tab 5, TEB Report,
at 4.  The price evaluation board (PEB) reviewed offerors* price
proposals, conducted a price analysis, and compared offerors* prices to
the government estimate.  AR, Tab 6, PEB Report, at 2-4.  The PEB found
both CMC*s and ATL*s prices to be reasonable.  ATL was the overall
low-priced offeror and CMC was the second low-priced offeror.  Id.

   The source selection board (SSB) then reviewed the technical and price
evaluations to select the proposal which offered the best value to the
government.  As relevant here, the overall ratings and prices of the
protester and awardee were as follows: 

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|A                                       |      CMC      |      ATL      |
|----------------------------------------+---------------+---------------|
|           Evaluated Price[1]           |*67,199,147.80 |*62,965,402.69 |
|----------------------------------------+---------------+---------------|
|Overall Technical                       |Excellent      | Satisfactory  |
|----------------------------------------+---------------+---------------|
|     1. Organizational Experience       |   Excellent   | Satisfactory  |
|----------------------------------------+---------------+---------------|
|     2. Organizational Past Performance |   Excellent   |     Good      |
|----------------------------------------+---------------+---------------|
|     3. Engineering-Construction Plan   |   Excellent   | Satisfactory  |
|----------------------------------------+---------------+---------------|
|     4. Schedule                        |     Good      | Satisfactory  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   The SSB determined that CMC was the *best value* offeror *since [CMC]
submitted the best value proposal with second lowest price and the highest
rated technical proposal where price and technical are approximately
equal.*  AR, Tab 7, SSB Report, at 6, 17.  The SSB found that *CMC*s
proposal is *4,234,745.11 or 6.5% more than [ATL]*s but was rated
Excellent, providing numerous enhancements, compared to [ATL]*s
Satisfactory overall rating.*  Id. at 6.  The balance of the SSB report
identifies under each technical factor the areas in which CMC*s proposal
was found superior to other offerors, particularly ATL.[2]  For example,
the SSB noted as strengths the experience of CMC*s on-site engineering
staff, early completion of past projects, and an innovative and flexible
technical approach to the construction.  Id. at 7-8.

   As permitted under the RFP, the agency did not conduct discussions with
the offerors.  CMC was awarded the contract on July 7.  ATL was notified
of the award to CMC on July 8 and requested a debriefing on July 9, which
the agency provided on July 13.  This protest followed.

   DISCUSSION

   ATL challenges the agency*s technical evaluation of its proposal in three
primary areas.  First, ATL argues that the agency unreasonably determined
that its proposal as a joint venture posed risk to the successful
performance of the contract because the joint venture partners lacked
experience working together.  Second, ATL argues that the agency
unreasonably determined that its proposal lacked a *layer of management*
for construction oversight and quality control that ATL contends was not
required by the RFP.  Third, ATL argues that the agency failed to give
proper credit for ATL*s proposal to meet early completion dates in its
construction schedules.  Additionally, although ATL does not challenge the
agency*s evaluation of CMC*s proposal, ATL challenges the rationality and
reasonableness of the agency*s price/technical tradeoff and best-value
determination.

   In reviewing a protest of a procuring agency*s evaluation of offerors*
technical proposals, our role is limited to ensuring that the evaluation
was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation and
applicable statutes and regulations. Urban-Meridian Joint Venture,
B-287168, B-287168.2, May 7, 2001, 2001 CPD P 91 at 2.  Our Office will
not question an agency*s evaluation judgments absent evidence that those
judgments are unreasonable or contrary to the stated evaluation criteria. 
Kay & Assocs., Inc., B-291269, Dec. 11, 2002, 2003 CPD P 12 at 4.

   As discussed below, we find, based on the record, that the agency*s
evaluation of ATL*s proposal was reasonable, with the exception of a
potential flaw in the agency*s review of one of ATL*s proposed
construction schedules.  That flaw, however, was not prejudicial to ATL
and, therefore, we find no basis to disturb the agency*s best- value
determination and the award to CMC.

   Factors 1 and 2:  Organizational Experience and Past Performance

   ATL challenges the agency*s determination that its proposal posed a *great
risk* to successful performance because the three ATL joint venture
partners had not previously worked together.  Both factor 1,
organizational experience, and factor 2, organizational past performance
stated, with regard to joint venture offerors, that

   [p]rojects submitted by Joint Venture offerors, where the joint venture
partners performed together (either as joint venture partners or in a
prime-sub relationship), will be given more weight than submitted projects
in which the Joint Venture offerors did not perform together.

   RFP amend. 2, S 202, at P 1.2, Factors 1 and 2.

   ATL interprets the RFP*s guidance regarding joint venture offerors as
providing for additional credit for joint ventures with prior work
experience performing as a joint venture.  ATL contends, however, that the
RFP language does not permit the agency to downgrade joint venture
offerors without such prior experience based on perceived performance
risk.  ATL argues that the agency*s evaluation constitutes an unstated
evaluation criterion that disfavors new joint ventures.

   The SSB found with regard to factor 1, organizational experience, that
*the fact that these three firms [in the ATL joint venture] have not
worked together as a JV [joint venture] on previous projects [is] a great
risk to the successful and timely completion of the MEGA 4 projects.*  SSB
Report at 10.  With regard to the overall determination of ATL*s technical
score, the SSB concluded that *[e]ven though the TEB did not identify any
risk with [ATL]*s proposal, the SSB finds a greater amount of risk
awarding to a JV composed of three separate firms than awarding to one
firm solely responsible for the success or failure of completing the
project on time.*  Id.
at 9.

   The protester argues, and we agree, that the agency did more than simply
decline to grant *additional credit* for past performance and experience. 
The SSB specifically downgraded ATL*s proposal because of a perceived
*great risk* posed by the joint venture partners* lack of work as a single
team.  The SSB found that *the fact that these three firms [i.e., the ATL
joint venture partners] have not worked together as a JV on previous
projects [presents] a great risk to the successful and timely completion
of the MEGA 4 projects.*  SSB Report at 10.[3]

   Based on the record, we think that the agency*s evaluation was
reasonable.  First, to the extent that ATL argues that risk, in and of
itself, was an undisclosed evaluation criterion, we note that agencies may
always consider a proposal*s risk to successful performance where that
risk is intrinsic to the stated evaluation factors.  Ridoc Enter., Inc.,
B-202962.4, July 6, 2004, 2004 CPD P __ at 7; Davies Rail & Mech. Works,
Inc., B-278260.2, Feb. 25, 1998, 98-1 CPD P 134 at 10.  Next, although an
agency may consider the separate qualifications of individual partners in
evaluating a joint venture*s experience or past performance, there is no
converse requirement that an agency disregard a lack of experience or past
performance by the joint venture.  Transventures Int*l, Inc., B-292788,
Nov. 4, 2003, 2003 CPD P 195 at 7; Global Eng*g & Constr. Joint Venture,
B-275999 et al., Oct. 6, 1997, 97-2 CPD P 125 at 9; MR&S/AME, An MSC Joint
Venture, B-250313, B-250313.2, Mar. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD P 245 at 9. 
Further, we do not think that the RFP*s statement that joint ventures
whose partners had prior experience working together would receive more
weight, or any other language in the RFP, in any way prohibited the agency
from reasonably considering that a joint venture whose partners lacked
prior work experience together might pose a risk to successful
performance.[4]

   The SSB risk assessments here were well within the agency*s discretion, as
they reasonably related to the stated evaluation factor of organizational
experience, which required offerors to demonstrate *the degree to which an
offeror has completed recent *new construction* projects that are similar
in scope, construction features, monetary value and complexity,* and also
to the stated evaluation factor of organizational past performance, which
required offerors to demonstrate that *the offeror has managed projects
submitted under Factor 1 * [that are relevant based on the criteria of]
*new construction* projects physically completed within the past five
years, have somewhat similar construction features, and are somewhat
similar in dollar value and complexity.*  RFP amend. 2, S 202, at P 1.2,
Factors 1 and 2. 

   ATL submitted the required five experience references, two each for AIA
and Todini projects and one for a Lotos project.  The SSB was specifically
concerned that although Todini, based on its experience, would have been
able to perform the contract on its own, AIA and Lotos could not perform
the work themselves individually or collectively.  SSB Report at 9-10. 
The references submitted by ATL demonstrated that the three joint venture
partners had never performed together as a group.  AR, Tab 3, ATL Proposal
at SS 1, 2.  The agency acknowledged that two joint venture groups had
worked together before, but expressed its concern that the three had never
worked together before.  ATL notes in its protest that Todini and AIA had
worked together in a prior joint venture, and that AIA and Lotos had
worked together in a different joint venture.  Protest at 4.  However, as
ATL*s proposal confirms, none of the projects in which Todini and AIA or
AIA and Lotos had performed as joint ventures were listed among the past
performance or experience references in the ATL proposal.  See AR, Tab 3,
ATL Proposal *Introduction,* at 1.  In any case, the fact that the joint
venture partners had worked in groups of two each on prior projects does
not render unreasonable the agency*s concern that the joint venture is
here comprised of three partners that lacked prior work experience
together. 

   Of the five references submitted by ATL, the SSB found that only two were
similar in size--both of which were performed by Todini without the
participation of AIA or Lotos.  SSB Report at 10.[5]  The SSB determined
with regard to factor 3, as discussed in further detail below, that ATL
intended for AIA and Lotos to each perform at one of the two construction
sites and that Todini would act in a supervisory general contractor role. 
Id. at 10-11.  ATL does not dispute any of the SSB*s findings with regard
to the evaluation of its experience or past performance information, nor
does it challenge the characterization of its intended technical approach
as calling for AIA and Lotos, which lacked relevant experience, to each
take primary responsibility for one of the two construction sites.  Based
on the record, we conclude that the agency reasonably evaluated the
protester*s experience and past performance.

   Finally, ATL complains that *[n]either the SSB report nor the TEB report
explains or provides any empirical basis for a presumption that joint
ventures are inherently more risky enterprises than single entities.* 
Protester*s Comments at 3.  ATL further contends that the agency*s
determination was irrational because a joint venture proposal actually
decreases the risk of unsuccessful performance.  Id. at 3-4.  However,
other than to state its belief that a joint venture should be considered
inherently less risky, ATL does not offer any specific basis to disturb
the agency*s evaluation conclusions.  We view the protester*s position as
mere disagreement with the agency*s assessment of its proposal, which does
not render the evaluation unreasonable.  Weber Cafeteria Servs., Inc.,
B-290085.2, June 17, 2002, 2002 CPD P 99 at 4.

   Factor 3:  Engineering-Construction Plan

   ATL next challenges the agency*s determination that its ECP does not
provide adequate quality control and project management, thereby posing a
*significant risk* to successful performance based on what the agency
perceived to be a *fragmented management structure.*[6]  The RFP stated
that offerors must present an *integrated* ECP to *manage the project
through the construction process.*  RFP amend. 2, S 202, at P 1.2, Factor
3.  In particular, the RFP required offerors to demonstrate how they would
meet the following *standard of acceptability*:

   The government will evaluate the extent to which the contractor presents
an integrated Engineering/Construction team to manage the project through
the construction process and demonstrates the degree to which the
offeror*s technical approach reflects an understanding of technical
challenges, in particular, logistics and schedule challenges (multiple
sites, phasing requirements, and strict schedule requirements of school
year) and describes a plan to successfully respond to those challenges and
resolve any areas of concern that may arise on a real-time basis.

   Id.

   The technical requirements of the RFP stated that there would be two
separate work sites--the P-220 construction project at site one and the
P-635 and P-640 construction projects at site two.  The agency interpreted
ATL*s ECP as providing that AIA and Lotos would each perform work at one
site, with oversight and management by Todini.  SSB Report at 10-11.  The
SSB found that ATL*s approach posed a risk to successful performance
because there was a lack of coordinated quality control and project
management between the two construction sites.  The SSB stated that

   [o]ne weakness in the response concerned the relationship of the three
firms within the JV.  It appears from the cross referenced project
staffing from Factor 1 that only one team member from the firm Todini is
actively participating in the construction management.  Also the structure
of the team appears to be fractured in that the two teams have separate QC
[quality control] and safety organizations that work completely
independently and not coordinated in any higher QC management structure. 
Both teams report directly to the president of the JV Mr. Crini with no
intermediate QC manager.  This arrangement is also repeated on the project
management or production side of the house.  It appears that these two
sites will be working completely independent of each other and that their
first level of integration is at the President of the JV level.  The SSB
considers the fragmented management structure between the three firms to
be a significant risk to the successful and timely completion of the MEGA
4 project.

   Id.

   ATL argues that the RFP*s requirement for an *integrated* ECP refers to
integration between engineering personnel and construction personnel at
each of the two sites, but did not require *integration* between the two
separate sites.  ATL contends that the agency*s criticism amounted to an
unstated solicitation requirement for a level of quality control and
project management supervision to supervise and coordinate between the two
sites that was above and beyond that required under the RFP.

   Although agencies are required to identify in a solicitation all major
evaluation factors, they are not required to identify all areas of each
factor which might be taken into account in an evaluation, provided that
the unidentified areas are reasonably related to or encompassed by the
stated factors.  Gentex Corp.--W. Operations, B-291793 et al., Mar. 25,
2003, 2003 CPD P 66 at 24.  We do not think, as the protester argues, that
the term *integrated* in the RFP is necessarily limited to the on-site
integration between engineers and the construction team.  Rather, the RFP
under evaluation factor 3 specifically set forth in its *standard of
acceptability* a requirement for an *integrated approach* that addressed
challenges such as *multiple sites.*  RFP amend. 2, S 202, at P 1.2,
Factor 3.

   We think that the agency was reasonably concerned that ATL*s ECP posed a
significant risk to successful performance, given its lack of a unified
structure to deal with the challenge of performing at multiple sites. 
This concern was particularly relevant to ATL in light of the fact that
ATL proposed as a joint venture that would perform the contract by
staffing each of the two work sites with one of the joint venture
partners, each of which had a separate quality control and oversight
system.  In particular, ATL*s proposal demonstrates that each of the two
worksites had a different *Quality Control Manager* and *Project
Managers.*  See AR, Tab 3C, ATL Proposal Organization Charts.  Although
the protester generally implies that the technical specifications at RFP
sections 1310 (quality control) and 1450 (administrative requirements)
only require quality control and project management systems for each site,
the protester does not identify any specific provisions to support its
argument.  We find nothing in the RFP provisions cited by the protester
that in any way contradicts the plain language of evaluation factor 3,
which the agency reasonably relied upon in determining that the
protester*s ECP lacked sufficiently integrated and coordinated quality
control and project management.

                              Factor 4:  Schedule

   The RFP stated that offerors would be given *additional consideration* for
proposing construction schedules that were shorter than the schedules set
forth in the RFP.  ATL protests that the agency failed to give credit for
three early completion dates proposed under its schedule, as follows:  (1)
the P-220 project for demolition of existing classrooms, construction of
temporary classrooms, and construction of the new elementary and high
schools (RFP schedule phases A1-A2 and B1-B3); (2) the
P-635 project for construction of the new operations support building (RFP
schedule phase C); and (3) the P-640 project for construction of the new
public works administration building (RFP schedule phase D).

   The RFP required offerors to submit a *single computer generated CPM
[critical path method] schedule (with number of days to complete), with
two separate sub-schedules for each Building/Site utilizing the Projects
Group feature of Primavera*s P3 software.* RFP amend. 2, S 202, P 1.1,
Factor 4 (b)(2).  The RFP stated that offerors would be given *additional
consideration* for *innovative approaches to completing early.*  Id. at
Factor 4 (a).  The agency later clarified as part of the offeror question
and responses that

   additional consideration will be given for a schedule that provides a
shorter construction duration than the maximum duration stipulated by the
contract, i.e. delivers a facility to the Government for Beneficial
Occupancy in advance of the contract maximum. 

   RFP amend. 5 at P 2.1.  Amendment 5 to the RFP also stated that, if
offerors proposed early completion schedules, *a description of an
innovation that is likely to succeed, will make these proposed time
savings gain full *additional consideration.**  Id.

   The RFP instructed offerors to assume, for purposes of their schedule
proposals, that notice to proceed for all projects and options would take
place on August 30, 2004.  RFP amend. 2, P 1.2, Factor 4.  The agency
developed *government completion* dates for each project phase based on
the number of days allotted in the RFP for that phase.  See TEB Report at
4-5.  The agency then compared each offeror*s date of completion to the
government dates.  Id.

   The SSB found that, although ATL proposed certain early schedule
completion dates, there was not a clear *commitment* to these dates.  The
SSB stated that *[ATL] mentioned in its proposal that it had the potential
for early completion dates however [ATL] did not commit to the early
completion dates.*  SSB Report at 11.  Thus, ATL was not given any
additional credit under the schedule factor.  Id.

   The protester argues that the agency either *misapprehended or failed to
fully review* the proposed alternative completion schedules.  Protester*s
Comments at 6.  The agency argues that, because ATL*s proposed CPM
schedule did not actually offer any shorter delivery dates, its proposal
was *ineligible for the *additional consideration* reserved for proposals
that included the prescribed shortened CPM schedule.*  Memorandum of Law
at 10.  The SSB and TEB evaluations do not make clear exactly how the
agency reviewed the ATL schedules.  The evaluations do not, for example,
state whether the agency determined that ATL proposed early completion
dates, but failed to adequately describe *innovative approaches* to
meeting those dates, or whether the agency simply disregarded any schedule
information that was not in the CPM format. 

   The CPM schedule for P-220 set forth in ATL*s proposal shows a *Contract
Completion* date of March 31, 2008, resulting in a total of 1,309 days. 
AR, Tab 3F,
P-220 Schedule, Phase A, at 1, and Phase B, at 3.  The TEB determined that
the government completion date was March 30, 2008, which results in a
total of 1,308 days, and evaluated ATL based on its proposed CPM date of
March 31, 2008.  TEB Report, ATL Evaluation for Factor 4.  ATL*s proposal
also contains a *Proposal for Early Completion of P-220* narrative
explanation accompanying the CPM schedule for P-220.  AR, Tab 3E,
Technical Proposal, at 60.  This alternative proposal is not reflected in
the CPM schedule, but suggests that a shift in certain move-in dates would
accelerate the schedule, resulting in the 129 days savings cited in ATL*s
protest.  Id. 

   The protester argues that although the RFP required a *single computer
generated CPM schedule,* ATL*s approach of explaining its alternative
schedules dates in the narrative accompaniment to the CPM schedules was
acceptable under the RFP.  Id.  ATL claims that its proposed alternative
schedule for the P-220 project provided a savings of 129 days over the RFP
schedule.  Protester*s Comments at 6. 

   We think that the agency is correct that the RFP language instructed
offerors to include all dates in the CPM schedule format for purposes of
evaluation and that the narrative explanations were intended to further
explain and justify the *innovative approaches* that enabled the early
completion.  In this regard, the RFP clearly instructed offerors to
provide a *single* CPM schedule for each building.  RFP amend. 2, S 202, P
1.1, Factor 4.  The clarification in amendment No. 5 to the RFP, stating
that offerors should provide *a description of an innovation that is
likely to succeed,* RFP amend. 5 at P 2.1, does not contradict or
supersede the basic RFP requirement for a CPM schedule.  Thus, although
there is limited documentation in the record concerning the agency*s
evaluation of ATL*s alternative proposal for early completion of P-220, we
do not think that the failure to give ATL credit was improper or
unreasonable because ATL*s proposal did not clearly offer a shorter
delivery schedule in accordance with the RFP requirements.

   ATL next claims that its proposed schedule for P-635 was 45 days shorter
than the 960 days set forth in the RFP.  ATL*s CPM schedule shows a P-635
proposal *Contract Completion* date of April 16, 2007, yielding 959 days
to complete the project.  AR, Tab 3F, P-635 Schedule, Phase C, at 1-2.  As
was the case with its P-220 schedule, the protester*s schedule for P-635
included additional narrative explanations, detailing March 2, 2007 as
*Works Completion Date*--a 46-day savings over the government completion
date and 960-day schedule.  AR, Tab 3E, Technical Proposal, at 61-62; AR,
Tab 3E, P-635 *Narrative Report.*  It is not clear from the CPM schedule
or the narrative whether ATL was treating the March 2, 2007 date as the
*real* end of the contract.  The fact, however, that the April 16, 2007
date is listed as the *Contract Completion* date under the required CPM
schedule renders reasonable the agency*s apparent treatment of this later
date as the completion date for purposes of evaluation.  Thus, as with the
P-220 schedule, we do not think that the failure to give ATL credit for
its alternative proposal for early completion of
P-635 was improper or unreasonable because ATL did not clearly offer a
shorter delivery schedule in accordance with the RFP requirements.

   With regard to the P-640 schedule (Phase D), we find that the agency may
have failed to give proper credit for an early completion proposal set
forth in ATL*s CPM schedule.  AR, Tab 3F, P-640 Schedule, at 1-3.  Unlike
the P-220 and P-635 CPM early completion proposals, the P-640 schedule
contains dates that were presented in the CPM schedule format that result
in an earlier completion date. 

   The RFP specified that P-640 was to be completed within 600 days.  RFP S
710, at 19.  ATL*s CPM schedule for P-640 shows a *Contract Completion*
date of April 21, 2006, which yields 599 total days.  AR, Tab 3F, P-640
Schedule, at 1-3.  However, unlike ATL*s CPM schedules for P-220 and
P-635, the CPM schedule for P-640 also listed a separate *Scheduled
Completion P-640* date of March 14, 2006, which yields a total of 561
days, for a savings of 39 days.  Id.  This savings is corroborated in the
narrative sections of the P-640 schedule, albeit with a slightly different
date, March 13, 2006, which yields a total of 560 days, for a savings of
40 days.  AR, Tab 3E, Technical Proposal, at 62-63; AR, Tab 3F, at P-640
*Narrative Report.*  Although there is a discrepancy between the CPM
schedule and narrative dates (March 14 vs. March 13), we think that the
ATL proposal for P-640 reasonably expressed an intent to complete the work
early and demonstrated that ATL intended to meet a schedule for P-640 that
was 39 or 40 days shorter than the RFP completion schedule.

   There is no evidence in the record how the agency evaluated ATL*s proposed
early delivery for P-640, aside from the TEB*s general comment, cited
above, that ATL failed to demonstrate an adequate *commitment* to the
early proposed completion dates.  Neither the evaluation documents nor the
agency memorandum of law specifically addresses the P-640 schedule.  We
think, therefore, based on the record, that the agency may not have
adequately considered whether ATL should have received credit for its
proposed 40-day early delivery.

   Despite the potential error in evaluating ATL*s P-640 schedule, however,
we find that ATL was not sufficiently prejudiced to warrant sustaining the
protest on this ground.  Competitive prejudice is an essential element of
every viable protest and we will not sustain a protest unless prejudice is
evident from the record.  To succeed in its protest, the protester must
demonstrate not only that the agency failed to follow established
procedures, but also that the failure could have materially affected the
outcome of the competition.  McDonald Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996,
96-1 CPD
P 54 at 3; see Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).  The agency found, and ATL does not dispute, that CMC was
substantially earlier than ATL on every completion date other than the
P-640 (Phase D) project (i.e., Phases A1, A2, B1, B2, B3, and C).  See TEB
Report, CMC Evaluation, at Factor 4; SSB Report at 7-8.  In our view, even
if the maximum possible credit were given to ATL for early completion of
the P-640 project, this would not, standing alone, be sufficient to create
a reasonable possibility that ATL would have received the award, in light
of the substantial advantages for CMC in all other areas of the technical
evaluation and our determination that the other areas of ATL*s protest are
without merit. 

   Finally, ATL argues that the agency was obligated to seek clarifications
to the extent it believed that ATL was not clear in its commitment to
provide early schedule completion.  Clarifications are *limited exchanges*
between the agency and offerors that may occur when award without
discussions is contemplated.  FAR
S 15.306(a)(1).  Such exchanges may allow offerors to clarify certain
aspects of proposals or to resolve minor clerical errors.  FAR S
15.306(a)(2).  Agencies have broad discretion as to whether to seek
clarifications from offerors, and offerors have no automatic right to
clarifications regarding proposals.  See A.G. Cullen Constr., Inc.,
B-284049.2, Feb. 22, 2000, 2000 CPD P 45 at 5-6.  In any event, a request
for clarifications would not have allowed ATL to improve its competitive
position, as clarifications do not permit revisions to proposals.  FAR S
15.306(a)(2); A.G. Cullen, supra, at 5-6.

   Best-Value Decision

   ATL challenges the SSB*s decision to pay a price premium in selecting
CMC*s higher technically rated proposal.  ATL argues that the best-value
determination was unreasonable because it relied upon what ATL argues were
flawed technical evaluations that did not justify selection of CMC over
ATL*s lower-priced proposal.  Additionally, ATL argues that the agency
failed to reasonably justify the selection of a higher-priced proposal.

   Where, as here, the RFP allows for a price/technical tradeoff, the
selection official retains discretion to select a higher-priced, but
higher technically-rated submission if doing so is reasonably found to be
in the government*s best interest and is consistent with the
solicitation*s stated evaluation scheme.  4-D Neuroimaging, B-286155.2,
B-286155.3, Oct. 10, 2001, 2001 CPD P 183 at 10.  Here, the agency
reasonably documented its determination that CMC*s technically superior
proposal merited a price premium over ATL*s lower-priced, lower
technically rated proposal.  See SSB Report at 6-9.  Although we
identified a potential error in the agency*s evaluation of ATL*s schedule
proposal, as explained above, we have no basis to conclude that the error
prejudiced ATL.

   The protest is denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] All prices were proposed and evaluated in euros (*).

   [2] The SSB report effectively served as the source selection decision, as
that document contained a best-value determination and was approved and
signed by the contracting officer.

   [3] Although ATL initially protested that the agency had failed to
evaluate the joint venture based on the experience and past performance of
the individual joint venture partners, the record demonstrates that the
agency did, in fact, evaluate the references for each partner and used
those ratings to assign a composite score for the joint venture.  TEB
Report at 7-8; SSB Report at 9-10.  We have held that the use of such an
evaluation method is within an agency*s discretion.  See, e.g., ITT Fed.
Servs. Int*l Corp., B-283307, B-283307.2, Nov. 3, 1999, 99-2 CPD P 76 at
14 (agency may reasonably evaluate a joint venture proposal based on the
individual joint venture partners* experience and past performance where
the joint venture itself has no prior performance).

   [4] ATL cites H.J. Group Ventures, Inc., B-246139, Feb. 19, 1992, 92-1 CPD
P 203, for the proposition that agencies may not attribute risk to new
joint ventures without explicitly disclosing such an evaluation preference
in the solicitation.  In H.J. Group Ventures, however, our Office did not
find that the agency improperly downgraded the protester for merely being
a new joint venture without experience.  Rather, we found in that case
that the agency improperly applied disproportional weight in the
evaluation process in finding that the protester*s status as a new joint
venture posed a *moderate* performance risk, despite the fact that the
*performance risk* criterion was identified as only an unweighted *general
consideration* in addition to the stated evaluation factors.  We sustained
the protest in H.J. Group Ventures because the difference in performance
risk between the protester and awardee proved to be the determinative
factor in the source selection where the technical ratings were otherwise
equal, thus outweighing a significant price difference.  Here, by
contrast, the agency properly related its risk assessments to the
disclosed evaluation factors of organizational experience and
organizational past performance.

   [5] By comparison, all five of CMC*s references were found relevant under
every one of the relevance factors.  TEB Report at 7.

   [6] ATL also alleged in its protest that the agency improperly downgraded
its proposal for failing to provide *an *engineering team* that would
ferret out *problems* arising from the Navy*s plans and specifications.* 
Protest at 6.  Although the agency responded to this protest ground in its
memorandum of law, ATL did not address the matter in its comments.  To the
extent that the protester intended for this allegation to be a separate
protest ground, we deem it abandoned for failure to comment.  See Bid
Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. S 21.3(i) (2004); SDS Int*l, B-285821, Sept.
21, 2000, 2000 CPD P 162 at 6.  We note, however, that the record
indicates that ATL was not downgraded regarding the lack of an engineering
team; instead, as stated in the debriefing, ATL did not receive any
additional credit under the RFP provision which stated that *Additional
consideration will be given for the following:  (1) Technical proposals
that commit to the active participation of engineers on site during
construction . . . .* RFP amend. 2, S 202, P 1.2, Factor 3.  See AR, Tab
11, Debriefing,
at 3.