TITLE:  Ready Transportation, Inc., B-285283.3; B-285283.4, May 8, 2001
BNUMBER:  B-285283.3; B-285283.4
DATE:  May 8, 2001
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Ready Transportation, Inc., B-285283.3; B-285283.4, May 8, 2001

Decision

Matter of: Ready Transportation, Inc.

File: B-285283.3; B-285283.4

Date: May 8, 2001

Timothy C. Riley, Esq., Riley & Riley, for the protester.

Raighne C. Delaney, Esq., and Leo S. Fisher, Esq., Bean Kinney & Korman, for
Green Valley Transportation, Inc., an intervenor.

Capt. Ryan M. Zipf and Col. Michael R. Neds, Department of the Army, for the
agency.

Tania Calhoun, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

  1. Protest that contracting agency improperly evaluated proposals with
     respect to past performance is denied where the record shows the
     evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's
     evaluation criteria; mere disagreement with the agency's evaluation is
     insufficient to show it was unreasonable.
  2. Protest that contracting agency implemented solicitation's evaluation
     scheme in a mechanical manner that resulted in an irrational source
     selection decision is denied where the record shows the allegation is
     without basis.

DECISION

Ready Transportation, Inc. protests an award made under request for
proposals (RFP) No. JD-5252-SH, issued by the Department of the Army,
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), for guaranteed traffic (GT)
freight transportation. Ready argues that the agency improperly evaluated
proposals with respect to past performance and implemented the evaluation
scheme in a mechanical manner that resulted in an irrational source
selection decision.

We deny the protests.

The GT program is a transportation management tool under which MTMC issues a
request for rate tenders for all the traffic for particular routes for a
specific period of time and awards what are, in effect, requirements
contracts to the successful carriers. [1] Allstates Air Cargo, Inc.,
B-261266, B-261266.2, Feb. 29, 1996, 96-1 CPD

para. 138 at 2 n.3. This solicitation concerns the movement of freight traffic
from the Defense Distribution Depot in San Joaquin, California (DDJC) to
various destinations within the United States. The procurement of these
services has been the subject of prior protests.

MTMC initially solicited for these requirements in 1999. After awards were
made to numerous shippers, Ready protested various aspects of the
procurement. MTMC took corrective action by terminating all of the awards
and resoliciting for the requirements; Ready's protest was dismissed as
academic. The resolicitation, issued January 25, 2000, anticipated the award
of 56 contracts, one for each lane of traffic. Traffic was to be awarded to
one primary carrier for each lane, with the possibility that alternate
carrier selections might be made for each lane. Each offeror could be
selected as a primary carrier or as an alternate for multiple lanes. Awards
were to be made to the firms whose proposals were most advantageous to the
government, considering equally important price and technical factors. The
RFP set forth two technical factors, past performance and service; past
performance was more important than service. MTMC reserved the right to
award on the basis of initial proposals, without conducting discussions. [2]
RFP encl. 5, at 30.

Offerors were to complete a rate tender for each lane in which they were
interested. The price evaluation team entered the rates into MTMC's
automated system and arrived at total prices for each offeror for each lane.
For each lane, the low-price offeror received the maximum number of price
points available, and all other offerors received prorated points. Since
prices varied from lane to lane, the points awarded for price varied for
each offeror from lane to lane.

The past performance factor was comprised of two equally important
subfactors, past percent on-time delivery and past performance "actions."
Past performance "actions" were essentially problems that had arisen during
performance of prior contracts. The technical evaluation team (TET) was to
consider an offeror's past performance activity in MTMC and other Department
of Defense (DOD) movements over the last 24 months. All performance actions
were to be considered for the term of the current GT contracts, to include
extensions. If the current GT contracts were shorter than 12 months,
performance actions on the prior contracts were to be considered. [3] The
past performance subfactors were to be adjectivally rated as outstanding,
excellent, good, fair, poor, or unsatisfactory. The service factor was
comprised of four subfactors, including the equally important cargo
liability amount, proposed on-time delivery percentage, and percentage
refund subfactors. The latter two subfactors were point-scored. The ratings,
and points, assigned to the technical subfactors remained constant for each
offeror from lane to lane.

For each proposal, the technical subfactor points were totaled, and the
total was weighted by assigning the maximum number of available points to
the offeror with the most technical points and prorating the points for the
remaining offerors. The weighted technical ratio was added to the total
price points to determine the total points for each offeror in each lane.
The offeror with the most total points was ranked as the potential prime
carrier, and alternate positions were identified for those offerors with the
next highest totals. Awards were generally to be made on that basis.
However, the RFP permitted the government to pay a higher price to an
offeror whose performance risk and price reasonableness gave it greater
confidence in that offeror's ability to keep its commitments. RFP encl. 5,
at 30.

Ready was awarded a contract as the primary carrier on lane 56 and as an
alternate carrier on others. Another carrier, Green Valley Transportation,
Inc., filed a protest in which it argued that MTMC improperly failed to
consider all of the information available to it when evaluating proposals
under the past performance subfactors. Our Office sustained Green Valley's
protest, finding that the agency's evaluation of past performance was
unreasonable. Green Valley Transp., Inc., B-285283, Aug. 9, 2000, 2000 CPD para.
133. We recommended that MTMC reevaluate the proposals with respect to past
performance and make appropriate award decisions in view of the results of
that reevaluation.

The TET reevaluated proposals in view of our decision. An Optimum Benefit
Negotiation (OBN) Review Board reviewed the results and concurred with most
of the past performance ratings, but revised several upward to reflect its
view that the record supported higher ratings. MTMC converted these ratings
to points by dividing the total points allocated for each technical factor
by six to allow a specific point for each grade level from outstanding to
satisfactory. As explained above, the weighted technical ratio was added to
the total price points to determine the total points for each offeror in
each lane. The offeror with the most total points was ranked as the
potential prime carrier and alternate positions were identified for those
offerors with the next highest totals.

Lane 56, the only lane at issue here, connects the two major Defense
Logistics Agency depots in the United States, DDJC and the Defense
Distribution Depot in Susquehanna, Pennsylania (DDS). The final relevant
evaluation results for lane 56 were as follows:

              Carrier A    Green      Carrier B  Ready      Carrier C
                           Valley

 Proposed     100%         97%        97%        95%        95%
 On-Time
 Delivery     [DELETED]    [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]
 Rate

 [DELETED]

 Refund       2%           1%         1%         0%         0%

 [DELETED]    [DELETED]    [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]

 Liability    Excellent    Excellent  Excellent  Excellent  Good

 [DELETED]    [DELETED]    [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]

 Past         Good         Good       Good       Poor       Fair
 Performance
              [DELETED]    [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]
 [DELETED]

 Past         Excellent    Good       Good       Excellent  Poor
 On-Time      [DELETED]
 Delivery                  [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]  [DELETED]
 Rate

 [DELETED]

 Estimated    $1,008,000   $820,000   $864,000   $705,600   $588,960
 Price

 Total        158.43       155.32     151.73     146.48     139.73
 Points

Although Carrier A had the highest total number of points, the Board did not
make award to that firm because its superior technical advantages did not
outweigh its price difference when compared with the next highest-ranked
carrier, Green Valley. The Board also decided that Green Valley's proposal
offered the best value when compared with the proposals of two lower-priced
carriers. Green Valley's proposed price was 39.4 percent higher (or $802
more per shipment) than that of Carrier C, but MTMC anticipated that Green
Valley would provide exceptionally better service in view of its superior
proposed on-time delivery rate and refund, and its superior ratings for
liability coverage, past performance, and past on-time delivery rate.
Ready's proposed price was approximately 20 percent lower (or $397 less per
shipment) than that of Green Valley, but MTMC concluded that its proposal
offered lesser service based upon its inferior proposed on-time delivery
rate, its lack of a refund, and its poor past performance rating.

Ready was displaced as the primary carrier on lane 56 by Green Valley and
became the second alternate carrier for that lane. Ready's protest, limited
to lane 56, alleges that MTMC improperly evaluated proposals with respect to
the past performance actions subfactor and implemented the evaluation scheme
in a mechanical manner that resulted in a flawed source selection decision.
[4]

Past Performance Evaluation

Where a solicitation requires the evaluation of offerors' past performance,
we will examine an agency's evaluation only to ensure that it was reasonable
and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria, since determining the
relative merits of offerors' past performance information is primarily a
matter within the contracting agency's discretion. Green Valley Transp.,
Inc., supra, at 3; DGR Assocs., Inc.,

B-285428, B-285428.2, Aug. 25, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 145 at 11. An agency may
base its evaluation of past performance upon its reasonable perception of
inadequate prior performance, regardless of whether the contractor disputes
the agency's interpretation of the facts. See Quality Fabricators, Inc.,
B-271431, B-271431.3,

June 25, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 22 at 7. A protester's mere disagreement with the
agency's judgment is not sufficient to establish that the agency acted
unreasonably. Birdwell Bros. Painting & Refinishing, B-285035, July 5, 2000,
2000 CPD para. 129 at 5. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
MTMC's evaluation of proposals with respect to the past performance actions
subfactor was reasonable.

Each carrier was required to submit copies of any corrective measure it had
taken in response to disciplinary actions against it by government shippers
or MTMC over the relevant time period in order to ensure that any actions in
its performance file were satisfactorily addressed. Such disciplinary
actions include the removal of a carrier from a lane due to its
unsatisfactory performance; a carrier's withdrawal from a lane prior to the
end of its contractual term; a letter of warning to a carrier associated
with its unsatisfactory performance; and a letter of concern to a carrier
associated with some aspect of its performance. The TET was to consider all
performance actions over the relevant time period, looking for reasons,
explanations, and clarifications for previous or current performance
actions, such as withdrawals from awarded lanes as the primary carrier, and
corrective actions on letters of concern, letters of warning, or
suspensions. The TET was to assess the overall past performance actions,
paying particular attention to those past performance actions and corrective
measures that specifically pertained to DDJC. RFP encl. 6, at 32-33.

In our first decision, we concluded that MTMC's failure to fully analyze the
substance of the past performance data at the agency's disposal, including
the volume of freight carried, was inconsistent with the solicitation's
requirement to "look for reasons, explanations and clarifications for
previous or current performance actions." RFP encl. 6, at 33. During the
reevaluation, MTMC provided a fully documented analysis of the information
in its possession, including materials provided in proposals; materials
received from DDJC such as on-time delivery statistics and assessments of
offeror performance; copies of performance actions; and statistics on
shipments moved by the offerors DOD-wide.

The TET analyzed the performance actions associated with DDJC and DOD-wide
shipments in terms of their seriousness, factored any reasons or
explanations offered by the carrier into its analysis, and considered the
performance actions in the context of the carrier's shipping volume. The
TET's adjectival rating of each proposal is supported by a detailed
narrative synopsis of its analysis of each carrier's past performance.

The Board reviewed the TET's evaluation results and undertook its own
analysis. The Board first weighted the types of performance actions in terms
of their seriousness. A letter of removal was considered to be more serious
than a letter of withdrawal, but a letter of withdrawal was considered to be
more serious than both a letter of warning and a letter of concern. The
Board developed a spreadsheet setting forth the carriers' performance
relative to their numbers of shipments as compared with their numbers of
weighted performance actions to obtain a better picture of the relative
quality of each carrier's past performance. The Board also reviewed letters
from DDJC regarding each carrier's performance at that depot. The Board
agreed with most of the TET's conclusions but decided that the record
supported higher ratings in some cases. [5] The Board found that some of the
variance might be explained by the fact that the TET's analysis of DOD-wide
shipping volume used tonnage carried rather than the number of shipments
made; the Board believed the number of shipments made was a more accurate
measure of shipping volume when considering past performance. The Board also
believed that the DDJC letters should be considered as one of the more
relevant measures since the RFP emphasized DDJC experience in the evaluation
of this subfactor.

The TET rated Ready's proposal "poor" for this subfactor. In approximately
6,900 DDJC shipments, Ready had two letters of withdrawal, one letter of
warning, and one letter of concern. In shipping approximately 77 million
pounds of freight DOD-wide (excluding DDJC), Ready had one letter of
removal, two letters of withdrawal, and two letters of concern. The record
shows that the TET considered the substance of each performance action,
along with the explanations provided in Ready's proposal, and did not
consider any of the performance actions to be excusable.

The Board found that Ready had 19 weighted performance actions, the second
highest number of all the carriers. In considering the firm's performance
actions in the context of its shipping volume, the Board determined that
Ready's DOD-wide volume (78 million pounds or 13,506 shipments) was high,
but not "very high," and that while its DDJC volume was high, the letter
from DDJC was not supportive. In this regard, DDJC's transportation
assistant responsible for monitoring carrier performance stated that the
depot had had problems getting proof of delivery receipts in a timely manner
from the firm; on occasion, office personnel at Ready who handled carrier
performance reports had not been very cooperative and had furnished the
information only after a second reminder. The Board did not revise the TET's
"poor" rating for Ready's proposal.

The TET also rated Green Valley's proposal "poor" for this subfactor. In
approximately 27,000 DDJC shipments, Green Valley had three letters of
withdrawal, three letters of concern, and two certificates of appreciation.
In shipping approximately 155 million pounds of tonnage DOD-wide (excluding
DDJC), the firm had two letters of withdrawal, one letter of warning, and
five letters of concern. The record shows that the TET considered the
substance of each performance action, along with the explanations provided
in Green Valley's proposal, and concluded that one withdrawal from DDJC and
one letter of concern for another DOD entity were excusable.

The Board found that Green Valley had 21 weighted performance actions, the
highest number of all the carriers, but raised its rating for two reasons.
First, the Board believed it was likely that the TET's low rating stemmed
from the fact that it measured DOD-wide shipping volume based on the weight
of the cargo rather than the number of shipments made. Under the TET's
measure, Green Valley was a high-volume shipper but not necessarily very
high; the TET weighed this fact against the firm's performance action
history. The Board believed, however, that using the number of shipments to
measure volume was a better measure because each shipment created an
additional opportunity for a negative performance action. Using this
measure, Green Valley, with 39,441 shipments, was the highest-volume carrier
DOD-wide. The Board acknowledged that Green Valley had the highest number of
weighted negative performance actions, but believed the fact it received
these in the context of its very high volume justified at least a "fair"
rating since the number of negative performance actions per shipment was
relatively low. Second, the Board believed that greater emphasis should be
placed on the supportive letter from DDJC summarizing its experience with
Green Valley. DDJC's transportation assistant stated that the firm was not
always timely submitting carrier performance reports, and required a
reminder from the depot, but, in such cases, Green Valley's staff had been
pleasant to work with and were making an attempt to provide the information
in a timely manner. The Board believed this letter was generally supportive
of Green Valley's past performance, and that it was sufficient to raise
Green Valley's rating from "fair" to "good" since the RFP placed an emphasis
on the carrier's performance at DDJC.

Ready first contends that MTMC improperly relied upon the letter from DDJC
to raise Green Valley's rating because the letter regarding Green Valley was
not supportive but was, instead, similar to the letter regarding Ready,
which was not considered supportive by the agency.

The letters are similar in that both carriers had problems with the timely
submission of information to DDJC, but the critical distinction lies in the
fact that Green Valley was apparently cooperative with DDJC when problems
arose and Ready was not. The protester does not dispute the contents of the
letters, but states that the letters only show that Green Valley's staff was
"nicer" than its own. We agree with MTMC that the significance of the
distinction is not one of courtesy. MTMC explains that a cooperative and
responsive carrier in the area of contract administration provides a value
to the agency in that its personnel are not wasting time and resources
trying to get responses or action out of a non-cooperative carrier. Although
Ready disagrees with MTMC's crediting Green Valley for its spirit of
cooperation, we cannot find this action unreasonable in view of the obvious
value inherent in working with a carrier with a past record of cooperation,
and in view of the fact that the RFP placed an emphasis on past performance
at DDJC.

Ready next argues that MTMC treated the two carriers unequally by excusing
Green Valley for its withdrawal from a lane in conjunction with a 1-year
extension of the contract while failing to excuse Ready from its withdrawal
in a similar situation. The record shows that the situations were not
similar.

In 1998, the agency asked Green Valley if it would enter into a 1-year
extension of a particular GT. Green Valley completed its 1-year commitment,
but declined to enter into this extension based on other business
considerations. The agency correctly concluded that this was not a
withdrawal from a lane prior to the end of the carrier's contractual term
but was, instead, an excusable decision not to enter into an extension.

In contrast, in 1998, a depot now under DDJC asked Ready if it would enter
into a

1-year extension of a GT whose base year ended September 30, 1998. Ready
advised the agency that it did not intend to enter into an extension and, by
letter dated August 12, the firm withdrew from the GT effective September
14, 2 weeks prior to the end of the base year. The sole reason Ready gave
for this withdrawal was that it was "no longer possible to service this lane
profitably due to changes in base operations." Letter from Ready to MTMC
(Aug. 12, 1998). The firm's proposal stated the firm withdrew from the lane
15 days before the end of the contract because it was not willing to enter
into an extension and to clear the way for the alternate carrier who was
ready to extend his tender. Proposal sect. 3. The TET did not find this
withdrawal to be excusable and found that replacing a carrier for the 2
remaining weeks of a contract created a hardship for the government.

Ready contends that personnel at the depot asked the firm to withdraw from
the lane because an alternate carrier was ready to step in and perform and
that, as a result, it should be excusable. The agency disputes this
contention, and our Office conducted a hearing to ascertain the facts
surrounding this incident.

The record shows that, in 1998, changes in base operations at the depot
resulted in performance problems for Ready in the form of several failures
to show up at the installation to pick up shipments. These problems were
memorialized in an

August 11 letter of warning from the depot to Ready, and were the subject of
a discussion between depot personnel and Ready at a meeting at about that
same time.

Ready's chief financial officer, who was present at the meeting, states that
at some time before or during this meeting, either the then-Chief of the
Shipment Planning Branch or her supervisor--he is not certain--"suggested"
that the firm could let the first alternate carrier take over the lane if
the firm wanted out of the contract but that it would have to submit a
letter of withdrawal first. Video Transcript (VT)

at 15:11-15:12, 15:16, 15:38. He stated that the firm would not have
withdrawn if the government had not asked it do so. Id. at 15:39.

The then-Chief of the Shipment Planning Branch testified that, at this
meeting, she told the firm to identify the problems causing the no-shows and
possible ways to resolve them, and to give her a date by which the problems
would be resolved. At some point, she stated, Ready advised that it did not
think the problems could be resolved, and asked what would happen if the
firm withdrew from the lane. She testified that she advised the firm that it
would be best if it resolved the problems but that if it could not do so, a
withdrawal would be better than being removed from the lane, which would be
the next step she would have to take if the problems were not resolved. Id.
at 14:12-14:14; 16:03-16:05. She testified that she did not ask Ready to
withdraw, and that whether or not an alternate carrier was ready to take
over the lane was not discussed. Id. at 14:14, 16:05. While there was an
alternate carrier for the lane, she was unaware whether that alternate
carrier or any other carrier was prepared to take over as the follow-on
carrier for the lane. This prospect would not be raised by the depot because
only MTMC has the authority to replace a carrier. Id. at 14:15, 16:06.

We do not question Ready's belief that it was advised it "could" withdraw
from the lane. The testimony of the then-Chief of the Shipment Planning
Branch makes it clear that she advised the firm that withdrawal was a better
option for it than the letter of removal that might follow if the problems
were not resolved. The weight of the evidence does not persuade us, however,
that Ready was advised it "should" withdraw from the lane because another
carrier was waiting to take its place.

The only evidence in support of Ready's position is the testimony of its
chief financial officer, who is not certain who advised him to withdraw, and
whose testimony on the matter is couched in such vague language as it was
"suggested" that Ready let the alternate carrier take over. Id. at 15:11.
This testimony is also unsupported by the contemporaneous written evidence.

Withdrawing from a lane has consequences. The regulations governing GT
traffic require a selected carrier to honor an award until its expiration
date, and carriers with a history of withdrawals may be removed from all GT
traffic and/or disqualified from participation in future solicitations. MTMC
Guaranteed Traffic Rules Publication (MGTRP) No. 50, Item No. 30, e.(1), f.
In view of the potential consequences, we find it implausible that a carrier
withdrawing because it is told to do so by a depot would not make that fact
known to MTMC. Ready did not do so. In fact, while Ready now states that it
withdrew at the depot's request, it did not give this reason to its agent
when it asked her to draft the letter of withdrawal; the agent testified
that she always asks her clients why they are withdrawing. VT at 15:48,
15:51-15:52. As a result, despite the fact that withdrawal letters are
required to contain the reasons for withdrawal, Ready's letter of withdrawal
did not say that the depot told it to withdraw, and did not say that the
firm was withdrawing to allow another carrier to perform. The only reason
given was that it was no longer possible to service the lane profitably.
Ready's account is further undercut by the fact that the regulations put the
firm on notice that only MTMC, not the depot, is responsible for offering
traffic to the next alternate carrier. MGRTP at Item No. 30, e.(2). There is
no evidence that anyone at MTMC told Ready to withdraw in order to make way
for a new carrier, and no evidence that the alternate carrier was prepared
to do so. Ready has implied that the alternate carrier began making
shipments on this lane immediately after its withdrawal, but the shipping
records provided in the agency report show that the alternate carrier did
not begin making shipments on this lane until November. Moreover, MTMC's
traffic management specialist testified that a follow-on carrier was not in
place prior to Ready's withdrawal. VT at 14:33-14:34.

Ready's proposal also failed to state that it withdrew from the lane at the
depot's request despite the fact that the RFP put the firm on notice that
its proposal was to be evaluated on its negative past performance actions,
including withdrawals from a lane as the primary carrier. RFP encl. 6, at
33. In the absence of such an explanation, MTMC had no basis to raise any
questions about this withdrawal. An offeror has the burden of submitting an
adequately written proposal, see Caldwell Consulting Assocs., B-242767,
B-242767.2, June 5, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 530 at 6, and may base its evaluation
of past performance upon its reasonable perception of inadequate prior
performance, regardless of whether the contractor disputes the agency's
interpretation of the facts. See Quality Fabricators, Inc., supra. Even if
this explanation had been included, however, the record shows that a
withdrawal prior to the end of a contractual term does cause the agency
hardship whether or not another carrier is in place. Agency personnel
testified at the hearing that, when a carrier withdraws, MTMC has to go
through the administrative process of entering into a new contract; the
depot has to obtain information from MTMC regarding the new carrier's rates,
effective date, and expiration date; and the depot has to load those new
rates into its database. VT at 13:50-13:51; 14:33; 16:09-16:10. Under the
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the TET unreasonably considered this
withdrawal to have posed a hardship on the agency.

In any event, while Ready has attempted to distinguish the impact of this
withdrawal on its rating from the impact of withdrawals on the ratings of
other carriers, the record shows that the "poor" rating given to Ready's
proposal under this subfactor was not attributable solely to this incident.
The TET concluded that the other performance actions were of high
significance in terms of service to the shipper and had impacts on the
workload of the shipper in the sense that it had to initiate service with an
alternate or new carrier when the carrier withdrew, was removed, refused
shipments, or was a no-show, which affected the timely delivery of freight.
In light of the firm's medium volume and the high significance of its
performance actions, both with DDJC and other DOD activities, the TET
concluded that the proposal should be rated "poor." The Board concurred, and
Ready has given us no basis to find this rating unreasonable.

Source Selection Decision

Ready contends that MTMC mechanically weighted the technical factors grossly
out of proportion to their impact on price in what it describes as the
proposed on-time delivery rate and refund "scam." Ready's Mar. 14 Comments
at 3.

The RFP required each carrier to provide an on-time delivery guarantee in
the form of a monthly service commitment percentage. A carrier could
guarantee to deliver 95 percent of its monthly shipments on time, the
minimum acceptable performance standard, or a carrier could guarantee to
deliver a higher percentage of its monthly shipments on time. Each carrier
was also given the opportunity to propose a refund in the form of a
percentage of the total revenues earned for the month from a given shipping
location. This amount would be refunded to the government when the on-time
performance commitment was not met. While the refund requirement was
optional, carriers offering refunds would be more favorably considered
during the evaluation. RFP encl. 6 at 32.

Green Valley proposed a 97 percent on-time delivery guarantee and a
1-percent refund. Since this proposed rate was substantially higher than the
minimum acceptable performance standard, Green Valley's proposal was given
[DELETED] of the [DELETED] available points under this subfactor; the
proposal was given [DELETED] of the [DELETED] available points under the
refund subfactor. Ready proposed a 95 percent on-time delivery guarantee and
no refund. Since this proposed rate was merely the minimum acceptable
performance standard, Ready's proposal was given [DELETED] of the [DELETED]
available points under this subfactor; the proposal was given [DELETED]
points under the refund subfactor.

Ready contends that MTMC mechanically applied the technical scores for these
subfactors without considering whether the awardee's higher technical score
reflected any technical superiority that was worth the price premium. Ready
contends that there is no penalty for failing to meet the proposed on-time
delivery rate other than forfeiture of the refund, and further contends that
the estimated amount of the refund is insufficient to make up for the price
premium.

Source selection officials have broad discretion to determine the manner and
extent to which they will make use of the technical and price evaluation
results in negotiated procurements. DynCorp, B-245289.3, July 30, 1992, 93-1
CPD para. 69 at 7-8. Since numeric point scores are merely guides to intelligent
decision making, they do not necessarily establish that a particular firm is
technically superior or mandate selection of a particular proposal for
award. Contract Servs., Inc., B-251761.4,

July 20, 1993, 93-2 CPD para. 40 at 6. Our review of the record affords us no
basis to object to the method MTMC used to calculate total point scores, and
no basis to object to MTMC's documented award decision for lane 56.

We have not objected to the formula employed here to calculate price points
from total prices, where the lowest price proposed is assigned maximum price
points and others are assigned points based on their closeness to the low
offer, and where the total weight assigned to price is consistent with the
RFP. PCL/American Bridge,

B-254511.2, Feb. 24, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 142 at 5-6. Moreover, in comparing the
estimated amount a refund could cost a higher-priced carrier with the price
differential between the proposed prices of that carrier and a lower-priced
carrier, Ready overlooks the fact that the proposed on-time delivery rate
and refund subfactors were not price subfactors, but technical subfactors to
be considered as part of the service an offeror could provide. MTMC believes
a carrier that offers a higher on-time delivery rate that is reinforced by
both the traditional discipline that results from a failure to meet a
service standard and a refund offers better service to the government. MTMC
anticipates that such carriers will be motivated to maintain their proposed
on-time rates in order to avoid the punitive refund and other disciplinary
actions and, for obvious reasons, values a carrier that proposes to deliver
more of its shipments on time.

Ready argues that a carrier can fail to meet its proposed high on-time
delivery rate without fear of negative repercussions except the minimal
monetary impact of the refund. We do not agree. Setting aside the question
whether a carrier would view the monetary impact of paying a refund as
"minimal," there are clearly negative repercussions to failing to meet
on-time delivery commitments. Carriers awarded traffic under the GT program
are required to meet certain service standards. One of these standards
requires a carrier to meet the established transit times at a rate equal to
the rate it proposed in its rate tender--the proposed on-time delivery
percentage. MGTRP No. 50, Item No. 30, g(4). Carriers that fail to meet a
service standard can be subjected to disciplinary action such as letters of
warning and letters of removal. Id. at a. In addition to the consequences of
service failure on a particular lane of GT traffic, our preceding discussion
regarding past performance actions should make it clear that such
disciplinary actions can and do affect a carrier's ability to win GT traffic
lanes in subsequent procurements. As a result, a carrier that fails to meet
its proposed on-time delivery rates does face potential negative
repercussions.

In any event, the record shows that MTMC did not conduct a mechanical
evaluation here. The agency did not award the lane to the carrier with the
highest number of points precisely because it used its judgment to analyze
the technical advantages offered and determined that they were not worth the
price differential. Conversely, MTMC did not award the lane to carriers
offering the lowest prices because it determined that their proposals
offered lesser service at a price differential that was acceptable. Ready
has given us no basis to conclude that MTMC's price/technical tradeoff
analyses were unreasonable or inconsistent with the solicitation's
evaluation criteria. MTMC reasonably concluded that Green Valley's "good"
past performance offered less performance risk than did Ready's "poor" past
performance, and the RFP permitted the government to pay a higher price to
an offeror whose performance risk and price reasonableness gave it greater
confidence in that offeror's ability to keep its commitments. RFP encl. 5,
at 30.

The protests are denied.

Anthony H. Gamboa

General Counsel

Notes

1. The GT evaluation and award process is based on an adaptation of Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) "best value" contracting procedures. See
, MTMC Responses to Carrier
Comments on GT FAR Transition, at 1-2. For this and other reasons, MTMC is
transitioning from its GT agreements to FAR-based contracts. 65 Fed. Reg.
45,362 (2000). While the provisions of FAR Part 15, which govern contracting
by negotiation, do not directly apply here, see FAR sect. 47.000, we analyze the
protester's contentions by the standards applied to negotiated procurements.
See Digital Sys. Group, Inc., B-286931, B-286931.2, Mar. 7, 2001, 2001 CPD para.
50 at 6.

2. As a result, Ready's contention that MTMC was required to conduct
discussions with offerors is without basis. See also FAR sect. 15.306(a)(3).

3. Since the current GT contracts were shorter than 12 months, the TET
considered performance actions and on-time delivery reports dating back to
the previously awarded contract, or 1997.

4. We denied Green Valley's protest of the reevaluation results in a
separate decision. Green Valley Transp., Inc., B-285283.2, Apr. 16, 2001,
2001 CPD para. __.

5. There is no evidence to support Ready's contention that the Board
"overrruled" the TET's ratings in an effort to steer the award to Green
Valley. Government officials are presumed to act in good faith, and we will
not attribute unfair or prejudicial motives to procurement officials on the
basis of inference and supposition such as that presented by Ready. See
AudioCARE Sys., B-283985, Jan. 31, 2000, 2000 CPD

para. 24 at 5. The record shows that the bases for the Board's revisions are

well-documented and consistent with the evaluation criteria.