TITLE:  Resource Consultants, Inc., B-290163; B-290163.2, June 7, 2002
BNUMBER:  B-290163; B-290163.2
DATE:  June 7, 2002
**********************************************************************
Resource Consultants, Inc., B-290163; B-290163.2, June 7, 2002

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Decision

Matter of:   Resource Consultants, Inc.

File:            B-290163; B-290163.2

Date:              June 7, 2002

Jacob B. Pompan, Esq., and Gerald H. Werfel, Esq., Pompan, Murray & Werfel,
for the protester.
David S. Cohen, Esq., John J. O'Brien, Esq., Rowena E. Laxa, Esq., and
Catherine K. Kroll, Esq., Cohen Mohr, for NCS Pearson, Inc., an intervenor.
Duane L. Zezula, Esq., Department of Transportation, Transportation Security
Administration, for the agency.
Tania Calhoun, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  General Accounting Office has jurisdiction over protest challenging the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) award of a contract for
services where the applicable statutory language effectively exempts TSA's
acquisitions of equipment, supplies, and materials--but not acquisitions of
services--from GAO's bid protest jurisdiction.

2.  Protests that contracting agency's evaluation of proposals and source
selection decisions were unreasonable are denied where the record shows that
the evaluation and source selection decisions were reasonable and consistent
with the solicitation's stated evaluation criteria.

DECISION

Resource Consultants, Inc. (RCI) protests the award of a contract to NCS
Pearson, Inc. under request for proposals (RFP) No. DTTS59-02-R-00440,
issued by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Transportation
Administrative Service Center (TASC), on behalf of the newly created
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), to obtain a wide range of
human resources services to establish and support the TSA.  RCI challenges
as unreasonable the agency's evaluation of proposals and source selection
decisions.

We deny the protests.

In the aftermath of the terrorist hijackings and crashes of passenger
aircraft on September 11, 2001, the Congress passed, and the President
signed, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No.
107-71, 115 Stat. 597 et seq. (2001), on November 19, 2001.  The ATSA
established the TSA as a new agency within the DOT and tasked it with
security responsibilities for all modes of transportation overseen by the
DOT and other related activities.  As part of its mission to ensure aviation
security, the TSA was made responsible for passenger security, including the
qualification, recruitment and examination of a federal workforce
responsible for all phases of security screening at various security
checkpoints throughout commercial airports.  To fulfill this mission, the
TSA is required to hire and deploy more than 30,000 federal security
screeners and thousands of federal security managers, federal law
enforcement officers, and intelligence and support personnel to screen all
passengers and property at 429 domestic airports by November 19, 2002.  Id.
sect. 110(c).

The TASC, which was delegated authority to conduct procurements on behalf of
the TSA, issued this solicitation on January 18, 2002 to acquire contractor
support to develop, implement and execute an overarching qualification,
assessment, staffing, and placement system and to provide on-going human
resources services for airport security screeners, law enforcement officers
and other TSA personnel in compliance with federal law, regulation and
policy to allow the TSA to meet or exceed the dated mandates and other
legislative requirements of the ATSA.  RFP sect. C.1.0.B.  The RFP's scope of
work was broadly written to encompass a wide range of human resources
services divided into four separate modules, three of which are at issue
here:  Module 1, ?Posting and Applicant Intake for Security Screener and Law
Enforcement Job Applications and Additional Postings as Required?; Module 3,
?Candidate Selection?; and Module 4, ?Day-to-Day Servicing.?  RFP sect.
C.2.0.G.

The agency planned to award a single contract for each module, and to
evaluate each module independently of the other modules, but contractors
were not limited to one award.  Award was to be made, without conducting
discussions, to the offeror whose proposal provided the best value.  The
agency planned to award time-and-material and labor hour contracts with a
cost line item for other direct costs.  Performance was to commence upon
award and continue through December 31, 2002.

Proposals would first be evaluated against minimum requirements for each
module on a go/no-go basis.  Proposals meeting the minimum requirements
would then be evaluated to ascertain which represented the best value to the
government against technical approach and price evaluation factors;
technical factors were to outweigh price.  RFP sect. M.A.2.  The technical
approach evaluation factor was comprised of two subfactors, past performance
and management/technical approach.  Past performance was more important than
management/technical approach.  Id.  For each module proposed, offerors were
required to provide a total labor price based on total proposed hours, a
proposed mix of labor categories, hour per category comprising the total
hours, loaded hourly rates per category, and other direct costs.  The agency
planned to conduct a price reasonableness evaluation.  RFP sect. M.C.

Twenty-five offerors submitted proposals by the February 1 closing date.
Proposals not deemed grossly deficient were referred to a technical
evaluation team, which first evaluated them against the RFP's minimum
requirements, and then evaluated those proposals meeting the minimum
requirements under the solicitation's past performance and
management/technical approach subfactors.

With at least eight offerors submitting proposals for each module, the
agency concluded that there was adequate price competition and that the
requirement for price reasonableness was satisfied.  Source Selection
Official (SSO) Decision at 7; Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect.
15.404-1(b)(2)(i).  The RFP's requirements were broad in scope due to the
inherently uncertain nature of the requirements and the government's desire
to seek out a variety of proposed solutions, and the agency anticipated and
received wide price variances based on a wide range of proposed approaches
and labor hours.  Since many proposals were based on differing sets of
assumptions for required workloads, some proposals were not considered
realistic because the hours proposed were too low to accomplish the
requirements, and other proposals were considered realistic for their
proposed solutions but their solutions were not as comprehensive as other
offerors' solutions, the SSO concluded that the total proposed prices did
not represent ?real? price differences.  As a result, on a module-by-module
basis, the agency compared offerors' proposed labor hours, loaded labor
rates, and other direct costs to see if a similarity in these breakdowns
would support price reasonableness.  The SSO ultimately concluded that,
given their widely disparate approaches and levels of comprehensiveness,
none of the offerors demonstrated an approach that would offer a comparable
technical solution at a much lower price as compared to any other
offeror.[1]  SSO Decision at 8.

Under Module 1, NCS's proposal was rated outstanding under both technical
approach subfactors and overall, with a proposed price of $10,183,748 using
68,121 hours.  RCI's proposal was rated outstanding under the past
performance subfactor, acceptable under the management/technical approach
subfactor, and outstanding overall, with a proposed price of $[DELETED]
using [DELETED] hours.  Under Module 3, both proposals were rated
outstanding under both technical approach subfactors and overall.  The
agency evaluated NCS's proposed price at $36,919,512 using 456,005 hours,
and RCI's proposed price at $[DELETED] using [DELETED] hours.[2]  Under
Module 4, both proposals were rated outstanding under both technical
approach subfactors and overall.  NCS's proposed price was $29,065,166 using
326,480 hours and RCI's proposed price was $[DELETED] using [DELETED] hours.

The SSO's source selection decision set forth the basis for his conclusions
regarding price reasonableness, as discussed above, and compiled a table of
the ?pros? and ?cons? of each offeror's technical proposal, on a
module-by-module basis.  In his trade-off analyses for each module, the SSO
found that NCS had the best technical proposal and clearly demonstrated the
capability to perform the requirements in the necessary time frame; other
offerors also had strong technical proposals, but had identified
weaknesses.  The SSO found that NCS's higher price was indicative of its
comprehensive technical approach and realistic workload assumptions, whereas
other offerors' lower proposed prices were the result of either unrealistic
assumptions or a less comprehensive approach.  The SSO concluded that, if
consistent approaches and workload assumptions were used, no offeror
proposed an approach that indicated the government would ultimately pay less
than it would to any other offeror, and found that NCS's approach provided
the clearest assurance it could accomplish the requirements in the
congressionally-mandated timeframes.  SSO Decision at 8-10.  NCS was awarded
a contract for all four modules.

After RCI filed these protests challenging the agency's evaluation of
proposals and source selection decisions, the agency determined that
contract performance was in the best interests of the United States and that
urgent and compelling circumstances existed which significantly affected the
interests of the United States, and which would not permit waiting for our
decision, and executed an override of the statutory stay of performance of
the contract.  See 31 U.S.C. sect. 3553(d)(3)(C)(i) (2000).

We first address the contention made by the agency and NCS that our Office
lacks jurisdiction to hear this protest.  In this regard, under the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), our Office has jurisdiction
to resolve bid protests concerning solicitations and contract awards that
are issued ?by a Federal agency.?  31 U.S.C.
sect. 3551(1)(A) (1994).  CICA provides that the term ?Federal agency? has the
meaning given the term by section 3 of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. sect. 472 (1994).  That Act
defines the term ?Federal agency? as including any executive agency, and
defines the term ?executive agency? as including any executive department or
independent establishment in the executive branch of the government.  40
U.S.C. sect. 472(a),(b).  Neither the agency nor NCS disputes that the TSA is a
federal agency for purposes of CICA.

Instead, both the agency and NCS argue that the ATSA provides that TSA
procurements are subject to the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
Acquisition Management System (AMS) under 49 U.S.C. sect. 40110(d) (1998 Supp.
IV), and that
49 U.S.C. sect. 40110(d)(2)(F) specifically exempts procurements subject to the
AMS from our bid protest jurisdiction.  In support of their position, the
agency and NCS rely on section 101(o) of the ATSA:

(o) ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.--The acquisition management system
established by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
under section 40110 shall apply to acquisitions of equipment, supplies, and
materials by the Transportation Security Administration, or, subject to the
requirements of such section, the Under Secretary may make such
modifications to the acquisition management system with respect to such
acquisitions of equipment, supplies, and materials as the Under Secretary
considers appropriate, such as adopting aspects of other acquisition
management systems of the Department of Transportation.

While 49 U.S.C. sect. 40110(d)(2)(F) does exempt procurements subject to the AMS
from our bid protest jurisdiction,[3] this provision of the ATSA
unambiguously limits the application of the AMS to the TSA's acquisitions of
?equipment, supplies, and materials.?  The procurement at issue here is not
an acquisition of ?equipment, supplies, and materials? but, rather, an
acquisition of services.  In matters concerning the interpretation of a
statute, the first question is whether the statutory language provides an
unambiguous expression of the intent of the Congress.  If it does, the
matter ends there, for the unambiguous intent of the Congress must be given
effect.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984).  We find that the statutory language at issue here
unambiguously limits the application of the AMS to the TSA's acquisitions of
?equipment, supplies, and materials,? and end our inquiry by concluding that
neither this nor any other provision of the ATSA exempts the TSA's
acquisitions of services from our bid protest jurisdiction.

We do not agree with NCS that, in drafting the ATSA, the Congress simply
tracked the language of the statute it previously used to permit the FAA
Administrator to develop and implement the AMS, and intended to make the
same language applicable to the TSA.  The statutory authority for the AMS is
couched in inclusive terms, directing the FAA Administrator to develop and
implement an acquisition management system that ?addresses the unique needs
of the agency and, at a minimum, provides for more timely and cost-effective
acquisitions of equipment and materials.?  Pub. L. No. 104-50, sect. 348(a), 109
Stat. 436, 460 (1995), codified at 49 U.S.C. sect. 40110(d).  In contrast, the
language in the ATSA is a clear limitation on the applicability of the AMS
to the TSA's acquisitions of ?equipment, supplies, and materials.?  In any
event, neither the ATSA nor its legislative history evidence congressional
intent to simply grant to the TSA the same procurement authority as was
previously granted to the FAA.  On the contrary, while the conference report
on the ATSA indicates that the House amendment had provided that the TSA
would have the ?same procurement and personnel authority as the FAA,? H.R.
Conf. Report No. 107-296, at 54 (2001), the conference substitute contains
no such language.  Id.  We recognize that the practical effect of our
interpretation of this provision is that protests of TSA acquisitions may
take two different tracks depending upon the nature of the acquisition, but
conclude that this interpretation is mandated by the specific language of
the statute.  Unless the Congress changes the statutory language, our Office
will consider protests of TSA acquisitions of services.

Turning to the merits of the protests, RCI argues that various aspects of
the evaluation of its own proposal and of the NCS proposal, as well as the
source selection decisions flowing from those evaluations, are
unreasonable.

The evaluation of technical proposals is primarily the responsibility of the
contracting agency, and our Office does not make an independent evaluation
of their merits.  Rather, we examine the agency's evaluation to ensure that
it is reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria and with
applicable procurement statutes and regulations.  The protester bears the
burden of showing that the evaluation is unreasonable, and the fact that it
disagrees with the agency does not render the evaluation unreasonable.
ESCO, Inc., B-225565, Apr. 29, 1987, 87-1 CPD
para. 450 at 7.  Our review of the record shows that RCI has not met that
burden.

Under Module 1, ?Posting and Applicant Intake for Security Screener and Law
Enforcement Job Applications and Additional Postings as Required,? offerors
were required to implement an automated process to distinguish qualified
candidates from unqualified candidates, determine the highest band
qualification for qualified candidates, and place candidates on appropriate
referral lists.  NCS's proposal was rated outstanding under both technical
approach subfactors and overall.  RCI's proposal was rated outstanding under
the past performance subfactor, acceptable under the management/technical
approach subfactor, and outstanding overall.

The SSO considered the NCS proposal to have 11 ?pros? and no ?cons,? and
considered the RCI proposal to have 7 ?pros? and 2 ?cons?--its failure to
address in greater detail the technology that would drive its database
system, and the fact that its technical approach was more of a process than
an execution plan.[4]  Since several other offerors had higher technical
ratings and lower pricing than RCI, the SSO did not consider RCI's proposal
in his tradeoff decision.  RCI argues that its acceptable rating under the
technical/management approach subfactor was unwarranted.

RCI contends that there was no RFP requirement to describe the technical
configuration and specifications for the computer system that would house
the candidate management system, and no RFP requirement that this database
be designed to run on TSA computers.  As the agency explains, however, its
concern that RCI failed to address in detail the technology that would drive
its database system was not with systems architecture, but with RCI's
failure to include details about the functional capabilities of its database
and how it would work with existing government systems.[5]  RCI's objection
that the agency is not procuring the database system and does not need this
detail does not address the agency's reasonable concern that it could not
ascertain RCI's ability to meet the requirements using its database without
having details about the functional capabilities of that database.

As for the second ?con? identified by the SSO, the agency explains that
RCI's proposal showed the steps it would take to meet the requirements but
lacked details about how its plan would be specifically implemented, a
failure that was exacerbated by the lack of a specific timeline.  As a
result, RCI's proposal did not demonstrate how it would apply sufficient
resources to process the required number of applicants in a timeframe that
would permit subsequent actions, such as assessing candidates, and hiring,
training, and deploying huge numbers of personnel, to take place while still
ensuring that the TSA's overall requirements would be met.  In this regard,
section L.C.(2) of the RFP required offerors to provide a detailed plan for
managing and accomplishing each module to include ensuring the timely
delivery of services.  RCI's referral to various parts of its proposal has
not persuaded us that this information encompasses the detail of concern to
the agency and gives us no basis to find its conclusions unreasonable.

RCI next argues that the SSO unreasonably selected the higher-priced NCS
proposal over its lower-priced proposal under Module 3, ?Candidate
Selection.?

The SSO's tradeoff analysis shows that he found seven ?pros? and no ?cons?
in NCS's technical proposal, and eight ?pros? and one ?con? in RCI's
technical proposal--its proposal of only [DELETED] candidate assessment
sites.  The agency evaluated NCS's proposed price as $36,919,512, using
456,005 hours, and RCI's proposed price as $[DELETED] using [DELETED]
hours.

In response to the protests, the SSO provided a declaration in which he
elaborated on his source selection decision.[6]  The SSO explained that
while NCS's proposal was evaluated as having no technical weaknesses, RCI's
proposal was evaluated as having one weakness he considered very
significant:  it was not clear to him that RCI's proposal of only [DELETED]
candidate assessment sites would be adequate to get the job done in the
required timeframe.  The SSO also stated he had a significant concern
regarding RCI's price proposal using only [DELETED] hours to do the work, as
compared with the 456,005 hours proposed by NCS.  The SSO explained that
Module 3 included the interviewing process, which called for the development
of interviewing protocols, training interviewers, conducting and scoring the
interviews, making and gaining approval of salary recommendations, extending
offers of employment, negotiating offers of employment, processing the entry
onto duty, and entering all relevant information relative to the above
processes into the appropriate databases.  The SSO's conservative estimate
was that, to hire 30,000 to 50,000 people, it would be necessary to conduct
approximately 60,000 to 100,000 interviews.  The SSO believed that [DELETED]
hours was a severe underestimate of the hours that would ultimately be
required to simply perform the interviews, let alone to perform the rest of
the required work.  Considering both of his concerns with RCI's proposal,
the SSO determined that NCS's significant strengths and lack of weaknesses
merited its additional cost.

RCI's argument that the SSO failed to consider whether NCS's proposal to
perform the requirements using 456,005 hours was excessive compared with its
own proposal to perform the requirements using [DELETED] hours is undermined
by its concession that it actually intended to propose a price of $[DELETED]
for Module 3 using [DELETED] hours.[7]  In our view, this confirms the SSO's
concern that RCI's proposed hours and resulting price were unrealistic to
perform the required tasks.  Moreover, in light of the large number of
expected candidates and their geographic dispersion, RCI has given us no
basis to discount the SSO's concern regarding the sufficiency of RCI's
proposal of only [DELETED] candidate assessment sites.

Module 4, ?Day-to-Day Servicing,? included all facets of human resources
services to include maintenance of official personnel folders, reporting to
the office of personnel management central personnel data file, staffing,
recruitment, compensation/classification, employee relations, labor
relations, benefits and retirement counseling, record keeping and
maintenance, office of workers' compensation tasks, and other requirements.

Both proposals were rated outstanding under both technical approach
subfactors and overall.  NCS proposed a price of $29,065,166 with 326,480
hours and RCI $[DELETED] with [DELETED] hours.  The SSO's tradeoff analysis
shows that he found NCS had six ?pros? and one ?con?--it was unclear whether
the firm had provided labor relations or benefit services to other clients.
The SSO found that RCI's proposal had seven ?pros? and two ?cons?--the
proposal assumed centralized processing and none of its past/current
projects were of the size and scope of this project.

In his post-protest declaration, the SSO explained why he found the NCS
proposal to be superior.  The SSO did not believe that the one weakness in
the NCS proposal, its failure to demonstrate that it had provided labor
relations or benefits support to other customers, threatened the firm's
ability to successfully complete the project in the time mandated by the
Congress, and did not consider this weakness significant.  On the other
hand, RCI's proposal had two weaknesses.  While the SSO questioned whether
RCI's assumption that there would be centralized processing was a good
assumption, he considered RCI's second weakness, its failure to demonstrate
that any of its past/current projects met the TSA requirements in size and
scope, to be much more significant.  He considered the fact that RCI had
never undertaken a project of this size and scope before to be a very
significant weakness that could threaten its ability to complete the project
within the mandated timeframes, and contrasted this significant weakness
with the significant strengths in the NCS proposal.  He noted that the NCS
proposal was credited with a well-prepared, thoughtful, and creative plan
and considerable practical experience, and stated that the NCS proposal
indicated it was currently maintaining 30,000 personnel folders on other
projects.  He concluded that this reflected favorably on the firm's ability
to complete the project within the mandated timeframes.

RCI first contends that the SSO failed to adequately consider NCS's weakness
regarding its lack of labor relations and benefits to other customers.  We
do not agree.  As the agency explains, the purpose of this procurement is to
assist the TSA in finding, evaluating, and hiring an enormous number of
passenger screeners and law enforcement officers to be deployed at 429
airports nationwide in less than one year.  To accomplish this task, certain
skills are required and, as the agency explains, some are more important
than others.  At the outset of the TSA's existence, the
10-month period covered by this contract, the agency believes there will be
little need for labor relations experience and the only significant role
played by human resources regarding benefits concerns retirement benefits,
which should not be an issue during this short-lived contract.  While RCI
objects that these are just hypotheses on the part of the agency, we find
them reasonable justifications in support of the agency's conclusion.

RCI next argues that the agency irrationally considered its assumption of
centralized processing to be both a strength and weakness.  However, as the
agency cogently explains, the fact that RCI assumed that there would be
centralized processing was a strength in concept, but was a weakness in
practice because RCI did not fully and adequately explain how such an
approach would be implemented to meet the scope of the TSA's
requirements--the ability to provide day-to-day personnel servicing support
to more than 30,000 recently hired employees nationwide.  The agency was
concerned, for example, that a centralized processing facility in one time
zone might not be available to provide support during the work hours of TSA
personnel dispersed across various other time zones.  RCI's objection that
this feature of its proposal could just as easily have been a strength does
not address the agency's concerns, which we find reasonable.

RCI finally argues that it did have a project of the size and scope of the
TSA project, referring to a contract listed in its proposal under which it
stated that it maintained official personnel folders for 28,000 students who
passed through a training center on an annual basis.  As the agency
explains, while 28,000 students pass through the training center each year,
RCI's proposal stated that there were only approximately 7,000 students
there at any one time, and the agency could only conclude that the firm
probably maintained 7,000 files at one time, less than one-fourth of the
minimum TSA requirement of more than 30,000 files.  RCI's response--that the
successful contractor would begin performance by maintaining just one file
and build up over time--does not address the agency's concern that, at some
point, the contractor will be maintaining approximately 30,000 files, and
its conclusion that it could not ascertain that RCI had experience on that
scale.

Source selection officials have broad discretion in determining the manner
and extent to which they will make use of the technical and price evaluation
results, and their judgments are governed only by the tests of rationality
and consistency with the stated evaluation criteria.  Chemical
Demilitarization Assocs., B-277700, Nov. 13, 1997, 98-1 CPD para. 171 at 6.
Where, as here, the RFP allows for a price-technical tradeoff, the selection
official retains discretion to select a higher-priced but also technically
superior submission, if doing so is in the government's best interest and is
consistent with the solicitation's stated evaluation and source selection
scheme.
4-D Neuroimaging, B-286155.2, B-286155.3, Oct. 10, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 183 at
10.  Here, technical factors were to outweigh price, and past performance
was the most important technical/management subfactor.  The SSO found that
NCS submitted the superior proposal for each module, and that its higher
price was indicative of its comprehensive technical approach and realistic
workload assumptions.  He also considered that the danger of selecting an
inferior but less expensive offer involved accepting a greater risk that the
project might not be accomplished as well or as timely as required, and the
fact that, in either case, the result would be to increase the risk to the
United States of a successful terrorist attack.  SSO Declaration at 2.  In
other words, the SSO was aware of the technical advantages of NCS's
proposal, and specifically determined that those advantages were worth NCS's
higher price.  This is all that is required for a proper tradeoff, and the
fact that RCI believes the price premium is too great is not sufficient to
establish that the SSO's determination was unreasonable.  Id. at 11; General
Servs. Eng'g, Inc., B-245458, Jan. 9, 1992, 92-1 CPD
para. 44 at 11.

The protests are denied.

Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel

-------------------------

[1] RCI's allegation that the agency failed to conduct an adequate price
reasonableness evaluation is unpersuasive.  The government may use various
price analysis techniques and procedures to ensure a fair and reasonable
price, including the comparison of proposed prices received in response to
the solicitation; normally, adequate price competition establishes price
reasonableness.  FAR sect. 15.404-1(b)(2)(i).  The agency recognized that
offerors' differing assumptions and approaches might diminish the
reliability of their proposed prices for purposes of comparison, and went on
to compare their proposed rates and other direct costs.  The depth of an
agency's price analysis is a matter within the sound exercise of the
agency's discretion, see HSG Philipp Holzmann Technischer Servs. GmbH,
B-289607, Mar. 22, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 67 at 6, and RCI has given us no basis
to question the adequacy of the agency's price reasonableness
determination.  As for RCI's contention that the agency failed to conduct a
cost realism analysis, where, as here, a solicitation provides for the award
of a time-and-materials contract with fixed-price burdened labor rates,
there is no requirement that the agency conduct a cost realism analysis in
the absence of a solicitation provision requiring such an analysis.  See
General Atomics, B-287348, B-287348.2, June 11, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 169 at 7;
ENMAX Corp., B-281965, May 12, 1999, 99-1 CPD para. 102 at 10.
[2] As discussed below, RCI's evaluated price for Module 3 was neither the
price it actually proposed nor the price it intended to propose.
[3] Section 40110(d)(2) lists provisions of federal acquisition law that
shall not apply to the acquisition management system; one of these is
?Subchapter V of chapter 35 of title 31, relating to the procurement protest
system.?  49 U.S.C. sect. 40110(d)(2)(F).
[4] The technical evaluation team identified separate weaknesses for both
offerors regarding a lack of a detailed timeline, but the SSO did not
consider this to be a separate ?con? for either proposal.
[5] The RFP stated that ?[i]nteroperable database capability is required to
capture, assess, link, and report information used to prioritize local
hiring, capture data for trend analysis, and integrate this data with the
global management of an applicant/candidate/new hire database and feed TSA
[human resources] systems,? and offerors were required to ?ensure that all
data capture can be linked, integrated and/or imported into the [DOT] [human
resource] systems.?  RFP sect.sect. C.2.0.B, D.
[6] Notwithstanding RCI's apparent request that we accord the SSO's
post-protest explanation little weight, such explanations that provide a
detailed rationale for contemporaneous conclusions, as is the case here,
simply fill in previously recorded details, and will generally be considered
in our review of the rationality of selection decisions, so long as those
explanations are credible and consistent with the contemporaneous record.
Jason Assocs. Corp., B-278689 et al., Mar. 2, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 67 at 6-7.
[7] In its proposal for Module 3, RCI apparently inadvertently inserted its
intended pricing for Module 2 ($21,040,322 using 96,682 hours), and vice
versa.  It is not clear why the agency believed that RCI's proposed price
for Module 3 was $18,472,266.