TITLE:  Cube-All Star Services Joint Venture, B-291903, April 30, 2003
BNUMBER:  B-291903
DATE:  April 30, 2003
**********************************************************************
Cube-All Star Services Joint Venture, B-291903, April 30, 2003

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE                                                
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective      
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.        

   Decision
    
Matter of:   Cube-All Star Services Joint Venture
    
File:            B-291903
    
Date:              April 30, 2003
    
Katherine S. Nucci, Esq., Thompson Coburn, for the protester.
Capt. Ronald D. Sullivan, Raymond M. Saunders, Esq., and Kenneth Allen,
Esq., Department of the Army, for the agency.
Glenn G. Wolcott, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
    
1.  Agency reasonably rejected protester's proposal for failing to meet
solicitation requirements regarding emergency work, and for protester's
introduction into its final revised proposal of a proposed program to
reduce preventative maintenance staffing that was incomplete and
inconsistent with other portions of the protester's final revised
proposal.
    
2.  Agency engaged in meaningful discussions with protester where agency
conducted two rounds of written discussions and two rounds of oral
discussions during which protester was reasonably led into all areas of
its proposal that required correction or amplification. 
DECISION
    
Cube-All Star Services Joint Venture (CASS)[1] protests the Department of
the Army's rejection of CASS' proposal under request for proposals (RFP)
No. DAMD17-02-R-0001 to provide base operating support services at Fort
Detrick, Maryland.  CASS maintains that the agency unreasonably evaluated
CASS's management/technical approach as failing to meet the solicitation
requirements, and that the agency failed to conduct meaningful
discussions. 
    

   We deny the protest.
    
BACKGROUND
    
On November 13, 2001, pursuant to the provisions of Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, the agency issued solicitation No.
DAMD17-02-R-0001, seeking proposals to perform base operating support
services at Fort Detrick, Maryland.[2]  The solicitation was issued to
select a private sector proposal to compete with the agency's most
efficient organization (MEO) under the A-76 cost comparison process.[3]  A
site visit was held for potential offerors in December 2001 and,
thereafter, the agency issued several RFP amendments, which primarily
responded to questions from potential offerors. 
    
The solicitation advised offerors that the agency *contemplates award of a
firm fixed price contract with a minimal number of cost reimbursement
CLINs [contract line item numbers]* [4] for a 1-year base period and four
1-year option periods, and provided that source selection would be based
on the technically acceptable proposal offering the lowest evaluated
cost/price.  Agency Report, Tabs 7, 8, RFP, at 2344, 2347.  The RFP
established the following non-cost/price evaluation
factors--management/technical approach,[5] past performance/past
experience, and subcontracting--and provided that the agency would employ
the following adjectival ratings: *technically acceptable,*[6]
*marginal,*[7] and *technically unacceptable.*[8]  Agency Report, Tab 7,
RFP at 2347-50.  Section L of the RFP required offerors to submit three
non-cost/price proposal volumes, which corresponded to the three
non‑cost/price evaluation factors, and provided detailed
instructions regarding the required content of each volume.  Agency
Report, Tab 6, RFP at 2331, 2334-39.
    
Four proposals, including CASS's, were submitted by the June 14, 2002
closing date;[9]  thereafter, each offeror was permitted to make an oral
presentation to the agency's source selection evaluation board
(SSEB).[10]  The agency states that, in evaluating proposals, each
proposal *was reviewed independently in a very structured approach by each
SSEB voting and nonvoting member on the corresponding committee* and that
*after the individual evaluations, each committee held a consensus meeting
to discuss proposal strengths and weaknesses.*  Agency Report, Contracting
Officer's Statement, at 6-7.  The consensus meetings led to assignment of
the following initial technical ratings for each of the proposals: 
    
Offeror                               Technical Rating
    
Griffin Services, Inc.        [deleted]
CASS                                 [deleted]
C&E Services, Inc.           [deleted]
Jantec, Inc.                        [deleted]
    
Agency Report, Contracting Officer's Statement, at 7.
    
Since none of the proposals were rated as technically acceptable, the
agency opened discussions with all four offerors, initiating these
discussions by letters dated August 5, 2002. 
    
In the August 5 letter to CASS, the agency summarized various concerns
regarding CASS's proposal and provided a 24-page attachment identifying
multiple specific noncost/price issues that CASS needed to address.[11] 
Agency Report, Tab 16.  The agency's letter summarized the agency's
concerns, stating, in part, as follows: 
    
There [are] several reasons that your technical proposal was [deleted]. 
Care must be taken to ensure that when you propose a job description that
the staff members you propose meet those qualifications. . . . 
Additionally, there are many times when it appears impossible for the
listed number of staff to be capable of providing coverage at the
facilities for the operating hours listed in the PWS.  Your method of
accomplishing these tasks with the identified staff must be explained to
us in the proposal. . . .  Your response may or may not need to increase
the total number of staff, but we need an explanation of how you intend to
staff functions during the required hours of operations and how you plan
to dispatch, manage, inspect, equip, and supply staff who . . . react to
maintenance and repair actions.  The final concerns are the unique
environment and the type of operations at Fort Detrick (i.e. BL-3 and BL-4
laboratories.[[12]])  For example,  job positions must
be specific to the tasks required, and draft plans must reflect a deeper
degree of knowledge of Fort Detrick.
Agency Report, Tab 16, at 3275-76. 
    
On August 14, the agency followed up the August 5 letter by conducting
face-to-face discussions with CASS; during this meeting, CASS was afforded
an opportunity to ask questions and provide comments regarding the matters
addressed in the August 5 letter.[13]  Agency Report, Contracting
Officer's Statement, at 8. 
    
Revised proposals were submitted by CASS, Griffin and C&E Services on or
before the September 3 due date.  Thereafter, the SSEB again evaluated
each proposal; the overall ratings for each proposal did not change.  By
letters dated October 11, the agency again identified various continuing
concerns regarding each proposal.  Specifically, in the October 11 letter
to CASS, the agency advised CASS, among other things, of the following:  
    
[CASS] provided some [deleted] for preventative maintenance and service
orders as justification for some of the craftsperson [staffing levels]. 
However, the times are [deleted] and apparently do not include [deleted]. 
In addition, special procedural, accessing, and protective equipment
requirements for repair and maintenance in USAMRIID [U.S. Army Medical
Research Institute for Infectious Disease] biological safety areas could
increase the [time] estimates considerably.  [CASS] should provide full
justification for these time estimates, and demonstrate how the [deleted]
are included. 
.     .     .     .    .
[CASS's] description of the reporting lines for the Quality Control,
Safety, and Environmental (QCS&E) Manager was unclear.  The QCS&E Manager
is shown as [deleted], but the text only shows him [deleted].  [CASS]
should clarify how this [deleted] ensures the autonomy of the QCS&E
Manager.  The PWS requirement that the Quality Manager *be accountable to
upper management* is to ensure that the QC Manager is able to be
autonomous of the management chain for operations.
.     .     .     .     .
[CASS] should explain how properly skilled off-duty staff will be able to
respond within 15 minutes to Priority 1, Emergency work, as required by
the PWS TE 5.20-4. 
Agency Report, Tab 24, at 4535-41.  
    
Again, approximately 1 week after the written discussions were sent, the
agency conducted face-to-face discussions with CASS.  At that meeting the
contracting officer notes that he specifically called CASS's attention to
various agency concerns, including the concern that CASS's proposal did
not adequately address the solicitation requirement to respond to
emergencies within 15 minutes.  The contracting officer states that, in
response, the CASS negotiatior acknowledged his understanding of the
agency's concern, but stated that because this was an A-76 procurement,
CASS intended to *roll the dice.*  Agency Report, Contracting Officer's
Statement, at 3, 9. 
    
Final revised proposals were submitted by the November 5 due date;
thereafter, the agency's SSEB performed final proposal evaluations. 
Griffin's final proposal was rated technically acceptable; CASS's and C&E
Services' proposal were rated technically unacceptable.  Specifically,
CASS's proposal was rated technically unacceptable under the primary
evaluation factor for evaluating management/technical approach; more
specifically, CASS's proposal was rated technically unacceptable under
each of the following management/technical approach subfactors: 
management approach; staffing/key personnel; phase-in; and technical
approach.[14]  Agency Report, Contracting Officer's Statement, at 11. 
Overall, the agency concluded that CASS's proposal *did not convey a
confidence that CASS could adequately perform the requirements of the
PWS.*  Agency Report, Contracting Officer's Statement, at 10.  Based on
this evaluation, the agency eliminated CASS's proposal from further
consideration, advising CASS of this action on January 7, 2003.  This
protest followed.
    
    
    
DISCUSSION
    
CASS protests that it was unreasonable for the agency to conclude that
CASS's proposal failed to meet the solicitation requirements with regard
to CASS's proposed management/technical approach.  CASS argues that,
notwithstanding various weaknesses, the proposal should have been
evaluated as minimally complying with the solicitation requirements.  We
disagree. 
    
In reviewing protests challenging an agency's evaluation of proposals, we
will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency regarding the
merits of proposals; rather we will examine the agency's evaluation to
ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's
evaluation criteria, and with procurement statutes and regulations. 
Honolulu Marine, Inc., B‑245329, Dec. 27, 1991, 91-2 CPD P: 586 at
3.  A protester's mere disagreement with the agency's evaluation does not
render it unreasonable.  CORVAC, Inc., B-244766, Nov. 13, 1991, 91-2 CPD
P: 454 at 5.
    
The record shows that CASS's proposal was rated as unacceptable for, among
other things, failing to comply with the RFP requirements regarding
*priority 1‑emergency* work.[15]  Specifically, the RFP stated:
    
PRIORITY 1 -- EMERGENCY:  Emergency work takes priority over all other
work and requires immediate action, including overtime or diverting
craftsmen from other jobs, if necessary, to cover the emergency.  Usually
work will be classified as emergency when it consists of correcting
failures/problems constituting an immediate danger to life, health,
mission, security or property. . . .[[16]]  Required response time for
emergency work is within 15 minutes.
Agency Report, Tab 3, RFP Technical Ex. 5.20-4, at 2044. 
    
In evaluating CASS's initial proposal, the agency found that CASS only
proposed [deleted].  The agency was concerned that CASS would be unable to
meet the response time for emergency requirements during the remaining
time periods.   Accordingly, as noted above, in its written discussion
questions dated October 11, the agency requested that CASS *explain how
properly skilled off-duty staff will be able to respond within 15 minutes
to Priority 1 Emergency work.*  Agency Report, Tab 24, at 4541.  During
the face-to-face discussions conducted on October 24, this matter was
again, orally, brought to CASS's attention.  Agency Report, Contracting
Officer's Statement at 3, 9.  The contracting officer states (and CASS
does not dispute) that the CASS negotiator acknowledged an understanding
of the agency's concern, but stated that CASS would *roll the dice.*  Id. 
    
In its final proposal revisions, following the October discussions, CASS
addressed this issue by again indicating it would [deleted].  However,
with regard to the [deleted], CASS's final proposal provided only the
following:  
    
[Deleted]. 
Agency Report, Tab 26, CASS Final Proposal Revision, at 4631. 
    
In short, despite the agency's repeated expressions of concern regarding
this matter, CASS declined to [deleted], and offered no information or
commitment regarding the proximity to Fort Detrick from which its
[deleted] personnel would be responding. 
    
In evaluating this aspect of CASS's proposal as unacceptable, the agency
concluded: 
    
Since Frederick [where Fort Detrick is located], is a high cost of living
area, most service staff live much more than 15 minutes from Ft. Detrick
(i.e. Thurmont [Maryland], rural areas, West Virginia, etc).  It is
unreasonable to expect that they will be able to respond in 15 minutes. 
The normal drive time [for employees traveling] to Ft. Detrick is often in
excess of 30 minutes.  This does not include the time required to clear
security at the front gate, obtain necessary equipment and travel to the
emergency.
Agency Report, Tab 48, SSEB Final Report, at 11371. 
    
CASS maintains that this aspect of its proposal should have been evaluated
as meeting the RFP's minimum requirements, arguing that, [deleted],
Protest at 29, and elaborating that *the data furnished by the Army . . .
show[s] that such emergencies historically have not occurred frequently
(about one event every two weeks).* [17]  CASS Comments, Mar. 13, 2003, at
42.  Finally, CASS explains that, *[w]ithout [deleted], it [was]
impossible for CASS to provide any further explanation of how on-call
staff can respond to emergencies within 15 minutes.*  Protest at 29.  
    
As discussed above, CASS was well aware of the agency's concern regarding
this aspect of its proposal, yet declined to respond in a manner that
would reasonably demonstrate how the RFP's requirements regarding
emergency work would be met.  Further, we view the agency's concern--that
is, that without assurances that CASS's personnel responding to emergency
requirements [deleted]--to be reasonably based.  Indeed, by CASS's own
admission, it was *impossible* for CASS to provide any assurance regarding
its ability to meet the 15‑minute response requirement because
[deleted].[18]  CASS's candid statement regarding the  *impossibil[ity]*
of responding to the 15-minute requirement simply confirms the
reasonableness of the agency's ultimate conclusion that CASS's proposal
*did not convey a confidence that CASS could adequately perform the
requirements of the PWS.*  Agency Report, Contracting Officer's Statement,
at 10.  On this record, we find no basis to question the agency's
conclusion that CASS's proposal failed to comply with the solicitation
requirements. [19]   
    
Additionally, the agency evaluated CASS's proposal as technically
unacceptable based on CASS's proposal, appearing for the first time in its
final proposal revisions, of [deleted].  The agency found CASS's proposal
of [deleted] incomplete and inconsistent with other aspects of its final
proposal. 
    
CASS's proposed [deleted] was offered in response to agency concerns with
its previously proposed staffing levels.  Specifically, during the second
round of discussions, the agency advised CASS as follows:
    
The overall staffing level is insufficient to perform many of the PWS
requirements.  The offeror was previously asked to demonstrate how it
could perform all of the PWS requirements with the proposed staffing
level, and did not adequately answer the question.  For example, the
offeror proposed to increase staffing for [deleted] by reclassifying
positions (a [deleted] to a [deleted] and a [deleted] to a [deleted]). 
This method of addressing staffing shortages within the organization does
not adequately address the request for clarification for performing this
type of work with the proposed staffing levels. . . .  The offeror does
not explain what positions are going to perform the work requirements of
those positions that were reclassified. 
Agency Report, Tab 24, at 4534.
    
In response, the technical/management portion of CASS's final revised
proposal stated:
    
[Deleted].
Agency Report, Tab 26, at 4579-80. 
    
Although CASS's proposed [deleted] appeared for the first time in its
final proposal revisions, CASS provided very limited information regarding
its proposed implementation of this approach.  Specifically, CASS proposed
to retain a subcontractor to [deleted], but failed to further define the
subcontractor's role, explain how involvement of this subcontractor would
benefit the government, or provide additional information regarding what
the [deleted] would entail.  Agency Report, Tab 26, at 4579-80.  Further,
although CASS's proposal stated that its proposed [deleted] would *require
cooperation and partnering with Government counterparts,* the proposal
provided no additional details.  Id.  Finally, CASS's proposal
stated--without explanation or elaboration--that CASS was [deleted]. 
Agency Report, Tab 26, at 4580.  In pursuing this protest, CASS expressly
acknowledges that this [deleted] approach is inconsistent with other
portions of CASS's final revised proposal.  CASS Comments on Agency
Report, Mar. 13, 2003, at 7.  Nonetheless, CASS asserts that the agency
should have conducted further communications with CASS to resolve this
inconsistency.  Id.     
    
It is well settled that an agency has no obligation to reopen discussions
to allow an offeror additional opportunities to revise its proposal when a
deficiency first becomes apparent in submitting final proposal revisions. 
See, e.g., Addsco Indus., Inc., B-233693, Mar. 28, 1989, 89-1 CPD P: 317.
    
Here, CASS's proposal of [deleted] (which CASS asserts is capable of
reducing costs for preventive maintenance and repairs by *up to 20%,*
Agency Report, Tab 26, at 4579) was presented to address the agency's
conclusion that CASS's prior proposal submissions failed to propose
adequate resources to perform various RFP requirements.  CASS's
introduction of this proposed approach in its final proposal revisions,
without providing adequate supporting information, along with its
unexplained proposal to [deleted] (a provision which CASS acknowledges is
inconsistent with other portions of its final proposal), precluded the
agency from accepting its proposal without obtaining additional
information.  As noted above, the agency had no obligation to reopen
discussions following submission of final revised proposals in order to
provide CASS with yet another opportunity to address the agency's
previously identified concerns. On this record, we find no basis to
question the agency's conclusion that CASS's final revised proposal was
unacceptable.  
     
In summary, based on the two examples discussed above, we find that the
agency had ample bases to reject CASS's proposal as technically
unacceptable.[20]  Since the RFP advised offerors that proposal selection
would be made on the basis of the technically acceptable proposal offering
the lowest evaluated cost/price, the agency acted reasonably in
eliminating CASS's proposal from further consideration.[21] 
    
Finally, CASS protests that *the Army failed to conduct meaningful
discussions.*  Protest at 12.  We disagree.
    
Although it is a requirement that, when discussions are conducted, they
must
be meaningful, this requirement does not mean that agencies must discuss
every element of an offeror's proposal that receives less than the maximum
rating when such elements are reasonably subsumed within a more general
area of the proposal that has been identified as requiring amplification
or correction.  Volmar Constr., Inc., B-270364, B‑270364.2, Mar. 4,
1996, 96-1 CPD P: 139 at 4; DAE Corp., B‑259866, B-259866.2, May 8,
1995, 95-2 CPD P: 12 at 4-5.  Consistent with this principle, an agency is
not required to describe how the offeror should revise its proposal to
cure an existing weakness or defect; indeed, one of the objectives in
proposal evaluation is to assess an offeror's own understanding of the
solicitation requirements, and its perception of the best method to meet
those requirements.  Accordingly, agencies need only lead offerors into
the areas of their proposals that require correction or amplification. 
Creative Mgmt. Tech., Inc., B‑266299, Feb. 9, 1996, 96-1 CPD P: 61
at 4.  Here, we find the discussions to have satisfied that standard.
    
As discussed above, the agency engaged in two rounds of written
discussions, which included a total of 39 pages of detailed questions
regarding multiple aspects of CASS's proposal, along with two rounds of
face-to-face discussions, during which CASS was invited to seek
clarification of any matter raised by the agency.  We have reviewed the
extensive discussion record here, along with the agency's final, multiple,
bases for rejecting CASS's proposal and find CASS's assertion that the
agency's discussions were less than meaningful to be wholly without
merit.  More
specifically, the agency clearly led CASS into each and every area of its
proposal on which the agency subsequently relied as a basis for rejecting
the proposal.   
    
The protest is denied.   
    
Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel    
    
    

   ------------------------

   [1] CASS is a joint venture between the The Cube Corporation of
Sterling,Virginia and All Star Services Corporation of San Diego,
California.  Protest at 1. 
[2] The U.S. Army Garrison at Fort Detrick currently provides services and
support for various tenant organizations including the Army Medical
Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, the Army Medical Information
Systems and Services Agency, the Army Medical Material Agency, the Army
Medical Material Development Activity, and the Nation Cancer Institute. 
Agency Report, Tab 2, Acquisition Plan, at 0054.    The solicitation
contemplated performance of the following activities:  maintenance and
operations of facilities; logistics; hazardous materials management;
military personnel services; engineering and construction services; visual
information services; continuing education and training; housing
management; arts, crafts and woodworking programs; and auto craft
program.  Agency Report, Tab 3, Performance Work Statement (PWS), at
0077. 
[3] The procedures for determining whether the government should perform
an activity in-house, or have the activity performed by a contractor are
set forth in OMB Circular A-76, and that Circular's Revised Supplemental
Handbook (March 1996).
[4] Four of the thirty-four CLINs in each year of the solicitation
schedule were cost-reimbursement items.  These CLINs primarily dealt with
requirements to perform minor construction, individual job orders under
$25,000, and acquisition of related supplies and materials.  Agency
Report, Tab 5, at 2184-89.
[5] Under the factor for evaluating management/technical approach, the
solicitation established the following subfactors:  management approach;
staffing and key personnel; phase-in plan; and technical approach.  Under
some of these subfactors, the solicitation identified additional
sub-subfactors.  Agency Report, Tab 7, RFP, at 2347-49.   
[6] The solicitation defined a *technically acceptable* rating as
applicable to *any proposal which can be awarded 'as is' and contains few,
if any, minor weaknesses,* elaborating that a technically acceptable
proposal *meets or exceeds the government's minimum needs and the
government is confident that the offeror can successfully perform the
services.*  Agency Report, Tab 6, RFP, at 2331, 2334-39.
[7] The solicitation defined a *marginal* rating as applicable to *any
proposal that contains weaknesses that must be clarified/modified before
it can be awarded,* elaborating that, *[t]he contractor could possibly
perform the services, but only if the weaknesses are corrected.*  Agency
Report, Tab 7, RFP, at 2347.
[8] The solicitation defined a *technically unacceptable* rating as
applicable to *any proposal that contains major weaknesses and could only
become eligible for award if it were substantially revised, and added that
*[such a proposal] does not meet the government's requirements and the
government has no confidence that the offeror can successfully perform the
services.*  Agency Report, Tab 7, RFP, at 2347.
[9] The other proposals were submitted by Griffin Services, Inc., C&E
Services, Inc., and Jantec, Inc.  Griffin's proposal was ultimately
selected for comparison to the MEO.  
[10] The SSEB was divided into four committees, corresponding to the four
primary evaluation factors--management/technical approach, past
performance/past experience, subcontracting, and cost/price; each
committee was comprised of both voting and nonvoting members.  The
nonvoting members were described as *subject matter experts* who had been
retained by the agency under a separate contract.  Agency Report,
Contracting Officer's Statement, at 5. 
[11] Additionally, the Army provided a separate, 4-page attachment
identifying various cost/price related issues.
[12] The National Institute of Health has established four biosafety
levels (BL) for research laboratories that handle infectious and/or
otherwise potentially hazardous agents.  BL-3 laboratories involve
activities with agents that may cause serious and potentially lethal
infection; BL-4 laboratories involve activities with agents that pose the
highest risk of life-threatening disease, may be transmitted via aerosol
route, and for which there may be no available vaccine or therapy. 
[13] The agency conducted similar discussions with Griffin and C&E
Services; Jantec withdrew from the competition following the initial
evaluation of proposals.  Agency Report, Contracting Officer's Statement,
at 9. 
[14] CASS's cost/price proposal was also rated unacceptable based on
various deficiencies, including inaccuracies and inconsistencies regarding
CASS's proposed subcontractors' indirect rates and labor rates.  CASS
acknowledges the existence of certain *mistake[s],* *typographical
error[s],* and *multiplication errors* on the part of its proposed
subcontractors.  Protest at 32, 34, 35.
[15] The RFP divided work orders into three categories--*priority
1-emergency,* *priority 2-urgent,* and *priority 3-routine*--and provided
a narrative, descriptive paragraph defining each level.  Agency Report,
Tab 3, RFP Technical Exh. 5.20-4, at 2044-45.
[16] Stated examples of emergency work included:  spillage of
hazardous/toxic substances, gas leaks, major utilities service failures,
broken electrical components that may cause fire or shock, and broken
water or steam pipes, as well as overflowing drains, clogged toilets (when
only one is available for use), and accidental lock-ins of children. 
Agency Report, Tab 3, RFP Technical Exh. 5.20-4, at 2044.    
[17] We do not take a position regarding whether emergency situations
(defined by the solicitation as involving *an immediate danger to life,
health, mission, security or property*) that occur *every two weeks* are
properly characterized as *rare occurrence[s]*; however, the basis for
CASS's frequency calculation (*one event every two weeks*) appears
inconsistent with the data provided in the solicitation. 
In this regard, the solicitation advised offerors that they should expect
to perform 10,434 service orders annually, and that 2 percent of these
orders will involve *priority 1 - emergency* work.  Agency Report, Tab 3,
RFP Technical Exh. 5.20-4,
at 2045.  This data suggests, to us, that offerors will perform
approximately 208 *priority 1 - emergency* service orders each year (2
percent of 10,434)--or, on average, approximately 4 such orders per week
(208 service orders divided by 52 weeks).
[18] It is clear that the solicitation requirement to respond to
emergencies within 15 minutes effectively mandated that offerors propose
either on-site staff or staff in close proximity to Fort Detrick.  CASS
did neither.
[19] Throughout its pursuit of this protest, CASS has asserted that the
agency evaluated CASS's proposal and Griffin's proposal in a disparate
manner.  We have reviewed all of CASS's arguments in this regard and find
no merit in them.  Specifically, with regard to the 15-minute requirement
discussed above, CASS expressly acknowledges that *Griffin proposed
[deleted].*  CASS Comments on Agency Report, Mar. 13, 2003, at 44.  As
CASS further acknowledges, *Griffin's approach was obviously preferable to
the evaluators.*  Id.  Based on CASS's own statements, it is clear that
the agency had a reasonable basis to distinguish between CASS's and
Griffin's management/technical approach.   
[20] We note that the agency also evaluated CASS's proposal as
unacceptable for, among other things:  [deleted].  Agency Report, Tab 48,
SSEB Final Report, at 11368‑72.  In light of our discussion above,
we need not address these issues.
[21] Throughout its pursuit of this protest, CASS has argued that, because
not all of the individual evaluator worksheets identified all of the
technical deficiencies that are ultimately reflected in the agency's
source selection decision, CASS's protest should be sustained on the basis
of inadequate documentation.  We disagree.  It is not unusual for
individual evaluator ratings to differ from one another, or to differ with
the consensus ratings eventually assigned; source selection officials may
reasonably disagree with the evaluation ratings and results of lower-level
evaluators, Verify, Inc., B-244401.2, Jan. 24, 1992, 92-1 CPD P: 107 at
6-8.  The overriding concern for our purposes is not whether the final
ratings are consistent with earlier, individual ratings, but whether they
reasonably reflect the relative merits of the proposals.  Brisk
Waterproofing Co., Inc., B-276247, May 27, 1997, 97-1 CPD P: 195 at 2
n.1.  Here, based on our review of the extensive agency evaluation record,
including all the evaluation worksheets and the final SSEB report, as well
as our own review of CASS's proposal, we conclude that the record contains
more than adequate support for the agency's ultimate conclusions.