TITLE:  OSI Collection Services, Inc.; C.B. Accounts, Inc., B-286597.3; B-286597.4; B-286597.5; B-286597.6, June 12, 2001
BNUMBER:  B-286597.3; B-286597.4; B-286597.5; B-286597.6
DATE:  June 12, 2001
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OSI Collection Services, Inc.; C.B. Accounts, Inc., B-286597.3; B-286597.4;
B-286597.5; B-286597.6, June 12, 2001

Decision

Matter of: OSI Collection Services, Inc.; C.B. Accounts, Inc.

File: B-286597.3; B-286597.4; B-286597.5; B-286597.6

Date: June 12, 2001

Joseph J. Petrillo, Esq., and Karen D. Powell, Esq., Petrillo & Powell, for
OSI Collection Services, Inc., and Robert A. Mangrum, Esq., Eric J.
Marcotte, Esq., and Paul S. Ebert, Esq., Winston & Strawn, for C.B.
Accounts, Inc., the protesters.

Deneen J. Melander, Esq., and Catherine E. Pollack, Esq., Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, for Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc.;
Brian A. Darst, Esq., and Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Esq., Williams Mullen
Clark & Dobbins, for Maximus, Inc.; and Saul L. Moskowitz, Esq., Dean Blakey
& Moskowitz, for Diversified Collection Services, Inc., intervenors.

Jeffrey C. Morhardt, Esq., and Jose Otero, Esq., Department of Education,
for the agency.

Tania Calhoun, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protests against award of federal supply schedule task order contracts for
private collection agency services--following a reevaluation of offerors'
past performance pursuant to prior protests and a new source selection
decision--are denied where the record shows that the contracting agency's
reevaluation of offerors' past performance was reasonable, consistent with
the solicitation's stated evaluation criteria, and fully supported.

DECISION

OSI Collection Services, Inc. and C.B. Accounts, Inc. (CBA) protest the
decision by the Department of Education to award federal supply schedule
(FSS) task order contracts to 11 other firms under a request for task order
proposal (RFTOP) for private collection agency (PCA) services. Both
protesters contend that the agency improperly evaluated offerors' proposals
with respect to past performance.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

The agency's Office of Student Financial Assistance performs collection and
administrative resolution activities on debts resulting from the nonpayment
of student loans and the failure to fulfill grant requirements. When this
solicitation was issued, 17 PCA contractors, including OSI and CBA, were
performing these services for the agency. This follow-on RFTOP was issued in
July 2000 to obtain the services of PCAs with contracts under the General
Services Administration's Financial Asset Management Services Schedule. Task
order contracts were to be issued to 10-12 FSS contractors, with at least
two awarded under a small business set-aside. The agency estimates that, on
average, each non-set-aside task order contract will generate approximately
$25 million in commissions during its term. The agency planned to conduct an
initial transfer of 20,000 accounts to each successful contractor, each of
whom was to locate and contact the borrowers to demand payment of their
debts or to otherwise resolve the account through such measures as wage
garnishment, litigation, or other administrative resolutions. Additional
account transfers were to occur throughout the life of the contract.

Incumbent contractors were invited to compete for the contracts if they had
performed "consistently well" for the agency based upon its Competitive
Performance and Continuous Surveillance (CPCS) evaluation. The CPCS
evaluation, performed every 4 months, measures the relative performance of
each contractor on all accounts transferred under various performance
indicators and is used to determine bonus payments and the transfer of new
accounts. Under the CPCS methodology, the contractor ranked the highest
under a particular performance indicator receives the maximum number of
points available for that indicator, and the remaining contractors receive
points in proportion to their ranking relative to the leading contractor.
Each contractor's overall CPCS score for each 4-month period is the sum of
its scores for all of the performance indicators for that period.

Offerors were required to propose a commission or fee for each type of
service to be performed under the contract. Since the RFTOP established
target rates for these commissions or fees, "quality factors" and the
commitment to small business were to be more important than price in making
the award selection decision. Section M.1.b of the RFTOP stated that
evaluation factors were to be considered in the following order of
importance: past performance, including the past performance of key
personnel; technical evaluation; commitment to small business; and price.

The past performance evaluation is the critical issue in these protests. In
addition to the past performance of key personnel, the RFTOP provided that
the following past performance information was to be obtained and
considered: a Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) past performance evaluation for all
offerors; information obtained when checking references for all offerors;
and, "[f]or those companies with a current contract, the Department will use
performance data that we have on hand such as the CPCS scores." RFTOP sect. M.2.
Recent and relevant information was to receive greater consideration than
less recent and less relevant information. The agency considered competitive
ranking information to be "extremely relevant." Id.

Twenty-six FSS contractors submitted proposals in response to the RFTOP.
Thirteen were large businesses currently performing PCA services for the
agency; seven were non-incumbents; and six were small businesses invited to
compete for award under the small business set-aside portion of the
solicitation. A source evaluation board (SEB) evaluated proposals and
submitted its award recommendation memorandum to the contracting officer,
who served as the source selection authority (SSA). The SSA concurred with
the SEB's recommendations, under which 11 firms--none of which were OSI or
CBA--were proposed for award.

OSI subsequently filed protests in our Office challenging the agency's
evaluation of its past performance. We sustained OSI's protests primarily
because the record showed that the agency's evaluation of offerors' past
performance, which largely relied upon a mechanical comparison of the
cumulative periodic CPCS scores for incumbent contractors without examining
the available past performance data behind those scores, was unsupported and
unreasonable. [1] OSI Collection Servs., Inc., B-286597, B-286597.2, Jan.
17, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 18. We recommended that the agency reevaluate proposals
with respect to past performance, giving appropriate consideration and
weight to the performance data in its possession.

During the reevaluation, the SEB reviewed each incumbent contractor's CPCS
scores and rankings in the context of particularized facts about the
contractor's performance in order to determine the underlying significance
of the CPCS results. The SEB also considered the ratings and comments
gathered about all offerors from D&B past performance evaluations and
contractor reference surveys, as well as the past performance of key
personnel. Based upon its analysis of this past performance information, the
SEB developed an overall assessment of each offeror's past performance and
assigned each offeror an overall past performance score. The SEB considered
the results of its evaluations under the past performance, technical, small
business and price factors to arrive at an overall assessment and ranking of
each offeror's proposal.

The SSA's source selection decision document includes a detailed narrative
justification supporting the SEB's rankings, as well as his source
selections consistent with those rankings. The source selections were
divided into several groupings based upon the SSA's level of confidence that
a firm would successfully perform the contract; each grouping is supported
by additional narrative explanation. The first grouping contained five
incumbent offerors: Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., Diversified Collection
Services, Inc., Van Ru Credit Corporation, Nationwide Credit, and National
Asset Management Enterprises, Inc. The second grouping was another incumbent
offeror, Financial Asset Management Systems, Inc. (FAM). The third, fourth,
and fifth groupings were three non-incumbent offerors: Recovery Bureau of
America (RBA), USA Education Group, and Maximus, Inc., respectively. The
sixth and final grouping contained two incumbent offerors, NCO Financial
Systems, Inc. and Aman Collection Services, Inc.

The SSA discussed the merits of each remaining proposal and ranked them, but
declined to award additional task order contracts to the succeeding offerors
in line for award. [2] The SSA ranked OSI 17th in line for award and
expressed his "very low confidence" in the firm's probability of successful
performance. He stated that OSI's performance under the current contract was
worse than that of its competitors; while performance under the current
contract was generally an asset, the SSA stated that he could not ignore the
quality of OSI's performance. The SSA ranked CBA

14th in line for award and stated that the firm was in the middle range of
incumbent contractors.

Both OSI and CBA filed protests and supplemental protests in this Office
after their debriefings. Both firms argue that the agency improperly
evaluated nearly every aspect of offerors' past performance during the
reevaluation.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, since the RFQ stated that the agency intended to issue
task order contracts under the vendors' FSS contracts, the provisions of
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 8.4 apply here. Those
provisions anticipate that agencies will review vendors' federal supply
schedules and place an order directly with the schedule contractor that can
provide the supplies or services that represent the best value and meet the
government's needs. FAR sect. 8.404(b)(2); Digital Sys. Group, Inc., B-286931,
B-286931.2, Mar. 7, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 50 at 6. Where, as here, the agency
intends to use the vendors' responses as the basis of a detailed technical
evaluation and price/technical tradeoff, it may elect, as the agency did
here, to use an approach that is like a competition in a negotiated
procurement. Where an agency takes such an approach, and a protest is filed,
we will review the agency's actions to ensure that the evaluation was
reasonable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation. COMARK Fed.
Sys., B-278343, B-278343.2, Jan. 20, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 34 at 4-5.
Accordingly, while the provisions of FAR Part 15, which govern contracting
by negotiation, do not directly apply, Computer Prods., Inc., B-284702, May
24, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 95 at 4, we analyze the protesters' contentions by the
standards applied to negotiated procurements. Digital Sys. Group, Inc.,
supra.

Our Office will examine an agency's past performance evaluation only to
ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation
criteria and applicable statutes and regulations, since determining the
relative merit of an offeror's past performance is primarily a matter within
the contracting agency's discretion. Arctic Slope World Servs., Inc.,
B-284481, B-284481.2, Apr. 27, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 75 at 10; Pacific Ship
Repair and Fabrication, Inc., B-279793, July 23, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 29 at

3-4. In conducting a past performance evaluation, an agency has discretion
to determine the scope of the offerors' performance histories to be
considered, provided all proposals are evaluated on the same basis and
consistent with the solicitation requirements. Arctic Slope World Servs.,
Inc., supra; Federal Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-250135.4, May 24, 1993, 93-1 CPD
para. 398 at 12. An agency may base its evaluation of past performance upon its
reasonable perception of inadequate past performance, regardless of whether
the contractor disputes the agency's interpretation of the facts. Ready
Transp., Inc., B-285283.3, B-285283.4, May 8, 2001, 2001 CPD para. __ at 5.

As explained in detail in our initial decision, the record of the original
past performance evaluation showed that the agency heavily relied on a mere
comparison of incumbent contractors' cumulative periodic CPCS scores in
order to evaluate their past performance. We found that the nature of the
performance data underlying the CPCS scores was such that the cumulative
CPCS scores could not be relied on mechanically to assess offerors' past
performance, and there was no evidence that the agency considered the
performance data behind these scores. We recommended that the agency
reevaluate the proposals with respect to past performance, giving
appropriate consideration and weight to the performance data in its
possession.

The record of the reevaluation shows that the agency gave careful
consideration to our decision and how best to implement our recommendation.
The SEB, in consultation with the SSA, analyzed the nine available sets of
CPCS periodic scores and rankings, as well as such underlying performance
data as the impact of the volume of account transfers and account inventory
size on the CPCS scores, and fluctuations in performance over time. The SEB
also reviewed the results of a D&B past performance evaluation survey that
asked customers to score firms' performance under various factors, and the
results of a contractor reference survey that asked questions designed to
elicit both narrative comments and a score. Finally, the SEB reviewed
information about the past performance of proposed key personnel. The SEB
supported its analysis with detailed evaluations of each offeror, and a
detailed narrative with its overall analysis, including its justifications
for the performance data it did and did not rely upon. The SEB also
explained its methodology for evaluating non-incumbent offerors with no CPCS
data, and its rationale for ranking four non-incumbent offerors above
lower-rated incumbent offerors. SEB Final Evaluation at 8-12. The SSA's
source selection decision included a detailed justification in support of
the SEB's rankings and his source selections, as well as an explanation of
the reevaluation process and rationale, including that for ranking
non-incumbent offerors ahead of incumbent offerors.

We have carefully reviewed each of the numerous allegations raised by each
protester and find the agency's reevaluation unobjectionable. Our discussion
analyzes the major allegations of each set of protests separately.

OSI Protests

OSI first alleges that the agency improperly failed to comply with the
recommendation we made in our initial decision. As a general matter, the
details of implementing our recommendations for corrective action are within
the sound discretion and judgment of the agency. Rel-Tek Sys. & Design,
Inc.--Modification of Remedy, B-280463.7, July 1, 1999, 99-2 CPD para. 1 at 3;
Serv-Air, Inc., B-258243.4, Mar. 3, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 125 at 1-3. We will not
question the agency's ultimate manner of compliance so long as it remedies
the procurement impropriety that was the basis for the decision's
recommendation. Rel-Tek Sys. & Design, Inc.--Modification of Remedy, supra.
While our decision pointed to different pieces of past performance
information that the agency might consider, we left it to the agency's
discretion to determine how best to implement the broad recommendation made
in that decision. Our analysis here focuses on the reasonableness of the
reevaluation itself.

OSI's proposal was ranked 17th in line for award. The SEB found that the
most relevant and reliable past performance data for OSI was the CPCS period
rankings and scores, and believed that this data suggested an overall past
performance assessment in the low end of the below average performers. The
SEB found that OSI's D&B information and contractor references were less
reliable indicators of the firm's prospects for successful performance than
the CPCS data, but noted that they did suggest that OSI had average to
superior performance under these indicators. This information somewhat
enhanced OSI's past performance assessment, but the past performance of the
firm's key personnel diminished that assessment.

The SEB reviewed OSI's CPCS rankings and scores for all nine available CPCS
periods. [3] The record shows that OSI's rankings for these periods were
1st, 4th, 15th, 16th, 15th, 8th, 5th, 12th, and 14th , generally based on a
universe of 17 PCA contractors. The SEB stated that, in the first period,
OSI received an [DELETED] number one ranking but, soon thereafter, its
performance declined to near bottom until the sixth period when it finished
in 8th place. The SEB pointed out that, for five of the nine periods, OSI's
performance was [DELETED] or [DELETED]. Its performance for the sixth and
seventh periods was in the [DELETED] range, but the most recent ranking
periods found its performance again in the [DELETED] range. [4]

The SEB also considered the volume of accounts each PCA received throughout
the life of the contract and how that might have affected its CPCS scores
and rankings. [5] The SEB did not believe that the volume of accounts
transferred to OSI excused its continued relatively poor performance as
compared to all other contractors. Although OSI received a transfer of
100,000 accounts because of its [DELETED] rating in the first period, three
other contractors received between 90,000 and 113,333 accounts after that
same rating period. One, FAM, performed in the [DELETED] range in the next,
third, ranking period, and another maintained an [DELETED] rating for three
of the next four periods. It was the SEB's view that management planning was
the key to successfully handling a large transfer, and that the ability to
handle large volumes efficiently was important to the agency's
performance-based environment. The SEB found that the data suggested OSI had
not done this as successfully as its competitors. The SEB further stated
that OSI had not had the largest number of accounts transferred to it
throughout the contract, but had had one of the lowest numbers of transfers
of all incumbents. Whereas some PCAs had consistently received high volumes
of transfers and performed well, OSI had gone without transfers for several
periods and still had not pulled out of the performance slump. The SEB
understood that a large volume of transfers might have some impact on a
PCA's next CPCS rating period, but believed that it should not take a PCA 1
year (three periods) to overcome large transfer volumes. Overall, the SEB
concluded that the CPCS data indicated the quality of OSI's past performance
and its inability to satisfy the agency's performance requirements had been
worse than most of its competitors. The SSA agreed with the SEB's
conclusions.

Comparing its performance record with that of FAM, OSI asserts that the
agency inconsistently treated large account transfers. OSI contends that
both firms had large account transfers in the second period, and both
suffered poor CPCS rankings for the next three periods, but only OSI was
criticized for taking three periods to overcome the effects of the transfer.
OSI's analysis is overly simplistic and fails to consider the data
underlying the CPCS rankings.

As the agency explains, the effects of a large account transfer in one
period appear in the rankings for the next period. In the second CPCS
period, when OSI was ranked 4th, it received a transfer of 100,000 accounts.
Its CPCS rankings for the next three periods were 15th, 16th, and 15th , and
it received additional account transfers in only one of these three periods.
In contrast, in the second CPCS period, when FAM was ranked 11th, it
received a transfer of 113,333 accounts. Its CPCS rankings for the next
three periods were 10th, 13th, and 11th, and it received additional account
transfers in two of these three periods. Hence, OSI's performance dropped
substantially to an [DELETED] rating after its large transfer and stayed
there, whereas FAM's increased slightly to an [DELETED] rating then dropped
down to positions at least two places higher than OSI. Moreover, the
recovery in the sixth period was greater for FAM than for OSI, 2nd as
opposed to 8th place. While OSI clearly disagrees with the agency's
interpretation of its past performance, we cannot find it unreasonable.
Ready Transp., Inc., supra. The differing outcomes for the two firms
reflected their differing circumstances, not improper disparate treatment.
Power Connector, Inc., B-286875, B-286875.2, Feb. 14, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 39 at
4.

OSI also contends that the agency inconsistently treated fluctuations in
rankings. The protester asserts that the agency discounted the CPCS data for
Aman and CBA due to extreme fluctuations in their CPCS rankings but did not
also discount the CPCS data for OSI, which it asserts had similar
fluctuations. We do not agree.

The rankings of Aman (6th, 6th, 14th, 15th, 5th, 1st, 6th, 14th, and 13th)
and CBA (16th, 3rd, 7th, 16th, 9th, 7th, 2nd, and 9th) clearly show
fluctuations from one extreme to another--from very high to very low. In
contrast, with the exception of period one, OSI had three periods where it
hovered around the same ranking, and spent the next three periods in
rankings within four places of each other. As the SEB states, OSI's
fluctuations were less pronounced, and thus did not diminish the reliability
of the data as a predictor of OSI's future performance. OSI's evident
disagreement with the agency's interpretation of the facts does not make it
unreasonable. Ready Transp., Inc., supra.

OSI's contractor reference survey was comprised of references from two firms
for an overall score of 1, where 1 was "extremely satisfied" and 4 was
"never satisfied." The SEB stated that this score tied the firm for 1st
place among all offerors under this indicator. The SEB also noted the
references' statements that OSI's areas of strength were that it promptly
returned telephone calls and had a cooperative, committed company, but there
were some concerns with [DELETED]. Overall, the SEB stated that the
contractor reference survey indicated that the quality of OSI's past
performance was one of the best of all offerors. The agency's confidence was
somewhat diminished in that it had responses from only two references.

OSI contends that the agency treated offerors disparately by making only one
attempt to contact its third reference but more than one attempt to contact
a reference for Maximus. There is no requirement that the agency make the
same number of attempts to contact each offeror's references. The agency is
only required to make a reasonable effort to contact each offeror's
references, and we cannot conclude that the agency's efforts here,
unsuccessful in both cases, were unreasonable. It is also not objectionable
to evaluate an offeror's past performance based on fewer than the maximum
possible number of references the agency could have received. Universal
Bldg. Maintenance, Inc., B-282456, July 15, 1999, 99-2 CPD para. 32 at 8 n.1;
see IGIT, Inc., B-275299.2, June 23, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 7 at 6 (although
agencies are required to evaluate the past performance of all offerors on
the same basis, there is no general requirement that an agency contact all
of an offeror's references, or contact the same number of references for
each offeror).

The D&B past performance evaluation for OSI shows that five customers rated
the firm under various categories for an overall score of 1.69, where 1 is
"outstanding" and 5 is "unacceptable." The SEB stated this score translated
into an overall performance between "very good" and "outstanding" under
D&B's adjectival scale; the score placed the firm 14th of the 26 offerors
under this indicator. The SEB noted that under the two categories of
greatest significance to the agency, timeliness and technical, OSI also
scored "very good" to "outstanding," and its scores ranked it 13th and 4th,
respectively. The SEB also reviewed the results of a D&B competitive ranking
survey and found nearly all of the respondents providing information about
OSI appeared to be from the student loan environment: two rated OSI as the
best of 13 and the best of 3, with first or second ranking in all
categories. Considering all of the D&B information at hand, the SEB
concluded that the quality of OSI's past performance was not significantly
better or worse than most other offerors.

OSI contends that the agency inconsistently evaluated offerors because it
"discounted" its rating under the contractor references indicator because
only two firms responded, but did not "discount" awardees' D&B past
performance evaluations when fewer than five responses were received.

Setting aside OSI's attempt to compare two different performance indicators,
the RFTOP did not prescribe a minimum number of respondents to be evaluated.
The critical question here is whether the agency had a sufficient number of
respondents to give it confidence in the reliability of the results. As the
SEB stated, in cases where there were fewer survey responses, the data was
deemed less reliable and its impact in the overall evaluation was somewhat
diminished. SEB Final Report at 10. Hence, the agency "discounted" D&B data
for NAM because only two responses were received, but did not "discount" D&B
data for NCO and Maximus where four responses were received. We do not find
this objectionable. [6]

The SEB finally considered the past performance of OSI's key personnel. The
SEB stated that the firm had [DELETED] years of student loan experience, and
[DELETED] of its key personnel had agency experience with more than one
contract. The SEB concluded that this experience had exposed the firm to
various collection approaches and methods that should help it know what
works and what does not work. However, the SEB also noted that these were
the individuals who were responsible for OSI's [DELETED] to [DELETED] scores
for five of nine CPCS ranking periods. In its view, the past performance of
OSI's key personnel lowered its overall assessment.

OSI contends that the fact the agency considered key personnel responsible
for CPCS scores improperly double-counted the CPCS scores. We do not agree.
The record shows that the agency considered various aspects of the past
performance of key personnel, including their years of experience on
different types of contracts and their experience working on contracts
generating CPCS rankings. It is obvious that the contributions made by key
personnel to a firm's CPCS rankings are relevant to the SEB's consideration
of their past performance. An agency is not precluded from considering an
element, such as experience, under more than one evaluation criterion when
the element is, as here, relevant and reasonably related to each criterion
under which it is considered. RAMCOR Servs. Group, Inc. et al., Mar. 23,
1998, 98-1 CPD para. 121 at 9.

OSI also contends that the SEB inconsistently attributed CPCS performance to
key personnel. The protester asserts that FAM's CPCS rankings placed its
performance in the [DELETED] to [DELETED] range for five periods, but the
SEB considered the experience of FAM's key personnel that led the firm to
its CPCS performance to be a positive factor. OSI overlooks the fact that
recent information was to be given greater consideration here. Beginning
from the sixth CPCS period, FAM had three periods of [DELETED] rankings and
one [DELETED] period. Overall, in fact, FAM had only one [DELETED] ranking.
Given the overall successful performance of the firm, we cannot find the
agency's evaluation unreasonable.

OSI finally contends that the agency inconsistently assessed key personnel
who changed employers by attributing to them the performance of their prior
employers during the time they are employed. OSI alleges that two of RBA's
proposed key personnel worked for FAM when it performed poorly, but the SEB
considered their prior employers to have had "[DELETED] to [DELETED]
performance for many CPCS periods and very few periods of [DELETED]
performance." RBA Reevaluation Document at 2. The record shows, however,
that both of these individuals worked for FAM when it was ranked 13th, 11th,
and 2nd, and one worked for OSI when it was ranked 1st, 4th, and 15th. As a
result, we cannot conclude that the data is inconsistent with the SEB's
finding.

In conclusion, OSI has given us no basis to question the agency's evaluation
and ranking of its proposal. We need not consider OSI's contention that it
should have been ranked ahead of Maximus, USA Education, and NCO. Even if
these three firms were eliminated from award consideration, five interceding
firms, not OSI, would be in line for award. OSI therefore lacks the direct
economic interest necessary to maintain these bases for protest. 4 C.F.R. sect.
21.0(a) (2001); Quaker Valley Meats, Inc./Supreme Sales, GmbH, A Joint
Venture; Upper Lakes Foods, Inc., B-279217 et al., May 20, 1998, 98-1 CPD para.
163 at 8-9.

CBA Protests

CBA's proposal was ranked 14th in line for award. The SEB found that the
most relevant and reliable past performance data for CBA was the CPCS
periodic rankings and scores, but that the extreme fluctuation in the firm's
rankings over time led it to give more weight to the D&B information and
contractor references. The SEB stated that the D&B information suggested
that CBA's past performance was one of the worst of all offerors'
performance, and the contractor references indicated the firm's performance
was worse than most offerors'. Accordingly, the SEB reduced the firm's past
performance score and found that its overall past performance was in the
high end of the below average firms when compared to other offerors. The SSA
agreed with the SEB's conclusions.

The SEB reviewed CBA's rankings and scores for all available CPCS periods
[7] and noted what it considered to be extreme fluctuations in performance.
CBA's rankings over the last eight periods were 16th, 3rd, 7th, 16th, 9th,
7th, 2nd, and 9th , generally based on a universe of 17 PCA contractors. As
the SEB remarked, the firm's performance was [DELETED] for four periods,
[DELETED] for two periods, and [DELETED] for two periods. Viewing the CPCS
data as a whole, and considering these significant fluctuations, the SEB
found that CBA's past performance and its ability to satisfy objective
performance measures on the contract were neither significantly worse nor
significantly better than its competitors, but the data indicated that CBA's
performance had fluctuated widely. Because of this extreme fluctuation, the
SEB had less confidence in the value of the CPCS data as a predictor of the
firm's future performance. As a result, the SEB stated that the other past
performance indicators became more important in its overall assessment of
CBA's past performance.

CBA asserts that the agency treated offerors disparately because its
rankings did not fluctuate any more than those of Aman and Pioneer, which
did not have their CPCS data discounted. CBA's assertion reflects a
superficial review of the record. The record shows that the agency did
evaluate Aman as having fluctuations and inconsistencies in its rankings
over time and, as a result, considered its past performance under the
current contract as a less reliable indicator of future success. The
agency's overall assessment of Aman shows that, as with CBA, other past
performance data was considered to be more reliable than the CPCS data due
to these fluctuations. The reasons for Aman's selection for award are
associated with other aspects of its past performance not addressed by CBA.
The record also shows that Pioneer never ranked below [DELETED] for any
period, and was ranked [DELETED] for five periods. Since the fluctuations in
Pioneer's rankings did not range from [DELETED] to [DELETED], as did CBA's,
we cannot say that the agency was required to discount the reliability of
Pioneer's CPCS data. [8]

CBA also argues that the agency improperly failed to give more weight to
offerors' most recent rankings and upward trends, since the RFTOP stated
that recent and relevant information was to receive greater consideration.
CBA asserts that it exhibited an upward trend in the last four periods,
whereas Aman and Nationwide Credit had worse rankings in the most recent
periods and were still selected for award.

The record shows that the agency did give greater consideration to more
recent information for offerors in cases where, given all of the past
performance data in its possession, it believed such consideration was
warranted. As noted above, the SEB gave less weight to CBA's--and
Aman's--CPCS data due to extreme fluctuations, and was not required to
disregard this information in favor of a formulaic application of the firms'
most recent standings. The SEB's overall performance assessment for
Nationwide Credit shows that it considered a range of information, in
addition to recent rankings, such as the fact that the firm's overall
performance had been [DELETED] to [DELETED] with only one [DELETED] rating
period, from which it recovered.

The D&B past performance evaluation for CBA shows that five customers rated
the firm under various categories for an overall score of [DELETED]. The SEB
acknowledged that this rating placed the firm's overall performance between
"good" to "very good" on D&B's adjectival scale, but pointed out that CBA's
score placed the firm 25th of the 26 offerors under this indicator. The SEB
also stated that under the two categories of greatest significance to the
agency, timeliness and technical, CBA was ranked 18th and 24th,
respectively. CBA had the lowest score of all offerors in the technical
category, which indicated to the SEB that the quality of the firm's past
performance and, in particular, its timeliness, ongoing support, and other
criteria measured by D&B surveys were among the worst of all offerors. The
SEB also reviewed the responses to a separate D&B competitive ranking survey
and found the results regarding CBA unremarkable.

CBA contends that one reference giving the firm a negative assessment is
suspect, and provides a statement from an individual purported to be the
only person authorized to provide reference information from this firm in
which she states that she did not recall being contacted by D&B to give the
reference and that, if she had been contacted, her reference would have been
favorable. D&B is an independent and impartial data-gathering organization
that enables government agencies to outsource the gathering of information
on contractor past performance. See
, D&B Past Performance
Evaluations Web Site. Such evaluations are often used by contracting
agencies in evaluating the past performance of potential contractors. The
negative reference at issue is consistent with at least one other reference
in CBA's D&B past performance evaluation, and there is no evidence that the
agency had any information that would have alerted it to this alleged
inaccuracy during the reevaluation. As a result, the agency had no reason to
question the accuracy of the D&B past performance evaluation and, thus, no
duty to independently verify the references. It was entitled to rely upon
this information as a component of its past performance evaluation. See
Harvard Interiors Mfg. Co., B-247400, May 1, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 413 at 5 n.6.

CBA contends that if the agency were so concerned about timeliness it would
have considered other indications of poor performance regarding timeliness.
Our review of CBA's examples reveals the protester's inadequate review of
the record. Both firms cited by CBA had references that responded negatively
regarding their timeliness. The record shows that these comments were duly
considered by the SEB, but that other past performance data not addressed by
CBA resulted in higher overall evaluation results for these firms. CBA
similarly contends that several successful offerors also had their lowest
D&B scores under D&B's timeliness and technical categories but did not have
their overall evaluations diminished. CBA has failed to consider that
numerous elements of the past performance evaluation, aside from the D&B
scores, went into the overall evaluation of each offeror's past performance.
Our review of CBA's examples shows offsetting information that supports the
ratings assigned.

CBA's contractor reference survey was comprised of references from three
firms for an overall score of [DELETED], which meant that the respondents
were "satisfied" to "extremely satisfied" with CBA's overall performance.
The SEB stated that, while the comments by these references reported CBA's
knowledge, cooperation, and experience, they also reported that CBA had
[DELETED]. The SEB noted that CBA's reference score ranked it 16th of the 26
firms under this indicator, suggesting that its past performance as reported
by its references was worse than most other offerors.

CBA objects that the agency treated offerors disparately because, while its
score was [DELETED] and the SEB called its performance "worse than most,"
Progressive had the same score and Diversified had a similar score but the
SEB called their performance "neither significantly worse or significantly
better" than others. CBA's focus on the scores alone overlooks other data
considered. As the SEB pointed out, the firm's references had unfavorable
comments regarding [DELETED]. In contrast, references for Progressive
reported strengths and no weaknesses, and references for Diversified
reported strengths and weaknesses, such as that the firm could sometimes be
overzealous, which the agency did not consider critical. The record shows
that the agency properly did not rely merely on numeric scores in making its
assessment. See OSI Collection Servs., Inc., supra, at 10.

The SEB finally considered the past performance of CBA's key personnel. The
SEB stated that all of CBA's key personnel had experience with the agency's
performance-based contract, and the director of student loans also had
experience with previous agency contracts. The SEB noted that the proposed
key personnel were responsible for CBA's overall average, but inconsistent,
CPCS performance on the current contract, and were unable to consider the
past performance for all of its key personnel because CBA listed four key
personnel positions for which it had not included names or resumes.

CBA states that, after the initial debriefing and prior to the reevaluation,
it submitted this missing information to the agency and that it should have
been considered in the reevaluation. We do not agree. The RFTOP required
offerors to submit, as part of their technical proposals, "resumes of key
personnel." RFTOP sect. L.1.2. CBA's proposal listed four key personnel
positions but did not include names or resumes for these positions. [9] An
offeror has the burden of submitting an adequately written proposal for the
agency to evaluate, Premier Cleaning Sys., Inc., B-255815, Apr. 6, 1994,
94-1 CPD para. 241 at 5, and CBA did not meet this burden. We agree with the
agency that consideration of this late submission during the reevaluation
would have been unfair to the firms who were not permitted to augment their
proposal. As for CBA's assertion that the agency was required to review the
information because our recommendation directed the agency to consider "all
past performance data in its possession," the recommendation did not
contemplate the mandatory review of late-submitted information such as this
but, rather, the review of the performance data supporting the CPCS rankings
and scores and other information that should have been fully considered in
the initial evaluation.

CBA has given us no basis to question the agency's evaluation or ranking of
its proposal. [10] The protester also argues, however, that the agency
improperly evaluated the past performance of Maximus and USA Education. The
record shows that, even if Maximus and USA Education were eliminated from
award consideration, two interceding offerors, not CBA, would be in line for
award. CBA therefore lacks the direct economic interest necessary to
maintain these bases for protest.

4 C.F.R. sect. 21.0(a); Quaker Valley Meats, Inc./Supreme Sales, GmbH, A Joint
Venture; Upper Lakes Foods, Inc., supra. Since a twelfth task order contract
might have been awarded, however, we briefly discuss CBA's allegations with
respect to one of these offerors.

CBA contends that the SEB improperly found that Maximus achieved a quality
of performance as good or better than most offerors based on the fact that
the firm's key personnel have collection experience with the National
Directory of New Hires (NDNH). CBA asserts that this experience is of
limited value because it comprises only a small portion of collections under
the contract and because the agency plans to train the new contractors to
use the NDNH.

Maximus's favorable assessment was based on its substantial experience in
the area of child support collections, which the SEB believed was nearly as
relevant as student loan collections experience. In addition, the SEB was
impressed by Maximus's experience with the NDNH database, which the agency
will begin using for the first time on the new contracts. The NDNH is a
reporting mechanism by which employers report certain information on newly
hired employees to designated state agencies in an effort to assist with
interstate enforcement of child support; Congress recently granted the
agency access to NDNH to locate defaulted education loan borrowers or those
who owe the government a refund because of an overpayment on a federal
education grant. It is obvious that key personnel with hands-on experience
using the NDNH offer a benefit to the agency. The SEB recognized that
Maximus's experience was not the same as student loan experience, and
discounted it accordingly, but its overall assessment was high enough to put
it in line for award. CBA's disagreement with the SEB's conclusions does not
make them unreasonable.

The protests are denied.

Anthony H. Gamboa

General Counsel

Notes

1. CBA had filed an agency-level protest challenging various aspects of the
evaluation of its proposal. The agency dismissed the protest as moot when
OSI's protest was sustained by this Office.

2. As the SSA explained, the award to Aman placed the agency within the
range of the 10-12 contracts it planned. The SSA stated that awarding more
than that number of contracts would increase the administrative burdens on
the agency and dilute the performance incentives for contractors, and that
he would not do so absent a compelling reason.

3. OSI complains that the agency improperly considered data from the ninth
CPCS period, which became available just before the reevaluation, but did
not request updated information from D&B or from contractor references. We
do not find the agency's actions improper. Whereas the RFTOP required the
agency to consider performance data on hand, such as the CPCS data, it did
not require the agency to initiate a search for updated D&B and reference
data. Given the relatively short timeframe between the initial set of data
and the reevaluation, we cannot conclude that the agency was required to do
so.

4. The SEB considered rankings of [DELETED] to be [DELETED]; [DELETED] to be
[DELETED]; [DELETED] to be [DELETED]; [DELETED] to be [DELETED]; and
[DELETED] to be [DELETED].

5. OSI contends that the agency should have considered such things as the
timing of these transfers, the fact that some PCAs did not receive large
transfers, and PCAs' differing contractual standards and methods of managing
inventory in evaluating past performance. Here, as in any procurement, the
agency could have considered an infinite number of details regarding past
performance. Our review of the agency's rationale for what it did and did
not consider shows that it reasonably exercised its discretion to determine
the scope of the performance information evaluated.

6. The agency did mistakenly evaluate RBA as having four references instead
of two. Since RBA's overall favorable assessment was not dependent upon this
performance indicator, however, we cannot conclude that OSI suffered any
prejudice as a result.

7. CBA was not awarded a contract in time to have data for the first CPCS
period.

8. CBA also argues that the agency treated offerors disparately with respect
to how it considered the effect of large account transfers on offerors'
subsequent CPCS rankings. CBA asserts that two offerors were given
consideration for significant drops in their rankings after the transfer of
a large number of accounts, but it was not given this same consideration.
CBA is mistaken. One of the offerors was not given consideration for its
ranking drops based on large account transfers, and the account transfer for
the other was substantially larger than that for CBA. The differing
evaluation outcomes for the firms reflected their different circumstances,
not improper disparate treatment.

9. CBA states that it "supposedly" did not submit this information with its
initial proposal, but the firm does not deny the agency's assertion and we
have no basis to conclude that CBA did include this information in its
initial proposal.

10. CBA also contends that the agency improperly evaluated its proposal
under the technical factor as having only a moderate probability of success.
CBA alleges that its sole weakness was similar to that of two other offerors
who received higher technical ratings. Our review of the record shows that
CBA's allegation is without basis. In addition to the fact that both of
these other offerors had more strengths than did CBA, both quantitatively
and qualitatively, CBA's proposal also suffered from its failure to provide
names or resumes for four of its key personnel.