TITLE:  American Medical Depot, B-285060; B-285060.2; B-285060.3, July 12, 2000
BNUMBER:  B-285060; B-285060.2; B-285060.3
DATE:  July 12, 2000
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Decision

Matter of: American Medical Depot

File: B-285060; B-285060.2; B-285060.3

Date: July 12, 2000

Katherine S. Nucci, Esq., and Timothy Sullivan, Esq., Adduci, Mastriani &
Schaumberg, for the protester.

Barbara J. Stuetzer, Esq., Department of Veterans Affairs, for the agency.

Christina Sklarew, Esq., and Paul I. Lieberman, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Exclusion of proposal from competitive range is unobjectionable where
agency reasonably concluded that the proposal contained informational
deficiencies and other weaknesses that warranted an evaluation rating of
marginally acceptable, and the proposed price was relatively high, so that
the proposal had no reasonable chance of being selected for award.

2. Although price proposals were improperly evaluated, protest is
nonetheless denied where the agency's error inured to the benefit of the
protester.

3. Amendment of solicitation after competitive range has been determined
does not require revising the competitive range determination where the
amendment does not materially change the basis on which initial offers were
solicited and submitted.

DECISION

American Medical Depot (AMD) protests the exclusion of its proposal from the
competitive range by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) under request
for proposals (RFP) No. 797-MSPV-99-1005, for the distribution of medical
and surgical supplies to specified VA facilities. AMD primarily challenges
the evaluation of proposals which led to the competitive range
determination.

We deny the protest.

The RFP, issued on June 10, 1999, contemplated an award to a single
supplier, known as a "Medical Surgical Prime Vendor," to act as the source
of distribution for a broad range of medical and surgical products as
required by the VA Medical Center in San Juan, Puerto Rico and its four
outlying clinics (two in Puerto Rico and two in the U.S. Virgin Islands). As
amended, the RFP required the prime vendor to commence performance of the
contract within 90 days of award. RFP amend. 1, at 2. The RFP pricing
structure separates the product price from the distribution fee, RFP part
II, sect. 4.1, and calls for offerors to propose percentage-based distribution
fees. The distribution fee is a markup to the product prices established
under other federal government contracts, primarily the Federal Supply
Schedule (FSS), the Veterans Integrated Service Network, or local
agreements, and is intended to cover the prime vendor's costs for managing
the customer's inventory, ensuring the timely delivery of needed products to
the customer in a more efficient and effective manner than other
conventional ordering methods, and administering electronic commerce systems
in support of the program. VA National Acquisition Center Database,
.

A single contract for a base year with four 1-year option periods was to be
awarded to the responsible offeror whose offer conformed to the solicitation
and represented the best overall value, price and technical factors
considered. RFP part VII, at 77. The RFP listed (in descending order of
importance) the following technical evaluation factors, which, combined,
would be somewhat more important than price in the source selection:

Technical Excellence:

(1) Distribution and Logistics Management

(2) Product Availability

(3) Price Accuracy and Management Information Systems

(4) Implementation of Prime Vendor Plan

Past Performance

Small Disadvantaged Business Participation

Id.

Part VI of the RFP provided detailed instructions regarding the information
that should be included in technical proposals. The solicitation advised
that, while the importance of price would increase as a proposal's overall
rating became more equal to those for competing offers, the government was
more concerned with superior past performance history and technical features
than award at the lowest distribution fee. Id. The RFP cautioned offerors
that the government intended to award the contract without holding
discussions, although it reserved the right to do so if necessary. Id.

On June 29,1999, the VA held a pre-proposal conference in Puerto Rico which
was attended by representatives of 11 firms, including AMD, to explain and
clarify the requirements of the solicitation to all interested potential
offerors. Contracting Officer's Statement at 1. Following the conference,
the agency provided conference minutes to all of the conference attendees,
in addition to publishing the minutes on the Internet. The minutes include a
vendor's question regarding the applicability of a provision of Puerto Rican
law known as "Law 75," which was not referenced in the RFP. In response to
the question, the VA prime vendor program team leader stated that the law
does not apply to federal government contracts, and concluded that "that
should not be a problem for this procurement and award." Agency Report,
Tab 5, Record of Preproposal Conference, Questions and Answers, at 7.
Although the protester states that it later contacted the contracting
officer by telephone to discuss this issue, it filed no protest objecting to
the agency's stated position.

Four offerors (Borschow Hospital and Medical Supplies, Inc., two other
firms, and the protester) submitted timely proposals. A technical evaluation
panel (TEP) reviewed and evaluated the technical proposals of the three
small business offerors. Overall, Borschow's technical proposal was rated
"[deleted]," AMD's was rated "[deleted]," and the third offeror's was rated
"poor." [1]

Prices were submitted as percentage-based distribution fees for three line
items, i.e., for the medical center, for the outpatient clinics in Puerto
Rico, and for the outpatient clinics in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Borschow's
proposal offered the following fees:

                    Line Item 1   Line Item 2    Line Item 3

 Base Year          [deleted]     [deleted]      [deleted]

 Option Year 1      [deleted]     [deleted]      [deleted]

 Option Year 2      [deleted]     [deleted]      [deleted]

 Option Year 3      [deleted]     [deleted]      [deleted]

 Option Year 4      [deleted]     [deleted]      [deleted]

Agency Report, Tab 8, Borschow's Offer, at 4.

AMD's proposal specified an identical fee of [deleted]% for each line item
for each year. Agency Report, Tab 7, AMD's Offer, at 4. The contracting
officer reviewed the business proposals and compared the offerors' fees. The
contracting officer compared fees by using an "average distribution fee,"
which was calculated on the basis of a simple mathematical average of the
base-year and option-year fees that each offeror submitted for all of the
line items. [2] Comparing pricing in this manner, the contracting officer
determined that Borschow had offered an average fee of [deleted]% in its
proposal, while AMD's proposal offered [deleted]%, and concluded that AMD's
price was "[deleted] higher than Borschow's." Contracting Officer's
Statement at 7.

In order to determine which proposals to include in the competitive range,
the contracting officer reviewed the technical and price evaluation results,
which are summarized in the agency report as follows:

 Offeror      Technical    Past Perf.   SDB Rating   Average      Overall
              excellence   Rating                    Dist. Fee    Rating

 Borschow     [deleted]    [deleted]    [deleted]    [deleted]    Very good

 AMD          [deleted]    [deleted]    [deleted]    [deleted]    Marginal

 3rd          [deleted]    [deleted]    [deleted]    [deleted]    Poor
 Offeror

 4th          [deleted]    [deleted]    [deleted]    [deleted]    Poor
 Offeror

Id.

Based on the technical proposal ratings and a comparison of average
distribution fees, the contracting officer determined that only Borschow's
offer should be included in the competitive range, because it was the only
one with a reasonable chance of receiving the award. Agency Report, Tab 18,
Report of Findings, at 2. The remaining offerors were informed of their
exclusion by letter and facsimile transmission of February 8 and were given
a February 11 deadline for requesting a debriefing. [3] Agency Report at 3.
AMD filed an agency-level protest on February 17, alleging that it was "the
only firm that can legitimately claim successful performance on a med/surg
prime vendor contract for this facility" and asserting in essence that it
could not reasonably be excluded from the competitive range, based on its
current capabilities and past performance record, and that it was improper
for the agency not to hold discussions with AMD. Agency Report, Tab 13,
Letter from Protester to Contracting Officer (Feb. 17, 2000).

On February 25, the VA issued amendment No. 2, which clarified delivery
terms in the contract, and on March 30, the agency issued amendment No. 3,
which deleted line item 3 (delivery to outpatient clinics in the U.S. Virgin
Islands). These amendments were sent to Borschow alone, as the only
competitive range offeror. The contracting officer denied AMD's protest
against the exclusion of its proposal from the competitive range by letter
of March 20, and AMD filed this protest in our Office on April 3. When AMD
learned of the amendments from the agency report, it filed a supplemental
protest alleging that the amendments so significantly changed the terms of
the solicitation that there was no common basis on which to compare offers
and contending that, had AMD been given an opportunity to respond to the
amended requirement, its fees would have been "comparable to Borschow's
proposed fees." Second Supplemental Protest at 3.

THE LAW 75 ISSUE

AMD alleges that all of the other offerors are subject to Law 75, which will
restrict their ability to supply all of the medical and surgical supplies
required by the solicitation. The protester asserts that it alone (as a U.S.
company with relationships with all of the U.S. manufacturers of the
supplies) is exempt from the restrictions imposed by the law, and that this
should have been considered in the agency's evaluation of proposals. This
protest issue is untimely filed and not for consideration on the merits.

Our Bid Protest Regulations contain strict rules for the timely submission
of protests. Under these rules, a protest based on alleged improprieties in
a solicitation which are apparent prior to the time set for receipt of
initial proposals must be filed prior to the time set for receipt of initial
proposals. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(a)(1) (2000). Our Regulations also provide that a
matter initially protested to the agency will be considered if the initial
protest to the agency was filed within the time limits for filing a protest
with our Office, unless the contracting agency imposes a more stringent time
for filing, in which case the agency's time for filing will control.
4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(a)(3); Pacific Photocopy and Research Servs., B-278698,
B-278698.3,

Mar. 4, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 69 at 3. Here, the RFP did not provide that Law 75
had any applicability to this procurement. Further, the protester concedes
that at the pre-proposal conference attended by its representative, during
which a vendor asked how the provisions of Law 75 would affect the
procurement, the agency's response "reflected the VA's understanding that
Law 75 did not apply to the Federal Government." Protester's Comments at 3.
In these circumstances, AMD knew at that time that the RFP did not reference
Law 75 and that the VA did not intend to consider Law 75 in its evaluation
of proposals. Accordingly, any protest based on the VA's position in this
regard was required to be raised prior to the time established for receipt
of initial proposals. Further, even if we construed this basis of protest as
relating to the evaluation of proposals, rather than relating simply to an
alleged apparent impropriety in the solicitation, AMD did not raise the
issue of the alleged applicability of Law 75 in its protest to the agency.
As an additional ground of protest, first protested in AMD's submission to
our Office, this protest basis does not independently satisfy our timeliness
requirements, and will not be considered. MRK Incineration/IDM Corp., a
Joint Venture; Halliburton NUS Envrtl. Corp., B-244406.5, B-244406.6, Jan.
16, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 77 at 7-8.

THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION

AMD protests the agency's evaluation of its technical proposal, essentially
alleging that the evaluation reflected an improper agency preference for
offerors with a presence and existing operations in Puerto Rico, and that
its proposal was downgraded for lack of sufficient factual details that
could have been provided if the agency had conducted discussions.

After evaluating all proposals, agencies must establish a competitive range
if discussions are to be conducted. Based on the ratings of each proposal
against all evaluation criteria, the contracting officer is to establish a
competitive range comprised of all of the most highly rated proposals,
unless the range is further reduced in circumstances not present here.
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 15.306(c). In reviewing an agency's
technical evaluation and its competitive range determination, our Office
will not reevaluate the proposals; rather, we will examine the record to
ensure that the evaluation was reasonable and in accordance with the
solicitation's evaluation criteria and any applicable statutes or
regulations. Cobra Techs., Inc., B- 272041, B-272041.2, Aug. 20, 1996, 96-2
CPD para. 73 at 3. The protester's mere disagreement with the agency does not
render the evaluation unreasonable. Ogden Support Servs., Inc., B-270354.2,
Oct. 29, 1996, 97-1 CPD para. 135 at 3.

Here, we see no basis to object to the agency's determination to exclude
AMD's proposal from the competitive range. As discussed below, the record
shows that the evaluation of AMD's technical proposal was reasonable and
consistent with the terms of the RFP. In addition, while our review reveals
that the fee evaluation was improperly performed, the actual price
difference between Borschow's proposal and AMD's is far greater than the
contracting officer's analysis indicated. Regarding the technical
evaluation, AMD's proposal received a "marginal" rating for technical
excellence, which appears in large measure to be based on the TEP's
dissatisfaction with the level of specific information provided in the
proposal. AMD complains that, "while [the evaluators] also did not believe
that AMD provided enough factual detail in its proposal (notwithstanding the
page limits of three to five pages each for the four subfactor sections),
the evaluators were most critical of AMD for not having an existing facility
in Puerto Rico." Protester's Comments at 5-6.

An offeror has the burden of submitting an adequately written proposal for
the agency to evaluate, Premier Cleaning Sys., Inc., B-255815, Apr. 6, 1994,
94-1 CPD para. 241 at 5, and agencies may exclude all but the most highly rated
proposals from further consideration. FAR sect. 15.306(c). Proposals with
significant informational deficiencies may be excluded, whether the
deficiencies are attributable to either omitted or merely inadequate
information addressing fundamental factors. McAllister & Assocs., Inc.,
B-277029.3, Feb. 18, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 85 at 2. Here, the evaluation record
reflects the agency's concern regarding AMD's ability to provide the
required services within the time limits set forth in the RFP, which was
exacerbated by the lack of detailed information in AMD's proposal. For
example, under the most important subfactor, distribution and logistics
management, the RFP provided that "within 30 calendar days of contract
award, the contractor shall be required to provide written certification
that its breakout areas and clean rooms [for converting larger shipments
into the required low-volume deliveries] are in compliance" with certain
listed VA standards. RFP part II, sect. 5.18.3. AMD's proposal simply indicated
that the firm had been "provided with two warehouse locations of existing,
fully bonded warehouses owned and operated by the Economic Development
Agency of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico," and proposed to use some of the
space for construction of the clean room/bulk-breakdown area, estimating
that this would take 3-4 weeks. Agency Report, Tab 7, Protester's Technical
Proposal, Vol. II, Tab A, at 1. AMD's proposal failed to discuss what
arrangements, if any, had been made to secure the use of these locations or
to provide any specific plan regarding how it would ensure that the
construction and certification processes would be complete within the 30-day
timeframe.

In our view, this level of response to the very specific informational
requirements set forth in the RFP was reasonably rated as "marginal." While
AMD asserts that its proposal "clearly stated that AMD had secured a firm
commitment . . . for warehouse space that would be immediately available
upon award," Protest at 8, we do not agree. AMD's proposal stated only that
the firm had "been provided with two warehouse locations of existing, fully
bonded warehouses," which, in our view, could simply mean that two locations
were identified to AMD. Protester's Technical Proposal, Vol. II, Tab A, at 1
(emphasis added). Regarding their availability, the proposal states that
they "are available for immediate occupancy," which did not ensure (as AMD
claims) that they would be available "upon award" in the absence of any
agreement between AMD and the warehouse owner, and no such agreement was
mentioned in AMD's proposal. In addition, the evaluators concluded that the
two vehicles that AMD proposed to use for delivering products were not
enough to service the facilities covered by the RFP. They also concluded
that AMD had not provided sufficient information to show its ability to
comply with the RFP's requirements in the areas of: meeting the required
fill-rates; taking corrective action if fill-rates were not met; meeting
off-schedule delivery orders; and procedures for handling pricing
exceptions, substitutions, confirmation, and manufacturer's backorders.

While AMD suggests that the evaluators should have considered AMD's
"successful performance of the same services in Puerto Rico under its prior
contract" as evidence of its ability and experience in setting up the system
required here, AMD's reliance on its status as a previous contractor is
misplaced. First, the VA disputes the characterization of the requirements
under the previous contract as being the same in a number of ways. More
importantly, a procuring agency is not required to overlook a flawed
proposal on the basis of the offeror's prior performance; on the contrary,
all offerors are expected to demonstrate their capabilities in their
proposals. Pedus Bldg. Servs., Inc., B-257271.3 et al., Mar. 8, 1995, 95-1
CPD para. 135 at 3-4.

In contrast, the TEP considered Borschow's proposal to be very thorough.
Agency Report, Tab 18, Price Negotiation Memorandum, at 8. In the
distribution and logistics management portion of its technical proposal,
Borschow identified warehouse space that it already has in Puerto Rico, for
which it disclosed available space and its proximity to the medical center;
it provided a detailed description of its processes for maintaining
inventory and filling orders; making off-schedule deliveries, handling
pricing exceptions, substitutions, confirmations and manufacturer's back
orders; and its quality control program. While AMD characterizes Borschow's
proposal as including "somewhat more detail," Protester's Comments at 9, we
think the evaluators reasonably concluded that the level of detail in
Borschow's proposal was significantly more responsive to the RFP's
instructions and merited a "very good" rating.

The combined effect of AMD's low technical rating and its price premium, as
discussed below, lead us to find unobjectionable the agency's conclusion
that AMD's proposal was not one of the most highly rated and had no
reasonable chance of receiving the award. There is no requirement that a
procuring agency retain in the competitive range a proposal that is
determined to have no reasonable prospect of award, even where its exclusion
will result in a competitive range of one. SDS Petroleum Prods., Inc.,
B-280430, Sept. 1, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 59 at 5-6.

THE PRICE EVALUATION

As explained above, offerors were instructed to submit percentage-based
distribution fees for each of the three RFP line items. The RFP provided
that for each line item, the proposed base-year fee and proposed option-year
fees would be averaged to determine the aggregate fee for each line item
over the potential life of the contract. RFP part VII, sect. 4. This fee would
then be multiplied by the annual estimated requirements for each line item
to determine the estimated total cost per line item. The government would
then determine the lowest price based on the sum of the estimated cost for
the three line items. Id.

The contracting officer did not follow the price evaluation procedures
established in the RFP. Instead, the contracting officer calculated an
overall average percentage fee for each offeror by adding the percentage
fees submitted for the base year and each option year for each line item and
dividing by 5 (years) and then by 3 (line items). RFP Tab 18, Report of
Findings, at 2. Limiting the price evaluation to review of percentage fees
(without regard to estimated dollar costs) and averaging the percentage fees
for the three line items, in addition to being inconsistent with the terms
of the RFP, completely disregarded the price impact of the differing
estimated quantities for each line item. For example, the RFP under line
item No. 1 (where Borschow's percentage fee was much lower than AMD's)
provided an estimated annual requirement of products valued at $6,331,000,
while for line item No. 3 (where Borschow's percentage fee was higher than
AMD's), it estimated a requirement of products valued at only $48,275. When
Borschow's proposed aggregate fees are multiplied by the estimated
quantities as provided in the RFP, Borschow's total proposed estimated fee
is $[deleted], [4] while AMD's is $[deleted]. [5] Thus, AMD's fees were
nearly three times as high as Borschow's, rather than being only 50 percent
higher, as the contracting officer had calculated.

While incorrect, the contracting officer's methodology did not result in
competitive prejudice to the protester, since its effect was to lessen the
difference between the protester's and the awardee's proposed fees. In fact,
the price discrepancy between the two proposals, when correctly evaluated,
lends further support to the reasonableness of the agency's conclusion that
the protester's proposal had no reasonable chance of receiving the award.

THE AMENDMENTS

AMD in its supplemental protest essentially alleges that the amendments
relaxed the initially established delivery terms of the RFP, without giving
the already excluded offerors an opportunity to compete on the altered
requirement. According to AMD, the price impact of the amendments that the
VA issued to the solicitation after AMD's proposal was excluded from the
competitive range was so great that it rendered the previous comparison of
prices meaningless.

Amendment No. 2 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

The resultant contract will use Federal Supply Schedule, VISN, and local
contracts as the base for product pricing for products that will be used by
using facilities. The Government will be responsible to the Medical/Surgical
Prime Vendor (MSPV) for freight charges, if any, the MSPV incurs for
products required by using facilities covered by this contract and priced as
F.O.B. Origin under the applicable supply contract.

Agency Report, Tab 2, RFP amend. 2.

AMD contends that its "pricing strategy would have been significantly
altered, resulting in a substantially lower proposed distribution fee, had
AMD known that the VA intended to reimburse the contractor for all F.O.B.
Origin charges added to the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) prices on those
medical/surgical products supplied by manufacturers in the United States,
and that the [U.S. Virgin Island] clinics were not going to be included in
the contract." Second Supplemental Protest at 2.

It is a fundamental principle of government procurement that competition
must be conducted on an equal basis, that is, offerors must be treated
equally and be provided with a common basis for the preparation of their
proposals. W.D.C. Realty Corp., B-225468, Mar. 4, 1987, 87-1 CPD para. 248 at 5.
However, competitive prejudice is an essential element of a viable protest.
Diverco, Inc., B-259734, Apr. 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 209 at 3. There is no
basis to sustain a protest that offerors were not competing on an equal
basis because the procuring agency changed a term of the solicitation after
exclusion of the protester's proposal from the competitive range, where the
solicitation amendment did not materially change the initial solicitation
provisions. J.M. Yurick Assocs., Inc., B-242138, Dec. 20, 1990, 90-2 CPD
para. 511.

Here, the RFP, in part III, at 53-54, included an "F.O.B. Destination"
clause, which obligates the contractor to perform a number of tasks such as
packing and marking shipments, distributing bills of lading, delivering the
shipment, assuming responsibility for loss and/or damage prior to delivery,
and paying all charges to the point of delivery. Amendment No. 2 did not
change the delivery terms under the prime vendor contract from "F.O.B.
Destination" to "F.O.B. Origin," but rather, only clarified that the
government would reimburse the prime vendor "for freight charges, if any,"
that are added to the product price by an FSS supplier whose products are
"priced as F.O.B. Origin under the applicable supply contract."

The agency asserts that the price impact of amendment No. 2 is not
significant. Supplemental Agency Report at 2. The agency explains in its
report that FSS contracts are the primary source for the products required
under the prime vendor contract, and that, under these contracts, the FSS
contractor may elect F.O.B. destination or F.O.B. origin for orders for
addresses in Puerto Rico. Supplemental Agency Report at 2. The contracting
officer states that, before issuing the amendment, she contacted major FSS
suppliers and determined that most of their contracts provided for F.O.B.
destination delivery to Puerto Rico; in addition, she discussed the issue
with purchasers from the VA procuring activity in Puerto Rico and was told
that F.O.B. origin delivery would affect only a few shipments and have
little impact. Id.

In support of its position, the VA has submitted a list of FSS contractors
that supply medical/surgical items, showing that approximately 91 percent
are delivered under F.O.B. destination supplier contracts to Puerto Rico.
Agency Letter 1 (June 29, 2000). The VA also supplied data showing that, of
supplies purchased by the VA in Puerto Rico during the period of January 1
through June 27, 2000 and valued at approximately $1 million, the amount of
supplies that were delivered F.O.B. destination was valued at approximately
$600,000; however, nearly $300,000 of the remaining money spent was for an
item (manual wheelchairs) that, while purchased during this (January - June)
time period on an F.O.B. origin basis, would have to be purchased from an
F.O.B. destination supplier in the future (based on a recent VA-wide
purchase mandate). Contracting Officer's Statement, June 29, 2000, at 1.
Thus, historical data provided by the agency shows that 90 percent of the
medical/surgical supplies (as measured by dollar value) was (or would be)
delivered under F.O.B. destination contracts. The protester has provided no
facts or statistical data or other evidence to support its conclusory
assertions to the contrary, either in its comments on the agency report or
when specifically afforded an opportunity to do so later. In these
circumstances, we have no basis to object to the VA's conclusion that
amendment No. 2, providing for reimbursements to the prime vendor for
transportation costs associated with supplies ordered from FSS suppliers on
an F.O.B. origin basis would have a relatively insignificant price impact,
and thus was not material.

Finally, AMD also protests that amendment No. 3 materially changed the
solicitation requirements. Amendment No. 3 deleted the third line item,
covering the distribution of supplies to clinics in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
The products that were to be ordered under this line item represent less
than 1 percent of the total requirement's dollar value. Supplemental Agency
Report at 2; RFP part II, at 3. AMD never explains how the deletion of so
small a portion of the requirement could affect AMD's pricing on the
remaining items or otherwise materially alter the solicitation. Accordingly,
AMD's allegation in this regard lacks a reasonable basis.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

Notes

1. The RFP included a "cascaded set-aside" clause that is not at issue here,
under which the agency initially treated the procurement as a small business
set-aside but later, because of the low ratings, the contracting officer
determined to also consider the remaining (large business) offeror, whose
proposal was evaluated as "poor." This sequence of events is undisputed and
does not affect the protest issues.

2. These fees were adjusted slightly to reflect a price evaluation
adjustment clause in the RFP to compare small disadvantaged business (SDB)
and non-SDB offeror prices, once it was determined under the cascade feature
that the procurement would proceed on an unrestricted basis. Contracting
Officer's Statement at 2, 7. This adjustment is not relevant to the issues
raised here.

3. AMD did not submit its debriefing request until February 15; it was
rejected as untimely the following day. Agency Report, Tab 15, Letter from
Contracting Officer to Protester (Feb. 25, 2000).

4. This figure is based on the following calculation: ($6,331,000 x
[deleted])+ ($220,000 x [deleted]) + ($48,275 x[deleted]) = $418,017. (This
does not reflect the 10-percent price evaluation adjustment, since it is not
relevant here.)

5. This figure is based on the following calculation: ($6,331,000
x[deleted]) + ($220,000 x [deleted]) + (48,275 x[deleted]) = $1,121,876.75.
(This calculation also does not reflect the 10-percent price evaluation
adjustment.)