TITLE: Information Technology & Applications Corporation, B-288510; B-288510.2, November 7, 2001
BNUMBER: B-288510; B-288510.2
DATE: November 7, 2001
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Decision
Matter of: Information Technology & Applications Corporation
File: B-288510; B-288510.2
Date: November 7, 2001
Jed L. Babbin, Esq., Sharon L. Babbin, Esq., and Charles R. McCarthy, Jr.,
Esq., O'Connor & Hannan, for the protester.
John D. Inazu, Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Where request for additional past performance information concerned the role
of proposed subcontractors in performing the statement of work and the
relevance of the subcontractors' experience to the proposed role, and did
not provide offerors an opportunity to revise their offers, the request
constituted clarifications under Federal Acquisition Regulation
sect. 15.306(a)(2), and did not trigger requirements attending the opening of
discussions.
DECISION
Information Technology & Applications Corporation (ITAC) protests the
Department of the Air Force's determination to award a contract to RS
Information Services (RSIS), under request for proposals
No. FA2550-01-R-0001, for technical services and space operations support
(TSSOS) for the Air Force Space Command's Space Warfare Center (SWC),
located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. ITAC challenges the
evaluation of proposals and the agency's failure to conduct discussions with
it concerning evaluated deficiencies and weaknesses in its proposal.
We deny the protest.
The RFP, a small business set-aside, provided for award of a
cost-plus-award-fee, indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract, for
a 60-day phase-in period and a base year, with 7 option years, to furnish
TSSOS in support of developing integrated space system support
concepts--including integrating existing and advanced technology weapons,
platforms, test facilities and technical expertise--so as to enhance combat
and research and development capabilities. Under the TSSOS statement of
work, the core contract effort will include: (1) support to program
management and integration; (2) requirements analysis and technical support,
including analysis of Air Force operational requirements and the capability
of current space systems to support the identified requirements; (3)
development of space warfare concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques
and procedures for current and future space systems; (4) modeling,
simulation and analysis; (5) education, training and aerospace course
development; (6) support of evaluation and user utility demonstration of
advanced technology concepts, prototypes and developing systems, including
providing experts in command, control, communications, computers and
intelligence architectures, systems and processes, and in space systems,
architectures and programs; (7) technical support to planning and execution
of test and evaluation activities; (8) support for exercises, wargames and
experiments; (9) support for real world contingencies and operations;
(10) intelligence support; (11) development and maintenance of information
systems, computer networks and web sites; (12) support to off-site SWC
organizations; and (13) support, planning and setup of SWC conferences. [1]
Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal represented the best
value to the government and afforded the greatest confidence that the
offeror will best meet the agency's requirements affordably. Proposals were
to be evaluated based on the following factors: (1) past performance, under
which the agency would evaluate relevant past performance, defined in terms
of similarity of technology and type of effort, to determine confidence in
the offeror's probability of successfully performing as proposed; (2)
mission capability, with subfactors for program management and integration,
management and maintenance of information systems, computer networks and
databases, response to a core sample task order, and response to a 72-hour
contingency sample task order; (3) proposal risk, focusing on the risks of
schedule disruption, increased costs, degraded performance and the need for
increased government supervision associated with the offeror's proposed
approach; and (4) cost/price reasonableness and realism. As part of their
cost/price proposal, offerors were required to propose the number of labor
hours and the loaded hourly rates (both on- and off-site) for at least five
specified labor categories for each year of the contract, basing their labor
mix on a yearly budget of $10 million (less government estimated travel and
other direct costs). The cost/price evaluation would also consider the
offeror's response to the core sample task order requirement. Past
performance and mission capability were equally important and individually
were substantially more important than proposal risk and cost/price, while
proposal risk was more important than cost/price.
Proposals were submitted by three offerors, including ITAC, RSIS and a third
offeror not relevant here. After requesting clarifications from the
offerors, the Air Force evaluated the initial proposals (with
clarifications) as set forth below:
ITAC RSIS
PAST PERFORMANCE High Confidence High Confidence
MISSION CAPABILITY
Program Management Acceptable/Moderate Acceptable/Moderate
Risk Risk
Information Systems Acceptable/Moderate Exceptional/Low Risk
Risk
Core Sample Task Acceptable/High Risk Acceptable/Low Risk
72-Hour Sample Task Acceptable/Moderate Exceptional/Low Risk
Risk
COST/PRICE
(Core Sample Task)
Proposed [DELETED] Hours [DELETED]Hours
/$[DELETED]
/$[DELETED]
Evaluated Most Probable No Most Probable Hours [DELETED]Hours
or Cost
/$[DELETED]
The source selection authority determined that RSIS's proposal represented
the best value to the government based on its evaluated advantages with
respect to mission capability, proposal risk and cost/price. For example,
RSIS was rated exceptional/low risk under the information systems subfactor
based on its proposal of: [DELETED]. In contrast, while the Air Force
recognized that the ITAC team--which included the primary incumbent
contractors--had demonstrated extensive communications and information
systems knowledge of SWC, the agency rated its proposal as only
acceptable/moderate risk based on the determination that ITAC's proposed
approach was primarily business as usual and that ITAC had failed to set
forth a methodology or approach for cross-utilization of personnel.
Likewise, under the core sample task order subfactor, RSIS's proposal was
rated as acceptable/low risk based on a proposed management approach that
included innovations and cost/risk reduction initiatives, and indicated the
capability to accomplish the task with little government intervention
required. In contrast, while ITAC's proposed approach to the core sample
task order was generally evaluated as indicating knowledge of the details of
the task and the existing system, the agency rated ITAC's proposal
acceptable with a high risk in this regard based on ITAC's failure to
include critical processes and milestones and its overall significant
underestimate of the time and labor hours required for completion of the
task. (The evaluated underestimate was such that the agency determined it
could not calculate a most probable cost/required number of hours for ITAC's
task order approach.) In addition, RSIS's proposal received a superior
rating, exceptional/low risk, under the 72-hour contingency sample task
order subfactor based on a detailed task order management plan that:
demonstrated a thorough understanding of the required tactics, techniques,
procedures and training; indicated a high potential for [DELETED]; included
a very good skill mix; and offered alternative solutions to assuring
[DELETED]. In contrast, the agency rated ITAC's proposal acceptable with a
moderate risk under this task order subfactor based on an evaluated failure
to provide a fully integrated task schedule, identification of only some of
the steps required to accomplish the task, and proposal of an
unrealistically low number of labor hours. Upon learning of the resulting
selection of RSIS, ITAC filed this protest with our Office.
ITAC argues that the evaluation and the conduct of the procurement were
unreasonable for a number of reasons. In reviewing an agency's evaluation of
proposals and source selection decision, our review is confined to a
determination of whether the agency acted reasonably and consistent with the
stated evaluation factors and applicable procurement statutes and
regulations. Main Bldg. Maint., Inc., B-260945.4, Sept. 29, 1995, 95-2 CPD para.
214 at 4. Based on our review of the record, we find that the evaluation and
the award to RSIS were reasonable. We discuss ITAC's principal arguments
below.
PAST PERFORMANCE
ITAC challenges the past performance evaluation. In this regard, the
solicitation requested the submission by offerors of "relevant Past/Present
performance information," including sending an attached past performance
questionnaire to knowledgeable sources for return to the agency, for
themselves and for each proposed critical subcontractor, teaming contractor,
and/or joint venture partner, that the offeror considers relevant in
demonstrating the ability to perform the contract, RFP sect. L, Instructions
sect. 11.1, "for each team member and major subcontractor," id. sect. 11.5.2, or
simply for each subcontractor. Id. sect. 11.5. The solicitation generally
indicated that relevant past or present performance can be for "any Federal,
State, and local Government or their agencies, and commercial contracts or
subcontracts having a performance period completion not earlier than three
(3) years from RFP release date," id. sect. 11.4, but added that, in determining
relevance, "consideration will be given to similar technology, type of
effort (development, maintenance, contract scope, schedule and type)." RFP sect.
M.4.1.3.1. The offerors' past performance volume was to describe "the
contribution each subcontractor will make to the proposed effort along with
an estimate of the percentage of total labor hours involved," id. sect. 11.5.2,
and, with respect to the referenced contracts, was to "[e]xplain the nature
of the work involved and the extent the work involved was similar to the
proposed effort of this solicitation." RFP sect. L, Instructions sect. 11.5.3.1.
ITAC submitted past performance information for its team, which included
ITAC and its subcontractor ACS--which were the primary incumbent prime
contractors and were proposed to perform [DELETED] and [DELETED] percent of
the overall new contract effort, respectively--and [DELETED] other
subcontractors, [DELETED] of which had experience on the incumbent
contracts, such that all but [DELETED] percent of the proposed overall
contract effort would be performed by firms with experience on the incumbent
contracts. In contrast, none of RSIS's proposed team, which included RSIS
performing [DELETED] percent of the overall contract effort and at least
[DELETED] (and perhaps as many as [DELETED]) subcontractors performing the
[DELETED] percent of the effort, was described in RSIS's proposal as having
experience on the incumbent contract. However, RSIS's team members, like
ITAC's team members, generally received excellent (or, for some performance
sub-categories, very good) past performance ratings for their contracts,
resulting in an overall high confidence rating for both offerors/teams.
ITAC primarily challenges these ratings on the basis that RSIS's own
relevant past performance is limited to the area of information technology
services, and that RSIS's reliance on numerous subcontractors warranted a
recognition of increased risk in the past performance area. According to the
protester, it was unreasonable for the agency to assign RSIS the same
overall high confidence past performance rating assigned to ITAC's team of
incumbent contractors.
Our review of the record, including RSIS's proposal and the past performance
questionnaires completed by its references, confirms that the focus of
RSIS's past performance was primarily in the areas of information technology
services and administrative support. Nevertheless, as noted by the agency,
the record indicates that RSIS possessed experience in, and received
favorable past performance ratings for its efforts with respect to, those
core SOW areas for which its proposal indicated it would play a leading
role. In this regard, RSIS proposed that it would be one of [DELETED] task
leads, [DELETED], for tasks requiring modeling, simulation and analysis.
RSIS described in its proposal its experience with modeling, simulation and
analysis in support of algorithm development activities at the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Glenn Research Center, and in
operating a computer graphics facility supporting modeling, simulation and
analysis at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. Further, a past performance
reference for RSIS's contract at Goddard rated RSIS's knowledge and
experience with modeling, simulation and analysis techniques, and its
support for space-related models, as exceptional, while two references for
RSIS's contract at the Glenn Research Center gave RSIS very good ratings in
the same categories. RSIS Past/Present Performance Volume at V-8, V-44 to
V-45, V-50. RSIS's proposal also indicated that [DELETED] had used modeling,
simulation and analysis techniques (under an engineering, analysis, design
and development contract) in supporting various Department of Defense space
control technology and architecture programs, and had received very good
ratings for its knowledge and experience with modeling, simulation and
analysis techniques, and for its support for space-related models. Id.
at V-86 to V-87.
RSIS's proposal indicated that it would also act as [DELETED] task lead for
program management/integration, information systems, and conference support.
RSIS's proposal described eight contracts demonstrating its
management/integration and information systems experience, and the past
performance references for those contracts generally rated RSIS's
performance in those areas as exceptional or very good. Id. at V-35 to V-52.
RSIS's proposal also described its experience in planning, support of, or
conducting conferences, including conferences for as many as 2,000 attendees
(at Goddard), and meetings. See, e.g., id. at V-39 to V-42, V-51. (The past
performance questionnaires did not expressly request a rating with respect
to conferences.)
We note that RSIS's approach of allocating a leading role for particular SOW
tasks to the team member best suited to performing that task, rather than
attempting to take the lead itself for each task, was consistent with the
solicitation, which specifically contemplated that the prime or lead offeror
might rely on a joint approach to performing critical aspects of the SOW and
task orders issued thereunder. Again, the RFP requested past performance
information not only for a single prime contractor, but also with respect to
team members, joint venture partners, and critical or major subcontractors
that were relevant in demonstrating the ability to perform the contract. RFP
sect. L, Instructions sect.sect. 11.1, 11.4, 11.5.
Notwithstanding RSIS's lack of incumbent experience, the extensive past
performance information for its team, in conjunction with the past
performance ratings available to the agency, reasonably indicated that the
core tasks under the SOW would be performed by team members with experience
in those areas and which had earned generally exceptional or very good
performance ratings, the same general ratings received by the ITAC team. As
for ITAC's position that RSIS's more extensive subcontracting approach
warranted some lower rating, we note that RSIS's proposal in fact was
downgraded for this reason under the program management and integration
subfactor of the mission capability factor. Specifically, the agency noted
that while RSIS had proposed a sound, integrated product team-based,
subcontractor management plan, "the sheer number of subcontractors
([DELETED]) introduces some potential to negatively affect task proposal
request responsiveness." Proposal Analysis Report at 38. In these
circumstances, we find reasonable the agency's assigning RSIS a high
confidence rating for past performance, the same rating assigned ITAC.
CORE SAMPLE TASK ORDER
ITAC challenges the evaluation of its core sample task order proposal.
According to the protester, the high risk rating its proposal received in
this area resulted from application of an independent government cost
estimate that was inaccurate and did not reflect ITAC's proposed approach.
In this regard, under the 12-month core sample task order scenario of the
RFP, offerors were required to submit a task order management plan (TOMP)
setting forth the offeror's methodology and approach, including its mix of
qualified personnel and labor hours, to developing a solution to take
advantage of the Iridium satellite telecommunications architecture/system to
deliver near-real time imagery and products. The task order SOW included
seven subtasks: (1) development of a concept of operations; (2) analysis of
the proposed concepts to assess their capabilities and vulnerabilities in
the current operational environment; (3) evaluating and recommending a
suitable architecture incorporating off-the-shelf hardware and software to
deliver imagery data through Iridium using the previously selected concept
of operations; (4) assessing the existing architectures at the agency's
Combined Air Operations Center-Space ("War Room") and another location at
which the selected concept can be demonstrated, and integrating
off-the-shelf components into the existing architecture to support the
demonstration; (5) developing lesson plans to train operators and
technicians in use and maintenance of the system, and conducting actual
training sessions for end users; (6) demonstrating the concept by
transmitting near real-time imagery data between the demonstration sites and
preparing a report on measures of performance and effectiveness; and
(7) support efforts for transitioning equipment, products, and/or prototypes
that were successfully demonstrated into operational status.
The Air Force tasked the Aerospace Corporation, a federally-funded research
and development center specializing in space and missile-related activities,
to prepare an independent government estimate of the effort required to
accomplish the sample task order requirements. A very detailed work
breakdown statement was prepared that set forth the required level of effort
for each of four--of the five specified in the solicitation--labor
categories for each sub-subtask over each week of the 12-month performance
period. The resulting independent government estimate totaled [DELETED]
hours. Upon receiving offers, however, the agency determined that
Aerospace's estimate included follow-on sustainment of the concept after
transition to operational status, a role not required under the SOW or
costed by the offerors, and also a significant program management effort
likewise not expressly required under the SOW or costed by the offerors.
After deleting [DELETED] sustainment hours and reducing the allocated
program management effort from [DELETED] to [DELETED] hours, the resulting
overall final government estimate totaled [DELETED]hours, all allocated to
elements of work for which the estimate did not change after the receipt of
proposals. Agency Comments, Oct. 31, 2001, at 1-3, attach.
In its core sample task proposal, RSIS proposed [DELETED] labor hours
divided among all five of the labor categories specified in the RFP; its
level of effort was adjusted upward, to [DELETED] hours, in the agency's
most probable cost analysis. In contrast, ITAC proposed a level of effort
totaling only [DELETED] hours divided between 2 labor categories. Further,
although the task order SOW specified a 12-month performance period, and
ITAC recommended establishing a 12-month limit to allow for any unforeseen
circumstances, ITAC proposed an actual schedule under which it would perform
the task order, from development of the concept of operations through
demonstration and transition to operational status, of only approximately
4-2/3 months. ITAC TOMP at 26. The Air Force determined that ITAC's
estimates of the required effort and schedule were unrealistically reduced,
and that ITAC had failed to include critical processes and milestones,
rendering its proposed approach high risk. (The agency found the approach so
unrealistic that it could not calculate a most probable cost/required number
of hours for ITAC's task order proposal.)
ITAC argues that the independent government estimate, and the agency's
determination that ITAC's proposed level of effort was unrealistic, failed
to take into account information available from Motorola, which designed and
built the Iridium satellite system. According to the protester, consistent
with the SOW direction to consider off-the-shelf solutions, it contacted
Motorola and discovered that savings with respect to required staffing were
available through use of Motorola information.
We find no basis to question the agency's determination that ITAC's proposed
schedule and level of effort for the core sample task requirement were
unrealistic. The record indicates that the agency's evaluation of proposals
in this area was based on a detailed work breakdown statement, prepared by
subject matter experts in the area of space and missile-related activities,
which estimated the time and effort by various labor categories required to
perform each sub-subtask of the task order SOW. This estimate was then
adjusted to account for each offeror's unique approach to the
cross-utilization of personnel, resulting in unique, differing total levels
of effort for the two offers (as well as labor hour estimates for each
proposed labor category which differed between the offerors and from the
initial independent government estimate). Proposal Analysis Report at 44.
While ITAC stated in its sample task proposal that it had established a
relationship with Motorola from which it could obtain unique insight and
access into the Iridium system, including taking advantage of
Motorola-prepared training and transition materials, ITAC's general
references in this regard did not explain in any significant detail the
existing Motorola concepts and information it proposed to use and,
specifically, how their use warranted such a dramatically reduced schedule
and level of effort. Id. at 1, 10, 18-23. For example, as noted by the
agency, while ITAC generally proposed to take advantage of Motorola training
materials, it set forth a detailed approach to course development that
appeared inconsistent with its proposed staffing ([DELETED] hours for both
developing the training courses and conducting the training). Id.
at 18-20, 28. It is an offeror's obligation to submit an adequately written
proposal, and it cannot reasonably complain when a poorly prepared proposal
is downgraded. See Alaskan Publ'ns, B-283272, Oct. 27, 1999, 99-2 CPD para. 102
at 8.
Further, we think the evaluators could reasonably view ITAC's omission of
critical processes and milestones as further indicating that reliance on
information from Motorola did not, in itself, account for the proposed
significant reduction in schedule and staffing. For example, the agency
considered ITAC's proposal of only [DELETED] (after the demonstration) for
implementation of training to be inadequate, since multiple training
sessions, possibly at different locations, may be required to train
operators, technicians and end-users. In addition, the agency questioned
ITAC's failure to propose any training before the demonstration and its
allocation of only [DELETED] for conducting the demonstration; ITAC itself
recognized the need for training to ensure that personnel were prepared to
conduct the demonstration, and the agency determined that conducting
dry-runs and setup/checkout for the demonstration also would be necessary.
Proposal Analysis Report at 21; ITAC TOMP at 18, 26. Likewise, the fact that
the level of ITAC's proposed effort was significantly below the independent
government estimate for all SOW tasks called into question ITAC's claim that
the discrepancy with respect to effort and schedule resulted from the
agency's failure to consider ITAC's reliance on information from Motorola.
Although ITAC argues that the first five tasks, from development of a
concept of operations through conducting training, "specifically relate to
the Motorola product," ITAC's proposed effort ([DELETED] hours) for the
remaining two tasks, demonstration of the capability and transition planning
and support, were also significantly below the government independent
estimate ([DELETED] hours). ITAC Comments, Nov. 1, 2001, at 2. We conclude
that the Air Force reasonably determined that ITAC's sample task proposal
failed to support its proposed significantly reduced level of effort and
schedule, that the proposed level of effort and schedule were unrealistic,
and that ITAC's proposal in this area therefore was high risk.
DISCUSSIONS
ITAC asserts that the Air Force failed to conduct meaningful discussions
regarding ITAC's evaluated deficiencies and weaknesses. In this regard, the
RFP advised offerors that the government reserved the right to award without
discussions. RFP sect. L, Instructions to Offerors sect.sect. 3.0, 6.0. After the
receipt of proposals, the agency issued a number of evaluation notices (EN)
requesting additional information. Each notice included the statement that
it was a clarification issued pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) sect. 15.306(a), governing exchanges between the government and offerors
when award without discussions is contemplated, and each specifically stated
the clarification did not constitute oral discussions. ITAC asserts that two
of the requests for clarification, ITAC EN 0001 and RSIS EN 0002, did in
fact constitute discussions, since they requested past performance
information without which high confidence ratings could not have been
assigned to ITAC's and RSIS's proposals. ITAC concludes that the Air Force,
having opened discussions, was required to advise ITAC of all of the
deficiencies and weaknesses in its proposal, which it failed to do.
We do not agree that these ENs constituted discussions. Under FAR
sect. 15.306(a)(2), if award will be made without conducting discussions,
"offerors may be given the opportunity to clarify certain aspects of
proposals (e.g., the relevance of an offeror's past performance information
and adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not
previously had an opportunity to respond) or to resolve minor or clerical
errors." Such limited exchanges do not constitute the conduct of
discussions, which would generally necessitate holding meaningful
discussions with all offerors in the competitive range. FAR sect. 15.306(d). The
ENs here fell within the clarifications provision. ITAC EN 0001 cited RFP sect.
L, Instructions to Offerors sect. 11.5.2, which required offerors to include in
their description of past performance a description of the contribution each
subcontractor would make to the proposed effort; the EN specifically
requested that ITAC describe by SOW subparagraph the contribution of its
proposed subcontractors as the lead or on a support basis. This information
would permit the agency to assess the relevance of ITAC's subcontractors'
experience to their role in performing the current effort. RSIS EN 0002
cited RFP sect. L, Instructions to Offerors sect. 11.5.3.1, which required offerors
to explain how the past performance cited in their proposals was similar to
the effort contemplated under the SOW; the EN requested RSIS to provide
additional past performance information for 11 of its subcontractors,
focusing on the team member's lead or support roles with respect specific
SOW paragraphs, so as to permit the agency "to verify relevant past
performance for their lead and support roles." Again, this information
related to the agency's assessment of the relevance of the subcontractors'
past performance to the current effort. As such, the ENs constituted
clarifications, not discussions.
The protest is denied.
Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel
Notes
1. The RFP also provided for the possibility that the agency might issue
task orders for additional tasks beyond the above core tasks, including
support of missile defense activities and technical and subject matter
support of the integration of space systems into command and control
architectures. RFP Statement of Work (SOW) sect.sect. 3.6, 3.13.