TITLE:  AVCARD, B-293775.2, December 30, 2004
BNUMBER:  B-293775.2
DATE:  December 30, 2004

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   Decision

   Matter of:   AVCARD

   File:            B-293775.2

   Date:              December 30, 2004

   John P. Janecek, Esq., Jay P. Urwitz, Esq., and Aimen Mir, Esq., Wilmer
Cutler Pickering Hale & Door, for the protester.

   Craig A. Holman, Esq., and Kara L. Daniels, Esq., Holland and Knight, and
Timothy W. Triplett, Esq., J. Michael Grier, Esq., Tamara L. Niles, Esq.,
and Seila L. Seck, Esq., Warden Triplett Grier, for Multi Service
Corporation, an intervenor.

   Louise Hansen, Esq., Defense Logistics Agency, for the agency.

   Linda C. Glass, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protest that agency's evaluation and source selection decision were flawed
is denied where the record shows that the agency's evaluation and source
selection decision were reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's
evaluation factors.

   DECISION

   Kropp Holdings, Inc., d.b.a. AVCARD, protests the award of a contract to
Multi Service Corporation (MSC) under request for proposals (RFP) No.
SP0600-04-R-0026, issued by the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) for
commercial charge card services for the ``Aviation Into-plane Reimbursement
(AIR Card) and Ships'' Bunkers Easy Acquisition (SEA Card) programs. 
AVCARD primarily objects to the agency's evaluation of proposals and the
agency's source selection decision.

   We deny the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The solicitation was issued on January 16, 2004 for the award of a
fixed-price contract to satisfy DESC's requirements to process retail fuel
transactions using commercially available services and to input detailed
transaction information for these purchases into DESC's ``fuels automated
system.''  The AIR and SEA cards will be used by government air and sea
crews to purchase aviation and ship bunker fuel and ancillary services at
commercial airports and seaports worldwide.[1]  The solicitation, as
amended, contained a statement of objectives (SOO) that listed 26 minimum
contract objectives that offerors were required to address in their
proposals.  RFP amend. No. 5, at 3. 

   The RFP provided that the award would be made on the basis of the proposal
determined to represent the best value to the government.  The RFP, as
amended, contained four evaluation factors listed in descending order of
importance--technical, price, past performance, and socioeconomic
subcontracting plan.  Id. at 7.  The solicitation provided that the price
factor was more important than the past performance factor and the
socioeconomic subcontracting plan factor, both separately and combined. 
Offerors were further advised that the agency would evaluate technical
proposals to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed
solutions in meeting the SOO goals and that additional evaluation credits
would be given to proposals that offered a single solution for both the
SEA and AIR card requirements and offered innovative commercial approaches
that satisfied the requirements of the SOO.  Offerors could submit a
proposal for the AIR card and the SEA card, individually or together.

   The agency received four proposals by the closing date.  The four offerors
proposed to furnish both types of cards.  After reviewing the results of
the technical evaluation team's evaluation of proposals, the contracting
officer concluded that the offerors needed further guidance on DESC's
requirements.  As a result, amendment No. 5 was issued to revise certain
terms of the RFP.  All of the original offerors submitted revised
proposals by the June 16 closing date.  After a review of the revised
proposals, the agency conducted discussions with all offerors and received
final proposal revisions.  The evaluators' final consensus ratings with
offerors' prices were as follows:

+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|OFFEROR    |TECHNICAL     |PAST PERFORMANCE |SOCIOECONOMIC  |PRICE      |
|           |              |                 |               |           |
|           |FACTOR        |FACTOR           |FACTOR         |FACTOR     |
|-----------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+-----------|
|[DELETED]  |[DELETED]     |[DELETED]        |[DELETED]      |[DELETED]  |
|-----------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+-----------|
|MSC        |Very Good     |Exceptional      |Very Good      |$6,274,688 |
|-----------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+-----------|
|AVCARD     |Satisfactory  |Very Good        |Satisfactory   |[DELETED]  |
|-----------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+-----------|
|[DELETED]  |[DELETED]     |[DELETED]        |[DELETED]      |[DELETED]  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Agency Report (AR), Tab 25, Contracting Officer's Recommendation, at 1.

   The contracting officer reviewed the evaluation results in order to make a
recommendation to the source selection authority (SSA).[2]  The
contracting officer found that MSC and [DELETED] had submitted the highest
rated and lowest priced proposals and proceeded to conduct a
technical/price tradeoff between these two offerors' proposals.  Comparing
the MSC and [DELETED] proposals, the contracting officer noted that MSC
and [DELETED] received identical ratings under the technical evaluation
factor and the socioeconomic subcontracting plan factor.  While the
contracting officer recognized that [DELETED] received a satisfactory past
performance rating compared to MSC's exceptional rating for past
performance, the contracting officer concluded that it was not in the
government's best interest to award a contract to MSC solely on the basis
of a higher past performance rating, since MSC's proposal was nearly
double the price of [DELETED] proposal.  Consequently, the contracting
officer recommended award to [DELETED].  As relevant here, the record
shows that the contracting officer (and subsequently the SSA) excluded
AVCARD's proposal from further consideration because AVCARD's proposal was
lower rated and higher priced than those of [DELETED] and MSC.  Id.

   The SSA viewed MSC's proposal as exceptional based on the SSA's own review
of the record, which included the proposals of [DELETED] and MSC, the
evaluation record, and the contracting officer's analysis.  More
specifically, the SSA determined that the technical superiority of MSC's
proposal, as well as MSC's overall business approach, superior past
performance, and socioeconomic subcontracting plan made MSC's proposal the
best value.  AR, Tab 26, Source Selection Determination, at 10.  The SSA
based that decision on the added benefits proposed by MSC and MSC's
comprehensive understanding of not only the credit card services required,
but also the unique program needs of the AIR and SEA card programs.  The
SSA noted that MSC demonstrated the most extensive understanding of the
ships bunker program and MSC proposed a flexible SEA card ordering
mechanism.  Recognizing that MSC's proposed price was higher than
[DELETED] proposed price, the SSA concluded that MSC's superior technical
proposal and its superior past performance justified paying the price
premium.  Award was made to MSC on September 23.  After receiving a
debriefing, AVCARD filed this protest with our Office on October 4.

   With regard to AVCARD's protest of the evaluation and source selection
decision, our Office will not sustain a protest unless the protester
demonstrates a reasonable possibility of prejudice, that is, unless the
protester demonstrates that, but for the agency's actions, it would have
had a substantial chance of receiving the award.  McDonald-Bradley,
B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD P 54 at 3.  Here, the agency rated
AVCARD's proposal lower than MSC's under all of the non-price evaluation
factors.  Given that AVCARD's proposal was significantly higher priced
than MSC's, in order to prevail in its protest, AVCARD would have to
demonstrate that the agency should have rated AVCARD's proposal higher
than MSC's proposal in at least one of the non-price evaluation areas. 
Based on our review of the record, AVCARD cannot demonstrate this, and
therefore cannot establish the requisite prejudice.[3]

   In reviewing an agency's evaluation, we will not reevaluate technical
proposals, but instead will examine the agency's evaluation only to ensure
that it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's stated
evaluation criteria and with procurement statutes and regulations.  See
MAR, Inc., B-246889, Apr. 14, 1992, 92-1 CPD P 367 at 4.  An offeror's
mere disagreement with the agency's evaluation does not render the
evaluation unreasonable.  McDonnell Douglas Corp., B-259694.2, B-259694.3,
June 16, 1995, 95-2 CPD P 51 at 18.

   TECHNICAL FACTOR

   The protester argues that the agency misevaluated its proposal under the
technical evaluation factor.  As relevant here, one objective, identified
as No. 26, provided for the successful contractor to obtain and pass on to
the government any negotiated fuel discounts or savings obtained
vis-a-vis the airfield/port suppliers' offered prices.  The protester
maintains that because of the importance of fuel savings in this
procurement, the superior fuel savings proposed by AVCARD should have been
given more weight in the evaluation than the other 25 objectives. 

   Here, while the RFP called for the agency to evaluate the offeror's
approach to meeting the 26 objectives, the RFP did not state that any
individual objective would be given greater consideration during the
evaluation process than any other objective.  As the agency points out,
with respect to technical and price evaluation factors, where the RFP is
silent as to their relative weights it must be presumed that they are of
equal weight.  Intermagnetics Gen. Corp., B-286596, Jan. 19, 2001, 2001
CPD P 10 at 8 n.7.  The record shows that the agency evaluated AVCARD's
proposal for fuel discounts but gave this objective the same weight as any
of the other objectives; in the agency's view, this approach was
consistent with our caselaw on the weighting of evaluation factors.  In
our view, the agency's approach was reasonable.  To the extent the
protester argues that the fuel savings objective should have been given
more weight during the evaluation than the other objectives, its protest
involves a challenge of an alleged solicitation impropriety that had to be
filed prior to the closing time for the submission of proposals.  Bid
Protest Regulations, 4A C.F.R. SA 21.2(a)(1) (2004); Pacific Photocopy and
Research Servs., B-278698, B-278698.3, Mar. 4, 1998, 98-1 CPD P 69 at 3.

   The protester also maintains that, in evaluating its proposal, the agency
improperly found that AVCARD had overemphasized the AIR card.  AVCARD does
not deny that its proposal emphasized the AIR card; rather, it argues that
it was justified in doing so by the nature of the contract.  Protester's
Comments at 12.  The protester contends that it was reasonable for an
offeror to emphasize the AIR card, since 99A percent of the transactions
would be AIR card transactions.  In the protester's view, if the agency
had properly considered the importance of the AIR card during the
evaluation, it would have materially raised AVCARD's technical rating.

   The RFP, however, stated that the RFP's purpose was to acquire a credit
card processing system for the purchase of both aviation and bunker fuel;
the RFP did not stress the importance of one type of card over the other. 
RFP amend. No. 6, at 3.  The RFP simply listed the objectives for both the
AIR card and the SEA card.  As discussed above with respect to the
importance of the fuel savings objective, if AVCARD believed that more
weight should have been given to the AIR card as opposed to the SEA card
in the evaluation, AVCARD's protest again concerns a solicitation
impropriety that should have been protested prior to the receipt of the
proposals.  4 C.F.R. S 21.2(a)(1).

   Turning to the evaluation itself, our review of the record shows that the
agency reasonably found that, while AVCARD's proposal provided details
concerning the AIR card, with respect to the SEA card, AVCARD essentially
proposed to modify its existing materials developed for the successful
introduction of the AIR card as the framework for the SEA card roll-out. 
AR, Tab 8, AVCARD's Proposal, at 3.  Under these circumstances, we do not
find unreasonable the agency's concern about AVCARD's proposal's lack of
detail regarding the SEA card.[4]

   AVCARD also complains that the agency improperly evaluated the proposals
of AVCARD and MSC under objective No. 25, which required offerors to
aggressively pursue agreements with suppliers for maximum coverage.  The
record shows that the agency recognized AVCARD for its worldwide network
of suppliers, but also recognized that MSC had a partnership with ``Air BP''
which provided a larger network of suppliers than AVCARD had identified. 
The record shows that objective No. 25 was not a discriminator between MSC
and AVCARD for the contracting officer or the SSA.  AR, Tab 25,
Contracting Officer's Recommendation, at 3;  AR, Tab 26, Source Selection
Determination, at 8.  AVCARD does not dispute that MSC, through its
partnership with Air BP, has a larger number of locations; rather AVCARD
argues that the agency should have given consideration to the remoteness
of the locations and the nature of the arrangement MSC has at these
locations.  While it is clear from the evaluation record that the agency
in its evaluation merely counted the number of locations and did not
evaluate the location of suppliers, we do not view this as inconsistent
with the solicitation language, which basically called for offerors to
show their capability to aggressively pursue supplier agreements for
maximum coverage.  In our view, the agency could reasonably decide that
the number of existing locations was an indicator of an offeror's ability
to meet the RFP requirement, and we see no basis to find that AVCARD's
proposal was required to be rated superior to MSC's for this objective.

   In sum, we find no basis to question the evaluation of AVCARD's proposal
under the technical evaluation factor and, therefore, we have no basis to
conclude that AVCARD's satisfactory rating under this factor was
unreasonable.[5]

   PAST PERFORMANCE FACTOR

   AVCARD objects to its past performance rating of very good.  AVCARD
primarily objects to the fact that it received only a satisfactory rating
for its past performance as the incumbent under the AIR card.  The agency
reports that AVCARD received a very good past performance rating based on
interviews and/or questionnaires submitted by four of AVCARD's commercial
customers and consideration of AVCARD's performance on the AIR card
contract.  More specifically, two former AVCARD commercial customers rated
AVCARD exceptional for past performance and two commercial customers rated
AVCARD very good.  AR, Tab 14, Past Performance Worksheet.  The record
also shows that while the evaluators characterized AVCARD's performance on
the AIR card contract as only satisfactory, the SSA recognized the merits
of AVCARD's performance on that contract as supporting the overall very
good rating.  The SSA specifically found that AVCARD's performance in
providing the first credit card program was a major factor in rating
AVCARD very good overall for its past performance and that AVCARD had
provided very good customer support under the AIR card contract as
evidenced by an agency award.  AR, Tab 26, Source Selection Determination,
at 8.  While AVCARD disagrees with the agency's conclusion that AVCARD's
past performance was only very good overall, we have no basis to find that
the agency's past performance evaluation was unreasonable.  Moreover, even
if AVCARD received a consensus rating of exceptional for past performance,
AVCARD's rating would be identical to MSC's under this factor, since
AVCARD does not challenge the evaluation and rating of MSC under the past
performance factor.  Given AVCARD's higher proposed price, assigning an
exceptional rating to AVCARD's proposal in the past performance area would
not have materially affected the award decision.[6]

   In sum, we find that the agency's evaluation of AVCARD's proposal was
reasonable.  In light of that, and given AVCARD's higher price, we have no
basis to object to the source selection decision.

   The protest is denied.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] AVCARD is the incumbent contractor for the AIR card program, an
established commercial card program for aviation fuel/related products and
ancillary services.  The SEA card is a new program, and the SEA card will
operate as a purchase and charge card for ship propulsion fuel/related
products and some ancillary services.

   [2] Two agency officials jointly served as the SSA for this acquisition.

   [3] As a result, we do not reach the question of AVCARD's ratings
vis-a-vis those of [DELETED].

   [4] The agency reports that while there are more aviation transactions,
the dollar value and quantities of bunkers' transactions are comparable. 
For fiscal year 2003, the total aviation quantities and dollars were 262.9
million gallons and $355.3 million.  RFP amend. No. 1, Enclosure A at 4. 
The marine bunker quantities and dollars were 284.9 million gallons and
$286.9 million.  Id.

   [5] AVCARD argues that in certain respects MSC's proposal was
misevaluated.  For example, AVCARD asserts that MSC was credited for
potential fuel savings beyond what it claimed in its proposal.  However,
even assuming this allegation is something other than mere disagreement
with the agency's evaluation conclusion, the record shows that the SSA did
not consider MSC's proposed fuel savings as a strength.  AR, Tab 26,
Source Selection Determination, at 5

   [6] AVCARD also complains that the agency misevaluated its proposal under
the socioecomic subcontracting plan factor, the least important factor. 
AVCARD received a satisfactory rating under this factor because the agency
concluded that AVCARD did not exceed the agency's small business
subcontracting goals.  AVCARD states that its goals were below the
agency's goals because it calculated its subcontract values by including
projected fuel purchases in the total dollars to be subcontracted.  AVCARD
contends that [DELETED]Comdata's and MSC's failure to include fuel
purchases in their subcontracting total was contrary to law.  AVCARD
maintains that if the agency was unclear about how AVCARD selected its
goals, preferred an individual plan to a commercial plan, or thought that
AVCARD's goals were too low, the agency should have raised these issues
during discussions.  Even if the agency should have held discussions with
AVCARD concerning its subcontracting plan, given AVCARD's high price,
there is no basis to conclude that AVCARD was prejudiced by the agency's
failure to discuss this issue.
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