TITLE:  Resource Consultants, Inc., B-293073.3; B-293073.5; B-293073.6, June 2, 2004
BNUMBER:  B-293073.3; B-293073.5; B-293073.6
DATE:  June 2, 2004
**********************************************************************
   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Resource Consultants, Inc.

   File: B-293073.3; B-293073.5; B-293073.6

   Date: June 2, 2004

   John S. Pachter, Esq., Jonathan D. Shaffer, Esq., Sophia R. Zetterlund,
Esq., Erin R. Karsman, Esq., and Richard C. Johnson, Esq., Smith Pachter
McWhorter & Allen, for the protester.

   Agnes P. Dover, Esq., Todd R. Overman, Esq., and Gary A. Campbell, Esq.,
Hogan & Hartson, an intervenor.

   Robert L. Duecaster, Esq., Department of the Army, for the agency.

   Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protester's contention that the awardee's final revised price effectively
altered its technical approach, even though offerors were not allowed to
make changes to their technical proposals, is sustained where the record
shows that the awardee's final price proposal shifted the mix of personnel
used to perform the contract, and significantly decreased the staffing it
proposed to use for one type of work covered by the contract.   

   DECISION

   Resource Consultants, Inc. (RCI) protests the award of a contract to Titan
Corporation, Enterprise Services and Solutions Sector, by the Department
of the Army under solicitation No. DASW01-03-R-0040, for desktop support
services to the Army's Information Management Support Center.  RCI argues
that the Army's evaluation of Titan's revised price proposal was
unreasonable.

   We sustain the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The RFP here was issued on May 23, 2003, and covered six separate lots of
effort designed to consolidate desktop service support operations for
approximately 80 agencies within Headquarters, Department of the Army. 
Lot I of the solicitation, the portion of the work at issue in this
protest, contemplated a single-award,
indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for desktop support
services for a base period of 2 years, plus five 1-year options.  RFP at
2. 

   The solicitation sought performance-based solutions to providing desktop
support services to the Army, and requested that offerors submit
fully-burdened hourly labor rates for their employees.  The solicitation
also stated that all task and delivery orders under the Lot I contract
would be issued on either a fixed-price or time-and-materials (T&M)
basis. 

   For reasons discussed in greater detail below, the particular pricing
requirements of this solicitation--both as initially issued, and as
ultimately amended--are relevant to this protest.  Initially, offerors
were required to submit five discrete components of price for the Lot I
work (and for each of the option years within Lot I).  These were:

   (1) a fixed price for the work (see, e.g., CLIN 0001AA);

   (2) a T&M price for the work (CLIN 0001AB);

   (3) an amount for other direct costs associated with performing the work
on a

   fixed-price basis (CLIN 0001AC);

   (4) an amount for general and administrative (G&A) costs to be added to

   other direct costs associated with performing the work on a fixed-price
basis

   (CLIN 0001AD); and,

   (5) a price for performing after-hours work on a fixed-price basis

   (CLIN 0001AE).

   RFP at 6-8.  Because the solicitation's pricing schedule requested both
fixed and T&M prices for the work, the total obtained by adding the prices
submitted for each of these CLINs was roughly twice the total expected
price for this effort.    

   The RFP advised potential offerors that award would be "based on a best
value analysis" of three factors:  management/technical, past performance,
and cost/price.  RFP amend. 3, at 6.  The RFP also advised that the
management/technical factor was more important than the past performance
factor, and that management/technical and past performance combined were
more important than cost/price.  Id. at 9. 

   Seven proposals were received by the initial due date of June 23, 2003,
and five of them were included in the competitive range.  After
discussions, and submission of final proposal revisions (FPR), the total
prices, and overall technical ratings, for the offerors were as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Offeror                  |Overall Rating        |Total Price            |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|RCI                      |Excellent             |$202.8 million         |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Titan                    |Excellent             |$233.1 million         |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Offeror A                |Very Good             |$540.7 million         |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Offeror B                |Very Good             |$187.7 million         |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Offeror C                |Very Good             |$168.9 million         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Contracting Officer's (CO) Statement at 3.  Based on these results, the
agency awarded a contract to RCI on September 30, 2003, after concluding
that the benefits of the RCI proposal justified paying a cost premium over
the price proposed by Offerors B and C, in their slightly lower-rated
proposals.  Agency Report (AR), Tab 13, at 3.

   After the initial award to RCI was challenged in two protests--one filed
with the agency, and one filed with our Office--the Army decided to take
corrective action to clarify conflicting information in the solicitation
about the number of users to be supported by this contract.[1]  The agency
also agreed to request revised price proposals from the five offerors in
the competitive range, and make a new selection decision.  CO's Statement,
supra. 

   In its request for revised price proposals, the agency advised offerors to
base their proposals on an estimate of 7,000 customers for the base
period, with an estimated growth in customers of 5 percent per year, for
each of the 5 option years.  RFP amend. 5, at 2.  Offerors were also
directed to use 2,080 hours per staff year for their proposals, and to
plan to provide customer support 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.  In
addition, the offerors were asked to submit five separate prices for the
work, as follows: 

   (1) a fixed price for performing all the work on-site;

   (2) a fixed price for providing all the work off-site;

   (3) a T&M price for providing all the work on-site;

   (4) a T&M price for providing all the work off-site; and

   (5) a fixed price for work performed after regular hours. 

   Id.  In this regard, the amendment expressly advised that the total price
would be determined by adding the amount offered for each of the five
categories identified above.  Id.  Thus, the total prices proposed were
roughly four times the total expected price for this effort (plus any
amount for after-hours work).  Finally, the amendment advised:

   The purpose of this amendment is to request revised price/cost proposals
for Lot I (desktop support services) from those offerors for Lot 1 that
are in the competitive range, and not for requesting revised technical
proposals for Lot 1.  Technical discussions will not be conducted.

   Id.

   The agency received revised price proposals from each offeror in the
competitive range by the December 8, 2003 closing date.  As the agency did
not receive revised technical proposals, it made no revisions to the
technical ratings used in the initial selection decision.  Thus, as
before, both RCI's and Titan's technical proposals were rated excellent. 
The prices proposed by the two offerors were, however, changed
significantly--Titan's total price fell from $233.1 million to $217.3
million, while RCI's total price increased from $202.8 million to $239.3
million. 

   The record shows that RCI and Titan took different approaches to preparing
and submitting their final revised prices, and these differences are
material to the current dispute.  RCI provided no narrative whatsoever
with its final submission, and instead submitted a series of pricing
tables showing the number of hours by labor category, the fully-burdened
labor rates, and the resulting totals for performing the work on a
fixed-price basis on-site, a fixed-price basis off-site, a T&M basis
on-site, and a T&M basis off-site.  AR, Tab 21.  Within these tables, the
fully-burdened labor rates for each labor category varied depending on
whether the work was priced on a fixed-price or T&M basis, and on whether
the work was being performed on- or off-site.  Although RCI's final prices
are based on using fewer labor hours than it used prior to the time the
Army reduced the estimated number of users to be supported, the relative
mix of experienced versus inexperienced personnel remained essentially the
same.  Compare AR, Tab 11B (RCI's final price proposal prior to corrective
action) with AR, Tab 21 (RCI's final price proposal in the reopened
competition).  In addition, the number of labor hours used to generate its
final revised price is the same under each of the four pricing
approaches.  AR, Tab 21. 

   In contrast, Titan's final submission begins with an 8-page narrative that
purports to explain the changes to its previously submitted price
proposals.  For example, Titan displays two staffing profiles--analagous
to RCI's display of the number of hours by labor category--showing
different approaches to staffing work based on whether the work will be
performed on-site or off-site.  AR, Tab 22, at 3.  Titan explains that its
new staffing profiles are based on "another detailed analysis of the
requirements, using the reduced number of users required by the Government
for bidding purposes."  Id. at 4.  Following the narrative, Titan provides
pricing tables showing, as did RCI, the number of hours by labor category,
the fully-burdened labor rates, and the resulting totals for performing
the work under each of the four pricing approaches requested by the
agency.  Id. at 9-32.  Within these tables, the fully-burdened labor rates
for each labor category appear to be the same under all four of the
pricing approaches.  However, the relative mix of experienced versus
inexperienced personnel was significantly changed from the proposals
submitted prior to the time the Army reduced the estimated number of users
to be supported.  Compare AR, Tab 11A (Titan's final price proposal prior
to corrective action) with AR, Tab 22 (Titan's final price proposal in the
reopened competition).  In addition, as indicated in its narrative, Titan
proposed to perform off-site work (on both a fixed-price and T&M basis)
with significantly fewer full time equivalent (FTE) personnel than used in
its earlier proposals, and with significantly fewer FTEs than it proposed
for on-site work in its final offer here.  Id.        

   A summary of the results of the reopened competition, with the total
prices and technical ratings (unchanged from the earlier evaluation), is
set forth below: 

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Offeror                  |Overall Rating        |Total Price            |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Titan                    |Excellent             |$217.3 million         |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|RCI                      |Excellent             |$239.3 million         |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Offeror A                |Very Good             |$396.3 million         |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Offeror B                |Very Good             |$200.5 million         |
|-------------------------+----------------------+-----------------------|
|Offeror C                |Very Good             |$270.1 million         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   CO's Statement at 4-5.  Given these results, the agency selected Titan for
award after concluding that the benefits of the Titan proposal justified
paying a cost premium over the price proposed by Offeror B, and concluding
that there was no basis upon which to justify paying the higher price
associated with RCI's proposal.  AR, Tab 24, at 9-10.

   On February 13, 2004, the agency advised RCI that it was awarding to
Titan.  This protest followed.

   DISCUSSION

   Although RCI initially raised a series of general contentions--including
that the agency failed to perform a proper price analysis of Titan's final
revised price proposal--its initial general complaints have been
supplemented with a series of specific complaints about the way in which
Titan lowered its price for this work.  In this regard, RCI argues that
Titan's final revised price[2] effectively altered its technical approach
by:  (1) shifting the mix of personnel used to perform the contract; (2)
significantly decreasing the number of FTEs used to perform off-site work;
and (3) disproportionately decreasing the number of FTEs in the option
years.  RCI argues that Titan should have been disqualified due to these
changes, or alternately, that the agency should have recognized that these
changes were so significant that the previous technical evaluation no
longer accurately reflects Titan's offer.  Finally, RCI argues that
certain changes in Titan's price proposal suggest a procurement integrity
violation--i.e., that Titan must have received inside information about
RCI's proposal--that should have led the agency to reject Titan's
proposal.

   In answer, the Army and Titan argue that the requirement for a review of
price realism was met by comparing the proposed prices received in the
competition.  With respect to the more specific allegations regarding
Titan's price reduction, both point out that there was nothing in the
agency's request for revised prices that prohibited reductions in the
number of hours proposed in any labor category, in the number of senior
staff offered, in an offeror's hourly rates, in profit levels, or in any
other component of an offeror's total price.  Instead, the agency argues
that Titan was simply making the adjustments expected to reflect the
changes associated with a reduction in the number of users from 10,000 to
7,000.[3]  Finally, both the Army and Titan deny that Titan improperly
received information about RCI's proposal, and both argue that none of
RCI's allegations supports a conclusion that such a violation occurred. 

   Before turning to the specifics of this protest, we note as a preliminary
matter that the decrease in anticipated computer users that will be
supported by this contract complicates this dispute.  As indicated above,
the solicitation as initially issued was ambiguous about the number of
users to be supported by the contract; the solicitation provided support
for estimates of both 10,000 and 12,000 users.  In revising the
solicitation, the Army reduced its estimate of users to 7,000.  As a
result of this reduction in estimated users, it was clearly appropriate
for offerors to reduce their staffing (and hence their prices) in response
to the reduction.  Nonetheless, while the estimate reduction is a
complicating factor for some areas of this discussion, there are certain
areas of Titan's proposal where its reductions appear unrelated to the
Army's reduction in estimated users.   

   With respect to RCI's general contention that the Army failed to perform a
proper price analysis here, we disagree.  The agency explains that it
compared the proposed prices to each other and to the government estimate
of the cost for this work, and compared the proposed labor rates to the
rates contained in existing contracts for the same work.  The several
approaches used by the agency are consistent with the price analysis
techniques identified at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Section
15.404-1(b).  In addition, absent specific requirements in the
solicitation imposing additional requirements, the nature and extent of an
agency's price analysis are matters within the agency's discretion.  See
AllWorld Language Consultants, Inc., B-291409, B-291409.2, Dec. 16, 2002,
2003 CPD Paragraph 13 at 2 (fixed-price contracts); Resource Consultants,
Inc., B-290163, B-290163.2, June 7, 2002, 2002 CPD Paragraph 94 at 3 n.1
(T&M contracts).  Our review provides no basis for questioning the
adequacy of the agency's price analysis. 

   We turn next to the heart of RCI's complaint--that Titan's final revised
price effectively altered its technical approach, even though Titan did
not submit a revised technical proposal.  It is a fundamental principle of
competitive procurement that offerors be provided with a common basis for
the submission and evaluation of proposals.  Pasco Realty, B-245705, Jan.
8, 1992, 92-1 CPD Paragraph 39 at 5.  To the extent that the agency
allowed Titan to submit a revised price that effectively altered its
underlying technical proposal--without allowing any other offeror to do
so--the agency abandoned one of the stated ground rules of the reopened
competition, to the prejudice of RCI and other offerors who were not given
a similar opportunity.  See DynaLantic Corp., B-234035, May 3, 1989, 89-1
CPD Paragraph 421 at 3-4, recon. denied, MicroSim Inc.--Recon.,
B-234035.2, B-234035.3, Oct. 11, 1989, 89-2 CPD Paragraph 336; Emerson
Elec. Co., B-213382, Feb. 23, 1984, 84-1 CPD Paragraph 233 at 4.  Based on
our review, we agree with RCI's contentions.  For the reasons set forth
below, we conclude that Titan's final revised price was based on
calculations of staffing costs that were so materially inconsistent with
its previously identified (and evaluated) technical approach that the
agency was required to take steps to rectify the situation.

   As a starting point--and as a baseline for this discussion--the record
shows that prior to the Army's corrective action in this case, Titan's
price was based on performing this effort using [deleted] FTEs in the base
period of performance, dropping to [deleted] FTEs by the last option
year.  AR, Tab 11A, at 5.  In the reopened competition, Titan reduced its
FTEs for on-site performance in the base year by approximately 28 percent,
to [deleted] FTEs (commensurate with a 30 percent reduction in estimated
users).  AR, Tab 22, at 3.  By the final option year, though, the number
of FTEs dropped approximately 43 percent from the earlier proposed level,
to [deleted].  Id.  Although we recognize that Titan has accelerated its
reduction of FTEs over the life of the contract--and we acknowledge RCI's
complaints about this approach--we think this reduction alone could be
viewed as a de minimis departure from the 30 percent reduction one would
anticipate given the agency's change to its estimate of users.[4]

   More troubling, however, are Titan's changes to the mix of employees it
offered, and the difference between the number of FTEs proposed to perform
off-site work, as opposed to the on-site work.  With respect to the mix of
employees, our review shows that prior to the Army's corrective action,
Titan offered a significantly more experienced (and hence more expensive)
mix of staffing than the mix it proposed after the corrective action. 

   For example, when one examines the number of FTEs identified in Titan's
five most expensive labor categories[5] (other than the program manager
category, which is the same in both versions of the Titan proposal, and
other than the two categories in which Titan offers [deleted] FTEs),
versus the number of FTEs identified in its five least expensive labor
categories,[6] the difference between the staffing used to calculate
Titan's earlier price and its final revised price is stark.  Specifically,
out of [deleted] total FTEs in Titan's earlier offer, [deleted] were in
the five highest-priced labor categories, while [deleted] were in the five
lowest-priced labor categories.  A proportional 30 percent cut to these
numbers yields approximately [deleted] FTEs overall, with roughly
[deleted] FTEs in the five highest-priced labor categories, and [deleted]
FTEs in the lowest-priced labor categories.[7]  Instead, out of [deleted]
total FTEs, Titan's final revised price was based on [deleted] FTEs in the
five highest-priced categories, and [deleted] FTEs in the five
lowest-priced categories.  See AR, Tabs 7, 11E, and 22.  Indeed, as RCI
points out, in Titan's lowest-priced labor category, [deleted], Titan
increased the number of FTEs from [deleted] to [deleted], while making a
28 to 43 percent cut in the total FTEs offered.  Id.  This significant
shift in the mix of FTEs essentially reflects a reversal in approach for
Titan--from one based on using a greater proportion of higher-priced labor
categories (reflecting higher levels of experience and expertise) relative
to lower-priced labor categories (reflecting less experience and
expertise) to an approach using a greater proportion of lower-priced
categories.  In our view, this shift leads inescapably to a conclusion
that Titan has changed its technical approach to performing this effort.

   We are also troubled by Titan's use of a different number of FTEs to price
the off-site work than it used to price the on-site work.  As discussed
above, the solicitation here, as initially issued, did not require
offerors to submit separate prices for performing this work off-site
versus on-site.  Instead, offerors were required only to provide a price
for performing the work on a fixed-price basis and on a T&M basis.  In the
earlier competition, both RCI and Titan used the same staffing
approach--i.e., their respective approaches--to generate both of these
prices.  Neither company prepared a separate staffing approach applicable
to only one of these prices.   

   In the reopened competition, Titan--for the first time--developed a
separate and unique staffing approach applicable only to its fixed and T&M
prices for performing the work off-site.  We need not set forth a detailed
analysis of this separate staffing approach, as it appears that there is
no dispute between the parties that this approach was significantly leaner
than the staffing approach Titan used for the on-site work, and
significantly different from the staffing approach Titan offered in the
initial competition--and upon which its technical evaluation was based. 
Again, we conclude that Titan has changed its technical approach to
performing this effort when performance will occur off-site.

   Before leaving this topic, we recognize that the agency and Titan argue
that since this was a performance-based procurement the agency was
evaluating technical solutions, not staffing levels.  They also point out,
correctly, that there was no requirement for any particular staffing
approach, and that this means the changes made by Titan in response to the
reopened competition should not be seen as affecting the nature of Titan's
performance-based offer.  We cannot agree with this assertion.  The
solicitation's evaluation scheme contained a management/technical
evaluation factor which was supposed to include a review of the evidence
of an offeror's technical proficiency.  RFP amend. 3, at 6.  In addition
the final memorandum of the source selection evaluation board
(SSEB)--which was based on Titan's earlier technical proposal, since
revised technical proposals were not submitted here--expressed the view
that Titan's approach allowed "[reduced] staffing levels in the out years
while maintaining a highly skilled technical staff."  AR, Tab 23, at 25. 
Given the changes Titan made to the mix of technical staff in its final
FRP, we are not sure this observation remains valid for this proposal.

   In our view, the situation here is similar to the situation we encountered
in DynaLantic Corp., supra.  In DynaLantic, after originally making award,
but then finding it necessary to terminate that contract for default, an
agency requested an additional round of best and final offers (BAFO) from
the remaining offerors, limiting them to price and delivery schedule
revisions.  The successful offeror in the recompetition included in its
revised BAFO a list of six changes which allowed it to reduce its earlier
price by 48 percent.  In our decision, we concluded that the awardee's
reduced price, in fact, reflected changes to its technical proposal,
contrary to the ground rules established for the submission of revised
BAFOs.   

   Here, we think Titan has essentially done the same thing.  In changing the
staffing mix of labor categories overall, and in offering a completely
different staffing approach for off-site work, Titan did not follow the
ground rules set by the agency in this reopened competition.  As a result,
offerors that followed the agency's instructions were placed at a
disadvantage, and did not have the same opportunity to achieve the price
reduction Titan was able to achieve. 

   We turn last to RCI's allegation that certain of the changes made to
Titan's final revised prices suggest that a procurement integrity
violation has occurred during this competition.  These changes include: 
(1) Titan's decision to segregate, for the first time in its FRP, the base
contract into two base periods, which RCI did in all its proposals; (2)
Titan's suggestion that all its work be performed on-site, which
suggests--in RCI's view--that Titan may have known that RCI had an
advantage in
off-site overhead rates; and (3) Titan's decision to significantly
decrease the number of FTEs in its option years, which--again, in RCI's
view--suggests that Titan may have known that both companies proposed
similar decreases for the option years in their earlier proposals. 

   In response, the agency argues that RCI's unsupported contentions do not
demonstrate that such a violation occurred here.  We agree.  Without more
concrete evidence that the integrity of this procurement has been
compromised, we will not reach such a conclusion based only on these
changes to Titan's proposal.  

   RECOMMENDATION

   We sustain RCI's protest in light of our conclusion that Titan's final
price proposal effectively changed its technical approach to performing
this effort, even though offerors were not allowed to make changes to
their technical proposals.  As a result, we recommend that the agency
reopen this competition and request revised technical proposals and prices
from all offerors in the competitive range.  If Titan is not the
successful offeror based on the evaluation of the revised offers, its
contract should be terminated for the convenience of the government, and
award made to the offeror whose proposal provides the best value to the
government.  Alternatively, and in the event that the agency wants to
proceed based on the results of the previously reopened competition, we
think the agency has no choice but to reject Titan's offer, and make a new
selection decision based on the remaining offers in the competitive
range.  We also recommend that RCI be reimbursed the costs associated with
filing and pursuing its bid protest, including reasonable attorneys'
fees.  4 C.F.R. Section 21.8 (d)(1) (2004).  RCI should submit its
certified claim, detailing the time spent and the costs incurred, directly
to the agency within 60 days of receiving our decision.  4 C.F.R.Section
21.8 (f)(1).

   The protest is sustained.

   Anthony H. Gamboa

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The record shows that in some places the solicitation advised that
10,000 users would be supported (RFP, Performance Work Statement, at 3),
while at other places, the solicitation advised that as many as 12,000
users would be supported (RFP amend. 2, questions 21, 108, 113). 

   [2] Since, in the course of this procurement, the agency twice called for
FPRs--once prior to the corrective action, once in the reopened
competition--and since this protest requires a comparison of the prices of
those FPRs, for ease of reference, we will refer to Titan's earlier price
and its final revised price.  Any reference to Titan's earlier price,
however, will be a reference to its first FPR price, not the initial offer
price in that earlier stage of the competition. 

   [3] Although the Army argued that Titan's proposal before corrective
action was based on supporting 10,000 users (Agency Report, Mar. 31, 2004,
at 3; Agency Supp. Report, Apr. 17, 2004, at 5), Titan has disputed this
assertion.  Specifically, during the course of this protest (Titan's
Comments, Apr. 16, 2004, at 12), and in its Final Revised Cost Proposal
(AR, Tab 22, at 2), Titan has represented that the earlier versions of its
proposal were based upon an estimate of users higher than 10,000.  We note
for the record, however, that prior to the time the depth of its cuts was
an issue--i.e., at the time of its agency-level protest, which led to the
Army's decision to take corrective action to clarify its estimated number
of users to be supported--Titan stated that it based its earlier proposals
on an estimate of 10,000 users.  AR, Tab 17, at 6-8 (Titan's Agency-Level
Protest).  In fact, Titan argued in that protest that to the extent other
offerors did not propose to support 10,000 users, they "did not meet the
material solicitation requirements and their proposals should be
considered nonresponsive."  Id. at 8.  Now that the agency has amended the
solicitation to advise that offerors should base their proposals on an
estimate of 7,000 users, Titan's final proposal states that this
represents "an approximate 44 [percent] reduction from the number of users
assumed in Titan's original submission and our subsequent BAFO response." 
AR, Tab 22, at 4.  The final proposal explained that this is the reason
the number of FTEs in its final revised price proposal decreased
approximately 48 percent overall.  Id.  

   [4] In addition, we think the issue of the amount by which Titan reduced
its FTEs (including Titan's accelerated reduction in FTEs in the option
years) is clouded by the dispute over the number of Army users Titan
thought it would need to support when it wrote its earlier proposals.  In
our view, this issue need not be definitely resolved in this protest since
we conclude that Titan's shift in the mix of FTEs and its changed staffing
for off-site work leads us to conclude that the company altered its
technical approach.

   [5] Our review indicates that the five most expensive labor categories for
which Titan proposed FTEs, other than program manager, are:  [deleted]. 
AR, Tab 7, app. C, Table C-5.  We have used the price of the labor
categories as an indicator of the experience and expertise required to be
included in that category, although we recognize that the correlation may
not be exact. 

   [6] Our review indicates that the five least expensive labor categories
for which Titan proposed FTEs are:  [deleted].  Id. 

   [7] For the record, we are not concluding that a straight 30 percent cut
in staffing was required here.  Rather, this sentence is included to
provide insight into the depth of the cut Titan made, versus what one
might have expected.  It is the difference between the numbers that leads
to our conclusion that Titan changed its technical proposal, not the fact
that the cut was not 30 percent.  As discussed above, we think that even
Titan's 44 percent cut in FTEs in the last option year might not require a
conclusion that the company was changing its technical approach.