TITLE:  STIDD Systems, Inc., B-292075; B-292075.2, June 17, 2003
BNUMBER:  B-292075; B-292075.2
DATE:  June 17, 2003
**********************************************************************
STIDD Systems, Inc., B-292075; B-292075.2, June 17, 2003

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE                                                
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective      
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.        
                                                                              
                                                                              

   Decision
    
    
Matter of:   STIDD Systems, Inc.
    
File:            B-292075; B-292075.2
    
Date:              June 17, 2003
    
Marcus B. Slater, Jr., Esq., and Jennifer J. Zeien, Esq., Slater & Zeien,
LLP, for the protester.
Robert E. Lieblich, Esq., Katherine A. Andrias, Esq., and William A.
Longwell, Esq., Naval Sea Systems Command, for the agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
    
Protest challenging awards under solicitation for lithium-ion batteries
for mini‑submarines (Advanced SEAL Delivery System) is denied
where:  (1) based on information in proposal, agency reasonably assessed
protester's proposal as weak or deficient based on noncompliance of its
proposed system with solicitation requirements; and (2) the awardees,
unlike the protester, possessed a full range of research, development,
test and production capabilities, such that they could perform the
necessary development.
DECISION
    
STIDD Systems, Inc. protests the Naval Sea Systems Command's (NAVSEA)
award of contracts to Yardney Technical Products and SAFT America, Inc.,
under request for proposals (RFP) No. N00164-02-R-6914, for lithium-ion
battery cells or modules for the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS).
STIDD challenges the evaluation of technical proposals.
    

   We deny the protest.
    
The solicitation contemplated a two-phase procurement, commencing with the
award of two Phase I contracts for the procurement of battery samples and
battery test data, to determine a source of lithium-ion batteries for the
ASDS to replace the current silver-zinc batteries used on the ASDS.  ASDS
is a battery-powered mini‑submarine--approximately 65 feet long and
8 feet in diameter, with a dry, pressurized interior--which can be used to
transport Navy special operations forces
and for intelligence collection and reconnaissance.  U.S. General
Accounting Office, Defense Acquisitions:  Advanced SEAL Delivery System
Needs Increased Oversight, GAO-03-442 (Washington, D.C.:  Mar. 31, 2003),
at 3.  The solicitation statement of work (SOW) defined the required
battery sample as a
    
1/2-string subassembly (individual cells, interconnects, scanner(s),
harnesses, electronics, hardware, and battery management software) that
would be housed inside the ASDS titanium battery bottle.  The 
1/2‑string subassembly shall be representative of the production
deliverable to meet the requirement for a complete ship-set ASDS battery.
SOW I at P: 1.0.  (Each  1/2-string assembly is contained in a single,
titanium *battery bottle*; there are 7 strings‑‑14 
1/2-strings--in a complete ship-set ASDS battery.)    
    
The RFP provided that, following the completion of Phase I, a competition
would be conducted between the two Phase I awardees, resulting in the
award of a Phase II indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract based
on the battery developed by the successful offeror under its Phase I
contract.  In this regard, each offeror for Phase I was required to
include in its proposal a not-to-exceed (NTE) pricing matrix for the
batteries it would produce if selected for Phase II.  The offerors were
not permitted under the solicitation to offer a Phase I price of more than
$1.5 million or a Phase II NTE price of more than $10 million per
battery.  RFP Amend. 0002 at 6.
    
Award in Phase I was to be made to the offerors whose conforming proposals
were most advantageous to the government, as determined under a two-step
evaluation process.  In step one, the agency was to evaluate whether
offerors' technical proposals addressed specified go/no go criteria--with
respect to the required minimum energy (1,200 kilowatt-hours (kWh)), size,
cycle life, and discharge current of the battery--*in sufficient detail to
clearly show that its proposal meets these minimum requirements*; if it
were determined that any proposal failed to meet any of the go/no go
criteria, evaluation of that proposal would immediately stop and the
proposal would no longer be considered.  RFP at 41.  In step two, the
*best value* proposals were to be determined based on four evaluation
factors:  (1) technical, including (in descending order of importance)
subfactors for research and development (R&D) methodology, design approach
and schedule; (2) past performance; (3) offeror capability, including (in
descending order of importance) subfactors for R&D resources available for
this effort, management plan and available production facilities; and (4)
price.  The technical factor was significantly more important than past
performance, while past performance was more important than offeror
capability; these non-price factors, when combined, were significantly
more important than price.
    
Four offerors submitted proposals.  STIDD's, SAFT's and Yardney's
proposals were included in the competitive range.
    
STIDD proposed a lithium-ion rigid cell battery based on the STIDD and
Mathews Associates, Inc. *Massive Unit Small Cell Lithium-Ion Energy
System* (MUSCLES) approach, under which *the most current* [DELETED]
battery cell in production is used as the basic building block for the
battery system.  According to STIDD's proposal:
    
For any size *MUSCLES* battery system, [DELETED].
STIDD Technical Proposal at 2-3.  The [DELETED] cell proposed by STIDD is 
[DELETED] in size and weighs [DELETED].  STIDD proposed to combine
[DELETED] (a total of [DELETED] cells) in a single  1/2‑string
bottle assembly, for a total cell‑only weight of [DELETED] pounds
(as calculated by the agency using the stated weight for the [DELETED]
cells), thus leaving a margin of approximately [DELETED] percent, or
[DELETED] pounds (based on the 1,160-pound battery weight limit
established in the specification), for all other mechanical structure,
intercell electrical connections, cabling, safety circuitry, and
monitoring system components.  STIDD Technical Proposal at 6, [DELETED]
Product Data Sheet; STIDD Revised Proposal, Feb. 18, 2003, at 8.  In
contrast, SAFT's proposed design combined eight *strands* of
[DELETED] cells each (a total of [DELETED] cells) in a single  1/2-string
bottle assembly, for a total cell-only weight of approximately [DELETED]
pounds, thus leaving a margin of [DELETED] percent, or [DELETED] pounds,
for all other structural elements.  Yardney proposed to rely on a
particular configuration combining a number of larger custom cells, with
up to [DELETED] cells in a single  1/2-string bottle assembly, but also
proposed to try a number of different approaches using cells of varying
sizes and configurations in order to find the best one.  The
cell‑only weight of Yardney's battery was [DELETED] pounds, thus
leaving a margin of [DELETED] percent, or [DELETED] pounds, for all other
structural elements.  Agency Report, Apr. 17, 2003, at 11, 42.
    
After conducting discussions, NAVSEA requested final proposal revisions
(FPR).  Based on its evaluation of FPRs, the agency concluded that SAFT's
and Yardney's proposals were most advantageous to the government. 
Although all three offerors received highly favorable past performance
ratings, Yardney's and SAFT's proposals received favorable ratings under
the technical factor, the most important factor, while STIDD's proposal
received an unfavorable rating.  In this regard, while NAVSEA evaluated
STIDD's proposal as offering several strengths deriving from its use of a
proven, commercially‑available lithium-ion cell (the [DELETED] model
[DELETED] cell), that offered demonstrated performance, quality and safety
at the cell level, the agency determined that the proposal nevertheless
included major deficiencies and significant weaknesses that might result
in moderate to high risk to the overall program.  FPR Evaluation Results: 
STIDD at 2.  These included a lack of definition in the design of the
mechanical assembly, support structure and cabling which, together with
the lack of analytical or modeling data showing an ability to meet the
solicitation shock and vibration requirements, left compliance in this
regard uncertain.  Nor did the agency find an explanation as to how
critical subsystems such as the battery monitoring system would be scaled
up to the large number of cells proposed.  Further, the agency expressed
particular concern that the evaluated weight of the proposed battery cells
left only [DELETED] pounds for all other system elements.  In addition,
NAVSEA questioned whether STIDD's proposed design would meet all of the
energy requirements in the specifications, including the requirements for
a 205-volt operating voltage and a minimum energy output of 1,200 kWh.  In
this regard, the agency calculated that the data furnished for STIDD's
battery indicated that it would not meet the minimum requirement of
1,200 kWh of energy output when operating at the lower end of the required
operating temperature range.  NAVSEA's concerns with respect to STIDD's
proposal were further enhanced by the protester's failure to describe an
R&D methodology or any R&D and modeling capabilities that could be
utilized in the event that problems were encountered in the above areas. 
Finally, the agency questioned whether STIDD's proposed maintenance and
repair approach complied with the specification requirements.  Id. at
2-10. 
    
NAVSEA likewise found STIDD's proposal less advantageous than the other
proposals under the offeror capability factor, under which the agency
assigned Yardney's and SAFT's proposals highly favorable ratings and
STIDD's proposal only a favorable rating.  In significant measure, this
disparity resulted from the agency's determination that, while Yardney's
and SAFT's proposals described a full range of R&D, test and production
capabilities, STIDD's proposal did not describe any R&D or modeling
capabilities.  Id. at 2, 6; FPR Evaluation Results: SAFT at 2; FPR
Evaluation Results: Yardney at 2. 
    
Finally, under the (least important) price factor, Yardney's prices for
Phases I and II were $[DELETED] million and $[DELETED] million,
respectively; SAFT's were $[DELETED] million and $[DELETED] million; and
STIDD's were $[DELETED] million and $[DELETED] million.  Given the
evaluation findings, NAVSEA determined that SAFT's proposal, with its
highly favorable past performance and offeror capability ratings and
favorable technical rating, clearly represented the best value to the
government, and that Yardney's proposal, with similar overall ratings,
represented the second best value, notwithstanding the higher prices.
    
STIDD challenges several specific aspects of the evaluation, as well as
the agency's overall assessment of STIDD's proposal as presenting
significant risk.  STIDD concludes that its proposal in fact was the low
risk proposal and that it should have received one of the Phase I awards
instead of Yardney or SAFT.  We have considered all of the protester's
arguments, and find them to be without merit.  We discuss the most
significant arguments below.
    
In reviewing protests against allegedly improper evaluations, it is not
our role to reevaluate proposals.  Rather, we will examine the record to
determine whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and in accord with
the RFP criteria as well as with applicable procurement laws and
regulations.  Abt Assocs., Inc., B-237060.2, Feb. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD P:
223 at 4.  It is an offeror's obligation to submit an adequately written
proposal for the agency to evaluate, and an offeror fails to do so at its
own risk.  United Defense LP, B‑286925.3 et al., Apr. 9, 2001, 2001
CPD P: 75 at 19.  We conclude that the agency reasonably evaluated STIDD's
proposal and that the consequent source selection was unobjectionable.
    
ENERGY OUTPUT
    
STIDD challenges NAVSEA's determination that its proposal indicated that
its battery would not meet the minimum requirement of 1,200 kWh of energy
output when operating at the lower end of the required operating
temperature range.  In this regard, paragraph 3.2.1 of the specification
provided that the battery shall furnish a minimum energy output of 1,200
kWh across the operating temperature ranges, as defined in paragraphs
3.4.4.1 and 3.4.4.3; paragraph 3.4.4.1 of the specification established
the normal operating temperature range for normal discharge as
minus 2 degrees Celsius (C) (also indicated as 29 degrees Fahrenheit) to
35 degrees C (also indicated as 95 degrees Fahrenheit).  (The
specification also established a goal for an energy output of 1,700 kWh.) 
RFP Amend. 0004, attach.
    
Low temperatures tend to result in lower energy output (all other factors
being equal).  The only detailed temperature performance information in
STIDD's proposal, showing how the performance of STIDD's proposed battery
varied with temperature, was a copy of [DELETED] product data sheet.  This
data sheet included a temperature characteristics chart depicting
temperature performance curves‑‑showing nominal voltage and
capacity‑‑assuming a [DELETED] amp constant current discharge
at [DELETED] temperatures, including [DELETED] degrees C.  Since the chart
did not include a temperature performance curve for the required minimum
low temperature of minus 2 degrees C, NAVSEA evaluated the energy output
of STIDD's battery at the 0 degree C temperature performance curve, at
which temperature energy output would be expected to be better than at
minus 2 degrees C.  NAVSEA calculated that the output of STIDD's proposed
battery at this less challenging temperature was only [DELETED] kWh, that
is, [DELETED] percent below the required minimum output of 1,200 kWh. 
(NAVSEA reports that this calculation actually may overstate energy
output, since it does not account for resistance of the energy cell
interconnects and cabling.  Agency Report, Apr. 17, 2003, at 36 n.28.)  
    
STIDD challenges the agency's calculation on several bases.  First, STIDD
asserts that the agency failed to account for the effects of battery cell
self‑heating, that is, the likelihood that a number of lithium-ion
cells operating together would generate heat so as to raise the ambient
temperature and thereby improve battery performance at low temperatures. 
In this regard, STIDD notes that the temperature performance curves in
[DELETED] product data sheet depict the performance of only a single
cell. 
    
We find this argument unpersuasive.  As noted by NAVSEA, STIDD's proposal
did not refer to self-heating as relevant to low-temperature energy
output; indeed, its proposal downplayed the extent of heat generation. 
According to STIDD's proposal, *[c]ell heat dissipation is negligible,*
STIDD Technical Proposal at 17; *[h]eat generated by the cells at the
maximum specified current is insignificant, and will be transferred to the
bottle by convection,* STIDD Proposal Revision, Feb. 25, 2003, at 6; and
the *heat generated by the single bottle *MUSCLES' battery is a function
of current provided and is estimated to be on the order of [DELETED] watts
during full 100A current draw.*  STIDD Proposal Revision, Feb. 18, 2003,
at 7.  (Likewise, SAFT stated in its proposal that its test data indicated
that self‑heating would increase the temperature of its battery by
less than [DELETED] degree C under worst-case conditions.  SAFT Technical
Proposal at 22.)  NAVSEA calculates, and STIDD has not shown otherwise,
that the temperature rise in a 1,160-pound battery from [DELETED] watts of
heat generation would be only [DELETED] degrees C.  Agency Report, May 12,
2003, at 6-7.  (Further, as noted above, STIDD stated in its proposal that
the heat generated would be transferred to the bottle by convection; the
formula used by NAVSEA and STIDD in calculating temperature rise
apparently does not take into account heat loss resulting from heat
transferred to the battery bottle and then to the ocean.  Agency Report,
May 20, 2003 at 1-3; STIDD Comments, May 16, 2003, attach., at 4.)
    
Although STIDD originally based its argument in this regard on the
[DELETED] watts heat generation cited in its proposal, STIDD Comments,
Apr. 28, 2003, at 30, and attach., at 6, STIDD altered its argument in
response to the agency's position.  Specifically, when the agency
presented calculations demonstrating that any resulting temperature rise
would be less than 1 degree C, STIDD responded that the heat generated by
the cells actually would be [DELETED] (instead of [DELETED]) watts.  This
supplemental argument was raised more than 10 days after the protester
knew of the basis for the argument, and thus is untimely.  4 C.F.R. S:
21.2(a)(2) (2003).
    
In any case, as noted, STIDD's heat generation argument was not reflected
in its proposal; if STIDD believed that sufficient heat would be generated
by the cells as to significantly increase the ambient temperature and
materially improve battery performance at the low end of the required
temperature operating range, STIDD was required to state and support this
proposition in its proposal.  United Defense LP, supra, at 19.[1]  In
these circumstances, NAVSEA reasonably relied on STIDD's
proposal‑‑which did not indicate that there would be
significant heat generated‑‑in calculating the energy output
of STIDD's proposed battery.
STIDD also challenges the agency's calculation that the energy output of
its proposed battery at a temperature of 0 degrees C was only [DELETED]
kWh, asserting that this calculation understated the energy output because
it was based on a [DELETED] amp constant current, when the current
required actually would be less.  STIDD calculates that, given the
specification description of typical battery discharge currents, including
an average discharge current of 40 amps and a maximum discharge current of
100 amps, Specification P: 3.2.4, the required discharge current for each
cell would be only [DELETED] amps (at the maximum discharge current) or
[DELETED] amps (for the average discharge current).[2]
    
In response, NAVSEA reports that the evaluators were aware that the
[DELETED] amp constant current discharge rate was higher than that
required by the specification, but used that rate in its calculation
because that was the indicated current discharge level used to generate
the temperature performance curves on [DELETED] product data sheet in
STIDD's proposal; there were no other discharge rates depicted on the
[DELETED] graph; STIDD's proposal included no other discharge data to
demonstrate the performance of its proposed [DELETED] cells; and it was
not feasible to calculate cell performance at other discharge rates with
the information included in the [DELETED] data sheet in STIDD's proposal. 
Further, the agency reports that, given (1) that the energy output of
STIDD's battery using the [DELETED] amp discharge rate and at the less
challenging temperature of 0 degrees C indicated on the [DELETED]
temperature chart was [DELETED] percent below the required output, and (2)
that the energy output at minus 2 degrees C (the lower end of the required
temperature performance range) would decrease to nearly [DELETED] percent
below (to [DELETED] kWh) the required minimum (1,200 kWh), there was a
significant risk that STIDD's battery would fail to furnish the required
energy output even at discharge rates of [DELETED] amps.  Agency Report,
May 20, 2003, at 5.
    
NAVSEA's evaluation was reasonable.  Although STIDD disagrees with
NAVSEA's position‑‑asserting that the agency could have
derived battery cell performance at lower discharge rates from the
[DELETED] data sheet, and disputing the extent of any decrease in energy
output associated with a decrease in temperature from 0 degrees C to the
required lower limit of minus 2 degrees C‑‑it has not shown
that the agency's approach was unreasonable.  STIDD itself concedes that
the calculations it claims the agency could have performed to derive
performance at discharge rates lower than the [DELETED] amp rate shown in
the [DELETED] product data sheet were *involved and time-consuming,* STIDD
Comments, May 21, 2003, at 4, and STIDD has not refuted the agency's
position that the [DELETED] data furnished in its proposal did not
clearly, directly and reliably allow calculation of the performance of the
proposed lithium‑ion cell at lower discharge rates.  Again, STIDD's
technical proposal should have included all information necessary for
these calculations.  Given STIDD's failure to clearly demonstrate in its
proposal the performance of its battery throughout the required operating
temperature range, and its failure even now to show that its proposal
unequivocally met the low temperature energy requirements, there is no
basis to question the agency's determination regarding the energy output
of STIDD's battery.
    
STIDD notes that, even accepting the agency's calculations as correct,
SAFT's revised proposal showed an energy output lower than STIDD's,
indicating an output of [DELETED] kWh at minus 2 degrees C, which was
approximately [DELETED] percent below the required 1,200 kWh.  While STIDD
is correct, the agency notes that the output of SAFT's battery was
calculated at minus 2 degrees C, the required lower end of the temperature
range, while the output of STIDD's battery was calculated at the less
challenging temperature of 0 degrees C.  NAVSEA asserts that, given the
likely decrease in battery performance associated with a decrease in
temperature at low temperatures, there was no basis for concluding that
the difference in output between STIDD's and SAFT's batteries reflected
anything other than the more demanding environment in which the SAFT
battery was tested.  Agency Report, Apr. 17, 2003, at 37-39.  We find
nothing unreasonable in this position.  We also find reasonable NAVSEA's
further conclusion that SAFT's shortfall in this regard was less
significant than STIDD's.  As noted by the agency, the significance of
STIDD's failure to demonstrate compliance with the low temperature
performance requirements was enhanced by an immature battery assembly
design, the lack of any weight margin needed to implement improvements in
performance, and a lack of R&D capability to improve cell performance. 
NAVSEA notes that, in contrast, the proposed SAFT battery had a more
mature assembly design and a greater weight margin, and SAFT had a proven
R&D capability.  Thus, while STIDD's proposal furnished the agency with
little basis to conclude that the performance of its proposed battery
would improve, it appeared that SAFT would have the opportunity to improve
its battery's performance during Phase I so as to ensure compliance with
the minimum energy output requirements.  Agency Report, May 12, 2003, at
7-8.
    
We conclude that, based on the information in STIDD's proposal, the agency
reasonably found that STIDD's proposed battery would not furnish the
required energy output at the low end of the required operating
temperature range, and that there was a significant risk that the
deficiency in energy output would not be remedied during performance, much
less that STIDD could satisfy the agency's stated desire for even higher
energy output than 1,200 kWh.
    
WEIGHT, SHOCK AND BATTERY ASSEMBLY DESIGN
    
STIDD challenges the evaluation of its proposed battery with respect to
weight and battery assembly.  In this regard, as discussed above, the
specification established a maximum weight of 1,160 pounds for all
necessary battery fixturing, spacers, trays, interconnects, harnesses,
scanner, electronics, and individual battery cells, and provided that
proposals for systems exceeding the maximum allowed weight would receive a
lower technical score.  Specification P: 3.3.2; amend. 0002 at 8 and
attach.;  and amend. 0004 at 4.  In addition, the specification
established detailed requirements for resistance to shock and vibration. 
Specification P:P: 3.4.7, 3.4.8. 
    
As noted above, NAVSEA determined that, among the major deficiencies and
significant weaknesses characterizing STIDD's proposal, were the lack of
definition in the descriptions of the mechanical assembly, support
structure and cabling which, together with the lack of analytical or
modeling data showing an ability to meet the solicitation shock and
vibration requirements, left compliance with these requirements
uncertain.  In addition, the agency viewed with concern the fact that the
weight of the proposed battery cells alone apparently left only
[DELETED]‑‑actually [DELETED]‑‑pounds of the
1,160 pounds available under the specification for all other mechanical
structure, intercell electrical connections, cabling, safety circuitry,
and monitoring system components.[3]  NAVSEA maintains that, given the
lack of definition of the battery assembly design, including a failure to
detail how the proposed battery structure could be restrained and
protected from shock and vibration, and the fact that STIDD allowed less
than [DELETED] percent of the total assembly weight for all other
components other than the battery cells, there was a significant risk that
STIDD's proposed battery would be unable to meet the specification shock
and vibration requirements.
    
STIDD asserts that the agency's concern with its battery assembly
structure is unwarranted.  STIDD notes that it stated in its proposal that
*[t]he current physical design concept requires no more than [DELETED] lbs
for connectors, wires, PC boards and protective structure,* explaining
that the PC boards and approximately [DELETED] percent of the wires and
connectors are lightweight.  STIDD Proposal Revisions, Feb. 18, 2003, at
8.  When questioned by the agency as to its battery assembly structure,
STIDD responded during discussions that [DELETED].  STIDD Proposal
Revisions, Feb. 25, 2003, at 7; STIDD Response, Feb. 18, 2003, at 5.   
    
Again, STIDD's argument is unpersuasive.  As STIDD itself noted in its
proposal, its design was incomplete and it lacked data to establish that
it could meet the specification shock and vibration requirements.  In this
regard, STIDD's proposal stated as follows:
    
Because the final design has not yet been completed, exact dimensions and
physical characteristics of PC board thickness, wire dress, shock mounting
schemes, wire type, wiring harness strategy, encapsulation, strategic
point fastening, vibration protection and overall cable run methodology
have not yet been finalized in relation to system vibration and shock.
STIDD Proposal Revisions, Feb. 25, 2003, at 5.  Likewise, according to
STIDD's proposal, *[a]ll aspects of the single bottle mechanical assembly
and its internal support structure will be analyzed to ensure that shock
and vibration requirements are met.*  STIDD Response, Feb. 18, 2003, at
5.  As a result, when NAVSEA questioned STIDD during discussions as to the
lack of definition of its ASDS battery assembly design and the ability of
the design to satisfy the specification shock and vibration requirements,
STIDD was unable to furnish shock and vibration data with respect to its
ASDS design because it had not performed the necessary analysis.  STIDD
Proposal Revisions, Feb. 25, 2003, at 5-6.  We think this provided the
agency with a legitimate basis for concern.
    
Further, we believe that the agency reasonably viewed STIDD's incomplete
design as a matter of particular concern in light of the fact that STIDD,
unlike SAFT and Yardney, had allocated very little weight to components
other than the battery cells.  Again, while STIDD allowed only
[DELETED]pounds, or approximately [DELETED] percent of the total assembly
weight, for all other components other than the battery cells, SAFT
allowed [DELETED] pounds, or approximately [DELETED] percent, and Yardney
allowed [DELETED] pounds, or approximately [DELETED] percent for all other
components.  STIDD's allowance in this regard was not only significantly
less than that of the other offerors, it was also less than the margins
commonly used.  In this regard, according to the agency, in the
development of battery designs for uses such as ASDS, margins of 8 to
10 percent of total battery assembly weight are generally allocated to
mechanical structure.  Agency Report, May 12, 2003, at 9.  As further
confirmation of its view that STIDD allowed too little weight for
non-battery cell components, NAVSEA cites data from a prior application of
STIDD's battery assembly concept.  NAVSEA notes that STIDD submitted a
number of sample lithium-ion battery [DELETED] cells) for evaluation for
the Navy's Swimmer Transport Device program.  The agency reports that,
considering only the non‑battery components of these [DELETED], the
data indicates that the weight of STIDD's proposed ASDS design would be
[DELETED] pounds above the allowed 1,160 pounds per bottle, even before
consideration of the weight of the necessary monitoring electronics and
cabling to connect the slices of [DELETED].  Agency Report, May 12, 2003,
at 3.[4]   
    
We conclude that the lack of definition of STIDD's proposed battery
assembly design and the fact that STIDD allowed little of the total
assembly weight for other components, reasonably indicated that STIDD had
allowed too little weight for non‑battery cell components in its
design.  NAVSEA therefore had a reasonable basis to conclude that there
was a significant risk that STIDD's proposed battery would be unable to
meet the RFP's shock and vibration requirements.
    
MAINTENANCE LOGISTICS
    
STIDD challenges the agency's evaluation of its proposed approach to
maintenance logistics.  In this regard, the specification established the
requirement that the mean time to repair (MTTR) the system not exceed 12
hours, including fault localization, repair, and repair effectiveness
verification.  Specification P: 3.11.3.  In addition, the specification
stated that a modular design concept shall be used to the extent
practicable, with repair limited to the replacement of modular assemblies,
Specification P: 3.11.4, while the statement of work (SOW) for Phase I
provided that *[t]he  1/2--string subassembly shall be configured such
that individual cells can be removed from or installed in the subassembly
by the Government without damaging the string.*  Phase I SOW P: 3.1.2. 
STIDD disagrees with NAVSEA's finding that STIDD's proposed approach to
maintenance logistics failed to comply with the solicitation
requirements.   
    
NAVSEA's evaluation was reasonable.  In response to a NAVSEA question
during discussions as to how its proposed battery would meet the 12-hour
MTTR requirement, STIDD initially responded that the battery bottle (and
thus the entire battery) would be the lowest replaceable unit (LRU), and
that the bottle would either be returned to STIDD for service or serviced
on-site by STIDD-trained and qualified technicians.  According to STIDD's
response, *[s]ince no government personnel will perform any service or
repairs, the 12-hour MTTR is not applicable to any STIDD *MUSCLES' battery
systems.*  STIDD Proposal Revisions, Feb. 18, 2003, at 5-6.  When advised
that its response was inadequate--that designation of the bottle as the
LRU was still a weakness, and that precluding government personnel from
servicing the battery contributed to a significant weakness--STIDD
modified its proposal to
    
provide the ability for government personnel to remove the battery from
the bottle for bottle assembly maintenance  . . . . There are no
serviceable parts on the battery itself, and during the warranty period
the government shall not service the battery or its wiring, but may only
service the bottle . . . . 
STIDD now proposes the single bottle *MUSCLES* battery with all PC boards
and wiring as the LRU, not including the bottle.  During the warranty
period, replacement of [DELETED], slices or PC boards will require the
services of expert STIDD‑trained technicians with proper equipment,
and is deemed a depot level repair.  After the warranty period, the
government may service the battery as it sees fit.
STIDD Proposal Revisions, Feb. 25, 2003, at 2-4.  However, this revision
did not eliminate the weakness; while the solicitation required a modular
design in which the modular assemblies could be repaired by replacement,
and individual cells could be removed from or installed in the
subassemblies by the government, STIDD continued to propose that the
entire MUSCLES battery (with all PC boards and wiring) would be the LRU,
with replacement of [DELETED], slices or PC boards limited to depot-level
replacement by expert STIDD-trained technicians.  We agree with the agency
that STIDD's refusal to countenance subassembly replacement by government
personnel in the field (at least during the warranty period) was
inconsistent with the specific solicitation requirement for such a
capability and reasonably called into question how STIDD could comply with
the 12-hour MTTR.[5]
    
R&D
    
STIDD argues that NAVSEA's downgrading of its proposal for lack of R&D
capability was inconsistent with the solicitation, which assertedly did
not provide for evaluation of R&D capability, and unreasonable, because
STIDD was proposing mature technology that did not require R&D.  As noted
above, however, the solicitation specifically provided for consideration
of R&D methodology, under the technical factor, and of offeror capability,
including R&D resources available for this effort.  As for the agency's
focus on STIDD's lack of R&D capability, we note that this was relevant if
for no other reason than that STIDD's proposed approach in fact failed to
comply with significant solicitation requirements, thus apparently
necessitating some R&D work.
    
RISK
    
STIDD asserts that NAVSEA failed to consider risk in the evaluation, as
required by the solicitation, and improperly found that STIDD's proposal
presented a higher risk than SAFT's and Yardney's proposals.  In this
regard, the solicitation provided that *[a]s part of the evaluation a risk
assessment will be done and a rating assigned to each proposal based on
the probability of success of the offeror's proposed technical approach.* 
Amend. 0002 at 6.
    
We find no basis to question the evaluation.  First, it is clear from the
record that the agency considered risk in the evaluation.  While, as noted
by the protester, NAVSEA did not assign a single, overall risk rating to
each proposal, the agency, as part of its evaluation, created a matrix
that included a risk rating, based on the likelihood of failure and the
impact of failure, for each of 121 performance requirements.  In addition,
the agency noted in its narrative evaluation particular instances of high,
moderate or otherwise significant risk.  For example, with respect to
STIDD's proposal, NAVSEA determined that the undefined modularity of the
proposed design, coupled with the lack of reliability data, represented a
high risk.  Further, the agency concluded that the significant amount of
assembly design work that remained to be completed by STIDD could present
a schedule risk.  FPR Evaluation Results:  STIDD at 4.
    
As for the risk assigned each proposal, STIDD's argument that its proposal
offered significantly less risk than SAFT's and Yardney's is based on its
view that, unlike those offerors' proposals, its own relied on mature
technology.  In this regard, and in contrast to its proposal of
commercially available battery cells, STIDD attributes some enhanced risk
to SAFT's proposal of a *modest* increase in the capacity of an existing
cell, from [DELETED] amp hours (Ah) to [DELETED] Ah.  STIDD attributes
more significant enhanced risk to Yardney's proposal, which provided for
three alternative types of design; Yardney proposed [DELETED].  Yardney
Technical Proposal at 6-11, 15, 21‑24; STIDD Comments, Apr. 2, 2003,
at 9-10, attach. at 1-3; STIDD Comments, Apr. 28, 2003, at 23 n.19.
    
NAVSEA's evaluation of risk was reasonable.  First, the agency evaluated
SAFT's and Yardney's proposals as indicating that, unlike STIDD, those
offerors possessed a full range of R&D, test and production capabilities. 
In this regard, NAVSEA noted Yardney's experience in bringing lithium-ion
batteries from design to prototype, including its work in manufacturing
the cells and assembling the batteries for the Mars Explorer Rover
Battery.  Further, NAVSEA determined that both SAFT and Yardney had
proposed significant risk reduction activities.  Thus, the agency noted
that SAFT had already undertaken significant design, prototyping and test
work for the ASDS, and had based its proposal on a shortened 6-month
delivery schedule, rather than the 9 months permitted under the
solicitation, thus building in a significant schedule margin.  NAVSEA
concluded that, given the advanced state of SAFT's hardware development,
the proposed increase in cell amp hours from the current [DELETED] Ah
to[DELETED] Ah was reasonable, and did not pose a significant risk.  As
for Yardney, the agency noted that it substantially mitigated risk through
its proposed phased development plan, which included consideration of
[DELETED], and provided for an early evaluation of the [DELETED] energy
capacities.  Further, the agency concluded that Yardney's proposed
[DELETED] design offered a significant weight and energy capacity margin,
which reduced the risk associated with the fact that the [DELETED] design
of the ASDS battery was still in the engineering concept phase.  FPR
Evaluation:  Yardney at 2.
    
Finally, the protest in this regard is based on the erroneous premise that
STIDD's proposal indicated that the firm was proposing a compliant battery
system that would require no development work.  As discussed, however,
NAVSEA reasonably determined that, based on the information in STIDD's
proposal, its proposed battery would not furnish the required energy
output at the low end of the required operating temperature range.  We
similarly have found that the agency reasonably determined both that STIDD
allowed too little weight in its ASDS design for non‑battery cell
components, and that there was a significant risk that STIDD's proposed
battery would be unable to meet the specification shock and vibration
requirements.  We conclude that NAVSEA reasonably determined STIDD's
proposal to be of somewhat higher risk than Yardney's and SAFT's
proposals.
    
The protest is denied.
    
Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel
    
    
    
    

   ------------------------

   [1] The solicitation here highlighted the need for an adequately written
proposal, stating as follows:
    
Each technical proposal shall enable Government evaluating personnel to
make a thorough evaluation and arrive at a sound determination as to
whether or not the proposal will meet the requirements of the government. 
To this end, each technical proposal shall be so specific, detailed and
complete as to clearly and fully demonstrate that the prospective
contractor has a thorough knowledge and understanding of the requirements
and has valid and practical solutions for technical problems.  Statements
which paraphrase the specifications or attest that *standard procedures
will be employed,* are inadequate to demonstrate how it is proposed to
comply with the requirements of the specifications, and this clause. 
RFP at 39.
[2] According to the agency, the actual discharge current for each cell
given a maximum discharge current of 100 amps for the battery would be
closer to [DELETED] amps than the [DELETED] amps cited by STIDD.  Agency
Report, May 20, 2003, at 4.
[3] We note that because of rounding errors associated with adding the
weight of the [DELETED] battery cells in a single  1/2-string battery
bottle assembly, the agency's calculation actually overstated the
available weight; the actual weight of the cells alone is approximately
[DELETED] pounds, leaving only approximately [DELETED] pounds for all
other components.  Agency Report, June 9, 2003.
[4] STIDD notes that its proposal included a cross-section that STIDD
claims shows that the battery would fill the battery bottle, and thus
restrain movement within the bottle without adding other materials.  STIDD
Comments, May 16, 2003, at 13.  However, as pointed out by NAVSEA, the
cross-section cited by STIDD includes open spaces inside the bottle that
allow room for movement.  STIDD Proposal Revisions, Feb. 25, 2003, at 10. 
According to the agency, unless the spaces are filled‑‑and the
cross-section in STIDD's proposal did not show any such filling--shock
loads would be transmitted to the high points, that is, the points of
contact around the perimeter, thus generating very large point stresses on
the cells and [DELETED].  Agency Report, May 20, 2003, at 7-8.
[5] STIDD maintains that NAVSEA's desire for the ability to replace
individual battery cells was inconsistent with good technical practice. 
STIDD's position, however, amounts to a challenge to the solicitation
requirements that STIDD was required to raise prior to the time set for
receipt of proposals.  4 C.F.R. S: 21.2(a)(1).