TITLE:  United Defense LP, B-286925.3; B-286925.4; B-286925.5, April 9, 2001
BNUMBER:  B-286925.3; B-286925.4; B-286925.5
DATE:  April 9, 2001
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United Defense LP, B-286925.3; B-286925.4; B-286925.5, April 9, 2001

Decision

Matter of: United Defense LP

File: B-286925.3; B-286925.4; B-286925.5

Date: April 9, 2001

Thomas C. Papson, Esq., James J. Gallagher, Esq., Richard B. Oliver, Esq.,
Richard P. Castiglia, Jr., Esq., Robert R. Plank, Esq., and Dana B.
Pashkoff, Esq., McKenna & Cuneo; and Allan J. Joseph, Esq., David F. Innis,
Esq., and Scott M. Rennie, Esq., Rogers, Joseph, O'Donnell & Quinn, for the
protester.

Marcia G. Madsen, Esq., Anthony J. Trenga, Esq., John L. Rice, Esq., David
F. Dowd, Esq., Charles F. B. McAleer, Jr., Esq., Michael J. Farley, Esq.,
Cameron S. Hamrick, Esq., and Christine S. Trafford, Esq., Miller &
Chevalier; and David A. Churchill, Esq., Kevin C. Dwyer, Esq., Paul W. Cobb,
Jr., Esq., Nicole G. Berner, Esq., Robert S. Nichols, Esq., and Geoffrey A.
Barrow, Esq., Jenner & Block, for GM GDLS Defense Group LLC, an intervenor.

Jeffrey I. Kessler, Esq., Craig E. Hodge, Esq., Susan M. Lewandowski, Esq.,
Robert A. Maskery, Esq., William C. Reed, Esq., and Dominic A. Femino, Jr.,
Esq., U.S. Army Materiel Command, for the agency.

David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protest against award of single contract for both infantry carrier vehicle
(ICV) and mobile gun system (MGS) variants of new family of armored vehicles
is denied where (1) awardee's proposal for ICV, accounting for approximately
89 percent of new vehicles in contemplated brigade, was reasonably evaluated
as offering significant performance and supportability advantages which
outweighed protester's schedule and price/cost advantages, and (2) although
awardee's schedule for deploying MGS was very disadvantageous and evaluation
did not fully reflect certain disadvantages with respect to ammunition
storage in awardee's MGS, its proposal nevertheless offered other
performance and supportability advantages, and selection of awardee's MGS
would result in commonality between ICV and MGS, such that award for both
variants was not unreasonable.

DECISION

United Defense LP (UDLP) protests the U.S. Army Materiel Command's (AMC)
award of a contract to GM GDLS Defense Group LLC (GM/GDLS), under request
for proposals (RFP) No. DAAE07-00-R-M032, for the Interim Armored Vehicle
(IAV). UDLP challenges the evaluation of proposals, asserting that the
evaluation and resulting cost-technical tradeoff were inconsistent with the
evaluation scheme set forth in the RFP and were otherwise unreasonable.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

RFP

According to the RFP, and the agency's overall statement of its requirements
in its "Operational Requirements Document for a Family of Interim Armored
Vehicles" (ORD), incorporated into the solicitation, there is an "an
immediate and urgent need for an air transportable [Brigade Combat Team
(BCT)], capable of deployment anywhere on the globe in a combat ready
configuration." RFP, Executive Summary; Operational Requirements Document at
1. In this regard, the agency states in "The Interim Brigade Combat Team:
Organizational and Operational Concept" (O&O Concept), also incorporated
into the solicitation, that Army light forces can deploy quite rapidly, but
lack the lethality, mobility, and staying power necessary to ensure
decision, while Army mechanized forces possess substantial lethality and
staying power, but require too much time to deploy. O&O Concept at 4.

The contemplated Interim BCT (IBCT), with which the Army intends to address
this perceived shortfall in capability, was generally described in the
Operational Requirements Document as "a full spectrum, combat force" which
has utility in all operational environments, but "is designed and optimized
primarily for employment in small scale contingency (SSC) operations in
complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range threats that
may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities." Operational
Requirements Document at 2. According to the Operational Requirements
Document, the IBCT "deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts
effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, contain,
stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations";
"participates in major theater war (MTW), with augmentation, as a
subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps, in a variety of
possible roles"; and "participates with appropriate augmentation in
stability and support operations (SASO) as an initial entry force and/or as
a guarantor to provide security for stability forces by means of its
extensive combat capabilities." Id. Further, "[i]ts core operational
capabilities rest upon excellent operational and tactical mobility, enhanced
situational understanding, combined arms integration down to company level,
and high dismount strengths for close combat in urban and complex terrain."
Id. at 3. Furthermore, "[g]ven its likely operational environment, the IBCT
achieves decisive action by means of combined arms dismounted assault at the
company level, supported by direct fires from organic weapon systems (ICV
[infantry carrier vehicle] crew served weapons, MGS [mobile gun system],
anti-tank systems, and snipers) integrated with indirect fires from
artillery, mortars, and joint fires/effects." Id. As an example of its
intended use, the RFP included as an attachment the IAV Operational Mode
Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP), which generally described a 30-day
long-term operation, consisting of a 4-day deployment period, 72-hour small
scale contingency, 19-day SASO period, and a 4-day redeployment period, but
focused on the 72-hour small scale contingency.

The solicitation requested proposals to equip on a requirements basis up to
six IBCTs with IAVs and for any necessary engineering and manufacturing
development (EMD) (to be performed on a cost-plus-award-fee basis). RFP
Amend. No. 0005. The Army contemplates that these IBCTs, which must be
"fully mobile and completely air deployable by C-130 tactical lift
aircraft," RFP, Executive Summary, will be comprised (after the first BCT)
of 330 IAVs (as well as numerous other vehicles), including: (1) the ICV
variant, comprised of 114 infantry carriers (108 plus 6 operational
readiness float (reserve) vehicles) per brigade after the initial brigade,
51 reconnaissance vehicles, 40 commander's vehicles, 38 120-millimeter
mortar carriers, 10 antitank guided missile (ATGM) vehicles, 14 fire support
vehicles, 10 engineer squad vehicles, 18 medical evacuation vehicles,
4 nuclear-biological-chemical reconnaissance vehicles; and the MGS
(31 vehicles). Offerors were permitted to propose for either the ICV variant
(including all configurations), the MGS, or both.

The solicitation included performance specifications for each type of IAV;
the requirements were categorized as Key Performance Parameters (KPP),
Band 1 Performance Requirements, Band 2 Performance Requirements,
non-Band 1/non-Band 2 Performance Requirements, and Desired Capabilities.
Offerors were required to meet all KPPs for all IAVs at the time of
delivery, commencing with the initial deliveries; offerors were encouraged
to meet as many of the Band 1, Band 2 and non-Band 1/non-Band 2 Performance
Requirements as possible in the initial delivery, but were required to meet
all performance requirements other than the KPPs (i.e., Band 1, Band 2, and
non-Band 1/non-Band 2) no later than delivery of the last vehicle in the
fifth brigade. Offerors not proposing to meet all performance requirements
at the time of initial delivery were required to propose block improvement
options for incorporating the remaining requirements into production
subsequent to initial delivery and for retrofitting all previously produced
IAVs to the block improvement design. RFP sect. M.1.1.10. Offerors were required
to furnish, not only extensive proposal information detailing their approach
to meeting the solicitation requirements, but also, in the event that they
proposed the ICV variant, two ICV bid samples to be used "to verify the
content of the written portion of [the] proposal." RFP sect. L.3.1.

The RFP provided for four award alternatives: (1) one award for both the ICV
variant (including all ICV configurations) and the MGS; (2) one award for
the ICV and one award for the MGS; (3) one award for the ICV only; or
(4) one award for the MGS only. RFP, Executive Summary, sect. M.1.6. Award was
to be made on a best overall/best-value basis to the offeror whose proposal
was rated acceptable for all evaluation areas (other than price/cost) and
was most advantageous to the government.

The solicitation provided for proposals to be evaluated under
five evaluation areas: (1) schedule, including evaluation elements for
production/delivery/support for the first IBCT element and for subsequent
production/delivery/support; (2) performance, including elements for
performance requirements and commonality; (3) supportability, including
elements for deployability, sustainment cost, system maintainability, and
predicted reliability; (4) price/cost; and (5) management. Schedule and
performance were equal in importance and were "each slightly more important
than" supportability and price/cost; supportability and price/cost were of
equal importance and were each more important than management. RFP sect. M.1.1.
In addition, offerors were advised that the source selection authority (SSA)
and source selection advisory council (SSAC),

using their best professional and military judgment and consistent with the
results of the proposal evaluation and the Basis for Award, [would] make an
integrated assessment of the capability of the offerors' proposals to
satisfy the objectives set forth in the BCT Organizational and Operational
(O&O) Concept, considering a Combined Arms Company Team. In the event this
analysis indicates that the BCT O&O Concept objectives cannot be achieved,
the Government reserves the right not to make any award(s) based on this
solicitation and to pursue other ICV and/or MGS contract actions.

RFP sect. M.1.7.

Seven offerors submitted proposals; some, including GM/GDLS and UDLP,
submitted multiple proposals. (GM/GDLS submitted three proposals, including
an ICV proposal, an MGS proposal and a combined proposal; UDLP submitted
four proposal sets based upon varying approaches, each including an ICV
proposal, an MGS proposal and a combined proposal.) Seventeen proposals from
four offerors were included in the competitive range. After conducting
extensive oral and written discussions with offerors, AMC requested final
proposal revisions (FPR). Based upon the evaluation of FPRs and the sample
test results, the source selection authority determined that the GM/GDLS
proposals, both individually for the ICV and MGS and combined, represented
the best overall value and were most advantageous to the government. Source
Selection Decision at 9, 27.

Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) Award Decision

The SSA first reviewed the proposals for the ICV; the SSA explained in the
Source Selection Decision that he had "elected to compare the ICV proposals
and select the ICV proposal that I deem to be the best value, before I
compare the MGS proposals, in recognition of the significantly larger number
of ICV vehicles and the fact that proposals for the ICV were submitted by
all four offerors, while MGS proposals were submitted by only [GM/GDLS] and
UDLP." Source Selection Decision at 5.

The SSA determined that UDLP's Proposal No. 1 submission set (including both
the individual ICV and MGS and the combined proposal) was its most
advantageous set of proposals, and thus compared its Proposal No. 1 approach
for the ICV with GM/GDLS's ICV proposal. The SSA found the GM/GDLS's ICV
proposal to be significantly superior to UDLP's proposal in the performance
and supportability areas, and found UDLP's proposal superior to GM/GDLS's in
the schedule area and significantly superior in the price/cost area.

The SSA acknowledged that the evaluated cost of UDLP's ICV ($[DELETED]) was
lower than GM/GDLS's ($3.534 billion), such that UDLP's proposal was
significantly superior in this area. As for the schedule area, the SSA rated
both proposals merely acceptable because neither met the agency's
"objective" deployment schedule, under which the First Unit Equipped would
be deployed by the end of March 2001 and Initial Operational Capability for
the first BCT would be achieved by the end of December 2001. The SSA did
recognize, however, that the most probable First Unit Equipped (August 2001)
and Initial Operational Capability (February 2002) for UDLP's ICV was "much
sooner" than the most probable First Unit Equipped (January 2002) and
Initial Operational Capability (December 2002) for GM/GDLS's ICV. Source
Selection Decision at 10. The SSA characterized UDLP's proposal as superior
with respect to schedule, and further recognized that "[g]iven the urgency
of the operational requirement" for the IBCTs, the RFP placed "considerable
weight on the [s]chedule [a]rea." Source Selection Decision at 16.

With respect to the performance area, the SSA recognized that UDLP's
proposed ICV--the MTVL, a tracked vehicle derived from the M-113 armored
personnel carrier--possessed three performance advantages over the GM/GDLS
8-wheeled LAV: (1) UDLP's ICV had superior off-road terrain mobility,
including soft soil mobility, vertical climb and side slope capability,
while GM/GDLS's ICV had disadvantageous mobility in soft soil; (2) UDLP's
proposal indicated that its ICV had the capacity to transport a 10-man
infantry squad (in addition to the crew), one more soldier than required and
one more than indicated in GM/GDLS's proposal; [1] and (3) UDLP's ICV,
unlike GM/GDLS's, would not need any block upgrades because it would meet
all minimum performance requirements with the initial deliveries. In
addition, the SSA recognized that UDLP's ICV offered greater commonality
than GM/GDLS's with currently fielded systems; on the other hand, the SSA
noted that, in the context of an award for both the ICV and MGS, GM/GDLS's
IAV "offers far superior commonality among the combined IAVs variants"
because its ICV and MGS "base designs are identical." Source Selection
Decision at 13-14, 24.

The SSA also found that the GM/GDLS ICV offered significant performance
advantages relative to UDLP's, such that GM/GDLS's proposal overall was
significantly superior in this area. Specifically, the SSA emphasized that
the GM/GDLS wheeled ICV offered "an exceptionally advantageous maximum
sustained speed of 60 mph," noting that the minimum speed in the
specification was only 40 mph and that UDLP's tracked ICV was evaluated as
at risk of not meeting even that lower speed. Source Selection Decision at
11. The SSA noted that the GM/GDLS "ICV's maximum sustained speed will not
only enable it to quickly road march to the designated mission location and
engage the threat, but also to rapidly disengage when facing a superior
threat, or to rapidly redeploy to a new position when facing an unexpected
threat." Id. In addition, the SSA noted that GM/GDLS's wheeled ICV offered
lower interior noise and vibration, and therefore an enhanced ride quality,
compared to UDLP's tracked ICV. According to the SSA, both increased the
alertness and fitness of infantry soldiers riding in GM/GDLS's ICV
and--because the soldiers in UDLP's ICV were required to wear double hearing
protection devices while those in GM/GDLS's were required to wear only a
single device--allowed better communication within GM/GDLS's ICV.

Further, the SSA noted that the overall (external) acoustic signature of
GM/GDLS's wheeled ICV was "far less pronounced" than that of UDLP's tracked
ICV, which would generally enhance the survivability of both the vehicle and
nearby dismounted infantry by reducing the likelihood of detection of the
vehicle, and also would provide a superior operational capability to advance
closer to a threat without being detected and thereby gain situational
dominance. Id. at 13. The SSA found that the survivability of GM/GDLS's ICV
also was enhanced by the fact that it included integral all-around
horizontal armor protection against 14.5 mm AP (Armor Piercing) rounds (a
desired but not a required capability under the RFP), while UDLP's ICV
offered that level of integral protection only in the 60-degree arc at the
front of the vehicle and otherwise offered only the lesser, required level
of integral protection against 7.62 mm AP rounds. The SSA found that
GM/GDLS's greater level of armor protection made it "much less vulnerable"
and offered "superior survivability" in the complex and urban terrain--a
non-linear environment where 360-degree protection was desirable because
threats could come from any quarter--where the BCT is envisioned to be used.
Source Selection Decision at 12, 26. ([DELETED]).

In addition to the above performance advantages, which the SSA concluded
would offer "significantly enhanced soldier survivability," the SSA noted
that UDLP's ICV offered "significantly disadvantageous self-recovery and
short track degraded operations." Id. at 12. In this regard, UDLP's ICV was
evaluated as requiring up to 135 minutes to enter short track mode in the
event of a track problem, significantly longer than the time required for
GM/GDLS's wheeled ICV either to change a wheel or to proceed based on the
"run flat" mode of its tires, and would be able to proceed in a degraded
mode (short track) at only approximately 7 mph, while GM/GDLS's ICV could
proceed in a degraded mode at speeds in excess of 30 mph. The SSA viewed
these UDLP disadvantages as having a significant negative impact on road
marches by causing loss of cohesiveness in march formations, and as being
"counter to the basic deployment and utilization concept for the BCT, which
envisions quick deployment and engagement." Source Selection Decision at 12.

GM/GDLS's ICV also was evaluated as being significantly superior to UDLP's
in the lesser-weighted supportability area. In this regard, it was found
that a unit of GM/GDLS's ICVs would require fewer C-130 and C-17 airlift
aircraft sorties to transport; GM/GDLS's 10-year sustainment cost (for
repair parts, maintenance manhours and petroleum, oils and lubricants) was
lower than UDLP's; and GM/GDLS's design offered more advantageous
maintainability characteristics, which were expected to ease the maintenance
burden and provide for superior operational readiness.

In addition, the SSA found the predicted reliability of GM/GDLS's ICV to be
significantly superior to that of UDLP's. In this regard, the agency was
projecting that most GM/GDLS ICV configurations would achieve a mean miles
between critical failure (MMBCF) ranging from [DELETED], while most of
UDLP's ICV configurations would achieve an MMBCF ranging from [DELETED]. The
SSA, noting that projected reliability targets are rarely realized in
practice, concluded [DELETED]. The SSA determined that the fact that
GM/GDLS's ICV was expected to experience [DELETED] fewer critical failures
than UDLP's represented "exponentially superior combat readiness" and
"dramatically heightened ICV readiness" that "directly affects both soldier
safety and survivability, as well as the potential for successfully
accomplishing the mission." Source Selection Decision at 15.

The SSA concluded that the advantages of GM/GDLS's ICV in the performance
and supportability areas were so significant as to outweigh UDLP's
advantages in the schedule and price/cost areas.

MGS Award Decision

The SSA likewise concluded that GM/GDLS's proposed MGS was more advantageous
than UDLP's, finding it significantly superior in the performance and
supportability areas, which offset UDLP's advantage in the schedule and
cost/price areas.

As with the ICVs, both proposals were rated as merely acceptable in the
schedule area because neither met the agency's objective deployment
schedule. However, the SSA recognized that the most probable First Unit
Equipped (September 2001) and Initial Operational Capability (February 2002)
for UDLP's MGS were "much closer" to the objective schedule than were the
most probable First Unit Equipped (August 2003) and Initial Operational
Capability (November 2003) for GM/GDLS's. Source Selection Decision at 21;
Addendum to Source Selection Memorandum. According to the SSA, GM/GDLS's MGS
schedule "represents a significant disadvantage and is substantially
inferior" to UDLP's; the SSA was "particularly concerned about the length of
the [GM/GDLS] development effort." Source Selection Decision at 21, 27. The
SSA also noted that UDLP's evaluated price/cost ($[DELETED]) was more
advantageous than GM/GDLS's ($1.04 billion).

In the performance area, the SSA recognized that UDLP's MGS possessed
advantages with respect to both the rate of fire and fire control for the
main gun, although he did not view these capabilities as particularly
significant in view of the MGS's primary assigned role of penetrating
bunkers and destroying sniper positions. Further, the SSA recognized that,
as with UDLP's ICV, its tracked MGS possessed superior off-road terrain
mobility, including soft soil mobility, vertical climb and side slope
capability, while GM/GDLS's wheeled MGS had disadvantageous mobility in soft
soil.

However, the SSA found that GM/GDLS's MGS offered significant performance
advantages relative to UDLP's such that its proposal overall was
significantly superior in this area. Specifically, the SSA emphasized that
the GM/GDLS wheeled MGS offered "a significantly advantageous sustained
speed of 60 MPH," noting that UDLP's tracked MGS was capable of only 45 mph.
Source Selection Decision at 22. As with the ICVs, the SSA found that the
superior maximum sustained speed of GM/GDLS's MGS would enable it both to
quickly road march to the designated mission location, and to rapidly
disengage when facing a superior threat, or to rapidly redeploy to meet an
unexpected threat. In addition, the SSA noted: "Operationally, selection of
the [GM/GDLS] MGS would result in the entire BCT, including all IAVs, having
comparable sustained speed mobility on hard surface roads." Id. at 22.
Further, the SSA also viewed as advantages the fact that the GM/GDLS's
wheeled MGS offered (1) superior ride quality with lower internal noise and
vibration; (2) greater all around integral 14.5 mm AP armor protection
(other than the wheel wells) than UDLP's (14.5 mm AP protection in the front
and otherwise 7.62 mm AP); (3) a reduced, "far less pronounced" acoustic
signature; and (4) more advantageous self-recovery and degraded mode
operation. Id. at 24.

The SSA also found that GM/GDLS's MGS offered advantages in supportability
such that it was overall superior to UDLP's in this area. The SSA recognized
that UDLP's MGS was "slightly superior overall" with respect to
deployability; although GM/GDLS's MGS was evaluated as requiring fewer C-130
and C-17 flights to deploy, UDLP's was evaluated as requiring substantially
less time for preparation, loading, unloading, and restowing equipment,
especially for unloading and restowing to bring the MGS to its combat ready
configuration after C-130 flights. Source Selection Decision at 25. However,
the SSA noted that the 10-year sustainment cost for GM/GDLS's MGS was lower
than UDLP's, and that GM/GDLS's MGS had significantly superior predicted
reliability, since it was expected to achieve an MMBCF of [DELETED],
compared to UDLP's initial MMBCF of [DELETED]. Although the SSA recognized
that the source selection evaluation board (SSEB) had projected that UDLP
would ultimately meet the RFP requirement for an MMBCF of 1,000, and that it
was proposing [DELETED], he noted that [DELETED].

The SSA concluded that GM/GDLS's "advantages in the Performance and
Supportability Areas are so significant as to outweigh the recognized and
significant advantages of the UDLP MGS in the Areas of Schedule and
Price/Cost." Source Selection Decision at 26. Again, according to the SSA,
UDLP's "significant [schedule] advantage . . . coupled with the lower
price/cost of the UDLP proposal, does not offset the tremendous long term
advantages accruing to [GM/GDLS] in the Performance and Supportability
Areas, and the delay in MGS capability can be filled by surrogate MGS
systems available to the Army." Source Selection Decision at 27; Addendum to
Source Selection Memorandum. Upon learning of the resulting award to GM/GDLS
for both the ICV and MGS, and after being debriefed by the agency, UDLP
filed this protest with our Office. We have reviewed the record and find no
basis to question the award. We discuss several of the protester's more
significant arguments below.

ANALYSIS

Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV)

Mobility

The protester asserts that the agency's evaluation of the mobility of
offerors' ICVs was unreasonable and inconsistent with the evaluation scheme
set forth in the RFP. Essentially, the protester argues that the source
selection over-emphasized the high-speed road march capability of GM/GDLS's
wheeled ICV and under-emphasized the superior off-road, cross-country
mobility of its own tracked ICV.

In discussing his determination that the higher maximum sustained speed of
GM/GDLS's ICV--"an exceptionally advantageous maximum sustained speed of
60 MPH"--represented a "highly significant" advantage relative to the 40 mph
sustained speed of UDLP's ICV, the SSA noted that

roadmarches were reflected both in the O&O, and in the integrated
operational assessment I performed, along with the SSAC, of the capability
of the offerors to satisfy the objectives set forth in the BCT O&O concept,
for a combined arms company. Based on my integrated O&O assessment of
representative operational scenarios, an extended roadmarch could be
accomplished [in] half the time with the [GM/GDLS] ICV, compared to the UDLP
ICV.

Source Selection Decision at 11-12. The assessment to which the SSA was
referring here was that provided for in RFP sect. M.1.7: "The SSA and SSAC will,
using their best professional and military judgment and consistent with the
results of the proposal evaluation and the Basis for Award, make an
integrated assessment of the capability of the offerors' proposals to
satisfy the objectives set forth in the BCT Organizational and Operational
(O&O) Concept, considering a Combined Arms Company Team." This Integrated
O&O Assessment included as its only specific operational scenario the "Road
March to Pristina: Port to AO [Area of Operations]," a presentation of three
possible, alternative road marches to Pristina in Kosovo, including a
200-mile march from Thessaloniki in Greece, a 185-mile march from Tirana in
Albania, and a 135-mile march from an airfield in Macedonia. AR, Tab 84,
Integrated Operational Assessment, Oct. 12, 2000; AR, Tab 85, SSAC
Integrated O&O Assessment for GM-GDLS; AR, Tab 86, SSAC Integrated O&O
Assessment for UDLP.

The protester asserts that the sole operational scenario against which the
capabilities of the competing vehicles were judged was the "Road March to
Pristina," which it describes as a long-distance movement down a hard
surface road between the port of entry and the area of operations; as a
result, argues the protester, the SSA gave decisive weight to the
operational mobility advantages of the GM/GDLS's wheeled ICVs for speed and
ride quality on primary roads, while largely ignoring the advantages of
UDLP's tracked vehicles in other terrain and in tactical operations.
According to the protester, nothing in the RFP or the O&O Concept informed
the offerors of the overwhelming emphasis he would place on the
long-distance road march, or the lack of emphasis he would place on tactical
mobility and offensive operations. On the contrary, claims the protester,
the O&O Concept made clear that tactical mobility and dismounted close
combat were key operational capabilities of the IBCT, and the RFP focused on
a small scale contingency scenario in the area of operations and advised the
offerors to assume that only 20 percent of operations would occur on paved
roads.

In reviewing an agency's evaluation of proposals and source selection
decision, our review is confined to a determination of whether the agency
acted reasonably and consistent with the stated evaluation factors and
applicable procurement statutes

and regulations. Main Bldg. Maintenance, Inc., B-260945.4, Sept. 29, 1995,
95-2 CPD para. 214 at 4. As explained below, we find that the evaluation in this
area was reasonable.

  1. Recognition of Importance of Cross-Country Mobility

As noted by the protester, the solicitation documents included several
references to the importance of tactical and cross-country mobility. For
example, the O&O Concept indicates with respect to the IBCT that "[i]ts core
qualities are high mobility (strategic, operational, and tactical) and its
ability to achieve decisive action through dismounted infantry assault,
supported by organic direct and indirect fire platforms, and enabled by
situational understanding." O&O Concept at 7. At the tactical level,
according to the O&O Concept, "overmatching mobility is critical to the
success of the force. The IBCT requires 100% tactical mobility, i.e., a
mobility capability that equals that possessed by a mechanized formation,
since it must be able to keep pace with mechanized formations when task
organized within a division for high-end, distributed operations in open and
rolling terrain." O&O Concept at 13-14. In addition, the ICV specification
(applying also to the MGS) in the RFP provided that "[t]he vehicle shall be
capable of operating over cross-country terrain," and that the NATO
Reference Mobility Model would be used to quantify mobility characteristics.
ICV Performance Specification sect. 3.1.1.5.2. (The model was used here for
calculating a vehicle's speed and the applicable percentage of no-go terrain
for the vehicle in six terrain categories: Germany dry, Germany wet, Mideast
dry, Mideast wet, Korea dry and Korea wet.)

Our review indicates that the agency's evaluation took into account UDLP's
advantage with respect to off-road mobility. In this regard, the SSEB
determined, applying the NATO Reference Mobility Model, that there were
differences in the percentage of no-go terrain for the two vehicles, most
significantly in the "Germany wet" category, where GM/GDLS's ICV was rated
as having a no-go percentage of 22.5 percent compared to UDLP's 5.8 percent.
Contracting Officer's Statement at 67. [2]

The SSA did acknowledge that the "Road March to Pristina" scenario, which
was part of the Integrated O&O Assessment, "focused on the operational
phase, the movement from the port to the AO [Area of Operations]." Hearing
Transcript (Tr.) at 1003-1004. [3] However, the record does not support
UDLP's assertion that this resulted in consideration of only a vehicle's
capability to undertake a high-speed, long-distance road march, without
consideration of its capability with respect to tactical mobility and
dismounted close combat. The SSA testified that he recognized that it could
not be assumed that the BCT would not encounter hostilities during the road
march to Pristina; rather, he was aware that there may be "tactical events"
along the way, and his assessment included ratings for tactical maneuver and
operational agility which took the possibility of such events into account.
Tr. at 1009-10, 1025-30. Indeed, the SSA testified that, while there was no
effort in the Integrated O&O Assessment to analyze any particular 72-hour
small scale contingency in the area of operations, the assessment
encompassed more than just merely the march to Pristina, and did take into
account operations in the area of operations. Tr. at 1006-07, 1102-03.

The contemporaneous documentation of the Integrated O&O Assessment confirms
that the agency considered more than just the capability for a high-speed
road march. In addition to the "Road March to Pristina" scenario, the
assessment included consideration of (and ratings for) (1) tactical
maneuver, including survivability, Red Zone ("Ambush (% x-country No Go),"
squad size, dismounted assault enabled by vehicles (signature), and vertical
obstacles), and command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence (C4I); (2) operational/tactical agility, including agility,
cohesiveness and crew/squad effectiveness upon arrival; (3) C-130
deployability/fight off the ramp; and (4) sustainability. AR, Tab 86, SSAC
Integrated O&O Assessment for UDLP; AR, Tab 85, SSAC Integrated O&O
Assessment for GM-GDLS. In this regard, UDLP's ICV (as well as its MGS) was
rated as a plus, "Enhances O&O," for "Ambush (% x-country No Go)"; in
contrast, GM/GDLS's ICV (as well as its MGS) was rated as only a minus, "O&O
at Risk," for that category and it was noted that "[i]ncreased cross-country
mobility would be beneficial." AR, Tab 86, SSAC Integrated O&O Assessment
for UDLP, at 7; AR, Tab 85, SSAC Integrated O&O Assessment for GM/GDLS, at
7.

Even beyond the Integrated O&O Assessment, the record indicates that the
agency recognized the difference in cross-country mobility of the vehicles.
The Army Test and Evaluation Command assessed a moderate risk against
GM/GDLS's vehicle on the basis that it was characterized by "significant
terrain denial" and cross-country mobility that was significantly below the
specification's tactical standard. AR, Tab 87, IAV System Performance Risk
Assessment for the MS/LRIP Decision, at 7. Further, and most significantly,
the Source Selection Decision reflects the SSA's specific determination that
UDLP's proposed ICV (as well as its MGS) had superior off-road terrain
mobility, including soft soil mobility, vertical climb and side slope
capability, while GM/GDLS's ICV had "disadvantageous mobility" in soft soil.
Source Selection Decision at 11, 22.

  2. GM/GDLS Higher Speed More Significant

In response to the protester's assertion that speed was over-emphasized, the
Army reports that the evaluation demonstrated that GM/GDLS's speed advantage
was "an unequivocal discriminator" between the offerors, in favor of
GM/GDLS. Agency Hearing Comments at 4. The agency maintains that the
evaluation in this regard was reasonable; we agree.

As an initial matter, we note that the RFP documents cited by the protester
repeatedly emphasize the importance of high-speed mobility; they stated that
a core capability of the IBCT is high operational mobility. O&O Concept at
7, 13, 32; Operational Requirements Document at 3. For example, in
explaining why the IAV must be capable of sustained hard surface speeds of
at least 40 mph, the Operational Requirements Document stated that "[o]ne of
the core capabilities of the IAV equipped IBCT is the ability to move
rapidly about the battlefield. . . . [The] IAV must be capable of rapid
deployment/displacement to critical areas immediately upon landing/insertion
and have the ability to rapidly relocate to meet emerging threats and to
shape the battlefield. This speed allows the commander to rapidly move and
commit his IAV equipped force." Operational Requirements Document at 8-9.
Likewise, the O&O Concept stated that "the IBCT will conduct rapid tactical
or operational movement to achieve positional advantage . . . . Rapid,
precision maneuver permits combat elements to avoid enemy strengths, to
attack from unexpected directions, to achieve surprise, or to fix the enemy
with one portion of the IBCT while mounting a precise, deliberate attack on
the enemy's flanks or rear." O&O Concept at 33-34. [4] Further, while the
protester argues that the fact that the terrain profile included only 20
percent road shows that the agency overemphasized the road march, we agree
with the agency that the terrain profile can most reasonably be read as
depicting operations only during the 72-hour small scale contingency, and
not during the overall 30-day operation. IAV Operational Mode
Summary/Mission Profile at 2, 5. [5]

We find no basis to question the agency's position that, even with respect
to operations in the area of operations during the 72-hour small scale
contingency envisioned by the RFP, GM/GDLS's lesser cross-country capability
was not a critical weakness. Again, as noted above, the Operational
Requirements Document itself associates the requirement for a sustained
speed of at least 40 mph with the need to be able "to move rapidly about the
battlefield," Operational Requirements Document at 8-9; this is consistent
with the SSA's position that GM/GDLS's higher speed offers a tactical
advantage. Tr. at 921-23. Furthermore, the agency maintains, and testimony
at the hearing confirms, that the increasing prevalence of roads, and the
fact that operations in the urban and complex terrain for which the IBCT is
optimized are likely to be canalized (funneled) into the road network, makes
roads an increasingly important factor in mobility. Contracting Officer's
Statement at 67; Tr. at 32, 125-26, 130-33, 180, 1088. Indeed, the terrain
breakdown in the RFP includes in the small scale contingency profile 50
percent primary and secondary road. IAV Operational Mode Summary/Mission
Profile at 5. This is significant, since the record indicates that GM/GDLS's
wheeled ICV will enjoy an advantage relative to UDLP's tracked ICV on
secondary roads as well as primary roads. (Although GM/GDLS's advantage on
secondary roads can diminish when secondary roads are wet or rough, the
agency reports that there are no likely conditions under which UDLP's
tracked vehicle will have an advantage on such roads.) Contracting Officer's
Statement at 68; Agency Hearing Comments at 35-36 n.1; Tr. at 179-181,
221-24.

Even with respect to cross-country movement and the relative percentages of
no-go terrain, where UDLP's tracked vehicles were evaluated as having an
advantage and GM/GDLS's as having a weakness, the agency notes that the
medium risk assessed against GM/GDLS in this regard was primarily due to the
high percentage of no-go terrain in the "Germany wet" category, which was
only one of six terrain categories. Contracting Officer's Statement at 136.
Further, the agency reports that GM/GDLS's ICV performed well during
cross-country movement during sample testing. (The only vehicle that became
stuck on the cross-country course was UDLP's ICV. Agency Hearing Comments at
6.) The agency notes in this regard that GM/GDLS's vehicles include
[DELETED], and thereby improve mobility in softer, more slippery soils (such
as those in the "Germany wet" category). Agency Hearing Comments
at 35-36 n.1; Contracting Officer's Statement at 68; Tr. at 814. Indeed, the
O&O Concept incorporated into the RFP recognized that the mobility
requirements for the IBCT can be met by "any of a variety of medium-weight
armored track or wheeled systems." O&O Concept at 14.

We conclude that the agency reasonably accorded greater weight to GM/GDLS's
evaluated advantage with respect to higher sustained speed than to UDLP's
advantage with respect to cross-country mobility. [6]

Reliability

The protester challenges the agency's calculation of predicted reliability.
In this regard, the RFP required that the ICV (excluding government
furnished equipment) have a reliability of 1,000 "mean miles between
critical failure (i.e. system abort)" (MMBCF). ICV Performance Specification
sect. 3.1.1.7.2.

In reviewing offerors' reliability predictions, the Army considered whether
the baseline reliability data for the reliability prediction were based on
reliability failure scoring criteria comparable to the IAV criteria here;
whether the baseline data were based on operating in comparable terrain;
reliability improvement since the baseline tests; increased equipment
complexity; and specific IAV mission equipment package configurations and
weapons installations.

UDLP cited in its proposal as the baseline for its ICV reliability
prediction (of [DELETED] Mean Miles Between Failure) the government's 1987
M113A3 Initial Production Test results, covering the performance of two
vehicles over 9,714 miles, and which scored 4.5 mission failures, for a
demonstrated 2,159 Mean Miles Between Critical Mission Failure. The M113A3
criteria provided that "criticality factors" would be assessed, which
resulted in ratings such as .5 failures or partial failures, and that crew
correctable failures would not be scored as critical failures. In 1995,
however, the Army issued guidance, apparently reflecting its practice since
approximately 1989, which eliminated the use of the criticality factors and
the practice of not scoring crew correctable failures as critical failures.
As a result, applying the current critical failure criteria, the SSEB
rescored as a 1.0 critical failure the one failure (a leak in the cooling
system) originally scored as a .5, and rescored as a potential additional
critical failure an engine vapor lock incident originally scored as a crew
correctable failure; this resulted in a range of [DELETED] critical
failures, or approximately [DELETED] MMBCF.

Further, since the 1987 M113A3 test was conducted using a mission profile of
40 percent cross-country, while the IAV mission profile in the OMS/MP
envisioned 50 percent cross-country (at least during the small scale
contingency), the SSEB made a 10-percent downward adjustment to the baseline
based on the SSEB's engineering judgment that the increased cross-country
travel would lead to reliability degradation because of increased shock,
vibration and introduction of contaminants. Although UDLP proposed an
approximately [DELETED] percent improvement for component enhancements and
an approximately [DELETED] percent degradation for added line replaceable
units (LRU) and complexity, the SSEB determined that these considerations
essentially offset each other, and therefore treated them as a wash, with no
adjustment. However, the SSEB did adjust the resulting value for the
expected effect on reliability of adding the ICV's remote weapon station.
Contracting Officer's Statement at 107-108; Agency Hearing Comments
at 81-83; Tr. at 598-611; see AR, Tab 141, M113A3 IPT (1986-1987) Data
Reevaluated; AR, Tab 197, M113A3 Initial Production Test Scoring Conference
Minutes, Mar. 23, 1988; AR, Tab 217, M113A Test Incident Reports; AR, Tab
216, Failure Definition and Scoring Guidelines for the M113 Family Vehicles
(Feb. 1978).

GM/GDLS referenced in its proposal three sets of test data, totaling over
90,662 reliability test miles, which were scored against operational mission
failure criteria that the agency determined were broader than the critical
failure criteria used for the IAV. In 1991, the Army Materiel Systems
Analysis Activity (AMSAA) had rescored the results from one of these tests,
for the LAV-25--a predecessor to the LAV offered in the
procurement--conducted in the period 1984 to 1985 over 63,133 miles, using
criteria the agency reports were essentially the same as the criteria
formally adopted in 1995, and which are reasonably equivalent to the IAV
criteria applied here. Since the IAV can operate with more than one flat
tire, AMSAA (in accord with the recommendation of the original scoring
committee) rescored the results to eliminate the 4 (of 15 total) failures
attributable to flat tires, and then added an assumed 12th hull failure;
this resulted in an overall increase in the mean miles between failure from
4,209 to 5,261 (erroneously reported as 5,161). The SSEB applied the
resulting adjustment factor to the two additional data points referenced by
GM/GDLS. In addition, since the LAV-25 test data were based on using a
mission profile of 40 percent cross-country, while the IAV mission profile
in the IAV Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile envisioned 50 percent
cross-country, the SSEB made the same 10-percent downward adjustment to the
baseline as it did for UDLP. Likewise, the agency concluded, as it did for
UDLP, that reliability growth was offset by additional complexity, and made
similar adjustments to account for mission equipment package configurations
and weapons installation. Contracting Officer's Statement at 108; Agency
Hearing Comments at 85; Agency Comments, Feb. 28, 2001, at 6; Tr. at 612-18;
see AR, Tab 122, Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) Report
for the Armored Gun System (AMSAA report), July 1991; Tab 129, Final Report
on IPT Comparison Test and Extended Durability Test of the LAV-25, July
1987; AR, Tab 136, Reliability Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria
(FDSC) Development Guidelines.

As reported in the Source Selection Decision, based on these calculations,
the agency projected that most of GM/GDLS's ICV configurations would achieve
an MMBCF ranging from [DELETED], while most of UDLP's ICV configurations
would achieve an MMBCF ranging from [DELETED]. In other words, the agency
determined that the awardee's vehicles would travel much further before a
failure than the protester's. The SSA determined that the fact that
GM/GDLS's ICV was expected to experience [DELETED] fewer critical failures
than UDLP's represented "exponentially superior combat readiness" and
"dramatically heightened ICV availability on the battlefield" that "directly
affects both soldier safety and survivability, as well as the potential for
successfully accomplishing the mission." Source Selection Decision at 15.

The protester questions each step in the agency's calculations, asserting
that, based on proper calculations, its ICV should have been credited with
an MMBCF of [DELETED] and that the MMBCF of the awardee's ICV could have
been as low as [DELETED]. UDLP Hearing Comments at 149-50. We find that
UDLP's arguments furnish no basis to question the agency's essential
determination that GM/GDLS's ICV was likely to be significantly more
reliable than UDLP's. We discuss the various aspects of UDLP's position
below.

  1. UDLP Reliability
  2. a. Starting Point for Reliability Calculation

     As an initial matter, we note that the protester's reliability
     calculations appear to be based on an erroneous starting point; UDLP
     adopted a higher reliability starting point in its FPR than it had
     previously claimed, and that was not apparent from the reliability
     scoring report it cited in support of its starting point. In its
     initial proposal, UDLP referred to a "demonstrated 2,159 MMBMAF," that
     is, Mean Miles Between Mission Affecting Failure, or an "M113A3 history
     demonstration test scored MMBF" (apparently, Mean Miles Between
     Failure) of 2,159; based on that starting point, it claimed an
     ultimate, adjusted Mean Miles Between Mission Affecting Failure/Mean
     Miles Between Failure of [DELETED] for its ICV. UDLP Proposal, vol. 4,
     at 4-1, 4-6, 4-14 to 4-15. In support of its claim that "the M113A3
     demonstrated reliability is 2,159 MMBMAF," UDLP cited the M113A3
     Initial Production Test Scoring Conference Minutes (a March 1998 report
     on the 1987 M113A3 Initial Production Test results), as well as a 1996
     UDLP memo, and stated that "[t]he final scoring conference minutes by
     [Test and Evaluation Command] (March 1988) documented an MMBF of
     2,159 based on scored MAFs [Mission Affecting Failures]." Id. at 4-1,
     4-6, 4-15. As noted by UDLP, the scoring conference minutes report in
     fact indicated a demonstrated reliability of 2,158.7 mean miles between
     failure for the M113A3. AR, Tab 197, M113A3 Initial Production Test
     Scoring Conference Minutes, Mar. 23, 1988.

     During discussions, the Army advised UDLP that its information was
     based on inconsistent failure definitions, mixing Mission Affecting
     Failures with Mission Abort (System Abort) Failures; the agency
     informed UDLP that "[t]he reliability requirement in the Perf[ormance]
     Spec[ification] is stated in terms of System Abort Failures," and
     instructed the offeror to "clarify all your predictions in the same
     terms of System Abort Failures as in the Spec." IFD No. SPR-U2-117. In
     its FPR, UDLP cited the same scoring conference minutes report (as well
     as the 1996 UDLP memo) that was cited in its initial proposal), but
     stated that "[t]he final scoring conference minutes by TECOM (March
     1988) documented an MMBF of 2,764 miles based on scored MAs." UDLP FPR,
     vol. 4 at 4-6, 4-14. (Elsewhere in its final proposal, UDLP cited a
     "demonstrated 2,764 MMBMA of the M113A3." Id. at 4-1.) In effect, UDLP
     apparently revised downward the number of assessed failures for the
     M113A3 test from the officially reported 4.5 to approximately [DELETED]
     (that is, the 9,714 miles of the test divided by the claimed
     reliability of [DELETED]). Based on the resulting revised upward M113A3
     reliability number starting point, it claimed in its final proposal a
     predicted Mean Miles Between Failure of [DELETED] for its ICV. Id. at
     4-1, 4-14 to 4-15.

     The Army essentially disregarded the new starting point number in
     UDLP's final proposal and, as discussed above, based its reliability
     prediction on the officially scored 4.5 M113A3 mission failures, for a
     demonstrated 2,159 MMBCMF starting point. The Army then made the
     adjustments (discussed above) in the number of failures, and arrived at
     an approximate [DELETED] MMBCF.

     The protester now questions whether all of the reported 4.5 M113A3
     mission failures should have been accepted by the agency as failures
     for purposes of calculating its ICV's reliability. This argument
     provides no basis for questioning the agency's reliability calculation.

     As an initial matter, this argument is untimely. The Army disclosed
     during discussions that the starting point for its reliability
     calculation was 2,159 MMBF, UDLP Letter, Mar. 28, 2001, and UDLP in its
     initial protest noted that both the agency and UDLP had used the same
     starting point of 2,159 MMBCF. Protest, Dec. 4, 2001, at 65. Similarly,
     in its comments on the agency report, the protester stated that "UDLP
     started with the M113A3 reliability test results of 2159 MMBCF. UDLP
     then considered its thirteen years of reliability growth
     activities . . . ." UDLP Report Comments at 272-73. In its comments on
     the hearing, however, UDLP for the first time argued that only three of
     the M113A3 scored failures qualified as critical failures for purposes
     of the IAV reliability calculation. UDLP Hearing Comments at 138. Since
     this argument questioning the number of critical failures used in the
     Army's calculation was raised more than 10 days after UDLP knew of the
     agency's approach of starting with the reported M113A3 test results, it
     is untimely. See 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(a)(2) (2000).

     In any case, UDLP's final proposal did not support an upward rescoring
     of the M113A3 test results. Although UDLP had asserted during
     discussions that its reliability number would be significantly higher
     if only mission abort failures were considered, and its final proposal
     generally referred to an agency direction to use Mean Miles Between
     Mission Abort (MMBMA), UDLP failed to explain in its final proposal
     precisely how it calculated the M113A3 starting point it referenced,
     that is, the basis for including in the IAV calculation only [DELETED]
     of the officially assessed 4.5 M113A3 critical failures. UDLP Response
     to IFD No. SP-R-U2-117; UDLP FPR, vol. 4. In this regard, we note that
     the RFP required offerors to "[i]dentify predicted or demonstrated
     system level reliability for each IAV variant or configuration," and to
     discuss "failure definition, data sources, and operating environment
     profile showing applicability to the IAVs." RFP, Table L/M, at 35. It
     is an offeror's obligation to submit an adequately written proposal.
     See Alaskan Publications, B-283272, Oct. 27, 1999, 99-2 CPD para. 102 at 8.
     Given this failure to explain in its proposal the precise basis for its
     upward rescoring of the official M113A3 test results, we have no basis
     to question the agency's use of the officially reported 2,159 Mean
     Miles Between Critical Mission Failures when calculating UDLP's
     projected reliability. In this regard, we note that, as calculated by
     the Army, starting with 2,159 Mean Miles Between Critical Mission
     Failures, making UDLP's [DELETED] percent upward adjustment for
     reliability growth and the [DELETED] percent downward adjustment for
     increased LRUs and complexity, and then adjusting for addition of the
     remote weapon station (using UDLP's estimate), the resulting MMBCF
     actually is only [DELETED] miles, that is, significantly below the
     level claimed by UDLP in both its proposal and its protest. Agency
     Hearing Comments at 84.

     b. Reliability Growth

     UDLP for the first time in its protest asserts that it increased its
     reliability value by [DELETED] percent, from [DELETED] MMBCF, to
     account for reliability growth in the years after the M113A3 test
     results, and then decreased it by [DELETED] percent, to [DELETED] to
     allow for integration risk, resulting in a net increase. UDLP Hearing
     Comments at 140-41. The protester questions the agency's rejection of
     its view and treatment of its reliability growth instead as being
     offset by integration risk and additional complexity. However, the
     protester's argument is based on numbers that are not reflected in its
     FPR. As noted by the agency, UDLP's Proposal No. 1 final proposal
     actually reflected only a [DELETED] percent upward adjustment for
     reliability improvements (from [DELETED]), such that there actually was
     a net decrease when its [DELETED] percent downward adjustment for more
     LRUs and increased complexity were considered. UDLP FPR, vol. 4, at
     4-1. [7] Thus, the agency's offsetting approach actually was more
     favorable to the protester than its own proposal, which would have
     resulted in a net decrease in reliability because reliability growth
     was more than offset by more LRUs and increased complexity.

     c. Additional Failures

     UDLP challenges the agency's determination to rescore as a 1.0 critical
     failure the leak in the cooling system, originally scored as a .5
     failure, and to add as a potential critical failure the engine vapor
     lock incident that originally was left uncounted as a crew correctable
     failure. This argument is without merit. The test incident report for
     the cooling system failure indicates that a 4-inch crack in a cooling
     reservoir led to overheating, engine shutdown and replacement of the
     cooling tank. AR, Tab 217, M113A3 Test Incident Reports. Since this
     would appear to interfere with the operation of the engine, clearly an
     essential function, we have no basis to question the Army's
     determination that this was a critical failure.

     As for the engine fuel vapor lock incident, the agency points out that,
     under the 1995 revised scoring criteria, the fact that a failure can be
     corrected by the crew no longer prevents it from being considered a
     critical failure; as stated in the revised criteria, "[e]ach failure
     event should be recorded based on its impact on system performance,
     regardless of who accomplishes the corrective action." AR, Tab 136,
     Reliability Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria (FDSC) Development
     Guidelines, Mar. 15, 1995, at 13. Noting that vapor locks will cause an
     engine to shut down and thus abort the mission, and that the original
     scoring conference had considered another vapor lock incident to be a
     critical failure, the agency maintains that it was appropriate to treat
     the above, second vapor lock incident as a critical failure. Agency
     Hearing Comments at 82. UDLP responds by citing the provision in the
     1978 M113 Failure Definition and Scoring Guidelines, which state that
     "a repetitive malfunction after the first occurrence is not chargeable
     as a mission or system failure if the common cause of the series of
     malfunctions is positively identified and proven to have been corrected
     by adequate testing." AR, Tab 216, Failure Definition and Scoring
     Guidelines for the M113 Family Vehicles (Feb. 1978), at sect. 7(d). The
     protester generally asserts that it successfully corrected the problem
     after 1987 and so advised the agency. Declaration of UDLP Program
     Manager, Feb. 25, 2001, at para. 17. UDLP's assertion notwithstanding, it
     has specifically described neither its corrective action nor the
     required confirmatory testing and, in any case, it is not clear whether
     this subsequent improvement in the M113A3 was already accounted for in
     UDLP's general claimed reliability growth. Further, even if this
     evaluated potential failure were removed from the reliability
     calculation, it appears that UDLP's ICV still would have a
     significantly less favorable reliability rating than GM/GDLS's. UDLP
     Hearing Comments at 138 n.59.

     d. Recent Reliability Information

     The protester asserts that in August 2000 it submitted to the agency
     negotiator recent reliability information that the agency failed to
     take into account in calculating the predicted reliability for its ICV.
     The protester also claims it was misled by the agency during
     discussions concerning the reliability issue; according to the
     protester, it was advised that it would receive credit for meeting the
     desired reliability objective of a MMBCF of 2,000. The protester
     maintains that, had it been advised of the agency's continuing concerns
     with respect to the reliability of its ICV, it "immediately would have
     inquired as to how the Army could have reached that conclusion in light
     of the supplemental reliability data that the company had provided to"
     the agency negotiator and, "[i]n the unlikely event that procuring
     officials had informed UDLP that [DELETED] even after reviewing UDLP's
     supplemental data, UDLP would have offered [DELETED]. UDLP Hearing
     Comments at 172-77; UDLP Post-Hearing Rebuttal Comments at 58-62. The
     agency negotiator denies having received any such reliability data in
     August. The negotiator also states that he advised UDLP that, while the
     agency would incorporate the 2,000-mile requirement into its model
     contract, this would not affect the government estimate of UDLP's
     reliability and the agency would assess UDLP's risk of meeting the
     requirement. Contracting Officer's Statement, attach., Declaration of
     Government Estimator; AR, Tab 225, Declaration of Government Estimator,
     Feb. 1, 2001.

     We need not determine whether UDLP in fact furnished additional
     reliability data to the agency in August, since we find reasonable the
     agency's position that the information, even if submitted, does not
     warrant a higher predicted reliability score. As noted by the agency,
     the additional reliability information includes data for only
     three (approximately) "500-mile" endurance tests, none of which was
     witnessed by the government or subject to reliability scoring, and each
     of which included potential or actual critical failures. According to
     the agency's analysis, there were four catastrophic, critical failures
     in one test, a critical failure in another test, and two potential
     critical failures in the third test. Agency Comments, Mar. 8, 2001, at
     3. Further, although the protester asserts that it would have offered
     [DELETED] if additional negotiations revealed that the agency's
     concerns were not alleviated even after consideration of the additional
     reliability information, the agency--having advised UDLP of its
     continuing, previously raised concern and having in response obtained a
     copy of UDLP's additional reliability information--was not required to
     raise the matter again with UDLP to furnish it still another
     opportunity to address this area. See Professional Performance
     Development Group, Inc., B-279561.2 et al., July 6, 1998, 99-2 CPD para. 29
     at 5 n.3 (once offeror has received adequate discussions regarding an
     area of concern, agency is not required to advise offeror of continuing
     concerns during successive rounds of discussions). In any case, given
     the clearly inadequate support the August data provided for UDLP's
     reliability predictions, it is not apparent why UDLP would not at that
     time have proposed [DELETED] if it believed it would have materially
     improved the reliability prediction for its ICV, and if it was in fact
     willing to propose such [DELETED]. We conclude that the agency's
     evaluation of UDLP's ICV's reliability was reasonable.

     2. GM/GDLS Reliability

     The protester challenges the calculation of predicted reliability for
     GM/GDLS's ICV. We find its arguments in this regard to be without
     merit. For example, UDLP argues that the Army failed to account for the
     results of ICV bid sample tests, in particular GM/GDLS's, in its
     projected reliability calculations; according to the protester, this
     was contrary to RFP sect. M.1.4, which provides that "[t]he results of the
     Bid Sample evaluation will be used to verify the content of the written
     portion of the offeror's proposal and will be considered in conjunction
     with the evaluation of . . . the Predicted Reliability Element within
     the Supportability Area." However, this provision does not specify any
     particular approach to taking into account the results of the bid
     sample testing. The agency reports that the bid sample data were not
     used in its actual reliability calculations because the ICVs were not
     production vehicles and had logged too few miles (approximately only
     1,994 miles for GM/GDLS's ICVs); in this latter regard, the agency
     notes that the government's planned testing of the awardee's vehicles
     will be based on accumulating 18,000 miles on three ICVs and at least
     one vehicle of the other configurations. Tr. at 622. The agency
     explains, however, that the SSEB did examine the bid sample failures to
     determine if there were systemic reliability problem indicators, but
     found none; most of the significant events were explainable as quality
     problems (rocker arm incidents for UDLP) or the result of the hurried
     nature of preparing the vehicles (loose bolts in the GM/GDLS ICV's
     steering, causing a loss of steering). Agency Hearing Comments at 74,
     85. We conclude that there was nothing improper in the agency's
     consideration of the bid sample test results.

     The protester also challenges the results of the original scoring of
     GM/GDLS's July 1987 Initial Production Test LAV-25 test results, which
     were subsequently rescored by the Army Materiel Systems Analysis
     Activity (AMSAA) in accordance with the revised reliability scoring
     criteria. The protester generally alleges that some of the incidents
     during Initial Production Test and durability testing which were not
     scored as contractor chargeable were as serious as those scored as
     critical failures for the UDLP M113A3. UDLP Supplemental Protest (Jan.
     25, 2001) at 3; UDLP Report Comments (Feb. 5, 2001) at 275; Tr. at
     644-46. This argument is unpersuasive. Since the IPT test report
     characterized the unscored incidents--including the three specific
     incidents cited by UDLP at the hearing--as "GFE [government furnished
     equipment], maintenance, or crew induced," it is not apparent why they
     should be charged as critical failures for the LAV. Further, as
     indicated above, a number of these incidents occurred during the LAV
     durability testing, which apparently was not rescored by AMSAA, and the
     miles for which were not included in the numerator of the reliability
     calculation. Finally, in the absence of strong evidence demonstrating
     the unreasonableness of such action, we believe the agency could
     reasonably rely on the rescoring, which was done prior to the current
     dispute by an independent organization with greater access to the
     relevant information as to the precise nature

     of the incidents in question. AR, Tab 122, Reliability, Availability,
     and Maintainability (RAM) Report for the Armored Gun System (AMSAA
     report), July 1991; Tab 129, Final Report on IPT Comparison Test and
     Extended Durability Test of the LAV-25, July 1987, at 7-10.

     We conclude that the Army reasonably determined that GM/GDLS's ICV
     would likely be significantly more reliable than UDLP's. More
     specifically, we find no basis to question the SSA's position that the
     difference in reliability represented "exponentially superior combat
     readiness" and "dramatically heightened ICV availability" on the part
     of GM/GDLS's ICV such that would "directly affect soldier safety and
     survivability, as well as the potential for successfully accomplishing
     the mission." Source Selection Decision at 15.

     Selection of GM/GDLS ICV--Conclusion

     Although the SSA recognized UDLP's significantly lower price/cost and
     its advantage with respect to schedule, one of the two most important
     evaluation areas, he found these advantages to be offset by GM/GDLS's
     overall significant superiority with respect to performance, the other
     most important evaluation area, and supportability. Again, the SSA
     determined that GM/GDLS's exceptionally advantageous sustained speed
     (which he reasonably considered to be more significant than UDLP's
     superiority with respect to cross country mobility), significantly
     superior all-around integral horizontal 14.5 mm AP armor protection,
     enhanced ride quality with lower interior noise and vibration, lower
     external acoustic signature, and significantly greater likely
     reliability, resulted in significantly enhanced soldier survivability
     and combat readiness. While UDLP has raised a number of challenges to
     the evaluation in the performance and supportability areas, the two
     most important of which we have discussed above, our review of the
     record furnishes no basis for questioning the SSA's overall
     determination that GM/GDLS's advantages in this regard, which went to
     the likelihood that the IBCT would successfully perform its
     contemplated mission with the least casualties, were such as to
     outweigh UDLP's price/cost and schedule advantages. In sum, we find
     that the selection of GM/GDLS's ICV was not unreasonable.

     Mobile Gun System (MGS)

     The protester also challenges the Army's selection of the GM/GDLS MGS.
     Although we agree with the protester that the evaluation does not fully
     reflect certain of the weaknesses associated with GM/GDLS's MGS, as
     discussed below, we conclude that the selection of GM/GDLS's MGS was
     not unreasonable when considered in light of the selection of GM/GDLS's
     ICV, which we have found to be not unreasonable.

     Schedule

     The protester challenges the Army's evaluation under the schedule area.
     As noted above, the RFP and the incorporated Operational Requirements
     Document stated that there is "an immediate and urgent need" for the
     IBCT. RFP, Executive Summary; Operational Requirements Document at 1.
     However, the RFP permitted offerors to propose other than off-the-shelf
     equipment to meet this need:

     The Program Objective may be achieved through the acquisition of:
     off-the-shelf equipment, non-developmental items, non-developmental
     items with integration of components, traditional development, systems'
     integration (multiple ground combat vehicles with sustainment solutions
     or vehicles with non-vehicle solutions), a mix of the aforementioned
     staggered over time and across variants, or other solutions.

     RFP, Executive Summary. The RFP did caution, however, that:

     The Army does not anticipate a lengthy development program and
     considers extensive development of solutions to be counter to the
     thrust of this acquisition due to the time, cost and risk associated
     with such an approach.

     Id. Again, according the RFP:

     A critical program objective is to achieve the earliest possible
     Brigade First Unit Equipped (FUE)/Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
     of capable IAVs. The Government does not intend to engage in extended
     variant/configuration development programs. Extended development is
     considered to be efforts requiring approximately 24 months or longer of
     development, including Government Test Activity, to complete EMD. Such
     a development effort would be inconsistent with the RFP's emphasis on
     (a) early Brigade Fielding, (b) [research, development, test and
     evaluation] funding profiles and (c) the overall program objective to
     quickly achieve a capable interim force. Offerors are encouraged to
     consider carefully the merits and probability of success, based on the
     evaluation criteria in the RFP, of a proposal submission which
     reflects, in part or in whole, variant/configuration development
     activity exceeding approximately 24 months.

     RFP sect. M.1.13.

     In the event that an offeror proposed a vehicle that was not production
     ready, as was the case with GM/GDLS's proposed MGS, the solicitation
     provided that:

     Only vehicles considered ready for production are approved for Low Rate
     Initial Production (LRIP). All vehicle systems identified below, as
     requiring development effort will be required to have the following
     prior to being approved for production: 1) have a stable production
     design and a complete manufacturing technical data package, 2) be
     producible and supportable, 3) have validated manufacturing and
     production processes, and 4) have demonstrated, through testing, system
     capabilities complying with the performance specification requirements.
     These items will be presented at the Production Readiness Review (PRR)
     as identified in C.5.4.5, and only upon approval by the Government be
     ready for LRIP.

     RFP, Amend. No. 0005, sect. H.24.

     UDLP's schedule was evaluated as more favorable than GM/GDLS's--the SSA
     was "particularly concerned about the length of the [GM/GDLS]
     development effort," and he considered GM/GDLS's schedule to be
     "substantially inferior" and "a significant disadvantage." Source
     Selection Decision at 21, 26-27. UDLP nevertheless asserts that the
     GM/GDLS evaluated schedule presented to the SSA understated the actual
     likely schedule and that, in any case, even as evaluated, the schedule
     was inconsistent with the fundamental terms of the solicitation; it
     concludes that GM/GDLS's MGS proposal was unacceptable.

     1. GM/GDLS's MGS Evaluated Schedule

     a. Availability of Required Test Vehicles

     The protester asserts that the evaluated schedule for GM/GDLS's MGS is
     based on a mistaken assumption as to the availability of required test
     vehicles. In its evaluated schedule for GM/GDLS's MGS, the Army assumed
     that an initial order for 12 MGSs would be placed at the time of
     assumed award in November 2000 and that 5 of these vehicles would be
     used for the required government production verification test (PVT) and
     live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E); it was assumed that the
     remaining 3 of the 8 vehicles required for PVT and LFT&E would come
     from Delivery Order No. 02, to be issued in May 2002 upon successful
     completion of PRR. SSEB Evaluated MGS Schedule. However, unlike UDLP,
     GM/GDLS did not include the pilot vehicles required for engineering and
     manufacturing development (EMD) testing in the EMD scope of work. As a
     result, the Army intended to place the first delivery order for
     12 vehicles for testing--described as "Production Vehicles" in the
     section B schedule of GM/GDLS's model contract--under section H.3 of
     the contract, which likewise provides that GM/GDLS's ordering charts
     "are applicable to the production vehicles only and exclude option
     provisions." RFP sect.sect. B (at 11 of 53), H.3.4. UDLP concludes that
     GM/GDLS's contract thus provides for the ordering of only production
     vehicles and not vehicles for EMD testing.

     UDLP's argument is unpersuasive. As noted by the agency, while it may
     have to order the initial MGSs for testing under ordering provisions
     for "production vehicles," GM/GDLS's FPR included a schedule that
     specifically indicated that MGSs from the first delivery order were
     intended to be used for PVT and LFT&E. Agency Post-Hearing Rebuttal
     Comments at 5; Agency Comments, Mar. 8, 2001, at 1; GM/GDLS FPR Master
     Program Schedule MGS Variant, attach. A-7; GM/GDLS FPR Production Plan
     Qty. [Quantity], Attach. A-8.

     Noting that the Army concedes that a vehicle used for PVT and LFT&E
     must be a production representative vehicle, Agency Comments (Mar. 8,
     2001) at 4, UDLP next contends that the agency's reliance on vehicles
     from Delivery Order No. 1 for five of the eight vehicles required for
     PVT and LFT&E is unreasonable because those vehicles will not be
     production representative vehicles. [8] This argument, too, is without
     merit. In its model contract, GM/GDLS agreed that PVT and LFT&E would
     be conducted "using materiel, which is built to a production
     configuration using normal manufacturing methods and tooling." Model
     Contract sect.sect. E.11.1, E.11.2. Further, we agree with the agency that
     GM/GDLS's proposal otherwise was reasonably susceptible of the
     interpretation that the vehicles from Delivery Order No. 01 that would
     be used for PVT and LFT&E would be, in the words of GM/GDLS's offer,
     "on-line production" vehicles, built at the same production facilities
     that would be used to produce the subsequent contract production
     quantities, and thus could be considered production representative
     units. GM/GDLS Proposal, Master Program Schedule, MGS Variant, Attach.
     A-7, and vol. 2, 4-5, 4-16, 4-24; Response to IFD No. S-GM-426; Agency
     Comments, Mar. 20, 2001, at 1-2; Agency Comments, Mar. 13, 2001, at 1.
     We conclude that the agency reasonably found that the five vehicles
     from Delivery Order No. 1 which are to be used for PVT and LFT&E will
     be production representative vehicles.

     b. RFP Funding Restrictions

     The protester argues that the evaluated GM/GDLS MGS schedule is
     inconsistent with the RFP's funding restrictions. The RFP provides that
     an "offeror's proposed prices/costs must accommodate the following
     planned [Fiscal Year] 00 reprogramming and [Fiscal Year] 01 President's
     budget," and identifies a total of $119 million in development funds
     that will be available for Fiscal Years 00 and 01. (A total of $362
     million in development funds was available for the entire contract
     period.) RFP Executive Summary. The protester asserts that research and
     development funds are required for purchasing the engineering and
     manufacturing development (EMD) vehicles, and calculates that, if
     Delivery Order No. 01 vehicles are used for EMD, the resulting overall
     required R&D funding will exceed the RFP funding limit by approximately
     $21 million. In response, the Army states that, although it currently
     intends to use research, development, test and evaluation funds to
     acquire the Delivery Order No. 01 vehicles, it believes that using
     production funds would also be appropriate because the vehicles
     ultimately will be deployed to users in the field and not retained as
     permanent test vehicles. Agency Comments (Mar. 13, 2001) at 2. In any
     case, the agency denies that the funding profile was intended to
     establish a mandatory requirement such that proposals in violation of
     the requirement must be rejected.

     We need not determine whether GM/GDLS's proposal as interpreted by the
     agency is inconsistent with the RFP's funding profile since, even if
     the agency in effect has waived the funding requirements, there is no
     basis for finding competitive prejudice to UDLP as a result of the
     alleged waiver. Specifically, the protester has not shown that it would
     have increased its development efforts so as to improve its competitive
     position had it known that an additional $21 million in development
     funds were available at the start of the contract. Where the record
     does not demonstrate that, but for the agency's actions, the protester
     would have had a reasonable chance of receiving the award, our Office
     will not sustain a protest, even if a deficiency in the procurement is
     found. McDonald-Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at 3;
     see Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
     1996).

     c. Program Management Office Schedule

     In further arguing its position that the evaluation understated the
     probable schedule for development and deployment of GM/GDLS's MGS, the
     protester notes that the agency Program Management Office (PMO)
     prepared a different, later schedule that was used to brief Army and
     Department of Defense officials. This PMO schedule was used by the Army
     Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) in determining on November
     8, 2000--after the SSA had internally announced his source selection
     decision at an SSAC/SSA meeting on October 20, on the same day he
     signed the original Source Selection Decision (November 8, that is),
     and before he announced the award on November 16--that the criteria for
     Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approval for entry into
     development/early production had been met, and then was used at the
     DAB's readiness meeting on November 16. The PMO schedule indicated
     that, in the absence of an in-lieu-of (ILO) replacement for the MGS,
     the most probable First Unit Equipped would be April 2004, that is, 8
     months after the August 2003 date assumed by the SSA/SSEB, and
     37 months after the RFP objective date of March 2001. It further
     indicated that the most probable Initial Operational Capability would
     be June 2005, that is, 19 months after the November 2003 date assumed
     by the SSA/SSEB and 45 months after the RFP objective date of December
     2001. Contracting Officer's Statement at 22, 37-42; AR, Tab 186, IAV
     ASARC Slides, Nov. 8, 2000. UDLP concludes that the PMO schedule is the
     more reasonable schedule.

     The existence of the later PMO schedule does not demonstrate that the
     SSEB/SSA schedule was an unreasonable estimate of the likely actual
     GM/GDLS MGS schedule. UDLP concedes that several of the differences in
     the assumptions underlying the PMO and SSEB/SSA schedules, and which
     accounted for the PMO's later overall schedule--including the PMO's
     assumption of a later award date, the decision by the Director of
     Operational Test and Evaluation to conduct Initial Operation Test and
     Evaluation with elements of a battalion rather than with a single
     company, and an extension of the period after brigade vehicle fielding
     and before Initial Operational Capability--would have affected the
     schedules of both offerors. UDLP focuses on the single most significant
     difference between the schedules--the fact that, while the SSEB/SSA
     assumed that performance of the first delivery order (to be placed at
     the time of award) would overlap the 24-month MGS development period,
     the PMO assumed that the first delivery order would be placed only
     after a 24-month development period. Contracting Officer's Statement at
     41-43; UDLP Report Comments at 75-80. The protester asserts that the
     PMO schedule is the one consistent with the RFP and GM/GDLS's proposal.
     However, its position in this regard appears to be based largely on its
     mistaken assumption that the SSEB/SSA's assumed first delivery order
     under the GM/GDLS contract would amount to the commencement of low-rate
     initial production (LRIP); according to the protester, such an LRIP
     order placed before any of the MGS development had been started would
     be improper. UDLP Report Comments at 79. The flaw in this argument is
     that GM/GDLS's proposal in fact contemplated that the MGSs acquired
     under the initial delivery order would not be an LRIP order but,
     rather, would cover vehicles to be used for EMD testing. (Indeed, it is
     difficult to understand how EMD would be completed without using the
     MGSs for EMD testing.) [9] Thus, UDLP's argument furnishes no basis for
     questioning the reasonableness of the schedule the SSEB/SSA used in
     evaluating GM/GDLS's MGS proposal. [10]
  3. Acceptability of GM/GDLS MGS Schedule

The protester argues that the lengthy development period required for
GM/GDLS's MGS is unacceptable on the basis that it is inconsistent with the
stated "immediate and urgent need" for the IBCT and the warning in the RFP
that the "Government does not intend to engage in extended
variant/configuration development programs." RFP, Executive Summary,
sect. M.1.13; Operational Requirements Document at 1.

In our view, the protester's interpretation fails to take into account the
solicitation as a whole. Specifically, as the Army notes, the RFP did not
prohibit development periods of 24 months or longer, but instead merely
cautioned that "[o]fferors are encouraged to consider carefully the merits
and probability of success, based on the evaluation criteria in the RFP, of
a proposal submission which reflects, in part or in whole,
variant/configuration development activity exceeding approximately
24 months." RFP sect. M.1.13 Thus, GM/GDLS's schedule was not unacceptable, and
the question for our review is whether the SSA took into account in his
decision the fact that GM/GDLS's MGS schedule included a lengthy development
period. He clearly did take this into account. As discussed above, the SSA
expressed concern about the length of the GM/GDLS development effort,
finding that GM/GDLS's MGS schedule was "substantially inferior" to UDLP's
so as to represent a "significant disadvantage" for GM/GDLS and a
"significant advantage" for UDLP. Source Selection Decision at 21, 26-27.

The protester asserts that the SSA's evaluation in this area, albeit already
favorable to UDLP, improperly reflected consideration of the availability of
an In-Lieu-Of (ILO)--the ICV Anti Tank Guided Missile Variant (ATGM) with a
to-be-modified TOW warhead with a "Bunker Buster Capability"--as a
substitute for the MGS during the period after the first IAVs are to be
deployed and before the MGS would become available, and that this had the
effect of improperly mitigating UDLP's schedule advantage.

This argument is without merit. First, even if the agency's concerns with
respect to GM/GDLS's schedule were in fact somewhat mitigated by the
availability of the ILO ATGM (which the SSA vigorously denies), it is not
apparent how this made a difference in the source selection given the fact
that the Army already had recognized UDLP's significant advantage in this
area. Tr. at 901-02, 944, 1092. Moreover, we do not agree that it was
improper for the Army to consider the availability of the ILO ATGM. In this
regard, the O&O Concept, incorporated into the RFP, specifically
contemplated that it might be necessary to initially equip the IBCT with
surrogate equipment:

Units will be equipped, per approved tables of organization and equipment
(TOE), to the extent possible from commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and
government-off- the-shelf (GOTS) equipment to meet the requirements stated
within this O&O document. However, not all equipment specified within TOEs
may be immediately available for the initial two Brigade Combat Teams within
the next 12 to 18 months. Instead, other items of equipment (surrogates)
more readily available may be issued in lieu of TOE specified systems.

O&O Concept, at 6. Further, since the solicitation provided for
consideration of proposals requiring development extending for as long 24
months or more, RFP sect. M.1.13, we think it was at least implicit that the
agency might turn to surrogate equipment to meet its immediate needs for
fielding the IBCTs. This being the case, there was nothing unreasonable in
the agency's considering the availability of the ATGM in evaluating
GM/GDLS's schedule.

MGS Performance

The protester argues that GM/GDLS's MGS was unacceptable because it did not
comply with two aspects of a Band 2 ammunition storage requirement, and that
this was not adequately taken into account in the evaluation. Specifically,
UDLP argues that the GM/GDLS MGS does not meet the specification
requirements for ready availability and storage of primary armament rounds.
In this regard, the MGS specification provided as follows:

3.1.2.2.5 Storage. The MGS must have the capability to store 17 primary
armament rounds, 14 of which are in a ready configuration. Primary armament
ammunition shall be separated from the crew to enhance crew protection from
secondary explosions/fire. Separation will protect the crew from residual
effects of 14.5 mm Armor Piercing ammunition that may enter the ammunition
area. Separation will isolate the crew from mechanical ammunition handling
if used.

RFP, MGS Mobile Gun System Performance Specification sect. 3.1.2.2.5. The MGS
specification further provided that "[t]he MGS primary armament shall
provide for a sustained rate of fire of at least six rounds per minute." Id.
sect. 3.1.2.2.2.4.

GM/GDLS proposed to equip its MGS with [DELETED]. [11] The proposal
described a sequence to fire all [DELETED] rounds that resulted in a maximum
rate of fire of [DELETED]. GM/GDLS Proposal, vol. 3, at 1-405, 1-409, 1-720;
1-860 to 1-875.

The Army issued several IFDs questioning GM/GDLS's approach, initially
advising the firm that it considered its proposal unclear with respect to
the ready round requirement:

The offeror does not adequately address the ready round requirement for the
main gun. [DELETED]. The offeror should provide a discussion of methodology
[DELETED] of the required fourteen ready rounds.

IFD No. P-P-GM-116, June 17, 2000. GM/GDLS responded that [DELETED]. IFD
No. P-P-GM-116, GM/GDLS Response (June 20, 2000).

Thereafter, on July 8, the Army issued another IFD in which it characterized
GM/GDLS's response to both the ready round requirement and the ammunition
separation requirement, as a "[d]eficiency," that is, "a material failure of
a proposal to meet a Government requirement or a combination of significant
disadvantages in a proposal that increases the risk of unsuccessful contract
performance to an unacceptable level," such that "[f]ailure to correct a
deficiency will preclude an offer from being considered for award." IFD No.
P-P-GM-382, July 8, 2000. The Army found GM/GDLS's approach deficient
because the weapon system [DELETED] and the "[m]ain gun ammunition is not
separated from the crew in a manner which will adequately protect against
secondary explosions/fires." Id. GM/GDLS responded to this IFD by
essentially repeating the explanation of its position that it complied with
the ready round requirement, and also noted with respect to the ammunition
separation requirement that [DELETED]. IFD No. P-P-GM-382, GM/GDLS Response
(July 8, 2000). The focus of GM/GDLS's response was on its measures "to keep
spall and secondary explosions from reaching the 105 mm ammunition
altogether." Id. In this regard, GM/GDLS noted the protection offered by
[DELETED]. Id.

Agency evaluators specifically rated GM/GDLS as meeting the storage
requirement with high risk because the proposed operational
solutions--[DELETED]--did "not totally compensate for the weapon system
[DELETED], and because, "if the vehicle is penetrated, there is negligible
physical separation of the crew adequate to provide any protection from
secondary explosions and fires from the main gun ammunition." AR, Tab 71,
SSEB GM/GDLS Performance Evaluation, MGS Performance Specification sect.
3.1.2.2.5. [12] In the SSAC/SSA Brief, GM/GDLS's MGS was generally credited
with a disadvantage with respect to the storage requirement on the basis
that [DELETED]. AR, Tab 83, BCT IAV SSAC/SSA Brief, Oct. 12, 2000, GM-GDLS
MGS 105mm.

The Army maintains that the GM/GDLS MGS met the ready round requirement. The
Army notes in this regard that [DELETED], which exceeds the rate of fire
requirement of 6 rounds/minute; the agency concluded that, since [DELETED],
the storage requirement of 14 ready rounds was satisfied.

The Army's current focus on the overall average firing rate for the GM/GDLS
MGS's [DELETED] rounds does not fully respond to the contemporaneous
concerns repeatedly raised by the Army's own evaluators with respect to the
cannon [DELETED]. Nor does the fact that [DELETED] respond to the [DELETED],
which was the focus of the contemporaneous evaluation. In this regard, we
note that, according to the Army itself, "[i]n an anti-armor role, a combat
vehicle must be ready to quickly engage multiple ‘tank type' targets
in an extremely volatile and dynamic battlefield. The inability to engage in
these scenarios would be fatal to equipment and crew." Agency Hearing
Comments at 42. The agency notes that the primary purpose of the MGS is to
perform infantry support missions, including breaching walls and penetrating
bunkers, with anti-armor as primarily the responsibility of the ATGM ICV
variant, but concedes, as it must, that the MGS does have an anti-armor
role. According to the MGS specification, the "MGS primary armament shall
have the capability to deliver high explosive munitions in an anti-personnel
mode and engage and destroy a variety of level II armored vehicles (light
skin and armored through T-62) as a self defense capability from a range of
33 meters out to a minimum range of 2000 meters." RFP, MGS Performance
Specification sect. 3.1.2.2.2.1. Further, the importance assigned to the rate of
fire for the MGS, as demonstrated by both the existence of the
6 rounds/minute minimum requirement and the fact that [DELETED], appears to
confirm that the MGS is expected to engage in "up tempo," possibly
anti-armor engagements [DELETED]. AR, Tab 83, BCT IAV SSAC/SSA Brief, UDLP
MGS 105 mm (1&3). Given that the GM/GDLS MGS's [DELETED], we find that the
evaluation did not reasonably take into account the seriousness of the MGS's
weakness in this regard.

As for the ammunition separation element of the ammunition storage
specification, in responding to UDLP's protest and explaining why the
GM/GDLS MGS met this requirement, the Army focuses on the effectiveness of
the [DELETED] against spall and its thermal properties. Agency Hearing
Comments at 44. However, its current position with respect to the
effectiveness of GM/GDLS's [DELETED] appears inconsistent with the
contemporaneous concerns expressed by the agency during the evaluation--that
if the vehicle is penetrated, the physical separation is not "adequate to
provide any protection from secondary explosions and fires from the main gun
ammunition." AR, Tab 71, SSEB GM/GDLS Performance Evaluation, MGS
Performance Specification sect. 3.1.2.2.5.

Notwithstanding our conclusion, we do not agree with UDLP that these
weaknesses required the Army to reject GM/GDLS's proposal as unacceptable.
In this regard, the RFP described the ready round and ammunition separation
requirements in fairly general terms; it did not specify a particular degree
of or approach to ammunition separation and crew protection, or provide a
definition of ready round, that had to be satisfied in order for a proposal
to be found acceptable. [13] Further, considering the evaluation as a whole,
there is no reason to believe that according more weight to these weaknesses
would have affected the award decision. First, GM/GDLS's MGS proposal was
reasonably evaluated as superior in supportability and in performance areas
other than ammunition storage. Further, even with respect to the ammunition
storage requirement, which was only a less important, Band 2 requirement,
the record indicates that UDLP's MGS may offer a lesser overall capability
than GM/GDLS's in some significant respects. Although UDLP's MGS was rated
as having an advantage under the storage specification because it [DELETED],
and its [DELETED] was favorably evaluated, the Army has made a strong
showing that there was significant risk to stored ammunition (and thus crew)
associated with its design. Specifically, given its lesser, 7.62 mm integral
armor protection over most of the vehicle (that is, other than the frontal
60-degree arc, where there was 14.5 mm AP protection), and the more exposed
location of its ammunition, the Army maintains that there is a higher
probability that shells striking UDLP's MGS would penetrate and ignite the
ammunition. Agency Hearing Comments at 43-44; Tr. at 453-461. Finally, and
most significantly, the record shows that commonality among vehicles weighed
very heavily in GM/GDLS's favor in the MGS award decision. We discuss this
consideration below.

Commonality and the Selection of the GM/GDLS MGS

Beyond GM/GDLS's MGS's significant performance and supportability
advantages, the record indicates that the enhanced commonality that would
result from selecting GM/GDLS's MGS was an overriding consideration once its
ICV had been selected. In this regard, section M.1.2.4 of the RFP stated:

Offerors are further cautioned that in light of the importance of
commonality within the evaluation process, it is possible that a highly
rated MGS proposal that lacks commonality with a highly rated ICV (including
all configurations) proposal may not receive an award. Similarly, it is
possible that a highly rated ICV (including all configurations) proposal
that lacks commonality with a highly rated MGS proposal may not receive an
award.

RFP sect. M.1.6.4. Not only was commonality included as an evaluation element,
but the Operational Requirements Document --which was incorporated into the
solicitation--provided that "[c]ommonality will be maximized between the ICV
and all other IAV platform variants and configurations." Operational
Requirements Document at 8. According to the Operational Requirements
Document:

To reduce the logistics footprint and sustainability of the force as a
whole, commonality must be achieved to the greatest extent possible.
Ideally, common chassis, components, and subcomponents will be achieved,
thus reducing the need for differing maintenance personnel, spare parts, and
tools. The result will be demand reduction and sustainment efficiency
measures which will contribute to the IBCT's ability to operate with a
reduced logistics footprint. Commonality will also increase the combat
effectiveness of the force by allowing crewmembers to switch from one
function to the next without loss in efficiency (interchangeability) and by
supporting and enabling dismounted assault operations with a family of IAVs.
Commonality also reduces training load both on the IBCT and institution.

Id.

The SSA recognized in the source selection decision that both UDLP's and
GM/GDLS's MGSs had been rated good and were essentially comparable with
respect to commonality when evaluated on an MGS-only basis. However, since
GM/GDLS's ICV and MGS base designs were identical--in contrast with UDLP's
Proposal No. 1, under which its ICV had little commonality with its MGS--the
SSA found that the combination of the GM/GDLS MGS and ICV offered far
superior commonality among the combined IAV variants. The SSA explained in
the source selection decision that GM/GDLS's

far superior ICV and MGS commonality will result in a smaller, more
deployable and flexible capability, with a significantly smaller logistics
footprint due to the commonality benefits of reduced training and smaller
parts/tools burdens, as well as operational efficiencies resulting from
cross-leveling of parts and interchangeable crew functions. The commonality
advantages of the [GM/GDLS] MGS, over that of UDLP, are extremely
significant and directly relate to the essential mission objectives of the
BCT.

Source Selection Decision at 24-25. In addition, the SSA noted:

Operationally, selection of the [GM/GDLS] MGS would result in the entire
BCT, including all IAVs, having comparable sustained speed mobility on hard
surface roads . . . . This will allow all required BCT assets to roadmarch
at essentially the same speed and provide for all necessary capabilities to
simultaneously be available at a mission location, following a road march,
to engage the threat.

Id. at 22-23. Further, in apparent reference to his prior selection of
GM/GDLS's faster ICV, the SSA observed that a BCT equipped with the UDLP MGS
"would face several unpalatable roadmarch options as a result of the slower
UDLP MGS sustained speed on hard surface roads." Id. at 23. Specifically,
the MGSs could begin the road march before the balance of the BCT, which
would expose the MGSs to unacceptable risks; the remainder of the BCT could
march ahead without the MGSs, which would deprive the remainder of the BCT
of the support of the MGSs and conflict with the combined arms concept of
the BCT; or the BCT could march at the speed of the MGSs, thus significantly
delaying the road march.

In his hearing testimony, the SSA explained in more detail the rationale for
not making a split award, that is, an award of the ICV to GM/GDLS and the
MGS to UDLP. The SSA testified that, not only would there be significant
supportability advantages from making a single award, there would be
significant operational difficulties from making a split award. With respect
to the factors he considered in not making a split award, the SSA testified:

The predominant factors relate back to . . . commonality and supportability
and overall performance. And I was assisted in that by the operational
assessment that was made in looking at the importance of having commonality
across all of those platforms from an operational sense. And so you get
tremendous supportability improvements by not creating something which is
different which would require a different support structure. In this case,
track vehicle mechanics and the additional fuel requirements for those
systems.

In the operational characteristics, it was noted if you split the award,
when you gave a track and a wheeled solution to the Army, that in addition
to increasing the support requirements, you also would change the way that
[the] commander had to operate that unit, because you would have different
mobilities and speeds at which that unit could operate. So you were forcing
an operational burden . . . on those commanders.

Tr. at 914-15. According to the SSA, combining a track component with a
wheeled component

means that you have different speeds and mobility conditions which those two
parts of your units would operate. And so if you were conducting high-speed
convoy operations, you would have had to split your organization so they
could move with like speeds. That's both an operational and safety issue
which you have to address. . . .

One of the most difficult things to do in military units is to achieve an
integrated use of all of your assets. We train and we work very hard to
bring the pieces together so they're brought to bear on the enemy as a
whole, not as separate pieces. Very infrequently do you do unsupported
attacks where you would take one of a kind and go in. You're setting up the
conditions, when you change the characteristics of a unit like that, to
cause them to have to operate at the capability of the least of their
ability, or to split it so they can take advantage of some characteristic of
one, and you lose the integrating factor of bringing them to bear at the
same time.

Tr. at 915-17, 1072-79.

In view of the above significant advantages that would accrue to the Army
from a single award to GM/GDLS for both the ICV and MGS, and the significant
disadvantages with respect to BCT operations and supportability that would
accrue in the event of an MGS award to UDLP, as well as the significant
performance and supportability advantages offered by GM/GDLS's MGS, we find
that the determination to make award to GM/GDLS for the MGS, as well as for
the ICV, was not unreasonable.

The protest is denied.

Anthony H. Gamboa

General Counsel

Notes

1. As noted by the SSA however, UDLP's proposal was rated as having a medium
risk that its ICV actually would not be able to carry a tenth soldier.

2. The overall evaluation applying the NATO Reference Mobility Model was as
follows:

Germany

Germany

Mideast

Mideast

Korea

Korea





Dry/Wet

Dry/Wet

Dry/Wet

Dry/Wet

Dry/Wet

Dry/Wet





MPH

% No-Go

MPH

% No-Go

MPH

% No-Go



Bradley Baseline

16.6/14.5

3.5/5.0

18.7/18.5

1.3/1.3

15.9/15.8

1.2/1.2



UD ICV

16.9/14.8

4.2/5.8

18.4/18.2

3.5/3.5

18.0/17.7

1.2/1.2



GM ICV

14.7/10.5

10.1/22.5

15.7/15.4

3.6/3.8

13.5/13.2

6.4/6.3





Contracting Officer's Statement at 67.

3. Transcript citations refer to the 4-day hearing our Office conducted
regarding this protest.

4. The importance placed by the agency on operational mobility was
consistent with the agency's actual experience with the operational
environment in which the IBCT is expected to be deployed. In this regard,
the Operational Requirements Document indicated that "[m]ission analysis
confirmed that recent operations in Balkans typified the operational
environment in which the IBCT would most likely be employed." O&O Concept at
10. In explaining the importance of operational road marches, the Army
reports that, during the deployment of the First Armored Division into
Bosnia in 1995, mechanized units were deployed overland 600 miles from
central Germany through Hungary and into Bosnia; while wheeled vehicles
moved in convoy over primary roads at speeds in excess of 45 mph, tracked
vehicles were loaded onto rail cars and moved separately. Agency Hearing
Comments at 5; Tr. at 36-37, 106-07, 115. Likewise, the record indicates
that units in Bosnia and Kosovo patrol up to 180 miles per day. Tr. at 116.

5. Although the protester suggests that assuming that the IBCT will
undertake high-speed road marches is inconsistent with the fact that the
towed 155 mm (M198) artillery piece that will initially be deployed with the
brigade is limited to a top speed of 45 mph, the record indicates that the
agency expects ultimately to replace this gun with a lightweight artillery
piece with a higher speed.

6. Noting that its ICV was evaluated as having a maximum speed of 40.2 mph
and rated at risk for achieving the required sustained hard, dry surface
speed of 40 mph, AR, Tab 83, BCT IAV SSAC/SSA Brief, Oct. 12, 2000; Source
Selection Decision at 11, UDLP asserts that the agency failed to conduct
meaningful discussions in this regard. According to the protester, had it
been advised of the agency's concern, it would have modified its ICV to
increase the sustained speed. This argument is without merit. During
discussions, the Army issued to UDLP Item for Discussion (IFD)
No. P-P-U1-336. Although this IFD focused on the agency's concern with
whether UDLP would comply with the specification requirement for the IAV to
accelerate from 0-to-50 meters in 8 seconds, it also clearly advised UDLP
that "[t]he spec[ification] requirement calls for a maximum speed of at
least 40 mph. The vehicle was considered to have marginally met this
requirement," and UDLP's response indicated that testing showed an average
top speed of 40.2 mph. IFD No. P-P-U1-336. Thus, UDLP was on notice of the
agency's concern regarding its compliance with the 40-mph requirement.

7. There was a similar decrease in UDLP's initial proposal, which reflected
[DELETED].

8. In this regard, we note that Department of Defense Directive No. 5000.2-R
(Archived), Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and
Major Automated Information System Acquisition Programs (May 11, 1999),
provides that "[t]he independent operational test activities shall use
production or production representative articles for the dedicated phase of
[Operational Test & Evaluation] that supports the full-rate production
decision . . . ." Section 3.4.5.

9. We note that the Program Management Office's current schedule, allowing
for such differences as the date of award and protest-related delays, and
based upon the PMO's current assumption of an early order for MGSs for EMD
testing, is generally consistent with the SSEB/SSA's. Tr. at 668; Agency
Hearing Comments at 21.

10. UDLP also argues that it was improper for the evaluated GM/GDLS MGS
schedule to assume that LRIP would commence during EMD. However, we agree
with the agency that nothing in the RFP prohibited, and we find no other
basis to prohibit, concurrency of EMD and LRIP. In this regard, we note that
Department of Defense Directive No. 5000.2-R (Archived) provides that "Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) occurs while the Engineering and
Manufacturing Development [EMD] phase is still continuing as test results
and design fixes or upgrades are incorporated." Section 1.4.4.

11. Spall was defined during the hearing as the secondary effects of a
projectile impacting the vehicle, including fragments of the projectile and
of the object struck by the projectile. Tr. at 447-49.

12. In contrast, the ammunition in UDLP's MGS was stored [DELETED], which
the Army considered to be an advantage. AR, Tab 76, SSEB UDLP Performance
Evaluation, MGS Performance Specification sect. 3.1.2.2.5.

13. Further, there has been no showing that UDLP would have altered its
Proposal No. 1 to its competitive advantage if it had been aware of the
manner in which the agency would evaluate the ammunition storage
requirements. See UDLP Post-Hearing Reply Comments (Feb. 28, 2001) at 21-22;
RGII Technologies, Inc.--Recon. and Protest, B-278352.2, B-287352.3, Apr.
14, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 131 at 8 (unfair competitive prejudice from a waiver or
relaxation of the terms and conditions of the RFP for one offeror exists
only where the protester would have been able to alter its proposal to its
competitive advantage were it given a similar opportunity; cf. Rockwell
Elec. Commerce Corp., B-286201, Dec. 14, 2000, 2000 CPD para. __ at 9).