TITLE:  Draeger Safety, Inc., B-285366; B-285366.2, August 23, 2000
BNUMBER:  B-285366; B-285366.2
DATE:  August 23, 2000
**********************************************************************
Draeger Safety, Inc., B-285366; B-285366.2, August 23, 2000

Decision

Matter of: Draeger Safety, Inc.

File: B-285366; B-285366.2

Date: August 23, 2000

David D. DiBari, Esq., William Silverman, Esq., Richard P. Ferrin, Esq., and
Anthony M. Cooke, Esq., Clifford, Chance, Rogers & Wells, for the protester.

Ron R. Hutchinson, Esq., and James D. Bachman, Esq., Doyle & Bachman, for
Scott Aviation, an intervenor.

Roger D. Waldron, Esq., General Services Administration, and John M. Davis,
Esq., Veronica E. Murtha, Esq., Lisa L. Hare, Esq., Valencia L. Bowers,
Esq., and Michael J. Glennon, Esq., Department of the Navy, for the
agencies.

Christine Davis, Esq., and James Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Where an agency requests competition among Federal Supply Schedule
vendors and decides to shift to the vendors the burden of selecting items on
which to quote, the vendors must be given sufficient detail to allow them to
compete intelligently and fairly.

2. Agency reasonably declined to establish blanket purchase agreement for
self-contained breathing apparatuses with a Federal Supply Schedule vendor
whose offered products either did not meet the agency's stowage size
requirements or were otherwise unacceptable.

DECISION

Draeger Safety, Inc. protests the Department of the Navy's issuance of
blanket purchase agreement (BPA) No. N00024-00-A-4030, to Scott Aviation for
self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA) for use by sailors in fighting
shipboard fires. The Navy established the BPA under Scott's Federal Supply
Schedule (FSS) contract. Draeger, which also has an FSS contract for SCBAs,
protests that the Navy improperly determined that Draeger's equipment would
not meet the Navy's needs, and that Scott's equipment was unacceptable and
otherwise could not be ordered from the FSS.

We deny the protest.

An SCBA is a respiratory protection device that supplies oxygen to
firefighters, allowing them to breathe in areas with unbreathable or
contaminated air. The SCBA supplies air to the firefighter from compressed
air cylinders worn on the firefighter's back. Navy Report at 2. The SCBA is
worn as a backpack, with an adjustable waist belt and shoulder straps. See
Navy Report, Tab 37, Intervenor's Product Demonstration Video; Tab 38,
Protester's Product Demonstration Video.

The Navy sent a draft BPA to vendors holding FSS contracts for SCBAs,
including Draeger and Scott. The agency estimated a requirement for 25,000
SCBAs and stated that it would establish BPAs with either one or two
contractors representing "the best value" to meet this requirement. [1] The
Navy asked interested vendors to complete pricing grids in the draft BPA, to
perform a product demonstration of their SCBA units, and to loan the units
to the government for testing and evaluation. Other than stating that the
offered SCBAs must be commercially available, certified by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and meet or exceed National
Fire Protection Association Standard 1981, the Navy did not disclose to the
vendors any aspect of its particular requirements, its evaluation scheme,
its source selection criteria, or its testing procedures. Id., Tab 20,
Commerce Business Daily (CBD) Net Announcement; Tabs 22 and 23, Distribution
of Draft BPA to Protester and Intervenor. The Navy did answer various
questions from the vendors about its requirements, although none directly
related to whether the Navy had any size limitations for storage of the
SCBAs. Id., Tabs 24 and 25, Questions and Responses.

Draeger, Scott, and another firm responded to the draft BPA. Draeger's FSS
contract includes the AirBoss Evolution SCBA, which it demonstrated for the
Navy on December 7, 1999. Id. at 5-6; Tab 72, Modification of Protester's
FSS Contract. Draeger's AirBoss Evolution SCBA includes a removable comfort
pad, which Draeger's commercial literature describes as optional, although
this option is not priced in Draeger's FSS contract. Id., Tab 32,
Protester's Draft BPA, AirBoss Evolution Specification, General
Specifications, at 1; Tab 72, Modification of Protester's FSS Contract.
Scott's FSS contract includes the Air-Pak 4.5 SCBA, which it demonstrated
for the Navy on that same date. Id. at 5; Tab 27, Modification of
Intervenor's FSS Contract, Dec. 2, 1999. Following the vendors' product
demonstrations, the Navy borrowed Scott's and Draeger's SCBAs for evaluation
and testing.

Based upon its evaluation of the SCBAs, the Navy determined that the Draeger
unit was unsatisfactory for Navy use. Most importantly, the evaluation team
found that the Draeger SCBA when fitted with the comfort pad would not fit
the specially designed, shock-qualified SCBA stowage lockers aboard
submarines and various surface ships. Id., Tab 53, Protester's Evaluation
Checklist, at 1; Tab 55, Protester's Evaluation Summary, at 2. In addition,
the evaluation team rated three other design attributes of Draeger's SCBA
unsatisfactory and deemed the unit "operationally and technically weak when
compared to the Navy's requirements." [2] Id., Tab 53, Protester's
Evaluation Checklist, at 2-3; Tab 55, Protester's Evaluation Summary,
at 2-3.

In contrast, the Navy rated Scott's SCBA technically excellent overall,
which led the evaluation team to describe the unit as "technically and
operationally strong when compared to the Navy's requirements." Id., Tab 57,
Intervenor's Evaluation Checklist; Tab 59, Intervenor's Evaluation Summary,
at 1. In addition, the evaluation team determined that the Scott SCBA
presented the lowest overall cost. Id., Tab 62, Price Summary for BPA
Quantities.

Based upon the recommendations and findings of the evaluation team, the
contracting officer elected to establish a single BPA with Scott, stating
that the firm "clearly offers the technically superior unit." The
contracting officer decided not to award a second BPA to Draeger because its
unit (with the comfort pad) did not meet the Navy's stowage requirements and
was unacceptable. In this regard, the contracting officer determined that it
would cost the Navy approximately $7.6 million to reconfigure its SCBA
lockers to accommodate Draeger's units, which he considered untenable. Id.,
Tab 61, Source Selection Statement. Accordingly, the contracting officer
established a single BPA with Scott. This protest followed.

Section 259(b)(3) of title 41 of the United States Code provides that the
procedures established for the General Service Administration's (GSA)
multiple award schedule program (that is, the FSS program) satisfy the
general requirement in 41 U.S.C. 253(a)(1) (1994) for use of competitive
procedures "if--(A) participation in the program has been open to all
responsible sources; and (B) orders and contracts under such procedures
result in the lowest overall cost alternative to meet the needs of the
Government." See also FAR sect. 8.404(a). Use of the streamlined procedures of
the FSS in lieu of conducting a competition is thus premised on a
determination regarding what the agency's needs are and which FSS supply or
service meets those needs at the lowest overall cost. The fundamental
principle of government accountability dictates that those determinations
are subject to review, and we view it as axiomatic that, in order to
withstand review when challenged in a bid protest, the agency must be able
to provide a reasonable basis for its determinations regarding its needs and
the FSS supply or service that meets those needs at the lowest overall cost.
In FSS buys, as in other procurements, the determination of what the agency
needs and which products meet those needs is within the agency's discretion,
and we will not sustain a protest in this area unless the determination
lacks a reasonable basis. See Delta Int'l, Inc., B-284364.2, May 11, 2000,
2000 CPD para. __ at 4.

Draeger protests the rejection of its SCBA, arguing that the requirement
that the unit fit into specially designed, shock-qualified SCBA stowage
lockers constituted an improper undisclosed evaluation criterion, of which
Draeger was not reasonably aware when it responded to the Navy's request for
product demonstration.

Where, as here, an agency requests competition among FSS vendors and decides
to shift to the vendors the burden of selecting items on which to quote, the
vendors must be given sufficient detail to allow them to compete
intelligently and fairly; the agency's description of its needs must be free
from ambiguity and state the agency's needs accurately. See COMARK Fed.
Sys., B-278343, B-278343.2, Jan. 20, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 34 at 4-5; Haworth,
Inc.; Knoll N. Am., Inc., B-256702.2, B-256702.3, Sept. 9, 1994, 94-2 CPD para.
98 at 5. Specifically, to satisfy its obligation to treat vendors fairly,
the agency should in some fashion inform vendors of its essential
requirements, so that a fair and intelligent competition can be achieved.
[3] Haworth, Inc.; Knoll N. Am., Inc., supra, at 5-6; see FAR sect.
1.102-2(c)(3); Computer Prods., Inc., B-284702, May 24, 2000, 2000 para. __ at
5.

The Navy's requirement that the SCBAs fit into the Navy's particular stowage
units is one of those requirements that we think should have been disclosed
to the vendors. Nevertheless, the record here establishes that Draeger was
not prejudiced by the Navy's failure to disclose this requirement. We first
note that Draeger reasonably should have known that the agency had stowage
size limitations (even though it may not have known their precise nature)
because of Draeger's previous experience with the Navy's evaluation of its
SCBAs for shipboard use, see Navy Report at 3-4; Tab 4, SCBA Commercial Item
Description, Jan. 30, 1997, para. 2.4; Tab 5, Protester's SCBA Evaluation
Summary, June 1997, at 2, and Protester's SCBA Evaluation Checklist, June
1997, at 1, and it therefore should have specifically inquired about the
matter when it received an opportunity to ask questions about the Navy's
requirements.

In any case, the record shows, and Draeger does not dispute, that the SCBAs
listed on Draeger's FSS with the comfort pad attached will not meet the
Navy's stowage requirements. [4] Navy Report, Tab 53, Protester's Evaluation
Checklist; Tab 55, Protester's Evaluation Summary.

Draeger nevertheless states that its SCBAs without the comfort pad will meet
the Navy's stowage requirements and that the Navy should have considered
this alternative. The detachable Draeger comfort pad is a relatively stiff,
orthopedic-type pad about 4ï¿½ inches wide, which threads through the strap
assembly of the SCBA's waist belt. Navy Report, Tab 32, Protester's Draft
BPA, AirBoss Evolution Specification, para. 4f; Hearing Video Transcript (VT)
at 9:22:39. As discussed below, the agency reasonably determined that the
Draeger SCBAs, without the attached comfort pad, have comfort and stability
problems that rendered them unsatisfactory for Navy use. [5] Thus, the fact
that the Draeger SCBAs without the pad will meet the Navy's stowage
requirements is irrelevant. [6]

There is no contemporaneous documentation supporting the Navy's
determination that Draeger's SCBA without the comfort pad is unacceptable
for Navy use. The only evidence supporting the Navy's determination in this
regard is a declaration executed by the Navy program manager addressing the
protester's comments on the agency report, where this protest issue was
first raised, see Navy Comments, July 11, 2000, exh. 7, Declaration of
Program Manager, and the testimony of an evaluator--a Navy officer with
extensive shipboard firefighting and emergency response experience--who
tested the Draeger SCBA. Tr. at 136-37. Draeger argues that we should not
credit this evidence because of the lack of contemporaneous documentation,
emphasizing that the Navy shredded individual evaluator worksheets during
this procurement and was therefore free to generate a new rationale for its
evaluation during the course of this protest without fear of contradiction
from the contemporaneous written record. Protester's Post-Hearing Comments
at 3, 11 n.7.

We share Draeger's concern regarding the Navy's destruction of documents and
held a hearing in this case precisely because the contemporaneous record was
silent as to the Navy's consideration of the Draeger SCBA without the
comfort pad. However, the testimony of the Navy evaluator, which we find
credible, persuades us that the Navy did not generate a new rationale to
defend this protest, but presented its contemporaneous rationale. Where
post-protest submissions represent a memorialization of contemporaneous
analysis, our Office generally considers those submissions, so long as they
are credible and consistent with the contemporaneous record, as they are in
this case. NWT, Inc; PharmChem Labs., Inc., B-280988, B-280988.2, Dec. 17,
1998, 98-2 CPD para. 158 at 16.

According to the evaluator, the Navy evaluated Draeger's SCBA without the
comfort pad during the course of "scuttle exercise" testing. [7] During the
scuttle exercise, the evaluator found that the Draeger unit with the comfort
pad restricted his ability to move through the scuttle because it was wider
than the other evaluated units. Tr. at 149, 153-54. The evaluator believed
that he could reduce the unit's width to address this problem by detaching
the comfort pad from the unit's waist belt. VT at 14:21:50 to 14:22:25.

After detaching the comfort pad, various members of the evaluation team wore
the reconfigured unit. Tr. at 169-70. The evaluator testified that the
removal of the comfort pad significantly diminished the SCBA's comfort and
stability, and that all evaluators who wore the unit without the pad shared
this opinion. According to the evaluator, the evaluation team discussed the
comfort and stability problems of the Draeger unit without the pad and
reached a consensus that the unit without the pad was unsatisfactory for
Navy use. [8] After reaching this consensus, the evaluation team did not
further evaluate the Draeger unit without the pad, but continued evaluating
the Draeger unit with the pad installed. Tr. at 170-72.

According to the Navy, SCBAs must be comfortable because firefighters may
need to wear the units for extended periods--sometimes several hours--while
responding to an emergency. Tr. at 128-29, 141-42, 146; VT at 14:44:06. To
achieve a comfortable fit, the SCBA should distribute the majority of the
unit's weight to the hips, away from the neck and shoulders. [9] VT at
14:09:20. Too much weight on the neck and shoulders can cause fatigue and
headaches, and thereby undermine the sailor's ability to respond to the
emergency. VT at 14:09:20 to 14:10:05, 14:46:30 to 14:46:40. In addition,
shipboard firefighting is unique because sailors must be able to climb
through narrow hatches and scuttles on a ship, and maneuver through narrow
passageways with obstructions and protrusions. As a result, the SCBA must
not restrict the sailor's freedom of movement, but must fit securely enough
so that the unit will not slide, catch on a scuttle or other protrusion, or
upset a sailor's balance. Navy Report at 2; Tr. at 156-57; VT at 14:08:42,
14:10:30 to 14:11:40. Sailors must be able to achieve a secure fit without
the need to adjust the straps too tightly. Tr. at 156. Because heat from
shipboard fires is trapped within the steel confines of the ship, the straps
of an SCBA must not be too tight, or else heat from the fire will compress
in the sailor's clothing and cause burns. VT at 14:06:42 to 14:07:10;
14:08:09 to 14:08:37.

According to the evaluator, the unit with the comfort pad provided a secure
and comfortable fit, as reflected in the contemporaneous evaluation
documentation. Tr. at 153, 155-56, 158; Navy Report, Tab 53, Protester's
Evaluation Checklist, Attributes--Fit and Sizing, at 1, Padded Harness or
Wide Belts, at 3. He testified that the Draeger SCBA with the comfort pad
fit securely without the need to fasten the straps too tightly. VT at
14:06:41, 14:08:40 to 14:08:50. Even with the straps relaxed to avert
compression burns, the unit remained centered on his back, with a stable
cylinder and with most of the SCBA's weight concentrated on his hips. Tr. at
153, 156-58.

In contrast, the evaluator testified that, upon donning the unit without the
pad, he immediately noticed that the unit began dropping down his waist,
past his hips. VT at 14:42:18. He testified that he tightened the waist
straps of the unit, which secured the unit around his waist, but cost him
the relatively relaxed fit necessary to maneuver properly and to avert
compression burns. Conversely, once he loosened the waist straps to
alleviate the constriction, he sacrificed the unit's secure fit around his
waist, such that the unit again dropped past his hips and forced him to bear
the unit's weight on his neck and shoulders, rather than his hips. VT at
14:42:18 to 14:43:50. The evaluator testified that he wore the unit for
15 minutes and, during that time, he could not achieve a proper fit--one
that anchored the unit around his waist and the cylinder at the center of
his back without cinching the strap assembly to the point of constriction.
VT at 14:46:45 to 14:48:40. Based on the evaluator's opinion, which he
asserts was shared by other members who wore the unit without the pad, the
evaluation team concluded that the unit without the pad did not meet the
Navy's needs. Tr. at 171.

The record in this case reasonably supports the evaluation team's judgment
that the comfort pad helps to anchor the unit around the user's waist
without undue stress from the strap assembly and that the removal of the
comfort pad erodes this advantage. This is not surprising given that, during
Draeger's December 1999 product demonstration to the Navy, Draeger's fire
service specialist described the comfort pad as follows:

Let me introduce the comfort waist pad. It's about 3ï¿½ inches thick. It
forces the user to carry the majority of the weight on the hips. You carry
approximately two-thirds of the weight distributed through your hips, which
is obviously one of the strongest parts of the body. It takes less
compression off the spine, off the shoulders.

Navy Report, Tab 38, Protester's Product Demonstration Video; see also Navy
Report, Tab 32, Protester's Draft BPA, AirBoss Evaluation Specification, para.
4f (states that waist belt padding ensures user comfort), PA-90 Evolution
Service Manual, Theory of Operation, para. 2.3 (states that waist pad helps to
transfer weight away from the shoulders for additional support and comfort),
and Protester's SCBA Presentation Slides, "The Original Comfort Harness"
(describes purpose of comfort harness, including comfort pad, as
distributing 2/3 of the weight to the hips); Tab 72, Protester's FSS Master
Price List, January 1, 1997, at R13 (describes comfort pad as "[h]ighly
recommended").

The protester argues that the above description overstates the importance of
the comfort pad and that the orthopedic backplate of Draeger's SCBA forces
weight to the user's hips, whether or not the comfort pad is attached.
Protester's Post-Hearing Comments at 7 n.5. While we have no reason to doubt
that Draeger designed its backplate to transfer weight to the hips, we also
find reasonable that the stiff, broad comfort pad enhances the system's
overall design by securing the unit around the waist, and that the fit and
comfort of the system suffer from the removal of the pad. In fact, Draeger's
fire service specialist testified at the hearing that the purpose of the pad
is to enhance the comfort of the system. Tr. at 208.

Draeger argues that the Navy evaluator who testified at the hearing wore the
unit without the pad incorrectly and did not tighten the shoulder straps
sufficiently to pull the backplate to its proper position. According to the
protester, this mistake caused the unit to drop too low on the evaluator's
waist and prevented him from carrying the weight on his hips. Protester's
Post-Hearing Comments at 8. Draeger's arguments overlook the fact that the
evaluator testified that he repeatedly adjusted the strap assembly to
prevent the unit from sliding and dropping too low on his waist, but found
that he could not do so without tightening the straps to the point of
constriction. This problem did not occur when he wore the unit with the
comfort pad. VT at 14:42:18 to 14:43:50; 14:45:14 to 14:45:30; 14:46:45 to
14:48:13.

In addition, we note that Draeger's product information does not discuss the
"correct" position of the shoulder straps or the backplate, but simply
advises the user to pull the waist and shoulder straps until the equipment
is secure and comfortable, which, the evaluator testified, was impossible to
do once the comfort pad was removed. See id.; Navy Report, Tab 32,
Protester's Draft BPA, AirBoss Evolution and ProAir Evolution User's
Instructions, "Operation," at 2; Tab 35, Protester's Donning Video.
Draeger's product information and production demonstration videos do not
suggest that the Navy evaluator wore the unit improperly or differently from
the way Draeger representatives demonstrated its use, either during the
evaluation or at the hearing in this case. Compare VT at 14:06:22 to
14:08:04; 14:40:45 to 14:42:45 with VT at 16:09:00 to 16:10:45; Navy Report,
Tab 35, Protester's Donning Video; Tab 38, Protester's Product Demonstration
Video.

Accordingly, we think that the Navy's determination that Draeger's SCBA is
unacceptable for the Navy's particular use without the comfort pad is
reasonably supported by the record. Since it is not disputed that Draeger's
SCBA will not otherwise satisfy the Navy's stowage requirements, the Navy's
decision not to place a BPA with Draeger for this item was reasonable. [10]

Draeger also protests that Scott's FSS contract does not properly describe
its SCBA and cannot serve as the basis for any orders. Protester's Comments,
July 11, 2000, at 8-9. This contention is based on the fact that Scott's FSS
contract contained a clerical error in the item description for its SCBA
with a 45-minute cylinder and incorrectly listed a 30-minute cylinder as a
component of the SCBA. See Navy Report, Tab 27, Modification of Intervenor's
FSS Contract, Dec. 2, 1999; Tab 66, Intervenor's BPA, attach. 1;
Intervenor's Comments, June 30, 2000, Tab B, Declaration of Intervenor's
Government Sales/Technical Representative, para. 6. During the course of this
protest, GSA corrected the clerical error through a contract modification to
reflect the 45-minute cylinder. GSA Report at 4, Tab 5, Modification of
Intervenor's FSS Contract, June 15, 2000. The Navy has yet to place an order
under Scott's BPA. Given that GSA corrected the item description in Scott's
FSS prior to the placement of any orders, we need not decide whether the
error in the item description precluded an order. [11]

Draeger also argues that the Scott SCBAs being acquired here are not
commercially available as required by the Navy in its CBD announcement, but
have been specially configured to meet the Navy's particular requirements.
However, Scott's Internet site lists the Air-Pak 4.5 SCBA. See
. To the extent that Scott has modified this
commercial SCBA for Navy use, its FSS contract lists the modified SCBA, see
Navy Report, Tab 27, Modification of Intervenor's FSS Contract, Dec. 2,
1999; Tab 37, Intervenor's Product Demonstration Video, and Draeger has not
shown that the modifications are anything other than minor modifications
made to meet the Navy's requirements, which do not render the product other
than commercially available. See TRW Inc.; Systems Research and Applications
Corp., B-260968.2 et al., Aug. 14, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 101 at 9.

Draeger also protests that the Navy did not properly test the face piece of
Scott's SCBA to determine that it would fit the user population. Protest at
8; Protester's Comments, June 30, 2000, at 13. During the evaluation, the
nine members of the evaluation team, whose face sizes varied widely, tried
on the face piece of each vendor's SCBA to test whether the face piece fit.
Scott's face piece fit each member's face, and, as a result, the evaluation
team determined that it would fit the user population and rated the face
piece satisfactory. Navy Report at 19, 23. Also, Scott submitted a
declaration from its National Service Manager that, based upon Scott's own
testing, its standard-size face piece fits 90- to 95-percent of the general
population, which the record indicates will satisfy the Navy's needs. [12]
See Intervenor's Comments, Tab A, Declaration of Intervenor's National
Service Manager para. 2; Navy Report, Tab 36, Source Selection Plan, attach. 1,
Attributes--Fit and Sizing, at 1.

Draeger argues that the most common testing protocol requires a fit test on
25 faces, ranging in size from the 5-percentile to the 95-percentile of the
population, and claims that the Navy should have used this testing protocol.
Protester's Comments, July 11, 2000, at 5. However, the Navy did not advise
vendors that it would use this, or any particular, testing procedure. We
have no basis to object to the adequacy of the Navy's fit test, particularly
since nothing in the record indicates that Scott's face piece will not fit
the target user population. A protester's mere disagreement with the agency
does not make the agency's evaluation unreasonable. SC&A, Inc., B-270160.2,
Apr. 10, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 197 at 8. Thus, Draeger has provided no basis to
question the placement of the BPA with Scott.

Finally, Draeger protests the Navy's cost evaluation and its solicitation of
a price decrease from Scott, but not Draeger, during the procurement. We
find that Draeger is not an interested party to raise these issues. Under
the bid protest provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act of
1984, 31 U.S.C. sect.sect. 3551-56 (Supp. IV 1998), only an "interested party" may
protest a federal procurement. That is, a protester must be an actual or
prospective supplier whose direct economic interest would be affected by the
award of a contract or the failure to award a contract. 31 U.S.C. sect. 3551(2);
4 C.F.R. sect. 21.0(a) (2000). Determining whether a party is interested
involves the consideration of a variety of factors, including the nature of
issues raised, the benefit or relief sought by the protester, and the
party's status in relation to the procurement. Four Winds Servs., Inc.,
B-280714, Aug. 28, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 57 at 2. Here, the Navy properly
determined that Draeger did not have a product on the FSS that met its
needs. Accordingly, even if Draeger successfully challenged the manner in
which the Navy evaluated cost and conducted price discussions with Scott, it
still would not be in line for the award of a BPA. Thus, we decline to
consider these issues.

The protest is denied.

Robert P. Murphy

General Counsel

Notes

1. All FSS contracts contain BPA provisions, and ordering agencies are
permitted to establish BPAs with FSS contractors for recurring requirements.
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 8.404(b)(4).

2. An internal source selection plan (SSP) provided adjectival
ratings--"outstanding," "excellent," "satisfactory," and
"unsatisfactory"--to rate numerous "critical," "important," and "desirable"
design attributes of the SCBAs. Navy Report, Tab 36, Source Selection Plan,
attach. 1. To the extent that Draeger protests that the Navy's evaluation
was inconsistent with the SSP, the SSP was an internal document not
disclosed to or relied upon by vendors, and therefore did not confer any
rights upon vendors in terms of the bid protest process. See Pulau Elecs.
Corp., B-280048.4 et al., May 19, 1999, 99-2 CPD para. 99 at 11 n.13.

3. The agency's disclosure of its requirements when soliciting quotes under
the FSS not only allows for fair and intelligent competition among the
vendors, but also promotes the agency's ability to obtain the lowest
possible price among available FSS products, and allows a vendor whose
products will not meet the agency's needs to choose not to waste its
resources responding to the agency's request for quotes where the vendor has
no chance of receiving an order.

4. Draeger has not protested this determination, beyond mischaracterizing
the hearing testimony of the contracting officer, who, contrary to the
protester's suggestion, never acknowledged that the Draeger SCBA, with the
comfort pad, meets the stowage requirements. See Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at
108-11.

5. Although Draeger's commercial literature mentions the comfort pad as
optional, Draeger's SCBA, as listed on the FSS, includes the comfort pad and
does not mention or separately price the comfort pad as an option, see Navy
Report, Tab 72, Modification of Protester's FSS Contract, and according to
GSA, the SCBA may not be ordered from the FSS contract without the pad. GSA
Report at 2; see Pyxis Corp., B-282469, B-282469.2, July 15, 1999, 99-2 CPD
para. 18 at 4 (agency may not order items not listed in an FSS contract under an
acquisition under the FSS). Given our conclusion that the Navy reasonably
determined that the unit without the pad does not meet its needs, we need
not decide whether the agency should have considered ordering the Draeger
SCBA with the pad and then discarding the pad, or asking Draeger to ship the
unit without the pad, or affording Draeger the opportunity to amend its FSS
contract to include the SCBA without the pad.

6. The Navy concedes that the Draeger SCBAs will meet its stowage
requirements if the comfort pad is removed. Letter from Navy to GAO (July
26, 2000).

7. A scuttle is an opening through a ship's deck, resembling a manhole,
through which sailors climb. VT at 13:26:40 to 13:27:09. Ship scuttles are
18 inches or 21 inches in diameter. VT at 13:28:40. Navy evaluators created
a mock, 21-inch cardboard scuttle to test how easily a sailor could climb
through a scuttle wearing the evaluated SCBAs. Tr. at 147-48.

8. Contrary to the protester's allegation, we find no material differences
between the evaluator's testimony and the declaration of the program manager
regarding the testing of the Draeger unit without the comfort pad. In
particular, both individuals indicated that the presence of the comfort pad
hampered mobility through scuttles, but that the absence of the comfort pad
made the unit difficult to wear. See Tr. at 153-54, 169-72; Navy Comments,
July 11, 2000, exh. 7, Declaration of Program Manager, para. 3.

9. The Draeger SCBA weighs 19.9 pounds with a filled cylinder. Protester's
Post-Hearing Comments at 7.

10. Thus, we need not consider Draeger's other contentions regarding the
evaluation of its SCBA.

11. Draeger argues that GSA's modification did not resolve a different
mistake in the item description of Scott's SCBA. Protester's Response to GSA
Report at 7-8. The Navy's report, submitted on June 20, 2000, included the
documentation necessary to raise this issue, yet Draeger did not mention the
issue until its August 4 response to GSA's report. We decline to discuss
this issue, because our Bid Protest Regulations do not contemplate the
piecemeal presentation of protest issues. See Armstrong Motorcycles Ltd.,
B-238436, B-238436.2, June 5, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 531 at 3-4.

12. Scott also offers small and extra-large face seals to accommodate the
small percentage of the population that cannot achieve an acceptable fit
with the standard face piece. Intervenor's Comments, June 30, 2000, Tab A,
Declaration of Intervenor's National Service Manager, para. 2.