TITLE:  Efficiency Management & Engineering Company;, B-292676; B-292676.2, October 31, 2003
BNUMBER:  B-292676; B-292676.2
DATE:  October 31, 2003
**********************************************************************
Efficiency Management & Engineering Company;, B-292676; B-292676.2, October 31,
2003

   Decision
    
    
Matter of:   Efficiency Management & Engineering Company;
Norcor Technologies Corporation
    
File:            B-292676; B-292676.2
    
Date:           October 31, 2003
                          
Emory B. Woods, Efficiency Management & Engineering Company, and Wes
Clayton, Norcor Technologies Corporation, for the protesters.
Eric Kattner and Dennis A. Walker, Esq., Department of the Air Force, for
the agency.
Paul E. Jordan, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
    
1.  Agency*s consideration of more than three contracts in evaluating
offerors* past performance was unobjectionable where solicitation required
offerors to submit detailed information on three most relevant contracts,
but did not specify three as the maximum, and specifically requested
offerors to include in their proposals a listing of all contracts
performed within past 3 years.
    
2.  Agency*s price reasonableness evaluation, which compared overall and
individual prices, but did not penalize offeror for proposing lower rates
than the incumbent, was unobjectionable; purpose of price reasonableness
review is to determine whether prices offered are higher--as opposed to
lower--than warranted.
    
3.  In price/technical tradeoff decision, where past performance and price
were of approximately equal weight, and agency was fully aware of the
proposals* relative technical and price advantages, agency reasonably
determined that awardee*s proposal with rating of very good/significant
confidence and higher price was best value compared to one protester*s
proposal with neutral/unknown confidence rating and lower price and second
protester*s proposal with exceptional/high confidence rating but higher
price.
DECISION
    

   Efficiency Management & Engineering Company (EMEC), the incumbent
contractor, and Norcor Technologies Corporation protest the award of a
contract to Cirrus Technologies, Inc. under request for proposals (RFP)
No. F09650-03-R-0006, issued by the Department of the Air Force for
advisory and assistance services.
    

   We deny the protests.
    
The RFP was issued as a competitive section 8(a) set-aside for contract
administration, reconciliation, and closeout services for physically
completed contracts in support of the various directorates at Warner
Robins Air Force Base, Georgia.  The RFP contemplated the award of a
fixed-price, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract with a
5-year ordering period.  Proposals were to be evaluated on the basis of
two factors of approximately equal value--past performance and price--and
award was to be made to the firm submitting the proposal representing the
*best value* to the agency.  Past performance information was to be
evaluated on the basis of relevance--very relevant, relevant,
semi-relevant, or not relevant--and based on the evaluation of past
performance, the agency was to make an overall confidence
assessment--exceptional/high confidence, very good/significant confidence,
satisfactory/confidence, neutral/unknown confidence, marginal/little
confidence, or unsatisfactory/no confidence. 
    
Twelve firms, including Norcor, EMEC, and Cirrus, submitted proposals. 
After an initial review of the proposals, the agency issued evaluation
notices seeking clarification of offerors* past performance.  The final
evaluations were as follows: 
    

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|               |Past Performance                     |Price             |
|---------------+-------------------------------------+------------------|
|Norcor         |Neutral/Unknown Confidence           |$4,182,298.80     |
|---------------+-------------------------------------+------------------|
|Offeror 2      |Satisfactory/Confidence              |$4,335,001.20     |
|---------------+-------------------------------------+------------------|
|Cirrus         |Very Good/Significant Confidence     |$4,820,113.20     |
|---------------+-------------------------------------+------------------|
|Offeror 4      |Neutral/Unknown Confidence           |$5,079,895.20     |
|---------------+-------------------------------------+------------------|
|Offeror 5      |Neutral/Unknown Confidence           |$5,095,416.00     |
|---------------+-------------------------------------+------------------|
|EMEC           |Exceptional/High Confidence          |$5,404,648.80     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+

    
The source selection authority (SSA) conducted an integrated assessment of
the offerors* past performance ratings and prices.  Based on his review,
he determined that Cirrus*s higher past performance rating, at a higher
price, represented the best value to the government over the ratings and
prices of the other offerors, and he awarded Cirrus the contract.  After
receiving notice of the award and debriefings, EMEC and Norcor filed these
protests. [1]
    
EMEC*s PROTEST
    
Evaluation of Cirrus*s Past Performance
    
EMEC asserts the agency erred in its evaluation of Cirrus*s past
performance by considering more contracts than the RFP allowed.[2]  In
this regard, while the agency based its *very good/significant confidence*
rating for the awardee on two contracts for Cirrus and five contracts for
its subcontractor, EMEC asserts that the RFP limited the agency to
considering a maximum of three contracts for each team member. 
    
In reviewing a protest of an agency*s proposal evaluation, it is not our
role to reevaluate proposals.  Rather, we will consider only whether the
evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the terms of the
solicitation and applicable statutes and regulations.  CWIS, LLC,
B‑287521, July 2, 2001, 2001 CPD P: 119 at 2.
    
The evaluation here was unobjectionable; nothing in the RFP prohibited
offerors from submitting more than three contracts for each team member or
the agency from considering more than three.  While the RFP required that
each offeror submit specified information on its three most relevant
contracts performed within the past 3 years for itself and its critical
subcontractors, RFP S: L-900(c)(1), it also specifically required that
offerors submit two additional pages listing all contracts that the
offeror was performing or had performed in the past 3 years and provided
that the *Government may obtain and use performance information on any or
none of these programs.*  Id. S: L-900(c)(3).  Thus, there was nothing
improper in the agency*s consideration of five contracts in evaluating the
past performance of Cirrus*s subcontractor.[3] 
    
EMEC asserts that the agency was required to, but did not, evaluate
Cirrus*s key personnel.  EMEC notes in this regard that offerors were
required to *[s]pecify, by name, key individual(s) who will participate in
the proposed effort under this acquisition who also participated in the
program identified [on a past performance *FACTS Sheet*] and indicate
their contract role [and] [d]escribe how participation of these key
personnel contributed to the success of the previous effort and how this
indicates probability of success on the proposed effort.*  RFP, attach.
1.   
    
This argument is without merit.  While the RFP indicated that the agency
would consider the relevance of past performance information concerning
proposed key personnel (RFP S: M-900(b)(1)(iii)), it did not require
offerors to separately propose specific key personnel to perform the
contract.  Rather, the performance work statement (PWS) stated that
*[p]ersonnel qualifications will be assessed at each task order.*  PWS
S: 2.1.  The FACTS sheet plainly was designed to include all information
regarding each contract submitted by the offerors as part of their past
performance proposals; it did not establish a separate requirement for the
proposal of key personnel.  Since the RFP did not provide for evaluation
of the qualifications of personnel identified on a FACTS sheet, the
absence of such an analysis does not provide a basis for questioning the
evaluation.
    
Price Evaluation
    
EMEC asserts that the agency*s price reasonableness evaluation was flawed,
as evidenced by Cirrus*s low price.  Based on EMEC*s calculation of the
average labor rates proposed by itself and Cirrus, it believes that
Cirrus*s price was unreasonably low. 
    
EMEC*s assertion that Cirrus*s rates were too low provides no basis to
question the reasonableness of its proposed prices.  The purpose of a
price reasonableness review is to determine whether the prices offered are
higher--as opposed to lower--than warranted.  Rodgers Travel, Inc.,
B-291785, Mar. 12, 2003, 2003 CPD P: 60 at 3 n.1.  Thus, we find nothing
objectionable in the price evaluation.[4]  As for whether Cirrus*s price
otherwise was too low, the RFP advised offerors that the Service Contract
Act was applicable and, because the specified labor categories were not
defined in the wage determination, set a minimum rate.  The price
evaluators analyzed the individual line item labor rates, and determined
that all were within a reasonable range of those proposed by the other
offerors.  Agency Report (AR), Tab 11.  In this regard, while EMEC*s labor
rates were higher than those proposed by Cirrus, Cirrus*s rates were
comparable and well exceeded the minimum set forth in the RFP. 
    
NORCOR*S PROTEST
    
Norcor asserts that the agency failed to evaluate its past performance
information.  In the protester*s view, its evidence of prior contract
experience was sufficient and relevant, and there thus was no basis for
the agency*s rating Norcor*s proposal neutral under the past performance
factor. 
    
Norcor*s argument is without merit.  The RFP stated that the past
performance evaluation would assess the offeror*s ability to successfully
accomplish the proposed effort, based on the relevance, currency, source
of information and performance trends of the offeror*s demonstrated
present and past work record.  The RFP provided that the relevance of an
offeror*s past performance was based on the extent to which its
*[p]resent/past performance programs involved [different levels of the]
magnitude of effort and complexities which are . . . what this
solicitation requires, including contract administration, reconciliation
and closure of physically complete contracts.*  RFP S: M-900(b).  Very
relevant contracts were those involving *essentially* what the contract
required; relevant ones were those involving *most* of what was required;
semi-relevant ones were those involving *some* of what was required; and
not relevant were those that did not involve *any significant aspects of
above.*  Id. 
    
Norcor submitted information on five past contracts, including four for
delivery of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment or
generators.  Work on these efforts included coordinating with other
contractors on exact placement of the equipment, coordinating invoicing
from suppliers to the general contractor for billing and payments, and
closeout of contract and contract payments.  The other contract was for
purchase and installation of metal frames and drywall and finishing of
surfaces.  Work on this effort included arranging safety meetings and
coordinating schedules and completion of work at various locations on a
military installation.  The evaluators found that none of these contracts
was relevant because none involved the administration, reconciliation, and
closure of physically completed contracts as required by the PWS.  When
provided an opportunity to submit additional information to clarify the
relevance of these contracts, Norcor simply provided information similar
to that already submitted; for example, it highlighted its past work in
manufacturing and services, oil and gas well drilling and operation,
computer store operation, and its contract performance coordination
experience.  AR, Tab 8.  While Norcor*s prior contracts effort involved
closeout services associated with performance of those contracts, closeout
services were not part of the subject matter of those contracts.  This
being the case, we believe the evaluators reasonably concluded that Norcor
lacked relevant past performance and that a neutral rating therefore was
warranted.[5]
    
PRICE/TECHNICAL TRADEOFF
    
Both protesters challenge the award determination.  Norcor asserts that
the SSA erred by selecting Cirrus*s higher-priced proposal, and EMEC
asserts that the SSA erred in selecting Cirrus*s proposal because it was
technically inferior to EMEC*s. 
    
In deciding between competing proposals, tradeoffs, such as between past
performance and price, may be made.  The propriety of the tradeoff does
not depend on the mere difference in technical scores or ratings, but on
the reasonableness of the source selection official*s judgment concerning
the significance of the difference.  Digital Sys. Group, Inc., B-286931,
B-286931.2, Mar. 7, 2001, 2001 CPD P: 50 at 7.  A protester*s mere
disagreement with the agency*s determinations as to the relative merit of
competing proposals and its judgment as to which proposal offers the best
value to the agency, does not establish that the evaluation or source
selection was unreasonable.  Weber Cafeteria Servs., Inc., B-290085.2,
June 17, 2002, 2002 CPD P: 99 at 4. 
    
The tradeoff here was reasonable.  The RFP provided that past performance
and price were approximately equal and that the award would be based on
tradeoffs between the two.  RFP S: M-900(a).  In making his tradeoff
decision, the SSA noted that Norcor had the lowest evaluated price, but
had no relevant past performance.  Similarly, even though the second low
offeror*s subcontractor had three very relevant contracts, the offeror
itself, with overall performance responsibility, had no relevant past
performance.  Based on Cirrus*s higher past performance score and the
SSA*s assessment that its price, 11.6 percent higher than Offeror 2*s, was
not significant over the life of the contract, the SSA determined that
Cirrus*s proposal represented the best value to the agency.  Where, as
here, the RFP allows for a price/technical tradeoff, the selection
official retains discretion to select a higher-priced, but technically
higher-rated submission, if doing so is in the government*s best interest
and is consistent with the solicitation*s stated evaluation scheme.  4-D
Neuroimaging, B‑286155.2, B-286155.3, Oct. 10, 2001, 2001 CPD P: 183
at 10.  In view of Cirrus*s clear past performance advantage over Norcor
and the SSA*s specific determination regarding the impact of Cirrus*s
higher price, we find nothing unreasonable in the SSA*s decision. 
    
While the source selection decision document does not specifically discuss
a tradeoff between Cirrus*s and EMEC*s proposals, it does state that the
SSA*s decision was based on his *assessment of all proposals.*  AR, Tab
12, at 2.  In this regard, according to his supplemental statement, the
SSA considered the relative past performance and price for EMEC and the
other eight offerors and concluded that the combination of performance and
price for these offerors *was such that it would not have warranted a
trade-off to pay a higher price for the associated confidence rating* over
Cirrus*s.  SSA Statement, Sept. 19, 2003.  Specifically, as to EMEC, the
SSA noted that, although its past performance rating was exceptional/high
confidence, its price was 12 percent higher than Cirrus*s.  Id.  Based on
his integrated assessment of the offers, the SSA found that the *higher
rated confidence assessment for EMEC did not merit [the] price difference
over Cirrus.*  Id.  An agency properly may select a lower-rated,
lower-priced proposal where, as here, it concludes that the cost premium
involved in selecting a higher-rated proposal is not justified in light of
the acceptable level of technical competence available at a lower price. 
Walsh Distribution, Inc.; Walsh Dohmen Southeast, B‑281904,
B-281904.2, Apr. 29, 1999, 99-1 CPD P: 92 at 8.
    
The protests are denied.
    
Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel
    

   ------------------------

   [1] Both EMEC and Norcor raise a number of arguments.  We have reviewed
them all and find that none has merit.  This decision addresses only the
more significant issues raised by each protester.
[2] Noting an Air Force memorandum on justification and documentation of
best value decisions, EMEC also asserts that the agency failed to have or
to follow an evaluation plan.  For example, it notes that the RFP did not
define the relationships between relevance and assessment ratings.  There
is no evidence in the record that the evaluators did anything other than
evaluate the proposals in accordance with the criteria disclosed in the
RFP.  Further, failure to follow internal agency instructions for
reviewing proposals, or alleged deficiencies in the application of an
evaluation plan, do not provide a basis for questioning the validity of
the award selection; these plans are internal agency instructions and as
such do not give outside parties any rights.  Management Plus, Inc.,
B-265852, Dec. 29, 1995, 95-2 CPD P: 290 at 2 n.2.
[3] In fact, the *five* contracts the agency considered were simply
separate task orders under three contracts.  The protester*s own three
contract submissions themselves encompassed four task orders, and the
agency considered them all in its evaluation.  In any event, EMEC was not
prejudiced by the agency*s consideration of more past performance examples
for the Cirrus team; Cirrus did not receive a higher past performance
rating and EMEC, with fewer contracts evaluated, received the highest
possible past performance rating.
[4] EMEC also asserts that the agency should have provided it with
discussions if it found EMEC*s labor rates too high.  This argument is
without merit.  The solicitation incorporated the clause at FAR
S: 52.215-1, which advised offerors that the government intended to
evaluate proposals and might award a contract without discussions, and
that offerors* initial proposals should therefore contain their best terms
from a technical and cost or price standpoint.  There is no requirement
that the agency hold discussions where the solicitation advises offerors
of the possibility of award without discussions.  FAR S: 15.306(a)(3);
Kahn Instruments, Inc., B-277973, Dec. 15, 1997, 98-1 CPD P: 11 at 8. 
[5] In a related argument, Norcor asserts that the agency*s evaluators
were either biased against it or lacked the appropriate experience to
perform the evaluation.  Norcor has furnished no credible evidence in
support of its arguments.  Norcor merely infers bias based on the
evaluation.  We will not attribute unfair or prejudicial motives to
procurement officials on the basis of inference or supposition.  Triton
Marine Constr. Corp., B‑250856, Feb. 23, 1993, 93‑1 CPD P: 171
at 6.  Norcor also has not refuted evidence in the agency report of the
evaluators* and contracting officer*s significant experience.  In any
case, absent evidence of bias, fraud or conflict of interest, we will not
review protests based on evaluators* alleged lack of qualifications. 
Emmert Int*l, B‑280478, B-280478.2, Oct. 7, 1998, 98-2 CPD P: 112 at
8.