TITLE:  The LEADS Corporation, B-292465, September 26, 2003
BNUMBER:  B-292465
DATE:  September 26, 2003
**********************************************************************
The LEADS Corporation, B-292465, September 26, 2003

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE                                                
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective      
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.        

   Decision
    
Matter of:   The LEADS Corporation
    
File:            B-292465
    
Date:              September 26, 2003
    
James J. McCullough, Esq., and Steven A. Alerding, Esq., Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, for the protester.
Craig S. King, Esq., Richard J. Webber, Esq., and Frederick D. McKalip,
Esq., Arent Fox, for CACI, Inc.-Federal, an intervenor.
David A. Ridgely, Esq., and Lt. Col. Nathaniel P. Causey, Department of
the Army, for the agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
    
Contracting agency reasonably determined not to reject the quotation from
the vendor selected to receive an order for augmentation of the agency*s
procurement staff on the basis of organizational conflicts of interest
(OCI) where any potential OCI can be avoided by the careful assignment of
work under the contract to ensure that the vendor*s contracting
specialists do not handle matters (procurements or contracts) in which the
vendor has an interest.
DECISION
    
The LEADS Corporation protests the Defense Contracting
Command-Washington*s (DCC-W) issuance of an order (DASW01-03-F-0810) to
CACI, Inc.-Federal for support services. The order was issued to CACI
under its General Services Administration Federal Supply Schedule
contract.LEADS challenges DCC-W*s acceptance of CACI*s organizational
conflict of interest (OCI) mitigation plan and the evaluation of
proposals.
    

   We deny the protest.
    
DCC-W furnishes contracting support to numerous Department of Defense
components in the Military District of Washington, processing over 10,000
contract actions in fiscal year 2002.  Although the RFQ here generally
described the required work as furnishing acquisition services, contract
management oversight, evaluation services, and assisting DCC-W in
receiving, tracking, and processing acquisition packages, contracts, and
delivery orders, RFQ S: 1.2, the statement of work (SOW) specifically
required the contractor to provide approximately 20 *contracting
personnel,* equivalent to a GS-1102 contracting specialist, and set forth
the following tasks:  (Task 1) recommend the appropriate contracting
strategy for any assigned requisitions, including whether to award a new
contract, modify an existing contract, or place an order against a
contract; (Task 2) implement the contracting strategy, including
coordinating an approach with DCC-W assets (e.g., the legal department and
small business office) and the requiring activity, reviewing statement of
work packages for completeness and quality, and assuring that sole-source
actions are justified; (Task 3) assure that award documents are detailed,
clear and understandable, and that awards are made in a timely manner;
(Task 4) perform contract administration functions, including monitoring
contract performance, and assisting the agency in recording past
performance evaluations and completing contract closeouts; (Task 5)
furnish sufficient management, including a task manager and a full-time
site/functional lead, who will provide direction and oversight to staff
and *will also process a workload*; (Task 6) develop a system to allow
monitoring of open contracts; (Task 7) review and assess the completeness
of documentation, including statements of work and task packages; (Task 8)
provide acquisition administrative support, including arranging travel,
maintaining calendars, and maintaining files; and (Task 9) start full or
near full performance within 2 weeks of award.  RFQ S:S: 1.2, 3.2;
Question and Answer No. 13.  Although the RFQ indicated that
*[c]ontracting personnel will be responsible for all pre & post award
functions,* it cautioned that in no circumstances would the contractor be
responsible for the inherent government functions of a contracting
officer.  Id.  All contracting personnel were required to be proficient in
the use of the Standard Procurement System (SPS) (also known as the
Procurement Desktop Defense (PD^2)), a computer software system for
automating the procurement process. 
    
The RFQ provided that quotations would be evaluated on the basis of price
and three technical factors, including (in descending order of importance)
technical approach, personnel qualifications, and corporate
capability/past performance.  The technical factors when combined were
approximately equal in importance to price.  In addition, the RFQ provided
for submission of a quality control plan and OCI mitigation plan to *be
evaluated on a pass/fail basis.*  RFQ S: 16.2.
    
Three vendors submitted quotations.  After one vendor subsequently
withdrew its quotation, the remaining two‑‑LEADS and
CACI‑‑made oral presentations.  DCC-W then requested the
submission of revised quotations.  Based on its evaluation of revised
quotations and oral presentations, DCC-W determined that CACI*s quotation
was most advantageous.  CACI*s evaluated price ($14,270,376) was lower
than LEADS*s ($[DELETED]), and while LEADS*s quotation was evaluated as
excellent under personnel qualifications and good under technical approach
and corporate capabilities/past performance, CACI*s was evaluated as
excellent under all three technical factors. 
    
Among CACI*s strengths under the technical approach factor, DCC-W noted
CACI*s extensive familiarity with SPS; as a subcontractor to AMS, the
developer of SPS, CACI had provided SPS training and would be able to
train the 13 contracting specialists who were not proficient in SPS.  In
addition, CACI proposed to train its personnel at night and on weekends at
no cost to the government.  In contrast, DCC‑W questioned whether
LEADS had a clear plan for training its staff; the agency noted that,
while LEADS stated that it could obtain the necessary training from AMS,
the company had stated a preference for relying on the agency*s license
with AMS to provide training and using the agency*s allocated spaces.  The
agency also found CACI*s proposal of one functional lead for each of the
three sites at which services were expected to be
provided‑‑for a total of three functional leads, rather than
the one lead proposed by LEADS‑‑to be an advantage.  Likewise,
with respect to the corporate capability/past performance factor, DCC-W
viewed as strengths CACI*s extensive knowledge of SPS and its corporate
resources, as well as the fact that, as confirmed by the firm*s clients,
CACI had previously performed contracts under which it provided the same
type of services as required here.  In contrast, DCC-W noted that, as
confirmed by several of its clients, LEADS*s prior contracts were not for
the specific contracting specialist work required here, but instead were
focused on acquisition management, technology management and enterprise
modernization.  DCC-W determined that LEADS*s presentation and answers
during its oral presentation seemed to indicate a misunderstanding of the
nature of the procurement, with LEADS viewing the procurement as one for
project management‑‑leading the firm to stress its acquisition
planning and proposal evaluation experience‑‑rather than
simply as a procurement for contracting specialists. 
    
Upon learning of the issuance of an order to CACI, LEADS filed this
protest with our Office.  LEADS challenges DCC-W*s issuance of an order to
CACI on a number of grounds.  After considering all of its arguments, we
find no basis for questioning DCC-W*s determination that CACI*s quotation
overall was most advantageous.  We discuss the most significant arguments
below. 
    
OCI
    
LEADS asserts that CACI had numerous OCIs such that CACI*s OCI mitigation
plan should have been rejected as unacceptable and, in any case, CACI*s
quotation should have been downgraded under the technical approach and
corporate capability/past performance factors.
    
The RFQ as issued provided as follows:
    
The Contractor(s) awarded this contract are explicitly prohibited from
providing any management, design, development, integration, training,
operations, or maintenance tasks or contracts with any DCC-W entity for
the completion of this task.  It is understood that the contractor, to
include all subcontractors and consultants, shall comply with the
provisions of [Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)] Subpart 9.5
Organizational Conflict of Interest.
RFQ S: 11.5.  In addition, as noted above, vendors were required to submit
an OCI mitigation plan.  Subsequently, in response to a question as to
whether the above language applied to *any DCC-W entity* or to *any DCC-W
supported entity,* DCC‑W advised vendors as follows:
    
The Organizational Conflict of Interest is applicable to all contracts
with offices supported by DCC-W due to the sensitive pre and post award
information the contractor will be privy to.  If a contractor wishes to
submit a Mitigation Plan as to how they propose to handle a Conflict of
Interest it will be addressed prior to award.  The Mitigation Plan should
at least address the support the contractor is providing agencies
supported by DCC-W and types of non-contracting related services to DCC-W
customers.
Question and Answer No. 7.
    
In its mitigation plan, CACI proposed a firewall, providing for the
organizational, physical and electronic separation of personnel from the
CDSI Business Management Division supporting DCC-W from other CACI
business units, a continuous education program, nondisclosure agreements,
document control, and semi-annual audits.  In addition, CACI proposed to
immediately notify DCC-W of any DCC-W acquisitions on which CACI planned
to submit a proposal.  As an initial step, CACI submitted a list of 29
ongoing contracts it had with DCC-W and 8 future DCC‑W procurements
in which CACI was interested, and it committed to keeping this list
updated.  CACI characterized the provisions of its mitigation plan as
    
methods by which business units of CACI other than the CDSI Business
Management Division may . . . both propose on future acquisitions issued
by DCC-W and continue to perform on existing contracts awarded to other
business units of CACI by DCC-W.  The CDSI Business Management Division
that would provide the support services to DCC-W would be precluded from
proposing on any solicitations issued by DCC‑W, except for those
specifically relating to internal contracting support services for DCC-W.
CACI OCI Risk Mitigation Plan at 1‑3.  DCC-W determined that CACI*s
OCI mitigation plan was acceptable. 
    
LEADS maintains that CACI*s OCI mitigation plan was unacceptable because
it did not preclude the possibility of a CACI contracting specialist under
the contemplated contract from working on a DCC-W procurement (or a DCC-W
contract) in which CACI was interested.  According to the protester, this
would create an OCI that would not be mitigated by CACI*s proposed
firewall.
    
Contracting officers are required to identify and evaluate potential OCIs
as early in the acquisition process as possible, and to avoid, neutralize
or mitigate potential significant conflicts of interest so as to prevent
an unfair competitive advantage or the existence of conflicting roles that
might impair a contractor*s objectivity.  FAR S:S: 9.504(a); 9.505.  The
situations in which OCIs arise, as addressed in FAR subpart 9.5 and the
decisions of our Office, can be broadly categorized into three groups. 
The first group consists of situations in which a firm, as part of its
performance of a government contract, has in some sense set the ground
rules for the competition for another government contract by, for example,
writing the statement of work or the specifications.  In these biased
ground rules cases, the primary concern is that the firm could skew the
competition, whether intentionally or not, in favor of itself.  FAR S:S:
9.505-1, 9.505-2.  These situations may also involve a concern that the
firm, by virtue of its special knowledge of the agency*s future
requirements, would have an unfair advantage in the competition for those
requirements.  Aetna Gov*t Health Plans, Inc.; Found. Health Fed. Servs.,
Inc., B‑254397.15 et al., July 27, 1995, 95-2 CPD P: 129 at 13.  The
second group consists of *unequal access to information* situations in
which a firm has access to nonpublic information as part of its
performance of a government contract and where that information may
provide the firm an unfair competitive advantage in a later competition
for a government contract.  FAR S: 9.505-4; Aetna Gov*t Health Plans,
Inc.; Found. Health Fed. Servs., Inc., supra, at 12.  The third group
comprises cases where a firm's work under one government contract could
entail its evaluating itself or a related entity, either through an
assessment of performance under another contract or an evaluation of
proposals.  FAR S: 9.505-3.  In these *impaired objectivity* cases, the
concern is that the firm*s ability to render impartial advice to the
government could appear to be undermined by the relationship with the
entity whose work product is being evaluated.  Aetna Gov*t Health Plans,
Inc.; Found. Health Fed. Servs., Inc., supra, at 13.
    
The responsibility for determining whether an actual or apparent conflict
will arise, and to what extent a firm should be excluded from the
competition, rests with the contracting agency.  RMG Sys., Ltd., B-281006,
Dec. 18, 1998, 98-2 CPD P: 153 at 4. Contracting officers are to exercise
*common sense, good judgment, and sound discretion* in assessing whether a
significant potential conflict exists and in developing appropriate ways
to resolve it.  FAR S: 9.505; Epoch Eng*g, Inc., B-276634, July 7, 1997,
97-2 CPD P: 72 at 5.  We will not overturn a contracting officer*s
determinations in this area except where they are shown to be
unreasonable.  SRS Techs., B-258170.3, Feb. 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD P: 95 at 9.
    
As noted by the protester, while a firewall arrangement may resolve an
*unfair access to information* OCI, it is virtually irrelevant to an OCI
involving potentially impaired objectivity.  See Aetna Gov*t Health Plans,
Inc.; Found. Health Fed. Servs., Inc., supra, at 16.  Likewise, due to the
ultimate relationship of one entity to another, a firewall would not
resolve an organizational conflict of interest involving biased ground
rules. 
    
However, the record indicates that the OCI mitigation approach relied upon
by DCC‑W in determining to issue an order to CACI extended beyond
CACI*s proposed firewall.  According to testimony at the hearing our
Office conducted in this matter, the most important feature of the plan
was CACI*s proposal to notify the agency of procurements under which CACI
was interested in competition, which would allow DCC-W to act to avoid an
OCI.  Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 29, 131.  Specifically, contracting
officials testified, and the then Acting Director of Contracting
confirmed, that potential OCIs on the part of CACI would be handled in the
same manner where a government employee has an interest in a matter; CACI
contracting specialists would not be assigned to a procurement for which
CACI was expected to submit an offer or to a CACI contract, and if CACI
submitted an offer for a procurement that already was assigned to a CACI
contracting specialist, the procurement would be reassigned to a
government contracting specialist.  Tr. at 32, 37, 39-40, 61-62,
121‑124, 138-40, 148, 183-84, 193, 196-97, 212-13; Agency Comments,
September 4, 2003; Agency Comments, September 5, 2003, Statements of
Contracting Officer and Former Acting Director of Contracting.[1]  As a
result, the mitigation approach addresses the unfair access to information
and impaired objectivity OCIs by ensuring that CACI contracting
specialists would not be in potential conflict positions. 
    
LEADS asserts that CACI*s mitigation plan was deficient because it did not
mention the agency*s reassigning CACI contracting specialists as a means
of avoiding an OCI.  This does not provide a basis to challenge the
evaluation of CACI*s plan, however, since the determination as to what
procurements or contracts to assign to CACI contracting specialists is one
that will be made by DCC-W, not by CACI.  LEADS further notes that FAR S:
9.504(d) provides for the contracting officer to document substantive
issues concerning potential OCIs, and that the contemporaneous written
record here does not explain the basis for the contracting officer*s
determination that potential OCIs were not a basis for denying CACI the
order.  However, contracting officials testified that the determination
not to assign CACI contracting specialists to matters in which CACI had an
interest was in fact a contemporaneous determination that had been
discussed during the procurement and at the time of order.  Tr. at 196-98;
Agency Comments, Sept. 5, 2003, Statements of Contracting Officer and of
Former Acting Director of Contracting.[2]  We find no basis to conclude
otherwise.  In practice, DCC-W already has gone considerably further;
shortly after issuing the order to CACI (and before LEADS*s protest), on
account of the fact that CACI had submitted a proposal in a large Tricare
Management Activity (TMA) procurement, DCC-W determined not to assign any
CACI contracting specialists to the office responsible for supporting TMA,
not just for the specific procurement.
    
We conclude that DCC-W reasonably determined that CACI*s mitigation plan
was acceptable; the agency reasonably concluded that any potential OCI can
be avoided by the careful assignment of work under the contract to ensure
that CACI contracting specialists do not handle matters in which CACI has
an interest.  Research Analysis and Maint., Inc., B-272261; B- 272261.2,
Sept. 18, 1996, 96-2 CPD P: 131 at 12; Deloitte & Touche, B-238371, May
18, 1990, 90-1 CPD P: 486 at 8; cf. Epoch Eng*g., Inc., supra, at 7
(contracting agency reasonably determined that awardee*s OCI mitigation
plan adequately avoided or mitigated OCIs where the awardee proposed to
avoid assigning work under task orders to a subcontractor with potential
conflict).
    
LEADS asserts that even if there was no basis for rejecting CACI*s
quotation based on its mitigation plan, it should have been downgraded
under the technical approach and corporate capability/past performance
factors.  According to the protester, DCC‑W should have taken into
account in the technical evaluation the fact that, on account of potential
OCIs, DCC-W would be limited in the work it could assign CACI.
    
This argument is without merit.  Because the RFQ clearly provided for
vendors* OCI mitigation plans to *be evaluated on a pass/fail basis,* RFQ
S: 16.1, and the solicitation*s description of the technical approach and
corporate capability/past performance evaluation factors nowhere indicated
that OCI considerations would be taken into account, there was no basis
for taking OCI into account in the relative evaluation under the technical
factors.  See Epoch Eng*g., Inc., supra, at 7. [3]  In any case, DCC-W
maintains that any OCI restrictions on DCC‑W*s use of CACI
contracting specialists was insignificant.  The agency explains that the
approximately 20 contracting specialists being procured here were intended
as an augmentation of the agency*s current staff of approximately 85
contracting officers and specialists, and that CACI was involved in
relatively few (only approximately 30) of the 6,300 actions handled by the
agency in fiscal year 2003 through August 2003.   Tr. at 189.[4]  Thus,
the agency maintains that it can simply assign government contracting
personnel to handle matters in which CACI has an interest and use CACI
contracting specialists instead for other matters.   
    
CORPORATE CAPABILITY/PAST PERFORMANCE FACTOR
    
LEADS challenges the evaluation under the corporate capability/past
performance evaluation factor.  DCC-W rated CACI*s quotation as excellent
under this factor on the basis of CACI*s extensive knowledge of SPS,
demonstrated ability to hire personnel with outstanding technical
expertise, demonstrated flexibility in moving personnel as needed,
corporate resources, *glowing* ratings of CACI*s performance by its
customers and overall good past performance, and highly relevant specific
experience performing contracts in which it provided the same type of
services as required here.  Source Selection Decision at 3-4; Evaluation
Memorandum, May 12, 2003, at 3-4.  In contrast, DCC-W rated LEADS*s
quotation as good under the corporate capability/past performance
evaluation factor on the basis that, although its past performance was
exemplary, LEADS*s prior contracts were not for the specific, contracting
specialist work required here, but instead were focused on acquisition
management, technology management and enterprise modernization.  Source
Selection Decision at 5; Evaluation Memorandum, May 12, 2003, at 4.  LEADS
primarily questions its rating on the basis that it had previously
performed work that was the same or quite similar to the work under the
RFQ here. 
    
We find no basis to question DCC-W*s evaluation under the corporate
capability/past performance evaluation factor.  LEADS generally claimed
during its oral presentation that it was *[c]urrently performing on
4 similar, active contracts managing $1.9 billion in Federal
procurements,* and included some relevant responsibilities in a general
list of various types of work it had performed.  LEADS Oral Presentation,
Slides No. 5-6.  However, the specific descriptions of the three contracts
described in LEADS*s revised quotation support DCC-W*s determination that
the focus of LEADS*s experience was with tasks other than those that would
be assigned to contracting specialists under the contemplated contract. 
For example, in describing its contract with the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) (valued at in excess of $800,000 per year), LEADS
mentioned some responsibilities that might be assigned to a contracting
specialist, but described its responsibilities in terms that reasonably
indicated a focus on other types of work.  In this regard, according to
LEADS*s revised quotation:
    
LEADS is supporting the FCC with a range of acquisition, business
management and training support services.  Primarily supporting the
Managing Director (OMD), LEADS is assisting the FCC through various
acquisition initiatives including performance based contracting,
acquisition planning and strategies, contract management, budgeting, and
training.  The FCC*s most recent initiative with the LEADS Corporation is
to implement Panoptic FMS‑‑an enterprise-wide fiscal
management tool integrating key FCC processes into one browser‑based
software solution . . .  Tasked support includes Program Management;
Performance Metrics/Earned Value; Budgeting and Execution; Pre-award,
award and post-award acquisition support; Policy Support; Contract
Management; and Past performance.
LEADS Revised Quotation, attach. 5, at 2.  Likewise, in its revised
quotation, LEADS described its contract supporting TMA (valued at
approximately $1.85 million in fiscal year 2003) as follows:
    
LEADS is supporting the [Department of Defense] [TMA] with a range of
acquisition support services.  Primarily supporting the Acquisition
Management Division (AMD), LEADS is assisting the AMD to receive, review,
track, and conduct all enterprise-level surveillance activities associated
with overall management of non‑managed healthcare requirements
totaling $1.2 billion.  Acquisition Management, Administration Support,
and [Information Technology] Support are included in this effort.  Tasked
support includes Acquisition Management; Contract Oversight; Analysis and
Evaluation Services; Establishment of Operating Instructions; Training;
Contract Closeout, including Past Performance; Administrative Support; and
Enhancement, Maintenance, and Management of the Contract Information
Management System.
Id.  Further, although LEADS stated with respect to the third contract
described in its revised quotation that it had supported the National
Institutes of Health in awarding a section 8(a) contract, the value of
this contract was relatively insignificant, amounting to only $23,500.
    
Moreover, beyond the description of its responsibilities under the three
contracts described in its revised quotation, the record indicates that
several of LEADS*s clients confirmed to the agency that LEADS*s
performance focused on acquisition management, technology management and
enterprise modernization, rather than on the specific contracting
specialist work required here.  In this regard, DCC-W was advised that,
under its FCC contract, LEADS has only a single, full‑time
equivalent contracting specialist plus a *temporary,* while under its TMA
contract LEADS was assembling purchase requisition packages, statements of
work, and government cost estimates, and developing management programs. 
Source Selection Decision at 5; Evaluation Memorandum, May 12, 2003, at
4.  We find that, while the record indicates LEADS had performed
contracting specialist work, DCC-W reasonably concluded that the overall
focus of LEADS*s experience was elsewhere.  It follows that the agency
reasonably determined that LEADS*s quotation did not warrant the same
excellent rating assigned CACI*s quotation under the corporate
capability/past performance evaluation factor.
    
PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS
    
LEADS challenges the evaluation under the personnel qualifications factor,
under which both CACI*s and LEADS*s quotations received excellent
ratings.  LEADS apparently believes it should have received some advantage
in this area.  CACI named and included resumes for all 20 of its proposed
contracting specialists; DCC‑W evaluated the qualifications of the
proposed personnel as excellent.  LEADS named and furnished resumes for 16
of its 20 proposed contracting specialists; DCC‑W evaluated the
proposed personnel as meeting all of the SOW standards except for
proficiency in the use of the SPS, in regards to which the agency was
concerned that LEADS lacked a *solid plan* to train staff not proficient
with SPS.  In addition, the agency evaluation panel indicated that it
would have been more comfortable if LEADS (like CACI) had named and
furnished resumes for all 20 of the proposed contracting specialists. 
Source Selection Decision at 3-5; Evaluation Memorandum, May 12, 2003, at
3; DCC-W Debriefing letter to LEADS, June 9, 2003, at 2.[5]
    
LEADS questions the reasonableness of the agency*s concern with respect to
SPS proficiency, noting that a number of CACI*s contracting specialists
also would require SPS training, since only seven were proficient with
SPS, and that LEADS had made arrangements for SPS training.  In this
latter regard, LEADS states that it advised the agency during its oral
presentation that it *had gotten AMS*[s] tentative agreement to *put on a
class just for LEADS.**  LEADS Comments, July 28, 2003, at 29.  (LEADS
also raised the possibility during its oral presentation of using training
spaces allotted to DCC-W.)  LEADS also challenges any downgrading of its
proposal with respect to SPS proficiency on the basis that it would be
patently unfair because DCC‑W knew or should have known that *only a
handful of SPS-experienced personnel were available to any offeror,
including CACI, and SPS training could only be obtained from CACI or AMS,
CACI*s strategic partner.*  LEADS Comments, Sept. 4, 2003, at 34. 
    
LEADS*s arguments do not furnish a basis to question the evaluation
ratings under the personnel qualifications factor.  First, while the
record indicates that CACI, as well as LEADS, needed to obtain SPS
training for a number of its staff, LEADS overlooks the fact that CACI,
unlike LEADS, could more readily ensure that its staff received SPS
training; unlike LEADS, CACI, a subcontractor to the developer of SPS
(AMS), reportedly was the source of most of the SPS-certified training
instructors and could itself conduct the training.  In addition, CACI*s
quotation indicated that its staff included over 85 personnel who
completely understood SPS; thus, CACI had a greater pool of SPS proficient
staff.  CACI Revised Quotation, Technical Proposal, at 8-9.  Further, to
the extent that LEADS questions consideration of a vendor*s ability to
furnish staff proficient with SPS, its arguments amount to an untimely
challenge to the terms of the solicitation, which both required SPS
proficiency and provided for the evaluation of personnel qualifications. 
4 C.F.R. S: 21.2(a)(1) (2003).  We conclude that LEADS DCC-W reasonably
assigned CACI and LEADS the same evaluation rating under the personnel
qualifications factor.
    
The protest is denied.
    
Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel
    
    

   ------------------------

   [1] As noted by LEADS, at one point in the hearing, an agency supervisory
procurement analyst testified that in the event that CACI was going to
compete in a procurement, the agency *likely would* reassign a CACI
contracting specialist.  Tr. at 40.  Although the answer was conditional
rather than absolute, we note that the same procurement analyst testified
that the contracting officer *would make sure that he or she did not
assign that work to any CACI personnel,* Tr. at 39, and that testimony
from a more senior DCC-W official, as well as the statement from the then
Acting Director of Contracting, was similarly definite that matters in
which CACI had an interest would not be assigned to a CACI contracting
specialist.  Tr. at 121-124, 138‑40, 148, 183‑84, 193, 196-97,
212-13; Agency Comments, Sept. 5, 2003, Statement of Former Acting
Director of Contracting.
[2] LEADS also cites the provision in FAR S: 9.507-2(a) which provides
that *[i]f, as a condition of award, the contractor*s eligibility for
future prime contract or subcontract awards will be restricted or the
contractor must agree to some other restraint,* the solicitation shall
contain a proposed clause specifying both the nature and duration of the
proposed restraint and the contract shall include the clause (after *first
negotiating the clause*s final terms with the successful offeror, if it is
appropriate to do so*).  This provision, however, appears to have no
applicability here, since as discussed above DCC‑W reasonably
intended to avoid OCIs by not assigning or by reassigning CACI contracting
specialists, not by precluding CACI from competing for future contract
awards.  
[3] The RFQ provided for evaluation under the technical approach factor of
a vendor*s *[u]nderstanding of the Standard Procurement System, adequacy
of the transition plan, and adequacy of overall plan to perform the
work.*  RFQ S: 16.2.  The RFQ provided for evaluation under the corporate
capability/past performance factor of the *overall record in managing
projects of comparable complexity and scope,* and *overall capability to
finance and manage this project.*  Id.
[4] DCC-W*s authorized staff is 120 contracting personnel.
[5] DCC-W also expressed concern in its evaluation under the personnel
qualifications factor as to the extent of time LEADS*s single, lead
contract specialist would spend performing problem resolution rather than
contract specialist duties.  This appears to be a concern encompassed by
the technical approach factor rather than the personnel qualification
factor.