TITLE:  SKJ & Associates, Inc., B-294219, August 13, 2004
BNUMBER:  B-294219
DATE:  August 13, 2004
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   Decision

   Matter of:   SKJ & Associates, Inc.

   File:            B-294219

   Date:              August 13, 2004

   Joseph M. Jankite for the protester.

   David G. Hester, Esq., U.S. Trade and Development Agency, for the agency.

   Edward Goldstein, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Contracting agency had a reasonable basis for canceling request for
quotations for analysis, grant, and audit services where the agency
decided to perform the services ina**house and therefore no longer had a
need for a contractor to perform the services called for under the
solicitation.

   DECISION

   SKJ & Associates, Inc. protests the cancellation of request for quotations
(RFQ)
No. USTDA-04-Q-0-171, issued by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency
(USTDA) for analysis, grant, and audit services in connection with the
USTDA's grant administration program.  SKJ principally argues that the
agency abused its discretion and violated the requirements of Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 when it canceled the RFQ.

   We deny the protest.

   On May 3, 2004, the USTDA issued the RFQ as a small business set-aside
under the provisions set forth in Federal Acquisition Regulation subpart
12.6 for acquisition of commercial items.  The RFQ contemplated the award
of a contract for analysis, grant, and audit services in connection with
the USTDA's grant administration program.  Specifically, the services
under the RFQ involve the agency's  "success fee program," and its related
audit program and procedures for the deobligation of grant funds.[1] 
According to the agency, a single USTDA employee has performed the grant
administration activities for the last several years, but, because the
volume of grant administration work has recently increased, the agency
issued the subject solicitation in order to obtain additional support from
a contractor.  Contracting Officer's (CO) Statement at 2.  The RFQ
estimated that the agency would require approximately 1,050 hours of
services over a period of approximately 6 months.  SKJ timely submitted a
quotation in response to the RFQ by the May 25 closing date.  The agency,
however, canceled the solicitation in a letter dated June 10 because it
had decided to divide the RFQ's requirements among USTDA employees and, as
a consequence, it no longer had a requirement for a contractor to perform
the analysis, grant, and audit services called for under the RFQ. 
According to the agency, this decision was made pursuant to what the
agency characterized as an agency-wide reorganization plan, which included
reallocating work among the USTDA's employees.  CO Statement at 3-4.

   Asserting contract avoidance, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit, the
protester essentially argues that the agency's decision to cancel the RFQ
was arbitrary and capricious.[2]  A contracting agency need only establish
a reasonable basis to support a decision to cancel an RFQ.  DataTrak
Consulting, Inc., B-292502
et al., Sept. 26, 2003, 2003 CPD P 169 at 5.  So long as there is a
reasonable basis, an agency may cancel a solicitation no matter when the
information precipitating the cancellation first arises, even if it is not
until offers (or, as here, quotations) have been submitted and evaluated. 
Id.   In this case, the USTDA indicates that it canceled the RFQ because
it decided to perform the analysis, grant, and audit services in-house
and, as a result, there was no longer a need for a contractor to perform
the services.  Our review of the record provides no basis for us to
question the reasonableness of the agency's decision in this regard.  Id.
(denying protest of solicitation cancellation where the agency indicated
that the services were no longer needed because they would be performed
in-house).

   The protester also argues that the agency's cancellation of the
solicitation in favor of performing the work in-house was improper because
OMB Circular A-76 requires that the agency contract with the private
sector for these requirements.  OMB Circular A-76 describes the executive
branch's policy on the operation of commercial activities that are
incidental to the performance of government functions and outlines
procedures for determining whether commercial activities should be
operated under contract by private enterprise or in-house using government
facilities and personnel.  Generally, we do not review such issues because
they involve maters of executive branch policy.  Daniels Mfg. Corp.,
B-253637, June 7, 1993, 93-1 CPD
P 439 at 1.  We will, however, consider protests concerning OMB Circular
A-76 when it is alleged that an agency did not adhere to the rules
announced in a solicitation issued for the purpose of comparing the cost
of contracting out work with the cost of performing work in-house.  Id. 
Because the subject solicitation was not issued for such a purpose, the
matter is not one that we review.[3] 

   The protest is denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] As explained by the USTDA, in carrying out its mission to promote
participation by the U.S. private sector in development projects for
developing and middle-income countries, the USTDA awards and administers
grants to private sector firms.  In certain circumstances, when a U.S.
firm has been funded by a USTDA grant it is required to pay a "success
fee" to USTDA.  Firms that participate in the success fee program are
required to provide information concerning whether a success fee
obligation has been incurred as well as the amount of the fee.  USTDA also
obtains audits of matters funded by USTDA grants and must in various
instances terminate its funding obligations in connection with the grants
and de-obligate the remaining funds.  Contracting Officer's (CO) Statement
at 1.       

   [2] The various theories cited by the protester are not applicable to the
issues raised in this case since they concern matters of contract
administration and extra-contractual theories of recovery.  Contract
avoidance is generally understood as a defense to contract enforcement
whereby a party seeks to exercise its power to avoid a contract that is
void or voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or incapacity in the
inducement of the contract.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 7
(1981).  A claim for promissory estoppel is founded on a contract
implied-in-law (a quasi-contract) where a duty is imposed by operation of
law without regard to the intent of the parties.  See Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 329, 340 (1983).  Similarly, quantum
meruit provides an equitable remedy where a party seeks to recover the
value of a benefit it provided to another party even though there was no
contract in effect.  See JANA, Inc., B-247889.2, Aug. 11, 1992, 92-2 CPD P
94 at 5 n.2.  We note that there is no evidence that the protester
provided any benefit to the government that would entitle it to recovery
of costs even under this theory.         

   [3] The protester also argues that the agency acted in bad faith when it
decided to cancel the RFQ.  The protester has not presented any evidence,
and we see none in the record, in support of this assertion.  See
McDonnell Douglas Corp., B-259694.2, B-259694.3, June 16, 1995, 95-2 CPD P
51 at 28 (holding that prejudicial motives will not be attributedA to
contracting officials on the basis of unsupported allegations, inference,
or supposition).