TITLE:  Kaman Dayron, Inc., B-292997, January 15, 2004
BNUMBER:  B-292997
DATE:  January 15, 2004
**********************************************************************
Kaman Dayron, Inc., B-292997, January 15, 2004

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE                                                
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective      
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.        

   Decision
    
Matter of:   Kaman Dayron, Inc.
    
File:            B-292997
    
Date:              January 15, 2004
    
Robert S. Ryland, Esq., and James S. Hostetler, Esq., Kirkland & Ellis,
for the protester.
James J. McCullough, Esq., and Steven A. Alerding, Esq., Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, for AMTEC Corporation, an intervenor.
Maj. Tami L. Dillahunt, and Sandra Bierman, Esq., Department of the Army,
for the agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of General Counsel,
GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
    
Protest is sustained where, under a solicitation that indicated that when
rating proposals under the technical evaluation factor particular
importance would be placed on the similarity of the items previously
produced to the grenade fuze being procured, the record does not support
the agency*s ultimate determination that the awardee*s experience
producing part of a different fuze was nearly identical to the experience
of the protester in producing the fuze being procured here such that both
offerors were entitled to the same *excellent* rating.
DECISION
    
Kaman Dayron, Inc. protests the award of a contract to AMTEC Corporation
by the Department of the Army, U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command, under
request for proposals (RFP) No. DAAA-09-03-R-0002, for M549A1
40-millimeter (mm) grenade fuzes. Kaman Dayron, the incumbent contractor,
challenges the technical evaluation primarily on the basis that the agency
unreasonably considered Kaman Dayron*s experience and that of AMTEC to be
equal.
    

   We sustain the protest.
    
The RFP contemplated the award of a fixed-price contract for 747,473
M549A1 grenade fuzes, with an evaluated 50 percent option for an
additional 373,736 fuzes.  The M549A1 fuze is a component of the 40-mm
High Explosive Dual Purpose M430A1 cartridge (grenade) used in the MK-19
Grenade Machine Gun. 
    
Award was to be made to the responsible contractor whose offer was
determined to be most advantageous to the government.  The most
advantageous proposal was to be determined in a *best value* evaluation
based on four factors:  (1) technical approach, including subfactors for
technical and automated production capability, automated acceptance
inspection equipment (AAIE) capability, technical data management,
production problem investigation and resolution, and vendor control and
requirements flow-down; (2) recent, relevant past performance, including
subfactors for on-time deliveries and quality of performance; (3) price;
and (4) small business utilization.  Technical approach was slightly more
important than past performance, and each was significantly more important
than price, which was more important than small business utilization.
    
The RFP further indicated that particular importance would be placed on
the degree of similarity of offerors* experience and the items previously
produced to the M549A1 fuze‑‑distinguishing among identical,
nearly identical, and similar experience‑‑when rating
proposals.  Thus, with respect to the technical subfactor for technical
and automated production capability, the solicitation required offerors to
furnish documentation of experience in the use of high‑volume
production machinery needed to meet quality requirements and delivery
dates; photographs of *any existing production equipment that is used or
similar to what would be required to produce the M549A1 fuze*;
*representative process flow diagrams of identical, nearly identical, or
similar items for which the offeror has manufacturing capabilities*; and
*technical information of the item produced (other than the M549A1fuze)
revealing any similarity of it to the M549A1 fuze with respect to both
assembly and function.*  RFP S: L at 51.  Likewise, with respect to the
subfactor for AAIE capability, the solicitation required offerors to
document *any existing AAIE in use or that [is] similar in complexity to
what is required to perform inspection of the M549A1 fuze,* and furnish
*technical information of the item being manufactured, if other than the
M549A1 fuze, sufficient to show similarity of it to the M549A1 fuze with
regards to assembly, function, and inspection requirements.*  RFP S: L at
51-52.  Further, the RFP defined relevant contracts for purposes of the
past performance evaluation *as procuring the same or similar items,
requiring the same or similar manufacturing processes, skills, and
abilities.*  RFP S: L at 53.  The RFP provided that *[t]he Government
reserves the right to determine whether an item is the same or similar and
identical or nearly identical.*  RFP S: L at 54; RFP S: M at 57.
    
The RFP*s focus on the degree of similarity among the items previously
produced to the M549A1 fuze was mirrored in the agency*s internal
evaluation plan.  In this regard, the source selection plan provided in
pertinent part that an offeror*s technical approach would be rated
excellent where *[t]he offeror has demonstrated the experience and
capability to manufacture and inspect the M549A1 Fuze or an item(s) nearly
identical in assembly and functional complexity,* and that an offeror*s
technical approach would be rated as only good where *[t]he offeror has
demonstrated the experience and capability to manufacture and inspect an
item with similar assembly requirements to the M549A1 Fuze.*  Source
Selection Plan P: 8.  
    
Initial proposals were received from two offerors, AMTEC and Kaman
Dayron.  Kaman Dayron was the developer (in conjunction with the Army) and
only manufacturer up to that time of the M549A1 fuze.  In this regard, as
explained in more detail below, the M549A1 fuze is comprised of a
centerplate assembly, which is placed above an escapement assembly under
the dome or ogive of the 40-mm grenade.  AMTEC, not having manufactured
the M549A1 fuze, nor any centerplate assembly, [DELETED] its production of
the M550 escapement assembly‑‑a component used in the M550
40-mm grenade fuze and the M918 target practice
projectile‑‑[DELETED]. 
    
Following the evaluation, the Army determined that AMTEC*s proposal
offered the best value to the government.  Both AMTEC*s and Kaman Dayron*s
proposals received excellent ratings under the technical approach factor. 
In this regard, in explaining AMTEC*s overall excellent rating, the
contracting officer (who was the source selection authority) emphasized
that, while AMTEC had not previously manufactured the M549A1 fuze, AMTEC
had successfully produced the escapement assembly for the M550 fuze. 
According to the contracting officer,
    
AMTEC has successfully produced over 6 million M550 Escapement Assemblies
that are nearly identical in design complexity and assembly processes as
those used in the proposed M549A1 Fuze production.  AMTEC has demonstrated
a clear understanding of all critical defects and has current and past
experience and technical capability to design, produce, and use AAIE for
the inspection of items nearly identical to the M549A1 fuze.
.  .  .  . 
AMTEC*s proposal may portray a slight risk in that they have never
assembled the centerplate, a subcomponent of the M549A1 Fuze.  However,
AMTEC is the previous/current producer of the M550 Escapement Assembly,
the most complex, major component of the M549A1 Fuze.  Successful
manufacture and assembly of the M550 Escapement Assembly is of utmost
importance in ensuring the manufacture of a quality M549A1 Fuze.  Although
the centerplate assembly is complex, manufacture of the M550 Escapement
Assembly far outweighs it in complexity.
Source Selection Decision (SSD) at 4, 11.  In addition, the Army rated the
past performance of both AMTEC and Kaman Dayron as good.  As for small
business utilization, the proposal of AMTEC, itself a small business,
received an excellent rating while Kaman Dayron*s received a good rating. 
Based on the above considerations, the contracting officer concluded that
the proposals were *relatively equal on non-cost factors.*  SSD at 12. 
However, AMTEC*s evaluated cost (price plus charge for the use of
government-furnished equipment and materials) of $[DELETED] (with first
article), was $[DELETED] lower than Kaman Dayron*s cost of  $[DELETED]
(with first article).  Given the evaluated relative equality of the
proposals with respect to the non‑cost factors, the contracting
officer concluded that there was no basis for paying the price premium
associated with Kaman Dayron*s proposal, and thus made award to AMTEC. 
Upon learning of the award, and after being debriefed, Kaman Dayron filed
this protest with our Office. 
    
Kaman Dayron asserts that the Army unreasonably evaluated the M550
escapement assemblies produced by AMTEC as being *nearly identical in
design complexity and assembly processes* to the M549A1 fuze, designed and
produced by Kaman Dayron, which is the subject of this procurement.  As a
result, it argues, the agency unreasonably assigned AMTEC*s proposal the
same technical factor rating of excellent assigned to Kaman Dayron*s
proposal.
    
In reviewing protests against allegedly improper evaluations, it is not
our role to reevaluate proposals.  Rather, our Office examines the record
to determine whether the agency*s judgment was reasonable and in accord
with the RFP criteria and applicable procurement statutes and
regulations.  See Rolf Jensen & Assocs., Inc., B‑289475.2,
B-289475.3, July 1, 2002, 2002 CPD P: 110 at 5.  Based on the record here,
including testimony at the hearing we conducted in this matter, we find
that the evaluation was unreasonable.
    
As previously noted, the M549A1 fuze consists of a centerplate assembly
placed atop an escapement assembly under the dome (or ogive) of the 40-mm
grenade.  Because of their importance in the source selection decision, we
describe the two assemblies in some detail.  The escapement assembly
serves a *safe and arm* function by ensuring that the fuze is not armed
during handling nor sooner than approximately 100 milliseconds after
firing or launch (so that the round will not explode if it hits a tree
branch or other interference near the gunner).  This *safe and arm*
function is accomplished in the M549A1 escapement assembly through several
safety features, including:  (1) a setback pin (and spring), which locks
the rotor containing the detonator into a safe position, and only retracts
(thereby allowing the escapement to move to an armed position) when the
round is fired; (2) a double spin *detent* consisting of two spin locks
that move to the outside and are thereby disengaged from the rotor as a
result of the centrifugal forces generated by the rotation of the round
caused by its traveling down the grooved (rifled) gun barrel; and (3) a
timing device that prevents movement into an armed position for
approximately 100 milliseconds after firing.  In addition, the M549A1
escapement assembly includes a rotor locking feature‑‑when the
rotor in the escapement assembly rotates into an armed position, a small
locking ball slides into the detent, thus locking the rotor into position
such that the detonator is properly aligned with the firing pin in the
centerplate assembly and cannot become misaligned prior to impact.
    
The centerplate assembly serves a detonation function by sensing the
impact of the round on the target and then pressing the firing pin into
the detonator.  The M549A1 centerplate assembly accomplishes the
detonation function using three weighted brackets; because of the
centrifugal force of the spinning round, each bracket rotates on a
retaining (hammerweight) pin away from the firing pin during flight, but
when the round hits, a bracket spring pushes back enough such that one or
more brackets press into the firing pin.  Hearing Transcript (Tr.)
at 12-31, 186-193; Declaration of Kaman Dayron General Manager.
    
As explained above, it was the escapement assembly for another
fuze‑‑the M550‑‑[DELETED] that the contracting
officer cited in her SSD as the AMTEC experience most similar to
experience with the overall M549A1 fuze.  It appears from the record,
however, that the M549A1 escapement assembly is more complex in design and
assembly than the M550 escapement assembly.  In this regard, while the
M549A1 escapement assembly was designed to use many of the same components
and features of the M550 escapement assembly, the M549A1 escapement
assembly includes significant features not found in the M550 escapement
assembly (as well as having a number of parts that are somewhat different
from the corresponding M550 parts).  Specifically, the double spin detent
and the rotor locking feature with the small locking ball in the M549A1
escapement assembly are not present in the M550 escapement assembly. 
While the agency asserts that these features do not substantially increase
assembly or functional complexity, Agency Comments, Dec. 2, 2003, the
double spin detent consists of two spin locks that are smaller, more
complex in shape than the locking feature on the M550 and, according to
Kaman Dayron, the only manufacturer of the M549A1 fuze, difficult to
install.  Tr. at 196-97; Declaration of Kaman Dayron General Manager.[1] 
    
The agency has not adequately explained why the M550 escape assembly was
nearly identical in complexity to the M549A1 escapement.  In fact, Kaman
Dayron*s position that the smallness of the double spin detent increases
the assembly complexity is consistent with the view expressed by one of
the three agency technical evaluators, namely, that the M549A1 centerplate
is less complex than the M549A1 escapement assembly because it uses larger
parts that have lesser tolerance requirements and are easier to assemble
because of their larger size.  Tr. 51, 133, 140‑41.  Further, it
appears from the record that, overall, the M549A1 escapement assembly is
more difficult to assemble than the M550 escapement assembly.  Not only
does the M549A1 escapement assembly include additional, smaller,
complex‑in‑shape parts but, in addition, unlike the
essentially single-plane M550 design, the M549A1 is a layered design in
which some parts are less accessible and which requires a more complex,
sequential assembly process.  Tr. at 196, 314‑16, 375, 386.   
    
As for the M549A1 centerplate assembly, the agency maintains that this
assembly is not as complex as the escapement assembly.  However, even if
the centerplate assembly is less complex, the source selection decision
characterized the M549A1 centerplate assembly as *complex,* SSD at 11, and
the record confirms that production of the centerplate assembly poses
significant challenges.[2]  Further, the fact remains that AMTEC had not
produced any centerplate assemblies for any fuze.  The agency, however,
failed to account for AMTEC*s lack of experience with centerplate
assemblies; nothing in the record indicates that, in determining the
similarity of experience, the agency accounted for the addition to the
overall complexity resulting from having to manufacture a centerplate
assembly as well as an escapement assembly, and then having to integrate
the two assemblies into an overall fuze.
    
The position taken by the evaluators immediately before preparing the
final evaluation summary was consistent with the view that the M550
escapement is only similar‑‑and not nearly
identical‑‑to the M549A1 fuze.  Tr. at 52‑53, 105, 162. 
Specifically, the handwritten draft of the evaluation team*s final
evaluation summary states that *[t]he M550 escapement is similar in design
and complexity to the M549A1 escapement used in the M549A1 fuze.*  Agency
Evaluation Notes.  Again, the source selection plan provided in pertinent
part that an offeror*s technical approach would be rated as excellent
where the offeror demonstrated the experience and capability to
manufacture and inspect *the M549A1 Fuze or an item(s) nearly identical in
assembly and functional complexity,* but would be rated as only good where
the offeror demonstrated the experience and capability to manufacture and
inspect *an item with similar assembly requirements to the M549A1 Fuze.* 
Source Selection Plan P: 8. 
    
The agency does not concede that the evaluators* reference to *similar*
equates with a determination that the M550 escapement assembly did not
satisfy the *nearly identical* standard.  When asked during the hearing to
explain why the final evaluation summary stated that the M550 escapement
assembly is *nearly identical in assembly, processes, design complexity
and function as the M549A1 fuze,* rather than merely similar, the
evaluator responsible for preparing the team*s handwritten draft summary,
responded that *it is just easier to say similar than it is to say nearly
identical.*  Technical Evaluation Worksheet, AMTEC; Tr. at 53-54, 85.  We
find this explanation unreasonable.  The source selection plan emphasized
the importance of distinguishing between these two levels (similar vs.
nearly identical) and, thus, as conceded by the evaluator, there was an
important difference in the meaning of these phrases in the context of
this evaluation.  Tr. at 85.  More importantly, the evaluator*s
explanation in no way explains the shift from the narrower claim of
similarity (or near identicality) between the two escapements to the
broader, and unsupported, claim of near identicality between the M550
escapement and the overall M549A1 fuze. 
    
Again, in reviewing protests against allegedly improper evaluations, our
Office does not reevaluate proposals, and we will not substitute our
judgment for that of the agency; rather, we examine the record only to
determine whether the agency*s judgment was reasonable (and in accord with
the RFP criteria and applicable procurement statutes and regulations). 
However, where neither the source selection decision nor the evaluation
record support the agency*s conclusions, we will sustain a protest
challenging the agency*s award decision.  See TRW, Inc., B‑260788.2,
Aug. 2, 1995, 96-1 CPD P: 11 at 3-4.  We find that this is the case here. 
Given that the record indicates that there are significant differences in
design and complexity between the M550 escapement, which is only part of a
fuze, and the M549A1 fuze, and the fact that the contracting officer
relied upon the evaluators* unexplained conclusion in determining that the
M550 escapement was nearly identical to the M549A1 fuze, we conclude that
the record does not support the determination of near identicality.  Since
this finding was one of the bases underlying AMTEC*s excellent rating
under the technical factor, it follows that this rating, and the overall
determination that the offerors were relatively equal under the non-cost
factors, were unreasonable. 
    
Although the contracting officer has testified that there was no
*guarantee* that Kaman Dayron would receive award if AMTEC*s technical
rating were reduced from excellent to good, she added that she was not
claiming that Kaman Dayron had no chance for award.  Tr. at 242,
250‑51.  Given the relative evaluated equality under the non-cost
factors when AMTEC*s proposal was rated excellent under the technical
factor, and the relatively small difference in prices, there is no basis
for concluding that Kaman Dayron would not had a reasonable chance for
award had the award decision been based on a reasonable evaluation.  In
these circumstances, we conclude that Kaman Dayron was competitively
prejudiced by the evaluation deficiencies.  McDonald‑Bradley,
B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD P: 54 at 3; see Statistica v.
Christopher, 102 F. 3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
    
We sustain the protest on the basis that the Army*s evaluation of AMTEC*s
proposal and the resulting source selection decision were unreasonable. 
We recommend that the Army either reevaluate the existing proposals or, in
the event that it determines that its procurement approach does not
reflect its actual requirements, revise the solicitation, and then request
revised proposals.  If its reevaluation or evaluation of revised proposals
results in the determination that an offer other than AMTEC*s represents
the best value to the government, the agency should terminate AMTEC*s
contract for convenience.  We also recommend that the agency reimburse
Kaman Dayron the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing the protest,
including attorney*s fees.  4 C.F.R. S: 21.8(d)(1) (2003).  Kaman Dayron*s
certified claim for costs, detailing the time spent and the costs
incurred, must be submitted to the agency within 60 days of receiving this
decision.  4 C.F.R. S: 21.8(f)(1) (2003).
    
The protest is sustained.
    
Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel
    
    
    
    

   ------------------------

   [1] We note that the record indicates that the contracting officer lacked
technical knowledge regarding the fuzes and their production, and instead
relied on the agency technical evaluators.  Tr. at 237, 244-49; see Tr. at
20, 29, 63-65, 90, 220-21.  Further, while, according to the contracting
officer, AMTEC has manufactured 6 million M550 escapement assemblies,
Kaman Dayron has manufactured 22 million M550 escapement assemblies and 15
million M550 fuzes (as well as 1 million M549A1 fuzes and 30 million of
the earlier M549 fuzes).  Declaration of Kaman Dayron General Manager. 
Thus, the record indicates that Kaman Dayron has detailed knowledge of
both the M550 fuze and components and the M549A1 fuze it developed and
manufactured.
[2] Although the centerplate assembly generally has larger, simpler parts
than does the escapement assembly, the record indicates that
production/assembly of the centerplate assembly is a very demanding
process.  This process extends beyond simply casting parts in an enclosed
die, that is, in a controlled environment, and instead also requires a
dynamic, difficult‑to‑control process of [DELETED].  Tr.
at 303-05, 313-19, 327-28, 344‑46.  Indeed, the complexity of the
M549A1 centerplate assembly and the demanding nature of the production
process appear to be confirmed by the fact that, as verified by the
agency*s evaluators, the problems encountered with the M549A1 fuze, namely
duds or unexploded ordinance, have been attributable to [DELETED].  Tr. at
75-77, 379.