TITLE: Securicor Sicherheitsdienste, B-292723, November 18, 2003
BNUMBER: B-292723
DATE: November 18, 2003
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Securicor Sicherheitsdienste, B-292723, November 18, 2003
Decision
Matter of: Securicor Sicherheitsdienste
File: B-292723
Date: November 18, 2003
Matthew A. Cambra, Cambra-Consult, for the protester.
Capt. Charles K. Bucknor, Jr., Department of the Army, for the agency.
Sharon L. Larkin, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Protest challenging *best value* selection of higher priced, higher
technically rated proposals is denied, where agency reasonably evaluated
protester*s proposal as marginal based on numerous technical weaknesses.
DECISION
Securicor Sicherheitsdienste protests the award of two contracts, one to
Securitas GmbH Werkschutz and the other to Pond Security Service GmbH, by
the Department of the Army under request for proposals (RFP) No.
DABN01-03-R-0005 for guard services at U.S. military installations in
Germany.
We deny the protest.
The RFP sought proposals for installation guard services for five Area
Support Groups (ASG) in Germany and the former U.S. Embassy in Bonn,
Germany.[1] These services include such things as static installation
access control, roving security patrols, explosive detection and patrol
dog teams, personnel security escorts, and *any other security related
function associated with the protection of the U.S. Government
installations, materials, property, and personnel.* RFP at 284. The RFP
also required the operation and maintenance of the government-furnished
*Mobile Vehicle Inspection System* to conduct security inspections of
vehicles at various locations on military installations. Operation of the
mobile search system at an installation required providing a three-person
team per shift. RFP at 475.
The RFP contemplated the award of multiple fixed-price contracts covering
the six installations for a base year with six 1-year options. Award was
to be made to the offeror or offerors whose proposals provided the
*overall best value,* considering technical/management capability,
performance risk (i.e., past performance), and price. The
technical/management capability and performance risk factors were of equal
importance, and combined were *significantly more important* than price,
which was to be evaluated for realism and consistency with the technical/
management proposal. The RFP provided for a tradeoff analysis between
price and the other evaluation factors to determine which offer
represented the best value, and cautioned offerors that the Army *reserves
the right to award to other than the low [price] offeror for better
technical/management capability or low performance risk or a combination
of both.* RFP at 496.
The technical/management capability factor consisted of eight subfactors
of equal importance--contractor*s qualification; contract organizational
structure; contract personnel staffing; personnel management; training
plan; mobilization capability; uniforms, vehicle and other equipment; and
quality control--which were further broken down into sub-subfactors. RFP
at 498-500. Unlike the other subfactors, which were to be qualitatively
evaluated, the contractor*s qualification subfactor was to be evaluated
only on a pass/fail basis. RFP at 498.
Securicor, Securitas, Pond, and four other offerors responded to the RFP.
A technical/management performance evaluation board (TMPEB) evaluated
proposals on a pass/fail basis under the contractor*s qualification
subfactor, and as deficient, marginal, good, or excellent under the
remaining technical/management capability subfactors. The Wiesbaden
Financial Services Branch evaluated the price proposals. Based on these
evaluations, a competitive range of three proposals was established,
including those of the two awardees and the protester.
Discussions were held with the three competitive range offerors. In
advance of these discussions, the offerors were provided a list of
questions concerning proposal weaknesses. In these discussions, Securicor
was informed of weaknesses under all eight of the technical/management
subfactors, including weaknesses relating to manager responsibilities,
recruitment, training, and mobile search team labor rates. Securicor was
represented at the discussion session by its proposed project manager, the
principal of Cambra-Consult, who had also prepared the proposal. No
employee of Securicor attended the discussion session.
After discussions concluded, the three offerors submitted final proposal
revisions (FPR), which were evaluated and rated as follows:
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |Ponds |Securitas |Securicor |
|------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
|Technical/Management Capability | | | |
|------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Contractor Qualification |Pass |Pass |Pass |
| |---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Contract Organizational Structure|Good |Good |Marginal |
| |---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Contract Personnel Staffing |Good |Good |Marginal |
| |---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Personnel Management |Good |Good |Marginal |
| |---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Training Plan |Good |Good |Deficient |
| |---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Mobilization Capability |Good |Good |Marginal |
| |---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Uniforms & Other Equipment |Good |Good |Good |
| |---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Quality Control |Good |Good |Good |
|------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
|Performance Risk |Low |Low |Low |
|------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
|Overall Technical Assessment |Good |Good |Marginal |
|------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
|Price (in Euros) | | | |
|------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |6th ASG |*12,850,746|--- |*10,634,106|
|--+---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |26th ASG |*40,312,948|--- |*30,331,550|
|--+---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |98th ASG |[REDACTED] |*31,792,594|*30,663,672|
|--+---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |100th ASG |*13,647,776|[REDACTED] |*12,190,655|
|--+---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |104th ASG |*42,271,488|--- |*36,601,142|
|--+---------------------------------+-----------+-----------+-----------|
| |Bonn |*621,359 |--- |*559,770 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Contracting Officer*s Statement P: 9; Agency Report (AR), Tab 9, Source
Selection Decision at 7-10.
As noted in the source selection decision, Ponds* and Securitas* proposals
received an overall rating of good for the technical/management capability
factor because their proposals met all of the technical requirements and
contained no weaknesses under the technical/management capability factor
for the installations for which they later received award. The source
selection authority (SSA) had *no doubt [of] the offeror[s*] capability to
provide satisfactory, reliable services* AR, Tab 9, Source Selection
Decision, at 3‑4. In contrast, the SSA found weaknesses in
Securicor*s proposal under five of the eight subfactors under the
technical/management factor that led to marginal or deficient ratings for
those subfactors and an overall marginal rating. The SSA concluded that
Securicor*s proposal warranted an overall technical rating of *Marginal
leaning towards Deficient based on the numerous weaknesses* and because it
*did not consider significant aspects of the Performance Work Statement
and is not clear or lacking in details in several areas of this proposal,*
such that *[t]here is some doubt ranging to considerable doubt of the
offeror*s capability to provide satisfactory, reliable service.* Id. at
6-7.
In comparing the offerors* prices, the SSA noted that the biggest
differential in prices for the ASG installations came from Securicor*s
price for the mobile search teams. These teams consist of three guards
each who possess higher certification requirements and responsibilities
than regular guards. The SSA noted, and the record confirms, that
Securicor*s pricing strategy was to propose a lower base security guard
rate for the teams, which did not account for the added certification or
responsibilities, and to price the team as if it contained only one guard,
as opposed to three guards. The SSA found this approach to present *not
only a considerable price risk but also a serious technical, and
performance risk to the government,* and it reflected an approach that was
*highly questionable to ensure successful performance.*[2] Id. at 7.
After comparing proposals, the SSA concluded:
Pond and Securitas clearly represent the current most viable contract
award solutions for the present requirement, whereas firm Securicor
contained many weaknesses and there was considerable doubt inherent in
performance of all ASGs and Bonn regarding successful contract
performance. Both Pond and Securitas provided a thorough and sound
technical approach to the requirements with little to no doubt of their
ability to provide reliable, quality services. Consideration for the
contract award for each ASG was evaluated against the Basis for Award
criterion and my own asses[s]ment of the best value trade-off of a higher
rated technical approach against a lower rated, lower priced offer.
Id. at 11. The SSA thus selected Pond for award of contracts for the 6th,
26th, 100th, 104th ASGs and Bonn, and selected Securitas for award of a
contract for the 98th ASG.
Securicor challenges its evaluation under several of the
technical/management capability subfactors.
In reviewing protests of alleged improper evaluations and source selection
decisions, it is not our role to reevaluate proposals. Rather, we will
examine the record to determine whether the agency*s judgment was
reasonable and in accord with the stated evaluation criteria and
applicable procurement laws and regulations. Abt Assocs., Inc.,
B-237060.2, Feb. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD P: 223 at 4. It is an offeror*s
obligation to submit an adequately written proposal for the agency to
evaluate, and an offeror fails to do so at its own risk. United Defense
LP, B-286925.3 et al., Apr. 9, 2001, 2001 CPD P: 75 at 19.
Under the contract organizational structure subfactor, Securicor*s
proposal was rated marginal because it was found to not identify clear and
comprehensive lines of responsibility, management, and training throughout
the corporate structure. Specifically noted were concerns that Securicor
did not adequately address the qualifications of Securicor*s proposed
project manager (who was a consultant but not an employee of the firm),
did not have any employees of the firm represent it at the discussions,
and did not clearly define responsibilities for recruiting, hiring, and
training. AR, Tab 9, Source Selection Decision, at 5. This led the Army
to conclude that the firm lacked a *clear and cohesive management
structure* such that there was a *HIGH risk that the Contract
Organizational structure presented will not provide effective contract
management.* AR, Tab 11, Final TMPEB Evaluation of Securicor, Factor 2.
Although the protester contends that the project manager was given full
authority to act on behalf of Securicor and was fully empowered to recruit
and hire, we cannot find that the Army*s concerns about effective contract
management were unreasonable, given the firm*s apparent lack of
involvement in preparing the proposal and participating in the
discussions. Nor can we find unreasonable the agency*s concerns over the
project manager*s qualifications, given that the resume for the proposed
project manager provided little detail concerning his qualifications and
Securicor did not provide any additional details in its proposal.
Additionally, from our review, we find that the agency could reasonably
conclude that there were unclear lines of responsibility for recruiting,
hiring, and training. For example, Securicor argues, and its initial
proposal states, that the project manager is responsible for recruiting
and hiring new employees. However, Securicor*s FPR provides that hiring
will be conducted through the firm*s Human Resources Department, and may
be conducted by site managers (who are also empowered to terminate
employees with approval of area managers). AR, Tab 15, Securicor*s FPR,
at 1. Similarly, from our review, it appears that the firm*s lines of
responsibility for training are blurred among the training division, site
instructors, project manager, and area supervisors. See AR, Tab 30,
Securicor*s Initial Proposal, vol. 3, at 24; Tab 15, Securicor*s FPR,
at 1. Thus, the agency*s marginal rating under the contract
organizational structure subfactor was reasonable.
Under the contract personnel staffing subfactor, Securicor*s proposal was
found marginal because it did not include a contingency plan for emergency
staffing of positions or provide for all possible contingencies. AR, Tab
9, Source Selection Decision, at 5. Under this subfactor, the RFP
required offerors to provide *a contingency plan to meet unforeseen
manning shortfalls caused by unexpected terminations, sick leave, and
other emergency type absences, etc.* RFP at 499. Securicor concedes that
it failed to provide this required plan, but argues that this omission was
minor. We disagree, and, based on our review, we find the marginal rating
for this subfactor was reasonable.
Under the personnel management subfactor, Securicor*s proposal was rated
marginal because it did not demonstrate an understanding of the agency*s
requirements, *based on the overall lack of detailed plans to ensure
recruitment of qualified guards, lack of compensation, [and] performance
and incentive plans that will result in a highly qualified and motivated
workforce,* despite the fact that these issues were raised during
discussions. Securicor*s proposal was specifically found to contain
inadequate information concerning required employee compensation and
incentive plans, particularly for the Explosive Detection Dog (EDD)
handlers, mobile search teams, and site managers, who appeared to be
compensated at rates lower than the agency believed were commensurate with
the qualifications and additional responsibilities of these positions.
AR, Tab 9, Source Selection Decision, at 5-6.
The protester contends that its plans for recruiting qualified guards were
adequately described in its initial proposal, which provided an overview
of the firm*s hiring process. However, our review confirms the
reasonableness of the agency*s determination that Securicor*s proposal
provided no elaboration or detail regarding the screening process or
procedures used to ensure guard applicants met the necessary requirements
and did not provide sufficient additional details in its FPR.
Also, Securicor does not deny that it failed to provide compensation or
incentive plans (and the record does not show that they were provided),
but rather states only that it believes its wage rates are adequate and,
in any event, it would *honor the current contracts of all guards who are
re-employed as long as these contracts are legal and plausible.* AR, Tab
15, Securicor*s FPR, at 7. Securicor also contends that since this is a
fixed-price contract, any shortfall in wages would fall to the contractor,
which would pose only minimal risk since the EDD handler and mobile search
team wages formed less than two percent of the contract. However,
Securicor*s arguments focus only on the price risk to the firm, and fail
to address the potential negative effect on the firm*s ability to *retain
qualified, reliable, dedicated and highly motivated guard force,* which is
what the RFP stated would be evaluated under this subfactor. RFP at 499.
Given Securicor*s qualified statement to honor current contracts, coupled
with its failure to provide information required by the RFP, namely
detailed compensation plans and incentives and a detailed recruiting plan,
the Army*s rating of Securicor*s proposal as marginal under the personnel
management subfactor was reasonable.
The Army assessed a deficient rating to Securicor*s proposal under the
training plan subfactor because Securicor failed to provide the required
training plan. AR, Tab 9, Source Selection Decision, at 6. The RFP
stated that the evaluation of this subfactor would include an assessment
of whether *[a]ll [of] the training requirements and the number of hours
in the specifications are included* and whether *[a] plan is included
showing the schedule of training to be provided.* RFP at 499. Although
Securicor contends that a training plan was provided in its initial
proposal, the record shows that the plan did not meet the requirements of
the RFP, since it merely listed general categories of required training
and outlined a general interface between the Securicor training division
and the project and area managers. AR, Tab 26, Initial TMPEB Evaluation
of Securicor, Factor 5; AR, Tab 30, Securicor*s Initial Proposal, vol. 3,
at 25. As the Army correctly notes, Securicor did not identify the role
of the site trainers or site managers, and provided no details of an
integrated training program in its initial proposal. AR, Tab 26, Initial
TMPEB Evaluation of Securicor, Factor 5. Moreover, in its FPR, Securicor
promised only that it *will provide a training plan,* stating that *[d]ue
to not knowing the current training standards of the incumbent[*]s guards,
a training plan cannot be delivered.* AR, Tab 15, Securicor*s FPR, at 8.
Given Securicor*s failure to submit a training plan as required by the
RFP, the Army*s rating of deficient under this subfactor was reasonable.
Finally, under the mobilization capability subfactor, Securicor*s proposal
received a marginal rating because it failed to identify specific roles
and responsibilities of personnel involved in the phase-in period, and
because Securicor presented conflicting descriptions of its mobilization
efforts in its discussions and FPR, which indicated to the Army that the
necessary mobilization efforts *were not clearly planned and only upon
contract award would there be any firm determination as to what would
actually take place.* AR, Tab 9, Source Selection Decision, at 6.
Securicor does not deny the accuracy of the agency*s observations in this
regard, but argues that it did not believe it necessary to identify the
personnel roles, given the firm*s experience in providing guard services.
However, the RFP stated that proposals would be evaluated for whether the
offeror *identified the individuals involved in the mobilization plan and
their duties and responsibilities,* as well as the *phase-in of management
personnel.* RFP at 500. While Securicor also argues that its
contradictory statement in discussions should have been ignored because
Securicor had *re-considered the mobilization efforts,* Protester*s
Comments at 5, it did not inform the agency of this change of position
and, thus, we cannot find the agency*s evaluation of Securicor*s seemingly
contradictory proposal unreasonable.
Based on the foregoing, the agency reasonably determined that Securicor*s
proposal warranted a marginal rating for the technical/management factor.
Thus, while Securicor challenges that Army*s best value determination,
arguing that award should have been made to it based on its lower priced
proposal, the record shows that the Army reasonably found that the Ponds*
and Securitas* proposals were technically superior and that their
technical superiority was worth the additional cost. Consequently, we
find no basis to object to the awards to these two offerors. Structural
Preservation Sys., Inc., B-285085, July 15, 2000, 2000 CPD P: 131 at 7.
The protest is denied.
Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel
------------------------
[1] The five ASGs were the 6th, 26th, 98th, 100th, and 104th.
[2] When its price strategy was questioned by the agency, Securicor
confirmed in its FPR that *[o]ur price strategy is that of a single hourly
rate for all positions,* and *verif[ied] that our hourly price for the
mobile search teams is for three guards per team.* Securicor
characterized this approach as *a very large risk* on its part. AR, Tab
15, Securicor*s FPR, vol. 2, at 1.