TITLE: B-293105.18; B-293105.19, Greenleaf Construction Company, Inc., January 17, 2006
BNUMBER: B-293105.18; B-293105.19
DATE: January 17, 2006
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B-293105.18; B-293105.19, Greenleaf Construction Company, Inc., January 17, 2006

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Greenleaf Construction Company, Inc.

   File: B-293105.18; B-293105.19

   Date: January 17, 2006

   Margaret A. Dillenburg, Esq.; Alexander Brittin, Esq.; and Jonathan D.
   Shaffer, Esq., Smith, Pachter, McWhorter & Allen, for the protester.

   James S. DelSordo, Esq., and Russell J. Gaspar, Esq., Cohen Mohr, for
   Chapman Law Firm Company, LPA, an intervenor.

   R. Rene Dupuy, Esq., Department of Housing and Urban Development, for the
   agency.

   David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Department of Housing and Urban Development's evaluation of awardee's
   proposal for contract to provide single-family home management and
   marketing services was unreasonable where it was based on awardee's
   proposal of key personnel and an electronic monitoring system that awardee
   should have known--more than 2 months prior to final evaluation and
   award--would not be available, and awardee never advised agency of the
   material change in circumstances.

   2. Protest is sustained where Department of Housing and Urban Development
   failed to reasonably consider or evaluate potential organizational
   conflict of interest arising due to the fact that the owner of the
   management and marketing (M&M) services contractor in Ohio will be
   receiving payments from the owner of the closing agent contractor for
   Ohio, the activities of which the M&M contractor will oversee.

   3. Affirmative determination of awardee's financial responsibility was not
   reasonable where, despite knowing awardee had sold an affiliated company,
   contracting officer nevertheless based responsibility determination on
   financial capability assessment by Defense Contract Audit Agency that was
   based in significant measure on financial resources of company that had
   been sold.

   DECISION

   Greenleaf Construction Company, Inc. protests the Department of Housing
   and Urban Development's (HUD) award of a contract to Chapman Law Firm
   Company, LPA (CLF) under request for proposals (RFP) No. R-OPC-22505, for
   single-family home management and marketing (M&M) services. Greenleaf
   asserts that CLF materially misrepresented in its proposal the resources
   it would use in performing the contract, and that, in any case, award to
   CLF was precluded by an impermissible organizational conflict of interest
   (OCI). In addition, Greenleaf challenges HUD's affirmative determination
   of CLF's responsibility.

   We sustain the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The solicitation, issued August 6, 2003, contemplated the award of
   indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity, fixed-unit-price contracts in 24
   geographic regions for M&M services in connection with the disposition of
   single-family homes. These properties are acquired or retained in custody
   by HUD pursuant to the Federal Housing Authority's (FHA) role in
   administering the single-family home mortgage insurance program. FHA
   insures approved lenders against the risk of loss on loans extended to
   home buyers; in the event of a default on a loan insured by FHA, the
   lender acquires title to the property through foreclosure or other
   procedure, and then conveys the title to HUD in exchange for the payment
   of insurance benefits. As a result of this program, HUD has a sizable
   inventory of single-family homes that it needs to maintain and dispose of
   through sale. The solicitation was issued to meet HUD's requirement to
   maintain and sell these properties.

   At issue in this protest is the contract for the properties in the
   Ohio/Michigan area (Philadelphia Home Ownership Center area 2, or P-2).
   For this area (as for 13 other areas), the RFP provided that the award of
   the contract would follow a cascading procedure under which any award
   would first be made on the basis of competition considering only eligible
   small business concerns. If adequate competition between small business
   concerns did not exist--that is, if there were not "[a]t least two
   competitive offers . . . received from qualified responsible business
   concerns at the tier under consideration," with award to be made at "fair
   market prices as determined in accordance with [Federal Acquisition
   Regulation (FAR) sect.] 19.202-6"--award then would be made on the basis
   of unrestricted competition. RFP sect. M.9.b.

   The RFP further advised offerors that the agency would make award on a
   "best value" basis, considering both price and non-price factors, with the
   non-price factors being significantly more important than price. There
   were six non-price criteria (in descending order of importance):
   management capability/quality of proposed management plan, past
   performance, experience, proposed key personnel, subcontract management,
   and small business subcontracting participation.

   Three offerors that certified themselves as small business concerns,
   including Greenleaf, CLF and a third firm, were included in the initial
   competitive range. After conducting discussions, HUD requested final
   proposal revisions (FPR) by early May 2004. Based upon its evaluation of
   FPRs, HUD selected Greenleaf for award. However, before award could be
   made, a size status protest filed by CLF resulted in Greenleaf's being
   found other than small by the Small Business Administration (SBA).
   Thereafter, HUD reopened discussions with CLF and the third offeror. After
   obtaining new FPRs, HUD found that the third offeror (which eventually
   withdrew its proposal) lacked the capacity to perform. With only one
   offeror, CLF, remaining in the small business tier, HUD concluded that
   this single small business offer constituted inadequate competition to
   permit a small business award, and cascaded the competition to the full
   and open, unrestricted tier. Having determined that Greenleaf's
   technically superior, low-priced offer represented the best value to the
   government, HUD awarded a contact to Greenleaf on April 19, 2005.

   CLF filed a protest with our Office, asserting that the procurement should
   not have been cascaded to the unrestricted tier; award instead should have
   been made to CLF as the only remaining small business offeror. In response
   to our request for its view in this regard, SBA advised that it viewed the
   three small business offers originally received as constituting adequate
   small business competition, such that, even though only CLF ultimately
   remained as a viable small business offeror, award should be made at the
   small business tier, that is, to CLF. HUD terminated Greenleaf's contract
   on June 17, returned the procurement to the small business tier and, by
   letter dated June 22, advised CLF that its proposal was "now being
   considered for award." Letter from HUD to CLF, June 22, 2005, at 1. HUD
   requested that CLF furnish "[c]ertification that your proposal submitted
   January 20, 2005 remains valid," and furnish documentation showing that a
   conflict of interest arising from CLF's ownership of Lakeside Title &
   Escrow Agency--the HUD closing agent contractor for Ohio which CLF, as the
   M&M contractor for Ohio, was prohibited under the RFP from owning--had
   been mitigated. Id.

   Greenleaf thereupon filed suit in the United States Court of Federal
   Claims protesting HUD's return of the procurement to the small business
   tier and the selection of CLF for award. The court denied Greenleaf's
   protest, finding that the "reversal of the decision to cascade was
   correct," and that the fact that CLF ultimately was left as the only small
   business concern "did not compel a cascade to the unrestricted tier."
   Greenleaf Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 350, 361 (2005).
   Thereafter, the agency evaluators amended the technical evaluation to
   recommend award to CLF; the source selection authority concurred with this
   recommendation on September 14. After determining that CLF was
   responsible, financially and otherwise, with no conflict of interest
   precluding award, and had adequate staffing and equipment to perform,
   Affirmative Determination of Responsibility, Philadelphia Area 2,
   September 26, 2005, the contracting officer made award to CLF on September
   30. Greenleaf then filed this protest with our Office.

   INACCURATE REPRESENTATIONS

   Greenleaf asserts that the award to CLF was improper because CLF's
   proposal misrepresented the resources and staff CLF intended to use to
   perform the contract.

   An offeror's material misrepresentation in its proposal can provide a
   basis for disqualification of the proposal and cancellation of a contract
   award based upon the proposal. A misrepresentation is material where the
   agency relied upon it and it likely had a significant impact upon the
   evaluation. Integration Techs. Group, Inc., B- 291657, Feb. 13, 2003, 2003
   CPD para. 55 at 2-3; Sprint Communications Co. LP; Global Crossing
   Telecommunications., Inc.--Protests and Recon., B-288413.11, B-288413.12,
   Oct. 8, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 171 at 4; AVIATE L.L.C., B-275058.6,
   B-275058.7, Apr. 14, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 162 at 11.

   Based on our review of the record, we find that HUD's evaluation of CLF's
   proposal was unreasonable because it was based on aspects of CLF's
   proposed resources and technical approach that, after the submission of
   CLF's FPR, and unbeknownst to the agency, materially changed such that the
   agency never evaluated the awardee's actual resources and technical
   approach as they existed at the time of award.

   The [A]s

   Greenleaf cites CLF's proposal of [Ms. A] and her spouse [Mr. A] as one of
   CLF's alleged misrepresentations. In this regard, in November 2004, HUD
   expressed concern during discussions that CLF lacked staffing and M&M
   experience. CLF responded in its January 20, 2005 FPR by adding staff,
   including Ms. [A] and Mr. [A] as two key personnel, and (with the
   assistance of the [A]s) by significantly rewriting its proposal.
   Specifically, CLF identified Ms. [A]'s role in contract performance as
   vice president for contract compliance, describing her responsibilities as
   follows:

   [DELETED].

   CLF FPR, Jan. 20, 2005, Response at 6.

   CLF identified Mr. [A]'s role in contract performance as vice president
   for operations and contract teams support leader (CTSL) alternate,
   describing his responsibilities as follows:

   [DELETED].

   CLF FPR, Jan. 20, 2005, Response at 6. According to CLF's proposal,

   [DELETED] and [Ms. A], along with [Mr. A], are members of the first-tier
   executive team that reports to and advises the CEO and company principal,
   Frank Chapman. [DELETED] and [DELETED] with their focus on [DELETED],
   respectively, are the other executives who will function at this level of
   the company.

   CLF FPR, Jan. 20, 2005, Response at 4. In addition, CLF included in its
   FPR resumes for Ms. [A] and Mr. [A] and an extensive narrative discussion
   of their experience. In this regard, the proposal stated that beginning in
   1998, Ms. [A] had worked as a consultant to, and then the national
   training and broker oversight director for, an M&M HUD contractor.
   Likewise, Mr. [A] served as a marketing director and a consultant with
   respect to staff and facilities selection for an M&M contractor.

   HUD evaluated CLF's proposal of the [A]s as a strength. According to the
   Technical Evaluation Panel's (TEP) report, CLF's proposal of Ms. [A] as
   vice president for contract compliance and Mr. [A] as vice president for
   operations was "a strength as both [A]s have extensive knowledge of the
   workings of an M&M contract as both were either employed by a former M&M
   contractor or worked as a consultant for a former M&M contractor." TEP
   Report at 75, 84, 87, 89. According to the TEP, and citing the [A]s as a
   specific example, CLF's proposal offered "a very low risk of unsuccessful
   performance relative to key personnel" as a result of the fact that
   "[m]any key personnel are long-time employees of a current M&M contractor
   and have recent experience performing work that is the same or similar to
   most of the required tasks." Id. at 89. Likewise, according to the TEP, it
   was a strength under the subcontract management evaluation factor that Ms.
   [A] and Mr. [A] "have been employed by a former M&M contractor and are
   familiar with the oversight and management of subcontractors." Id. at 90.
   Indeed, according to the TEP, while Greenleaf's technical proposal overall
   was marginally superior to CLF's, CLF's staffing plan was superior to
   Greenleaf's because, unlike for Greenleaf, all key CLF personnel were
   clearly qualified for their positions. Id. at 97-98.

   Greenleaf asserts that, while CLF's proposal included the [A]s in its
   "first-tier executive team," CLF was on notice months before the September
   30, 2005 award that, in fact, the [A]s were unwilling to participate in
   CLF's performance of the Ohio/Michigan M&M contract. The record, including
   testimony taken at a hearing our Office conducted in this matter, supports
   this argument.

   CLF's January 2005 FPR included certifications executed by Ms. [A] and Mr.
   [A] (on November 11, 2004) stating that "[w]hen a contract is awarded, I
   am committed to pursuing the position for which my resume is proposed." In
   addition, the protest record includes a separate "Contingent Employment,
   Non-Compete & Non-Disclosure Agreement" for each of the [A]s (also
   executed on November 11, 2004), which provided for CLF's "At Will
   Employment" of Ms. [A] (as a consultant) and Mr. [A], contingent upon
   CLF's receiving award of the M&M contracts for Ohio/Michigan and/or
   Illinois/Indiana.

   Shortly after CLF certified to HUD on June 22 that its January 2005 FPR
   remained valid, and more than 2 months prior to the agency's final
   evaluation of CLF's offer and the subsequent award to CLF (on September
   30), CLF was put on notice that the [A]s in fact would not be willing to
   work for CLF to perform the contract. In this regard, on March 4, 2005,
   HUD issued a solicitation for closing agent services in several states,
   including North and South Carolina. According to the testimony of Ms. [A]
   and Mr. [A], prior to submitting proposals for North and South Carolina,
   they inquired of Mr. Chapman, the owner of CLF and (at that time) Lakeside
   Title, whether he would be competing against them for those contracts. Mr.
   Chapman advised that he would not compete, and agreed to the [A]s'
   submitting his resume with their offers. Following the submission of
   proposals (but before award), the [A]s learned from Mr. Chapman that
   Lakeside Title had in fact submitted proposals for North and South
   Carolina. At that point, according to Ms. [A], Mr. Chapman reassured the
   [A]s that "[i]f we win the Carolinas, it's for you." Hearing Transcript
   (Tr.) at 146-53, 212, 323-24. (Likewise, Mr. [A] testified that
   Mr. Chapman reassured the [A]s prior to award of the North and South
   Carolina contracts that "if we get this, you guys can have a part of this
   and we'll still go forward with doing something together." Tr. at 324; see
   Tr. at 364.)

   When HUD informed the [A]s by letter dated July 1 that award for the North
   and South Carolina closing agent requirements had been made to Lakeside
   Title, Ms. [A] called Mr. Chapman to follow up on Mr. Chapman's earlier
   representations that the [A]s would nevertheless benefit from an award to
   Lakeside Title. The record indicates that Mr. Chapman advised Ms. [A] that
   he had sold Lakeside Title and that, therefore, the [A]s and their company
   would not participate in the North and South Carolina contracts. According
   to Mr. Chapman, he informed Ms. [A] that, while it was true that he "had
   promised her a job," "it's also true that I told you that that was if we
   did not win the M&M, and we have won the M&M, so we will be working at the
   M&M and that [DELETED] owns the title company." Tr. at 637-38, 640-41. (In
   response to a subsequent question as to "[w]hat kind of commitments, if
   any, did you give the [A]s with respect to the contract in North
   Carolina/South Carolina," Mr. Chapman gave a different answer, stating
   that he had "told them that if we didn't win the M&M, that I would hire
   [Mr. A] to be a manager" in North Carolina. Tr. at 648-49.)

   What occurred after Mr. Chapman advised Ms. [A] that the [A]s would not be
   participating in the North and South Carolina closing agent contracts is
   in some dispute. Ms. [A] testified that, having concluded that Mr. Chapman
   was unreliable, the [A]s decided that they would not relocate from Texas
   (where they had entered into a contract to sell their home) to Cleveland,
   Ohio to work with CLF on the Ohio/Michigan M&M contract. According to Ms.
   [A], she advised Mr. Chapman during a telephone call (apparently on July
   6) that the [A]s "could not trust him," and "felt that our business
   reputation would be at risk" if (as they had heard he intended to do) he
   deviated from the CLF proposal by using a different computer software
   company than proposed, and that the [A]s therefore would not come to
   Cleveland to perform the M&M contract, or otherwise work with him.
   Tr. at 159-60. Although Mr. [A] was not on the telephone call, he
   testified that he was at home with Ms. [A] during the call, and that she
   advised him of the contents of the call, including her statement that the
   [A]s would not work with Mr. Chapman. Tr. at 325-26. Mr. Chapman conceded
   in his testimony that the [A]s "were mad at me about the North Carolina
   closing agent contract, and they had asked for more money," but denied
   that they stated that they would not come to work for him on the M&M
   contract. Tr. at 637-44.

   Based on our review of the record, including the demeanor of the
   witnesses, we find that Mr. Chapman (and thus CLF) was on notice that the
   [A]s would not participate in performing the M&M contract. In particular,
   we find Ms. [A]'s testimony persuasive. Ms. [A]'s testimony was
   corroborated not only by the testimony of Mr. [A], but also by the
   subsequent communications with Mr. Chapman. On July 6, after the above
   telephone conversation with Ms. [A], Mr. Chapman sent Ms. [A] an e-mail in
   which he advised her that "[a]s you are aware, CLF is the intended
   awardee" for the M&M contract, and "[u]pon the release of this contract,
   which could be as early as next week, you will be asked to fulfill your
   contract which is contingent upon award to CLF as written without
   modification." E-mail from Frank Chapman to [Ms. A], July 6, 2005,
   11:03 a.m. Shortly thereafter, Ms. [A] replied that "I'm sorry Frank, but
   our confidence in you has been breached in a very hurtful way. We do not
   respond well to ultimatums, and do not regard that type of relationship as
   a workable one for the future." E-mail from [Ms. A] to Frank Chapman, July
   6, 2005, 1:43 p.m. Later that day, Mr. Chapman responded as follows:

   I have done nothing but fulfill every promise I've ever made . . . . .

   My e-mail was not intended as an ultimatum, but to remind you that,
   pursuant to that agreement, you have an obligation to work for us when
   award is made. Your repeated references to "renegotiating" your contract
   and your non-committal attitude about reporting to work in Cleveland, as
   well as implied threats of working for foreclosure.com, a related
   business, have caused me great concern. That is why I feel it necessary to
   remind you that we expect that you will honor your previous agreement to
   come and work on the M&M when the stay is lifted.

   . . . . .

   As we will have to hit the ground running when the stay is lifted, if you
   no longer have any intention of honoring your agreement, I would ask that
   you advise us at your earliest opportunity.

   E-mail from Frank Chapman to [Ms. A], July 6, 2005. In our view,
   Mr. Chapman's repeated references to Ms. [A]'s obligation to fulfill the
   "at will" employment agreement she had signed regarding employment on the
   M&M contract suggests that Mr. Chapman had been given reason to question
   her and Mr. [A]'s plans in this regard, and thus corroborates Ms. [A]'s
   persuasive testimony that she in fact had advised Mr. Chapman that the
   [A]s would not work with him on an Ohio/Michigan M&M contract.

   The record indicates that the [A]s, believing that the agreements they had
   signed were only for "at will" employment and that, in any case, their
   intention not to work on the M&M contract had already been conveyed to Mr.
   Chapman, did not specifically respond to Mr. Chapman's request in his July
   6 e-mail for notice that they "no longer have any intention of honoring
   your agreement." Tr. at 223-24, 374-77. However, to the extent that any
   uncertainty as to the [A]s' intentions could have remained after Ms. [A]'s
   previous express refusal to work for Mr. Chapman on the M&M contract, we
   find that any such uncertainty could not reasonably have survived the
   subsequent notice to Mr. Chapman of the [A]s' relocation to North
   Carolina, rather than to Ohio as originally planned, after selling their
   home in Texas. In this regard, Mr. Chapman testified that at one point in
   his earlier conversations with Ms. [A], she had stated that "when she came
   back from Texas . . . she could either go north or south on I-77." Tr.
   at 878. In an e-mail to Mr. Chapman dated July 18, sent in response to his
   e-mail that "I miss you. We should talk or email, not about money but
   about the future," Ms. [A] wrote about having moved into an apartment in
   North Carolina. E-mail from [Ms. A] to Frank Chapman, July 18, 2005,
   12:52 p.m. Ms. [A] did offer in her response that "[i]f there is a way to
   make things right re the [North Carolina/South Carolina] contracts, we are
   interested in talking about that. Seems setting that situation straight is
   a first step." Id. However, Mr. Chapman did not explain how, nor is there
   any basis in the record to conclude that, he then made any attempt to
   "make things right" regarding the North Carolina/South Carolina closing
   agency contracts. In these circumstances, we conclude that Mr. Chapman
   (and thus CLF) was on notice more than 2 months prior to the agency's
   final evaluation and award of the M&M contract that, contrary to the
   provisions of CLF's final FPR, the [A]s would not be available to work on
   the M&M contract.

   Dynamic Quest Software

   Greenleaf asserts that CLF's proposal also misrepresented the software
   package and software company it was planning to use to perform the
   contract. Our review of the record confirms that CLF determined more than
   2 months prior to the agency's final evaluation and award of the
   Ohio/Michigan M&M contract to use a different software package and
   software company than those on which its proposal was based.

   The solicitation PWS required the contractor to maintain a complete file
   for each property using a secure, electronic, web-based Electronic
   Monitoring System (EMS) accessible to employees of both the contractor and
   HUD. The statement of work (SOW) set forth detailed performance
   requirements for the EMS to ensure that it would adequately serve HUD's
   information needs under the PWS, including requirements that the system:
   (1) provide a daily posting of complete electronic records of actions
   taken for mortgagee compliance and the management and marketing of a
   property; (2) display electronic images of all property-related documents
   and color photographs of properties not later than 24 hours following
   receipt or creation by the contractor; (3) index information in a way that
   provides access to an individual property file or to information from all
   files based on document type or action performed; and (4) prepare various
   reports regarding the status of the properties. SOW sect. C.5.1.1, attach.
   9.

   In its January 2005 FPR, CLF proposed to meet the EMS performance
   requirements through the use of the TEAMS electronic monitoring system
   developed and implemented by Dynamic Quest, Inc. CLF's proposal described
   in detail the proposed TEAMS EMS system and listed two owners of Dynamic
   Quest as "key subcontract partner[s]." CLF FPR, Jan. 20, 2005, at 24-44,
   Resumes. As described in CLF's proposal, TEAMS would not only generate the
   reports required under the PWS, but would also generate additional
   reports--such as a vendor evaluation report, a listing broker benchmark
   report, an asset maintenance inventory report, a communications
   responsiveness report, and conveyance reports--to assist the M&M
   contractor in better meeting the PWS requirements regarding managing and
   marketing the properties. Id. at 30; Tr. at 70-71.

   HUD evaluated CLF's proposal of the TEAMS EMS system and on-line bidding
   system as "demonstrat[ing] a strong IT [information technology] approach
   to handling the functions in the PWS." TEP Report at 74. In particular,
   the TEP noted that the TEAMS EMS would provide not only the required
   reports, but also additional reports "that will assist the contractor in
   meeting the requirements of the RFP." Id. at 75. Likewise, the agency
   noted that CLF had proposed to "enter the information into TEAMS using
   technology to replace the current mode of faxing forms between the M&M and
   mortgagees," thereby "add[ing] efficiency to the process by allowing the
   offeror and the mortgagee instant information on an individual claim or
   property." Id. at 80.

   Shortly after CLF certified to HUD on June 22, 2005 that its January 20
   FPR remained valid, and more than 2 months prior to the agency's final
   evaluation and award to CLF, CLF decided to replace its proposed TEAMS EMS
   with an EMS [DELETED]. In this regard, on June 23, [DELETED], one of the
   owners of Dynamic Quest, conducted an on-line demonstration of TEAMS for
   Mr. Chapman and [DELETED] (CLF's proposed IT manager for the M&M
   contract), with Ms. [A] also connected to the demonstration. Tr. at
   396-97, 591-93. The development status of the software and the course of
   the June demonstration are in some dispute. Mr. Chapman and Mr. [DELETED]
   testified that the June 23 demonstration, like an earlier November 2004
   demonstration (before TEAMS was included in CLF's proposal), amounted to
   little more than a series of screen shots, with Mr. [DELETED] being unable
   to enter data or create reports. Tr. 388-89, 393-410, 609-12. In contrast,
   Mr. [DELETED] and Ms. [A] testified that the ability to enter data and
   generate reports was included in the TEAMS software when first
   demonstrated for other potential M&M offerors, when later demonstrated for
   CLF in November 2004, and when demonstrated on June 23, 2005. Tr. at
   102-06, 112-13, 507-33, 560-76, 589-93.

   In any case, it is undisputed that, shortly after the June 23
   demonstration of the TEAMS EMS, CLF arranged for a demonstration of an EMS
   developed by [DELETED] and used by several other M&M contractors.
   According to the testimony of Mr. Chapman and Mr. [DELETED], based on the
   results of that demonstration, (held on or about June 26), CLF decided to
   replace TEAMS with the [DELETED] system. Tr. at 469-72, 622-23, 872.
   Although CLF maintains that the [DELETED] system meets the minimum
   requirements set forth in the PWS for the required EMS, it concedes that
   the [DELETED] system did not include all of the additional capabilities
   that CLF's proposal indicated would be provided by TEAMS. Tr. at 470-72,
   622-23; CLF Comments, Dec. 13, 2005, at 11-12.

   We conclude that there was a material change in the awardee's proposed
   staffing and EMS approach that occurred after CLF certified that its
   January 2005 FPR remained valid, but more than 2 months prior to the
   agency's final evaluation and award of the M&M contract. Under these
   circumstances, CLF was required to advise the agency of the material
   change in its proposed resources and technical approach, in order to
   ensure that the evaluation was based on consideration of the staffing and
   EMS that CLF actually intended to use in performing the contract. See
   Dual, Inc., B-280719, Nov. 12, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 133 at 3-6, as
   recently explained in SAMS El Segundo, LLC, B-291620, B-291620.2, Feb. 3,
   2003, 2003 CPD para. 44 at 19-20. Because CLF failed to do so, the agency
   never evaluated CLF's actual employees and EMS approach as they existed at
   the time of award; as a result, the evaluation--and, it follows, the award
   determination that was based on the results of the evaluation--were
   unreasonable. Dual, Inc., supra, at 6. To allow such an award to stand
   would call into question the integrity of the competition. Accordingly, we
   sustain the protest on this basis.

   OCI

   Greenleaf also asserts that HUD failed to reasonably consider or evaluate
   a potential organizational conflict of interest that will be created by
   award to CLF. In this regard, the RFP generally provided that "[t}he
   Contractor shall not engage in or permit any conflict of interest," and
   specifically identified as one potential, prohibited conflict of interest
   the following:

   M&M Contractors may not serve as contractors or subcontractors that
   perform contract monitoring, oversight or other services related to any of
   the tasks in this PWS. Excluded contract services include but are not
   limited to . . . Closing Agents . . . .

   RFP sections H.8, I.14(b).

   At the time CLF submitted its initial proposal, Mr. Chapman, the owner of
   CLF, also owned Lakeside Title, which is HUD's closing agent contractor
   for the state of Ohio.[1] Consistent with the above prohibition, CLF
   agreed in its proposal to transfer "full ownership" of Lakeside to another
   escrow and title attorney. CLF FPR, Jan. 20, 2005, at 6. In its June 22
   letter advising Mr. Chapman that CLF was being considered for award, HUD
   noted that "[y]our firm agreed to sell shares of Lakeside Title to
   mitigate the conflict of interest in servicing both the M&M and closing
   agent contracts." Letter from HUD to CLF, June 22, 2005. HUD specifically
   requested the submission of documentation showing that the OCI had been
   mitigated. In response, CLF furnished a notarized stock transfer agreement
   indicating that all shares in Lakeside Tile had been sold by Frank Smith
   to [DELETED], and an affidavit executed by Mr. Chapman stating that the
   "sale of all shares of Lakeside Title . . . has been completed and I no
   longer have any ownership interest or control over Lakeside Title." CLF
   Letter to HUD, June 22, 2005.

   Subsequently, during the Court of Federal Claims litigation with respect
   to this procurement, HUD learned that the purchase agreement for Lakeside
   Title, dated June 20, 2005, provided for a purchase price consisting of
   $[DELETED], plus all monies paid to Lakeside Title for 2004 and 2005, plus
   50 percent of any profits of Lakeside Title through December 31, 2005.
   Purchase Agreement for Lakeside Title, June 20, 2005, sect. 3.1. The
   contracting officer advised Mr. Chapman by letter of September 2 that
   "[t]he fact that you will still be receiving profits continues to present
   a conflict. This conflict must be resolved." On September 2, Mr. Chapman
   responded by submitting an amendment to the purchase agreement that
   deleted the above provisions and substituted a clause providing that the
   purchase price shall be $[DELETED], to be paid at the rate of $[DELETED]
   per week for [DELETED] weeks. Amendment to Lakeside Purchase Agreement,
   Sept. 2, 2005, sect. 3.1. The contracting officer concluded that, because
   this amendment provided for a "final fixed price under which Chapman would
   receive no future profits," it resolved the OCI. Affirmative Determination
   of Responsibility, Philadelphia Area 2, Sept. 26, 2005, at 3.

   Greenleaf asserts that CLF's OCI with respect to Lakeside Title was not
   resolved by the amended purchase agreement. According to the protester,
   the fact that the purchaser of Lakeside was required to make significant
   weekly payments to Mr. Chapman continued to pose an unacceptable OCI.

   The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) instructs agencies to identify
   potential OCIs as early as possible in the procurement process, and to
   avoid, neutralize, or mitigate significant conflicts before contract award
   so as to prevent unfair competitive advantage or the existence of
   conflicting roles that might impair a contractor's objectivity. FAR
   sections 9.501, 9.504, 9.505; PURVIS Sys., Inc., B-293807.3, B293807.4,
   Aug. 16, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 177 at 7. The responsibility for determining
   whether a contractor has a conflict of interest and should be excluded
   from competition rests with the contracting officer, who must exercise
   "common sense, good judgment and sound discretion" in assessing whether a
   significant potential conflict exists and in developing appropriate ways
   to resolve it. FAR sections 9.504, 9.505; Aetna Gov. Health Plans, Inc.;
   Foundation Health Fed. Servs., Inc., B-254397 et al., July 27, 1995, 95-2
   CPD para. 129 at 12. Situations that create potential conflicts of
   interest are identified and discussed in FAR subpart 9.5, and they include
   situations in which a contractor's performance of contract requirements
   may affect the contractor's other activities and interests. See FAR
   sections 9.505, 9.508. That is, a contractor's judgment and objectivity in
   performing the contract requirements may be impaired if the substance of
   its performance has the potential to affect other activities and interests
   of the contractor. Id.; Science Applications Int'l Corp., B-293601 et al.,
   May 3, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 96 at 4.

   We find that HUD failed to reasonably consider or evaluate the potential
   OCI arising due to the fact that the owner of CLF (the M&M contractor in
   Ohio) will be receiving payments from the owner of the closing agent
   contractor for Ohio, the activities of which CLF will oversee.
   Specifically, it appears that CLF's judgment and objectivity in performing
   the contract requirements could be impaired if its performance could
   potentially affect the ability of the owner of the closing agent
   contractor to make the payments owed to CLF's owner.[2] Further, while the
   contracting officer was aware of the potential OCI from having CLF's owner
   receive a share of Lakeside Title's profits, and proceeded properly to
   have CLF eliminate that OCI, it is clear that the contracting officer
   failed to consider the OCI implications of the amended version of the
   purchase agreement--whether the magnitude of the payments was such as to
   call into question whether CLF's judgment and objectivity were likely to
   be impaired, or whether there were suitable mitigation measures required
   to address the scope of the potential conflict of interest.[3] In these
   circumstances, we sustain the protest on the basis that HUD failed to
   reasonably consider or evaluate a potential OCI that may result from an
   award to CLF.

   RESPONSIBILITY

   Greenleaf challenges the contracting officer's determination of CLF's
   responsibility on several grounds, including the determination that CLF
   possessed adequate financial resources to perform the contract.

   Contracts may only be awarded to responsible prospective contractors. FAR
   sect. 9.103(a). In making a responsibility determination, the contracting
   officer must determine, among other things, that the contractor has
   "adequate financial resources to perform the contract, or the ability to
   obtain them." FAR sect. 9.104-1(a).

   Because the determination that an offeror is capable of performing a
   contract is largely committed to the contracting officer's discretion, our
   Office will generally not consider a protest challenging an affirmative
   determination of responsibility except under limited, specified
   exceptions. Verestar Gov't Servs. Group, B-291854, B-291854.2, Apr. 3,
   2003, 2003 CPD para. 68 at 3. One specific exception is where a protest
   identifies serious concerns that a contracting officer, in making an
   affirmative determination of responsibility, failed to consider available
   relevant information or otherwise violated statute or regulation. Bid
   Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.5(c) (2005). This exception was
   intended to encompass protests, for example, that include specific
   evidence that the contracting officer may have ignored information that,
   by its nature, would be expected to have a strong bearing on whether the
   awardee should be found responsible. See 67 Fed. Reg. 79,833-34 (2002).

   Here, the contracting officer requested that the Defense Contract Audit
   Agency (DCAA) perform a financial risk assessment with respect to CLF.
   Indeed, according to the contracting officer, the determination that CLF
   had adequate financial resources to perform the contract was made by DCAA.
   Tr. at 693. DCAA's findings with respect to CLF's financial responsibility
   were set forth in the affirmative determination of CLF's responsibility
   which was signed by the contracting officer. That determination indicated
   that in reporting that CLF had adequate financial resources to perform the
   contemplated contract, DCAA considered the "consolidated key financial
   ratios of Mr. Frank Chapman's three related companies: Chapman Law Firm,
   Lakeside Title & Escrow Company, and MacDonald National Mortgage Company."
   Affirmative Determination of Responsibility, Philadelphia Area 2, Sept.
   26, 2005, at 1-2. In this regard, DCAA reported that "CLF had minimal
   revenues in [fiscal year] 2004 (approximately $[DELETED]). Therefore, most
   of the sales from Mr. Chapman's three related companies came from the
   Lakeside Title & Escrow Company, which had revenues of nearly $[DELETED]
   in [fiscal year] 2004." Id. at 2.

   As noted by Greenleaf, however, the contracting officer had always
   understood that, pursuant to the OCI provisions in the RFP, Mr. Chapman
   would be required to sell his interest in Lakeside Title. Tr. at 695, 699.
   Indeed, the contracting officer was aware that Mr. Chapman had already
   sold his interest in Lakeside Title by the time he signed the affirmative
   determination of CLF's responsibility. The contracting officer, however,
   never advised DCAA that Mr. Chapman was required to sell Lakeside Title.
   Tr. at 702. Further, when asked whether the determination that CLF had
   adequate financial resources might have been different if the resources of
   Lakeside Title had not been considered, the contracting officer responded
   as follows:

   A. I can't make that determination. I don't know.

   Q. Why not?

   A. Because I relied on DCAA, the audit agency, who is the expert in that
   area to assist me with that.

   Tr. at 699.

   Based on this record, we find that the determination of CLF's financial
   responsibility was based on information that the contracting officer knew
   to be inaccurate. Further, since Lakeside Title apparently generated
   nearly all of the income earned by Mr. Frank Chapman's three related
   companies, Mr. Chapman's sale of Lakeside Title on an installment basis
   for payments to be received over 320 weeks clearly was material to a
   determination of his financial ability to commence and continue
   performance of the contemplated M&M contract. In these circumstances, we
   find that the contracting officer simply ignored information that, by its
   nature, would be expected to have a strong bearing on whether CLF should
   be found financially responsible, and we sustain the protest on this
   basis. Cf. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., B-292476, Oct. 1, 2003, 2003
   CPD para. 177 at 10-11 (contracting officer's affirmative determination of
   the awardee's responsibility is not reasonably based where, despite having
   general awareness of misconduct by some of awardee's principals and parent
   company, the contracting officer did not obtain sufficient information
   about or consider the awardee's record of integrity and business ethics in
   making his responsibility determination).

   RECOMMENDATION

   We recommend that the agency reevaluate the merits of CLF's proposal in
   light of our finding that, contrary to the provisions of the proposal, CLF
   will not use Mr. and Ms. [A], or the TEAMS EMS system, in performing the
   contemplated contract. In addition, the agency should ascertain and take
   into account in its reevaluation whether CLF's proposal otherwise
   inaccurately represents the resources that CLF will use in performing the
   contract. We also recommend that the agency consider, and document its
   findings with respect to, the potential OCI that will be created by the
   fact that Mr. Chapman is owed significant payments over time by the
   purchaser of Lakeside Title. We further recommend that the contracting
   officer make a new determination of CLF's responsibility which takes into
   account the fact that Mr. Chapman has sold Lakeside Title, as well as any
   changes in the resources that CLF will have available to perform the
   contemplated contract. If, as a result of this reevaluation, the agency
   determines that CLF's proposal is not the best value, the agency should
   terminate CLF's contract and make award in accordance with the evaluation
   results. Finally, we recommend that Greenleaf be reimbursed its costs of
   filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
   4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(2)(1). In accordance with 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(f)(1),
   the protester's certified claim for such costs, detailing the time
   expended and costs incurred, must be submitted directly to the agency
   within 60 days after receipt of this decision.

   The protest is sustained.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] Closing agents obtain title information about properties that HUD
   seeks to sell so that HUD can convey clear and marketable title; they meet
   with buyers and buyers' brokers to have closing documents executed; and
   they receive funds for closings on behalf of HUD, and then after the
   closing, transmit those funds to HUD. Tr. at 763-64.

   [2] In this regard, HUD's Deputy Director of the Office of Single Family
   Asset Management explained that the M&M contractor could not be the same
   entity as the closing agent for that jurisdiction because

   some of [the M&M's] duties include oversight of closing agent activities.
   They work very closely with the closing agents, and monthly the M&Ms
   prepare a report that comes to HUD that identifies closing agent
   performance, both positive and negative. They review invoices for closing
   agent fees for the services that they charge and approve those invoices,
   and the M&Ms also review HUD-1 settlement statements on which all of the
   funds that are involved in a transaction are recorded.

   Tr. at 764-65. Likewise, according to the Deputy Director, an M&M's
   entitlement to a portion of the closing agent's profits would be a matter
   of concern because the "M&M contractor does have the ability to influence
   the financial viability of the closing agent by failing to report poor
   performance, by overlooking irregularities, by approving invoices that are
   not appropriate." Tr. at 793. The Deputy Director further testified that,
   for the same reason, it also would be a concern if the closing agent owed
   the M&M contractor a substantial debt upon which the closing agent was
   obligated to make fixed payments over time; in this regard, the Deputy
   Director explained that "if the closing agent doesn't have any income, it
   can't pay its debts," and the amount of income the closing agent has could
   depend on how well the M&M contractor performs its duties. Tr. at 794.

   [3] When asked during the hearing whether she considered the stream of
   payments owed by the owner of Lakeside Title to the owner of CLF to
   represent a conflict of interest, the contracting officer answered that
   she did not, because the underlying purchase price was a fixed price. Tr.
   at 714-15. However, the contracting officer admitted that she was unaware
   of where [DELETED] would obtain the resources to make the required
   payments to Mr. Chapman, and also unaware of what if any impact there
   would be on the stream of payments if Lakeside Title were found to have
   failed to perform under its HUD contract. Tr. at 686, 716.