TITLE:  Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corporation, B-292895.2, May 25, 2004
BNUMBER:  B-292895.2
DATE:  May 25, 2004
**********************************************************************
Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corporation, B-292895.2, May 25, 2004

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE                                                
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective      
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.        

   Decision
    
Matter of:   Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corporation
    
File:            B-292895.2
    
Date:              May 25, 2004
    
John S. Pachter, Esq., Stephen D. Knight, Esq., Jonathan D. Shaffer, Esq.,
Sophia R. Zetterlund, Esq., and Erin R. Karsman, Esq., Smith Pachter
McWhorter & Allen, for the protester.
David R. Hazelton, Esq., Latham & Watkins, for The Charles Stark Draper
Laboratories, an intervenor.
Elizabeth J. Fischmann, Esq., John D. Schminky, Esq., Thomas L. Frankfurt,
Esq., and Dean R. Berman, Esq., Department of the Navy, for the agency.
Katherine I. Riback, Esq., and David A. Ashen, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
    
Protest against proposed sole-source award to establish and certify an
integrated support facility for repair and refurbishment of the MK 6
guidance system used in the Trident II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic
missile is denied where the record shows that the agency reasonably
concluded that only one responsible source, the MK 6 guidance system
design agent and system integrator, could satisfy its needs.
DECISION
    
Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corporation protests the proposed
sole-source award by the Department of the Navy, Strategic Systems
Programs (SSP), of a contract to The Charles Stark Draper Laboratories
(Draper) to set up and certify an integrated support facility (ISF) for
repair and refurbishment of the MK 6 guidance system for the Trident II
(D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
    

   We deny the protest.
    
BACKGROUND
    
Trident II (D-5) MK 6 Guidance System
    
The MK 6 guidance system, the current generation of guidance systems for
the Navy*s SLBM program, serves as the guidance system for the Navy*s
Trident II (D-5) missile system.  The Trident II (D-5) missile, first
deployed in 1990, is launched from submerged Ohio class (Trident)
submarines.  The D-5 missile has a range of more than 4,600 miles; can
travel at speeds greater than 20,000 feet per second; and is capable of
carrying multiple, nuclear-armed warheads, each of which can be
independently targeted with pinpoint accuracy.  The ability of the D-5
missile to accurately strike its targets involves the precise interaction
of the missile*s six main subsystems:  (1) the ship*s navigation system,
which uses sonar, a global positioning system and other navigation
equipment to identify the missile*s launching position from the submarine;
(2) the ship*s fire control system, which constantly processes the
submarine*s location, true north, target location and other data to
compute the proper trajectory for each missile; (3) the launcher system,
which uses expanding gases that are ignited to eject the missile from the
launch tube, through the water and to the surface; (4) the missile*s
three-stage rocket motor propulsion system; (5) the missile guidance
system, considered the most complicated and sensitive of the D-5 missile*s
six main subsystems, which is responsible for directing the missile on a
corrected trajectory, compensating for submarine position and in-flight
effects such as high winds, and triggering the re-entry bodies for release
towards the target; and (6) the re-entry bodies system, including
separation of the warheads towards the precise target, which is totally
dependent on the missile guidance system.  Facts/Chronology Polaris,
Poseidon, Trident at 1-9.
    
The MK 6 guidance system is packaged in two assemblies, including the
inertial measurement unit (IMU), containing the inertial instruments in a
gimbaled stabilized platform, and the electronic assembly, containing the
computers and support electronics.  The IMU is primarily comprised of: (1)
four gimbals; (2) two Kearfott‑manufactured MITA-5 gyros, to provide
a stable inertial frame of reference; (3) three size 10 *pendulous
integrating gyro accelerometers* (10-PIGA), which measure missile velocity
and transfer that information to the associated electronics to ensure that
the proper velocity is maintained throughout the missile*s flight so that
the missile stays on target; (4) a stellar sensor system, comprised of a
telescope optics assembly and a camera detector assembly, which updates
the guidance system through sightings of stars; and (5) electronics for
the camera, PIGA control, temperature control, gyros, gimbal torque motor
drive, data measurement and other purposes, which are collectively
referred to as the IMU electronics (IMUEs). 
    
The electronic assembly contains six computers that collectively provide
for gimbal control, utility control and monitoring, and missile navigation
and guidance computations.  Id. at 1.  For example, in the event that the
pitch and roll of the missile causes the missile to tilt and move off
target, thus moving the IMU gimbals, an electronic signal is sent via the
IMUEs to the two gyros and three 10-PIGA accelerometers; the electronic
assembly and IMUEs process the signals and information from the gyros and
accelerometers and send corrections back to the gimbals, which aligns the
gimbals back to an accurate target position; and the correction by the
gimbals is then sent to the electronic assembly, which sends a signal to
the missile steering system to correct the flight of the missile so that
it stays on target.  Contracting Officer*s Statement (COS), at 2-5; Agency
Report, Tab 73, Marvin A. Biren, The Trident II (MK 6) Guidance System,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc. (1991). 
    
Guidance System Contractor Support
    
There have been six generations of the SLBM nuclear weapons
systems‑‑the Polaris A-1, A-2 and A-3 missiles, developed and
deployed throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Poseidon (C-3) missile, first
deployed in 1971, the Trident I (C-4) missile, first deployed in 1978, and
the current Trident II (D-5) missile, first deployed in
1990‑‑and five generations of SLBM guidance systems.  Draper,
a nonprofit research and development laboratory originally associated with
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been the only prime
contractor responsible for the design, development, initial production and
repair of each of the five generations of SLBM guidance systems, including
the current, MK 6 guidance system.  In fiscal year (FY) 1984, Draper was
awarded a contract by SSP under which Draper was responsible for the
overall design and development of the MK 6 guidance system.  From 1983 to
1986, Draper established and qualified various industrial support
contractors (ISC) as subcontractors for production and repair of various
components of the MK 6 guidance system.  Beginning in 1992, upon
completion of the design, development and initial production effort,
Draper was awarded a series of contracts for Technical Engineering Support
(TES) activity, under which contracts Draper serves as the MK 6 system
integrator, with overall responsibility not only for engineering support
of the MK 6 guidance system, configuration management, changes to
manufacturing processes or repair processes, procedures and documentation,
test equipment development and production and test development, and
alterations to the guidance system itself, but also for systems
integration into the D-5 missile system.
    
Starting in 1987, SSP began awarding prime contracts to the ISCs for the
production and repair of the major hardware components of the MK 6
guidance system, including the IMU, electronic assembly, IMUEs and PIGAs. 
The agency initially dual sourced these components to various ISCs,
awarding two prime contracts each for the IMU, electronic assembly and
IMUEs, and the PIGA.  Kearfott and another contractor received contracts
for the IMU.  Subsequently, SSP determined that there no longer was a need
to dual‑source the production and repair of the major MK 6 hardware
elements and, in 1994, the agency made a series of down-select decisions
that resulted in the selection of a single ISC for the manufacture and
repair of each MK 6 component.  Kearfott was selected as the single
manufacture and repair contractor for the IMU, Raytheon for the electronic
assembly and IMUEs, and Honeywell for the PIGAs.  While Kearfott continues
to be the prime contractor for IMU repairs, and Raytheon continues to be
the prime contractor for electronic assembly and IMUE repairs, in fiscal
year 2003, Draper replaced Honeywell as the prime contractor for PIGA
repairs. 
    
Integrated Support Facility
    
Because production for the major hardware elements of the MK 6 guidance
system has ended, and only a continuing repair effort is still required,
and in order to reduce the resources required to support the MK 6 guidance
system, SSP in 2001 developed a plan for consolidating the MK 6 repair
effort in a single integrated support facility (ISF).  Under the
contemplated ISF approach, one contractor would provide the infrastructure
and personnel necessary to perform the repair, modification, diagnostics,
fault isolation and calibration for all of the components of the MK 6
guidance system, with full repair operations to begin in October 2005. 
Draft Navy ISF Requirements Planning Document, Jan. 28, 2002.
    
SSP then undertook a series of meetings with the guidance system
contractors, including (for a number of the early meetings) Kearfott, to
discuss the implementation of the ISF concept.  See, e.g., ISF Meeting
Presentations and Minutes, Jan. 2002; ISF Meeting Presentations and
Minutes, Feb. 28, 2002.  Ultimately, on September 9, 2003, the agency
published a synopsis on the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps)
web site announcing its intention to award a sole‑source contract to
Draper, as the *only known source* capable of satisfying the agency*s
requirement, to *establish an integrated support facility for repair and
refurbishment of the Trident II (D-5) MK 6 missile guidance subsystem.* 
The notice, however, also referenced Note 22, which affords interested
persons 45 days to identify their interest and capability to meet the
stated requirement.  On September 10, SSP issued its justification and
approval (J&A) for other than full and open competition. 
    
On September 22, Kearfott filed a protest with our Office asserting that
the proposed sole-source award was unjustified.  In a subsequent letter to
the agency, Kearfott outlined its repair capabilities with respect to, and
expressed its interest in, the ISF contract.  Kearfott Letter to SSP,
Sept. 26, 2003.  On October 28, after Kearfott had withdrawn its protest
because the agency was still evaluating Kearfott*s qualifications, SSP
invited Kearfott to submit a technical proposal *which demonstrates your
capability to set‑up and certify an ISF for the repair and
refurbishment of the complete TRIDENT II D5 MK 6 Guidance Sub-System to
the TRIDENT II D5 Missile System.*  Contracting Officer*s Response to
Kearfott*s Expression of Interest, Oct. 28, 2003, at 1.  In this regard,
SSP*s letter specifically cautioned Kearfott that, while PIGAs *will not
be repaired on the line [at the ISF] initially,* *the line must provide
for the repair of PIGAs in future years.*  Id. at 2.   
    
In response, on December 17, Kearfott submitted a technical proposal. 
When SSP, by letter dated February 5, 2004, issued its determination that
Kearfott*s technical proposal failed to demonstrate it could meet the
requirement for establishing and certifying an ISF, and reaffirmed SSP*s
initial intention to award a sole source contract to Draper as the only
source known to be capable of meeting the requirement, Kearfott filed this
protest with our Office.  Kearfott argues that the proposed sole-source
award is improper because Kearfott in fact has the capability to establish
and certify the ISF.
    
ANALYSIS
    
Although the overriding mandate of the Competition in Contracting Act of
1984 (CICA) is for full and open competition in government procurements,
obtained through the use of competitive procedures, 10 U.S.C. S:
2304(a)(1)(A) (2000), CICA permits noncompetitive acquisitions in certain
circumstances.  10 U.S.C. S: 2304(c).  One of those exceptions to the
mandate that competitive procedures be used‑‑that only one
responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy the
agency*s requirements‑‑was cited by SSP as the authority for
its proposed sole-source to Draper.  Justification and Approval For Award
to Draper (J&A).
    
When an agency uses noncompetitive procedures under 10 U.S.C. S:
2304(c)(1), it is required to execute a written J&A with sufficient facts
and rationale to support the use of the cited authority, and publish a
notice to permit potential competitors an opportunity to challenge the
agency*s decision to procure without full and open competition.  See 10
U.S.C. S: 2304(f)(1)(A), (B); Federal Acquisition Regulation
S:S: 6.302-1(d)(1), 6.303, 6.304; Marconi Dynamics, Inc., B-252318, June
21, 1993, 93‑1 CPD P: 475 at 5.  Our review of the agency*s decision
to conduct a sole-source procurement focuses on the adequacy of the
rationale and conclusions set forth in the J&A.  When the J&A sets forth a
reasonable justification for the agency*s actions, we will not object to
the award.  Global Solutions Network, Inc., B-290107, June 11, 2002, 2002
CPD P: 98 at 6; Diversified Tech. and Servs. Of Virginia, Inc.,
B‑292497, July 19, 1999, 99-2 CPD P: 16 at 3.  Here, based on our
review of the record, we find no basis to question SSP*s overall
determination that only Draper could satisfy the agency*s need for the
establishment and certification of an ISF for the MK 6 guidance system. 
    
As documented in its J&A justifying award to Draper, SSP determined that
only Draper could establish and certify the ISF SSP because, while
individual ISCs were familiar with their particular individual subsystems,
only Draper, as the design and development agent for the MK 6 guidance
system, as well as for the fleet ballistic missile guidance systems
generally, had (1) *comprehensive knowledge* of *all critical elements
unique to the guidance system*s performance,* and (2) *comprehensive
knowledge* of *the interrelationships of these elements with the entire
Trident II weapon system.*  J&A at 2.  SSP concluded that Draper*s
*overall systems engineering knowledge and technical expertise in the MK 6
guidance system is unmatched as a result of over forty years as sole
design and development agent on the [fleet ballistic missile] guidance
systems.*  Id. 
    
We conclude that SSP reasonably determined that Draper*s overall knowledge
of all of the critical components of the MK 6 guidance system, including
the IMU, electronic assembly/IMUEs, and 10-PIGA, was essential in view of
the broad scope of the requirement to establish and certify the ISF. 
Again, the record indicates that the contemplated ISF is to be an
integrated support facility which ultimately consolidates all guidance
system repair, assembly and factory support in a single facility, merging
three separate repair lines‑‑the IMU, electronic
assembly/IMUEs, and PIGA repair lines‑‑to form a single,
consolidated repair line for the overall MK 6 guidance system (other than
Kearfott*s MITA-5 gyro).[1]  The ISF contractor and its subcontractors
will be responsible for ensuring:  (1) that the selected facility is made
ready for repair process setup and qualification; (2) that fixturing,
tooling, procedures, infrastructure and personnel are in place to perform
the repair, modification, diagnostics, fault isolation, and calibration
for all elements of the MK 6 guidance system; and (3) the
qualification/certification of the integrated repair facility*s ability to
perform and sustain repair and refurbishment operations in the selected
location.  COS at 20; Tr. at 19-20; 87‑88, 256-57; Procurement
Request, Aug. 14, 2003; Draft Statement of Work for Competitive Set Up of
Integrated [Guidance System] Repair, Mar. 26, 2003.[2]  Further, according
to SSP, consolidating the three repair lines into one integrated repair
line for the overall MK 6 guidance system and maximizing efficiency will
require developing new manufacturing and testing equipment and
processes.[3]  Indeed, SSP reports that the required work under the
contemplated ISF contract would be similar in some respects to the work
Draper performed under the FY 1984 contract, under which Draper was
responsible for the overall design and development of the MK 6 guidance
system, including responsibility for the establishing and certifying of
the IMU, 10-PIGA, and IMUE/ electronic assembly facilities, and to
Draper*s ongoing work as the MK 6 systems integrator prime contractor
under its TES contracts, under which Draper has developed additional
repair processes and performed hands-on repair work for each of the MK 6
components, albeit on a smaller scale than that performed by the ISCs. 
Navy*s Hearing Comments, Apr. 29, 2004, at 7; Tr. at 69-70. 
    
In contrast, the record supports the Navy*s determination that Kearfott
lacked familiarity with at least two of the components of the MK 6
guidance system, the 10‑PIGA and the Trident electronics.  While
Kearfott in its December 17 technical proposal to SSP pointed to its
experience in establishing and operating its IMU repair facility, e.g.,
Kearfott Technical Proposal at 1-1, 2-1, 2-11, 2-12, the fact remains that
Kearfott has never produced or repaired the Trident MK 6 10-PIGA (nor even
the preceding MK 5 generation of 10‑PIGA).  Tr. at 391-92, 615.[4] 
Further, as noted by SSP, while Kearfott asserts that its experience with
other accelerometers will be useful with respect to the 10-PIGA,
Kearfott*s Director of Strategic and Space Programs acknowledged in his
testimony that the MK 6 10‑PIGAs were complicated components,
testifying that the 10-PIGA was *too complicated a design for reverse
engineering.*  Tr. at 542.  In these circumstances, we find that SSP
reasonably determined that Kearfott lacked adequate knowledge of the
10‑PIGA, a major, complex component of the MK 6 guidance system,
such as to call into question Kearfott*s qualifications for the
contemplated contract to establish and certify the ISF.[5]
    
As for the Trident electronics, even accepting that Kearfott possesses
experience with electronics similar in complexity to the Trident
electronics, a proposition which the agency maintains Kearfott failed to
adequately demonstrate in its technical proposal (or even at the hearing
on this matter), the fact remains that, as emphasized by the agency,
Kearfott lacks experience with the actual Trident electronics.  We
conclude that the agency could reasonably view this lack of experience
with Trident electronics as the basis for concern as to Kearfott*s
qualifications to establish the ISF.
    
Furthermore, the record supports SSP*s determination that, contrary to
Kearfott*s position, Draper*s unique, comprehensive knowledge of the
interrelationships of the MK 6 guidance system and its various components
with the overall Trident II (D-5) missile and its various subsystems was
necessary to meeting the ISF requirement.
    
Kearfott*s director for strategic and space programs conceded at the
hearing that Kearfott lacks an understanding of the other subsystems of
the D-5 missile and how the subsystems interact.  Tr. at 566.  Kearfott
maintains that such knowledge is not necessary because each component of
the MK 6 guidance system, including the 10‑PIGA, IMU, and electronic
assembly, has a test console for measuring performance; if the data output
from the test console matches the established performance requirements,
then the unit is acceptable to the fleet.  Tr. at 566‑67.  According
to Kearfott, this is how the ISCs currently test the respective components
that they repair, and Kearfott does not foresee that the establishment of
an ISF would change this arrangement.[6]
    
Testimony at the hearing, however, indicated that knowledge such as Draper
possesses of the various subsystems of the D-5 missile, including the
guidance system, navigation system, fire control system, missile
propulsion system and re-entry bodies, and how these subsystems interact,
is essential because the subsystems are highly integrated and
interconnected.  Tr. at 19‑23, 87-88, 279-81; Agency Hearing
Comments, Apr. 29, 2004, at 19-20.[7]  While the individual ISCs may not
have or need an understanding of the interrelationship of the MK 6
guidance system with the other subsystems of the D-5 missile, Draper
through its TES contract has such an understanding.  Draper, as part of
its TES contract, maintains the parameters for each of the test consoles
that are used by the ISCs, to repair the components of the MK 6 guidance
system, and Draper changes and updates the test consoles to accommodate
changes in the other subsystems of the D-5 missile.  Kearfott Supplemental
Submission (May 6, 2004) at 2.  Under the TES contract, Draper serves as
the MK 6 systems integrator, whose work includes systems integration into
the D-5 missile.  Contracting Officer*s Statement at 13.  According to
SSP, the ISF contractor must be able to make appropriate changes in the
MK 6 guidance system, the repair processes, and the appropriate test
consoles, in reaction to changes in other subsystems of the D-5.  Indeed,
SSP*s MK 6 Program Manager testified that the navigation subsystem of the
D-5 missile is changing and will result in a *different device,* which
sends out *different signals,* so that the ISF contractor will be required
to develop new repair and refurbishment processes for the electronic
assembly.  Tr. at 87-88.  In these circumstances, we find reasonable the
agency*s position that while an individual ISC such as Kearfott may have
been able to rely on test consoles furnished by another entity, instead of
on knowledge of the interaction of the Trident and MK 6 subsystems, this
approach will be insufficient for meeting the future ISF requirement.
    
In summary, we conclude that SSP reasonably determined that Kearfott had
failed to demonstrate its qualifications to establish and certify the ISF
for the MK 6 guidance system.  Our review of the record further indicates
that SSP reasonably determined that only Draper, with its unique,
comprehensive overall knowledge of the critical elements of the MK 6
guidance system and of the interrelationships of these elements with the
subsystems of the Trident II weapon system, could satisfy the agency*s
need for the establishment and certification of an ISF for the MK 6
guidance system.
    
The protest is denied.
    
Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel
    
    
    

   ------------------------

   [1] The record indicates that the Navy has a large inventory of MITA-5
gyros, sufficient to last through planned retirement for the MK 6 guidance
system, and thus defective MITA-5 gyros will be replaced rather than
repaired.  Hearing Transcript at (Tr.) at 70‑71, 95, 276-77, 639.
[2] In resolving this protest, GAO conducted a 2-day hearing, during which
testimony was given by witnesses from SSP, Draper and Kearfott.
[3] Although Kearfott contends that SSP failed to advise it of the
agency*s desire for achieving new efficiencies in the ISF, we find no
basis to question SSP*s position that Kearfott, through its participation
in meetings with SSP and other ISCs leading up to the issuance of a
synopsis for the ISF requirement, was or should have been aware of the
agency*s intent in this regard.  See, e.g., Agenda‑‑Initial
ISF Transition Team Meeting, Jan. 24-25, 2002, at 4, 6.  In any case, to
the extent that Kearfott asserts that the agency failed to advise it of a
desire for improved efficiency, or of other desired characteristic of the
ISF, Kearfott has failed to demonstrate that it could have furnished
additional information in response to a clearer statement of the agency
requirements sufficient to establish its ability to meet those
requirements.  See  Statistica v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (prejudice is an essential element of every viable protest, and
even where an agency's actions may arguably have been improper, GAO will
not sustain a protest where the record does not reflect that the protester
was prejudiced).  
[4] In its protest submissions and testimony, Kearfott asserts that its
personnel assisted Draper engineers in designing elements of the IMU.  Any
contributions Kearfott may have made in this regard does not alter the
fact that, as found by the agency, Kearfott lacked knowledge with respect
to critical aspects of the MK 6 guidance system.
[5] Kearfott contends that SSP does not intend to include repair of the
10-PIGA in the ISF.  SSP concedes that because the move would be a complex
engineering task, it may not initially move the repair of the
10‑PIGAs to the ISF, but instead may wait a year.  The agency,
however, does not rule out an immediate move and, in any case, maintains
that the facility must be set up to accommodate 10-PIGA repair.  We find
that, although the record indicates some earlier uncertainty with respect
to the agency*s plans in this regard, see SP23 Guidance Executive Council
Meeting, Dec. 7, 2001, SSP*s current intention concerning 10-PIGA repair
is evidenced by the agency*s letter of October 28, 2003, inviting Kearfott
to submit a technical proposal establishing its qualifications; this
letter specifically stated that the ISF line *must provide for the repair
of PIGAs in future years.*  Contracting Officer*s Response to Kearfott*s
Expression of Interest. Oct. 28, 2003, at 2.  To the extent that Kearfott
objected to the agency*s statement of its requirements in this regard, it
could not delay filing a protest to this effect until approximately 5
months after receipt of the agency*s letter.  4 C.F.R. S: 21.2 (2004).
[6] When questioned during the hearing as to whether Kearfott*s lack of
experience with other D-5 subsystems would adversely affect its ability to
establish an ISF, Kearfott*s director of strategic and space programs
testified as follows:
    
The factory is the factory.  The test console is there, you run it [the
component] through the test console, it makes it.  That*s what we do
today.  Why would I need to have the fire control experience at all?  I
don*t need it today.  Why do I have to have it for any factory?
Tr. at 568.
[7] In this regard, Draper*s director for strategic and space programs
testified that:
    
part of the actual input to a repair process is being able to ascertain
the cause and effect relationship between these highly integrated and
interconnected subsystems to determine that you are having the actual
[submarines] remove the appropriate failed component and send these back
for repair, not one sending good components back or leaving bad components
in. 
Again, that is all predicated on being able to understand the overall
interrelationship and interaction amongst all of these subsystems, and
that was Draper*s responsibility in the initial development of the system,
and continues to be as we monitor that. 
Tr. at 280.