TITLE:  Information Network Systems, Inc., B-284854; B-284854.2, June 12, 2000
BNUMBER:  B-284854; B-284854.2
DATE:  June 12, 2000
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Information Network Systems, Inc., B-284854; B-284854.2, June 12, 2000

Decision

Matter of: Information Network Systems, Inc.

File: B-284854; B-284854.2

Date: June 12, 2000

Kevin P. Connelly, Esq., John C. Lavorato, Esq., and, Michael D. Garson,
Esq., Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, for the protester.

Charles W. Mahan, Esq., Dunlevey, Mahan & Furry, for MacAulay Brown, Inc.,
an intervenor.

Gregory H. Petkoff, Esq., Sharon A. Jenks, Esq., and William Landsberg,
Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the agency.

Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Protest that discussions were not meaningful is denied where the record
shows that the agency's questions clearly indicated that certain proposed
labor rates were considered too low, and identified the evaluators' concerns
that these rates could have an adverse impact on workforce retention.

2. In evaluation of offers for a service contract where the agency placed a
strong premium on retaining the incumbent workforce, protester's contention
that the agency unreasonably assessed its proposal as high risk under
workforce retention subfactor is denied where the evaluation was made in
accordance with stated evaluation criteria, and where the record shows that
the protester's proposed labor rates are lower than those rates paid to
incumbent employees under the previous contracts, and the proposal contained
seemingly inconsistent promises to retain 100 percent of all incumbent
personnel with salaries at, or above, their previous level, and to do so
without exceeding proposed costs.

3. Contention that a tradeoff decision violated the stated evaluation scheme
because the selection official concluded that the protester's advantage
under the most important evaluation factor was outweighed by the proposal's
high risk under a less important evaluation subfactor is denied where the
selection official reasonably concluded that the difference between the two
proposals under the most important evaluation factor was relatively
insignificant, while a detailed review of the two proposals showed that
their underlying differences supported the risk assessment, and led the
selection official to have greater confidence that the awardee's proposal
would be more able to achieve the workforce retention goals of the agency.

DECISION

Information Network Systems, Inc. (INS) protests the award of a contract to
MacAulay Brown, Inc. (MBI) by the Department of the Air Force, pursuant to
request for proposals F08635-00-R-0001, issued to procure technical and
acquisition management support for the Air Armament Center and other
organizations at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. INS argues that the
selection of MBI was improperly based on an unreasonable assessment of
proposal risk, and a flawed best value decision. In addition, INS argues
that the Air Force failed to hold meaningful discussions, failed to perform
a proper cost realism review, and treated offerors unequally.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The Air Armament Center at Eglin AFB is responsible for developing,
acquiring, testing and evaluating a wide array of weapons systems, including
conventional munitions, missiles, range equipment, aerial targets, guided
munitions, air base operability equipment, electronic combat systems, and
navigation/guidance systems. Statement of Work (SOW), RFP, attach. 1, at 4.
This RFP, issued October 1, 1999, seeks a supplemental civilian workforce of
non-engineering acquisition management support personnel (an estimated 340
staff-years of effort) to help the Air Force meet the workload requirements
associated with procuring the above-described systems. RFP Cover Letter at
1; RFP at 18. The RFP anticipates the award of two cost-plus-award-fee task
order contracts--one reserved for a participant in the Small Business
Administration's (SBA) section 8(a) set-aside program, and one reserved for
a small business--for a 3-year base period, followed by two 1-year options.
RFP Cover Letter at 1; RFP at 4-5.

The RFP advises that award will be made to the offeror whose proposal
represents the best value to the government. RFP at M-1. To determine best
value, the RFP identifies four evaluation factors: past performance, mission
capability, proposal risk, and cost/price. RFP at M-2. These four factors
are listed in descending order of importance, except that mission capability
and proposal risk are of equal importance. Id.

For the most important factor, past performance, there are no subfactors.
Past performance was evaluated using one of six adjectival ratings, as
follows: (1) exceptional/high confidence; (2) very good/significant
confidence; (3) satisfactory/confidence; (4) neutral/unknown confidence;
(5) marginal/little confidence; and (6) unsatisfactory/no confidence. Source
Selection Evaluation Team (SSET) Proposal Analysis Report at 20.

The equally important mission capability and proposal risk factors share six
identical subfactors. These six subfactors, in descending order of
importance, are: (1) workforce retention; (2) training and education; (3)
transition; (4) task orders; (5) facilities management; and (6) cost
management. RFP at M-2. Under mission capability, these six subfactors were
assigned a color rating of blue/exceptional, green/acceptable,
yellow/marginal, and red/unacceptable. SSET Proposal Analysis Report,
attach. 2, at 3. Under proposal risk, the same six subfactors were assigned
risk ratings of low, moderate, or high. Id. at 4.

For the least important factor, price/cost, the RFP advises that proposed
costs will be evaluated for reasonableness and realism, which are of equal
importance. RFP at M-8. The RFP advises that reasonableness will be
determined using price analysis techniques identified at Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) sect. 15.404-1(b). To determine realism, the RFP identifies six
analytical steps, including "calculating a ‘probable cost' for each
proposal to reflect the Government's best estimate of the cost of any
contract that is likely to result from the offeror's proposal." RFP at M-8.
(There is no issue raised in this protest involving the remaining five cost
realism analyses identified in the RFP, thus we need not repeat them here.)

The pricing structure of this RFP required offerors to submit both an
average fully-burdened labor rate (FBLR), and a maximum FBLR, for up to 4
different skill levels in each of 14 labor categories, [1] totalling 48
average FBLRs and 48 maximum FBLRs. RFP at 13-17, L-17-18. Offerors were
also required to identify the average and maximum base rates used to
calculate their FBLRs. These proposed average and maximum FBLRs were to be
incorporated into any resulting contract at Tables H-2 and H-3. An estimate
of the required hours for each of these 48 labor categories was set forth in
the solicitation at pages L-20-21. The RFP stated that both the average and
maximum FBLRs would be used in calculating estimated labor costs for
evaluation purposes. RFP at L-17. The total average cost for each proposal
is derived by multiplying the 48 average FBLRs by the estimated hours for
each labor category, and adding the proposed cost for off-site facilities,
[2] plus travel, [3] plus the offeror's proposed award fee. RFP at L-18-19;
Tr. at 13-14. The total maximum cost for each proposal is derived by
performing the same calculation as above using the maximum FBLRs.

In response to the RFP, the Air Force received 15 proposals. After an
initial evaluation, the agency selected the seven highest-rated proposals,
including those of INS and MBI, for inclusion in the competitive range. The
agency determined that, among the seven highest-rated proposals, there was
adequate competition for both the small business and 8(a) awards. Source
Selection Decision at 1.

In reviewing the results of the initial evaluation and preparing discussion
questions, the Air Force noted that four of the competitive range offerors,
including INS, had proposed base rates in several important labor categories
that were below the incumbent rates. Since retaining the incumbent workforce
was a priority for the
Air Force, RFP at L-15, the low labor rates led to concerns that these four
offerors might be unable to retain the incumbent workforce. Competitive
Range Briefing, Cost Evaluation, at slide 4; Tr. at 214-16. To address these
concerns, the Air Force directed discussion questions to INS pointing out
that its average and maximum FBLRs were below those of the incumbents, in
some instances, and suggested that INS review them. In response, INS raised
certain of its rates and reiterated its proposal promises to hire 100
percent of the incumbent workforce, and to match or exceed their current
salaries. INS Final Revised Proposal (FRP), Cover Letter, Jan. 20, 2000, at
2.

At the conclusion of discussions, and after submission of all FRPs, the Air
Force performed a final evaluation. The results of this evaluation for INS
and MBI are set forth below:

 EVALUATION                     INS                 MBI

 CATEGORY

 Past Performance               Excellent/High      V. Good/
                                Confidence          Significant
                                                    Confidence

 Mission Capability/

 Proposal Risk

 --Workforce Retention          Green/High          Green/Low

 --Training and Education       Green/Low           Green/Low

 --Transition                   Blue/Low            Blue/Low

 --Task Orders                  Green/Low           Green/Low

 --Facilities Management        Green/Low           Green/Low

 --Cost Management              Green/Low           Green/Low

 Total Cost [4]                 $100.9 million      $102.3 million

 --Realism                      No                  Yes

 --Reasonableness               Yes                 Yes

INS Post-award Debriefing, Feb. 29, 2000, slides 85-87.

As the table above shows, INS's proposal received a very high rating under
the most important factor, past performance, and generally high ratings
throughout. In two areas the proposal was downgraded. First, it was
evaluated as presenting high risk under the workforce retention subfactor of
the proposal risk factor. INS received this rating because [deleted]. Thus
the evaluators concluded that INS's proposal presented a high risk that the
company might not be able to retain incumbent employees. Source Selection
Decision at 5.

Second, while the proposed costs were considered to be reasonable, they were
found to be unrealistic. The proposed costs were deemed reasonable because
the evaluators decided that the company would be able to perform the
contract using appropriately qualified personnel at its proposed rates. The
costs were deemed unrealistic because the evaluators did not believe that
the proposed rates were sufficient to hire 100 percent of the incumbent
employees at, or above, their current salaries. Despite these findings, the
evaluators concluded that no probable cost adjustment was required because
INS should be able to perform the contract at its proposed rates.

To choose awardees, the Source Selection Authority (SSA) first selected an
8(a) offeror for award, and then returned the remaining 8(a) offerors to the
evaluation pool for consideration for the non-8(a) small business award.
Next, the SSA began a tradeoff process between INS, MBI, and four other
offerors; ultimately the selection decision turned on a tradeoff between INS
and MBI.

The Source Selection Decision document states that although both INS and MBI
submitted very strong proposals, the most significant difference between
them was INS's high risk rating under the workforce retention subfactor. In
the SSA's view, the INS proposal's excellent rating under past performance
(compared to MBI's very good rating for past performance) was offset by its
high risk under workforce retention. Id. at 6. In addition, the SSA
concluded that the MBI proposal's $1.4 million higher potential cost to the
government was realistic, and--because of its higher base labor rates and
lower labor overheads--provided even greater confidence that MBI would be
able to achieve the workforce retention goals of the agency. Thus, while the
SSA acknowledged that the selection decision here was close, she concluded
that MBI's proposal represented the best value to the government. Id.

On February 17, 2000, the Air Force awarded the 8(a) contract to Madison
Research Corporation, and the small business contract to MBI. The estimated
value of the contracts was $112.7 million and $102.3 million, respectively.
Contracting Officer's Statement at 3-4. On February 29, INS received a
debriefing, and on March 6, it filed this protest challenging the award of
the non-8(a) small business contract to MBI.

DISCUSSION

Every challenge raised by INS in this protest involves how the Air Force
addressed a single underlying conflict in the company's proposal.
Specifically, the proposal raises the issue of whether a shortfall in
proposed labor rates, as measured against the labor rates paid by the
incumbents, could be reconciled with the proposal's seemingly inconsistent
promises to retain 100 percent of all incumbent personnel; to pay all
incumbent personnel salaries that meet, or exceed, their current salaries;
and to do so without exceeding proposed costs. As described above, the Air
Force concluded that this shortfall in labor rates created a high risk that
INS would not be able to retain the incumbent workforce.

We will address each of the challenged evaluation decisions in the
chronological order in which they were made. Thus, we will consider first
the contention that the questions provided by the agency during discussions
were inadequate to alert INS to the agency's concerns. We will follow with
consideration of INS's challenges to the assessment of proposal risk, the
cost realism review, and the best value decision.

With respect to the adequacy of the discussion questions--termed Evaluation
Notices (EN) here--the record shows that four of the competitive range
offerors proposed labor rates sufficiently low as to generate concern that
these offerors might not be able to retain the incumbent workforce. The Air
Force performed this review by comparing the base labor rates that were over
or under the incumbents' base labor rates to determine whether there was a
net surplus or net deficit in the comparative rates. Tr. at 22-23. (As
explained above, offerors were required to identify the base labor rates
used to calculate their average FBLRs.) For those offerors whose proposals
showed a net surplus--meaning that when all the labor rates were reviewed
collectively, the offeror was proposing more in base labor rate dollars than
the incumbent--the evaluators concluded that there was no risk the offeror
would fail to retain the workforce because the proposal contained sufficient
funds to match the current salaries of all of the incumbent employees. Id.
For the four offerors whose proposals showed a net deficit in total base
labor rates as compared to the incumbents, the evaluators raised concerns
that these offerors might not be able to retain the incumbent workforce. Tr.
at 23.

To more adequately explain the extent of the Air Force concerns and to fully
understand the meaning of the ENs provided to INS, additional background
about the rate structure of this contract is necessary. First, the
solicitation anticipated that the contractors selected for award here would
maintain their labor costs to within a very close margin of the proposed
average FBLRs. Maintenance of this close margin was enforced through the use
of performance ratings and the award fee program. Specifically, if during
performance of the contract, actual average fully-burdened labor hour costs
for any of the 48 labor categories exceed the proposed average FBLRs
incorporated into the contract at table H-2 by more than 2 percent, the RFP
warns that the contractor will receive an unsatisfactory point score rating
for the cost management portion of its performance review, and a reduced
award fee. Award Fee Plan, RFP attach. 5, at 8, 12. Thus, the Air Force
views the total of the proposed average FBLRs multiplied by the estimated
hours for each labor category (plus the other relatively incidental costs,
like travel and facilities) as the likely cost of this contract. Tr. at
13-14, 148.

Second, although the Air Force expected that its contractors would adhere to
their proposed average FBLRs, it also anticipated permitting them to pay
individuals at rates higher than the average FBLRs without agency
involvement--up to the level of the maximum FBLR for that individual's labor
category. Tr. at 144-45. (An Air Force witness described this practice as
essentially a predetermination of reasonableness for rates that, with
overhead, do not exceed the maximum FBLRs. Tr. at 145.) To pay any
individual a rate higher than the maximum FBLR for that individual's labor
category, the contractor will be required to obtain a waiver of the
applicable maximum, and the Air Force anticipates the use of no more than 10
such waivers at any given time. Tr. at 147-48. Thus, the total of the
maximum FBLRs multiplied by the estimated hours for each labor category
operates like a cap on labor costs, which may to a very limited degree, be
waived. Tr. at 145-46.

As indicated above, the Air Force provided INS with two ENs in this area.
One EN addressed the company's proposed average FBLRs and one addressed its
proposed maximum FBLRs. They stated:

Subject: Average Fully Burdened Labor Rates
Problem: [DELETED]. Please consider this observation selectively, address it
narratively in your response to this EN, and then prepare to make any
revisions to your proposed rates you deem appropriate, consistent with your
proposed approach to meeting TAMS 2 [5] objectives, in your final price
proposal revision (not in response to this EN). Limit your response to 2
pages.

Subject: Maximum Rate Tables and Waivers
Problem: [Deleted] Please re-examine and either confirm or revise your
maximum rates selectively, consistent with the following statement of
government preference.
The need for waivers should be minimized but not necessarily eliminated. The
maximum rates should reflect a selective, realistic approach to projecting
the upper limits of the rates for the vast preponderance of personnel in
each labor category (thus "minimizing" the need for waiver requests to
exceed maximum rates) without necessarily covering the foreseeable maximum
rate needed for a select few (fewer than 10 for the entire contract)
employees at any given time. Any revision to your rates should be submitted
. . . .

Evaluation Notices, 14-INS-COS and 13-INS-COS, Dec. 16, 1999.

INS argues that these questions were inadequate to communicate that the Air
Force perceived a conflict between the proposal's promise to hire 100
percent of the incumbent workforce and its commitment to "manage to" the
proposed average FBLRs that were to be incorporated into the contract. INS
Post-Hearing Brief,
May 22, 2000, at 13. We disagree.

In negotiated procurements, contracting agencies generally must conduct
discussions with all offerors whose proposals are within the competitive
range. 10 U.S.C. sect. 2305(b)(4)(A)(i) (1994); FAR sect. 15.306(d)(1). Although
discussions must be meaningful, leading an offeror into the areas of its
proposal requiring amplification or revision, the agency is not required to
"spoon-feed" an offeror as to each and every item that could be raised to
improve its proposal. Du & Assocs., Inc., B-280283.3, Dec. 22, 1998, 98-2
CPD para. 156 at 7-8. An agency has not satisfied its obligation to conduct
meaningful discussions if it misleads an offeror or conducts prejudicially
unequal discussions. Biospherics,Inc., B-278278, Jan. 14, 1998, 98-1 CPD para.
161 at 6.

In our view, the questions set forth above clearly communicated to INS that
the
Air Force was concerned that certain of the labor rates used in the INS
proposal were below incumbent rates. In addition, the question involving the
average FBLRs indicated precisely the area of the evaluation concern--i.e.,
workforce retention, the most heavily-weighted subfactor under the mission
capability and proposal risk factors. While INS correctly notes that the
questions did not state the concern in terms of conflicting promises, a
review of these questions provides no support whatsoever for any claim that
these questions were inadequate to advise the company of the Air Force's
concern, or that the questions were misleading.

Turning from discussions to the time of the final evaluation, when INS's FRP
failed to make changes in its proposed labor rates of sufficient magnitude
to resolve the concerns raised by the Air Force, the evaluators assessed a
high risk against the proposal under the workforce retention subfactor. In
addition--and again involving the same conflicts as addressed above--the
evaluators concluded that INS's proposed costs were both reasonable and
unrealistic, but that no probable cost adjustment was required.

INS's challenges to these evaluation conclusions--that the agency's risk
assessment was unreasonable, and its cost realism review improper--are
largely inseparable. With respect to risk, INS argues that the Air Force was
wrong to conclude that its proposal contained a risk that the company would
fail to retain the existing workforce. With respect to the cost realism
review, INS argues that if the agency had performed an adequate probable
cost analysis it would have concluded that the proposal's average FBLRs were
sufficient to avoid any risk to retention. For the reasons set forth below,
we disagree on both counts.

Our standard in reviewing evaluation challenges is to examine the record to
determine whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and consistent with
stated evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and regulations. ESCO,
Inc., B-225565, Apr. 29, 1987, 87-1 CPD para. 450 at 7. Here, INS's specific
challenges to its risk assessment are that the Air Force: (1) did not give
credence to the company's promises to hire all of the incumbents employees
at or above their current salaries; (2) did not recognize the company's
flexibility to pay incumbent employees up to the amount of the proposed
maximum FBLR in order to retain them; and (3) failed to consider the
company's excellent past performance history in the area of workforce
retention. Protester's Comments, Apr. 18, 2000, at 23-26.

The Air Force answers INS by noting that there was no requirement in the
solicitation that offerors retain all incumbent employees, or ensure that
all of them were paid at, or above, their current salaries, regardless of
the promises in INS's proposal to do these things. Tr. at 151-53. As a
result, the agency viewed INS's promises in this regard as not
binding--unlike the express incorporation of proposed average FBLRs into the
contract, and the levying of poor past performance ratings and reduced award
fees against the contractor for failing to maintain actual average
fully-burdened labor costs incurred to within 2 percent of the average FBLRs
proposed. Specifically, the SSA explained that when forced to speculate
about whether INS would jeopardize its excellent past performance rating and
its award fee by exceeding the average FBLRs incorporated into the contract,
in order to achieve the desired (but not required) retention of all
incumbent personnel, she concluded that INS would elect to preserve its
performance rating and maximize its fee, raising a risk that retention would
suffer. See Agency Memorandum of Law, Apr. 6, 2000, at 13; Tr. at 172-78.

In our view, the Air Force approach to INS's promises was reasonable. A
failure by INS to maintain its actual fully burdened labor costs to within 2
percent of the proposed FBLRs incorporated into the contract will result in
immediate and serious consequences. There are no similarly specific and
immediate consequences for failing to hire, or to match the salaries of, all
incumbent personnel. As between these two options, we see nothing
unreasonable in the Air Force conclusion that INS would elect to act in its
self-interest.

We also reject the contention that the Air Force failed to consider a
contractor's flexibility to pay incumbent employees up to the amount of the
proposed maximum FBLRs to retain them. The ENs quoted above show that the
Air Force was well aware of the operation of its contract, and that its
assessment was that the INS proposed maximum FBLRs--at least at the time of
the competitive range determination--would not permit the company to recruit
and maintain employees in some categories. There is no basis in this record
to argue that the Air Force did not understand the flexibility inherent in
the structure of this contract to pay some employees at rates above the
average FBLRs, and in a very limited number of cases, above the maximum
FBLRs.

Similarly, we do not agree that the agency failed to properly rely on INS's
excellent past performance in the area of workforce retention. In fact, the
agency acknowledged this strength at several junctures. In our view, there
is no evidence that this strength was overlooked. Also, the importance to
INS of retaining excellent past performance ratings in order to compete for
task orders under this contract against the 8(a) awardee, and for competing
for future Air Force business, provides further support for the agency's
conclusion that these ratings, not proposal promises regarding desired
retention, will be the chief motivating factor during performance of this
contract.

With respect to the cost realism review, as indicated above we see little
difference between INS's challenges to the agency's assessment of risk and
its challenge to the cost realism evaluation. To completely address INS's
complaints, however, it does appear that one issue remains. INS contends
that once the agency concluded that its proposed costs were unrealistic, the
agency was required to make a probable cost adjustment to its proposed rates
to calculate the increase in costs associated with hiring the incumbent
employees as it promised. In INS's view, this probable cost adjustment, done
properly, would have shown that there was little basis for concern that the
shortfall in its proposed labor rates would have a significant impact on its
ability to retain the workforce.

To the extent INS argues that the agency was required to calculate a
probable cost for its proposal because cost evaluators labeled the
proposal's costs unrealistic, we disagree. As indicated above, the cost
evaluators concluded that INS's proposed costs were both reasonable and
unrealistic, but that no adjustment was necessary. To further explore the
agency's rationale for this admittedly unusual conclusion, our Office
convened a hearing. Based on the testimony received, which explained the
nature of the conclusions regarding the realism of the proposed costs, we
conclude that the agency's judgment was reasonable.

During the hearing, the agency explained that it made a distinction among
the four proposals whose net labor rates were lower than those of the
incumbents, based on the nature of the promises made in the proposal. Tr. at
15-18, 137. While all four were viewed as presenting a risk of failing to
retain the incumbent workforce, only two of them--one of which was INS's
proposal--had their costs labeled "unrealistic" by the evaluators. An
offeror's proposed costs were labeled "unrealistic" if its proposal
contained an express promise to achieve a specific level of workforce
retention--such as INS's promise to retain the 100 percent the workforce.
Tr. at 16-17. Thus, the evaluators concluded that INS's proposed costs were
too low, hence "unrealistic," to permit retention of all of the incumbent
employees. Id.

Despite its use of the term "unrealistic" to describe INS's proposed costs,
the agency concluded, as explained above, that there was no requirement in
the contract to hire 100 percent of the incumbent workforce, and that INS
would likely "back off" of this commitment during performance. Tr. at 139.
Since the proposed costs were not unrealistic in terms of INS's most likely
method of performance, as reasonably determined by the Air Force, the costs
were appropriately deemed its probable costs, and did not need to be
adjusted. See FAR sect. 15.404-1(d)(2) (before awarding a cost reimbursement
contract, an agency must determine the most probable cost of an offeror's
performance).

In a related argument, INS asserts that it was improper for the Air Force to
address its concerns about the proposal's shortfall in the proposed labor
costs by assessing a risk under the evaluation subfactor of workforce
retention--rather than addressing those concerns via a cost realism
adjustment. During the hearing, Air Force witnesses testified in great
detail regarding their consideration of whether to assess a risk to the
proposal under workforce retention, adjust the offeror's proposed cost, or
both. Tr. at 46-50. The SSA concluded that rather than exceed the average
FBLRs incorporated into its contract, it was more likely that INS would risk
some degradation in its retention of the incumbent workforce. Tr. at 207-10.
In our view, the SSA gave a thoughtful, nuanced, and thorough explanation of
the judgments made and the reasoning behind them. We have no basis to
conclude that her decision to assess risk under workforce retention--and to
do so only there--was

unreasonable, improper, or resulted from a failure to understand any facet
of this evaluation. [6]

As a final matter, INS argues that the SSA violated the stated evaluation
scheme when she concluded that INS's superiority under the most important
evaluation factor of past performance was outweighed by the high risk
present in one subfactor under the proposal risk evaluation factor. We
disagree. Source selection officials are given broad discretion to determine
the manner and extent to which they will make use of evaluation results,
limited only by the requirement that the tradeoff decision be reasonable in
light of the established evaluation and source selection criteria. Grey
Adver., Inc., B-184825, May 14, 1976, 76-1 CPD para. 325 at 11-12. In this
regard, evaluation scores are merely guides for the source selection
authority, who must use her judgment to determine what underlying
differences between the proposals might mean to successful performance of
the contract. Id. at 9-10.

Here, the SSA's selection decision expressly acknowledges the overall
excellence of the INS proposal and its superiority under the most important
evaluation factor. Source Selection Decision at 6. The decision then turns
to a detailed review of the underlying differences between the two proposals
that led to the risk assessment against the INS proposal. Her review
includes an assessment of the differences between total likely costs,
proposed award fees, wrap rates, and underlying average base rates, before
concluding that the MBI proposal offers high confidence in workforce
retention both during the transition period, and over the life of the
contract. Id. Despite INS's arguments to the contrary, we see nothing
unreasonable about her judgment that the relatively small difference between
these two offerors under the past performance factor is outweighed by the
more significant difference between them in the area of workforce retention.
Accordingly, we conclude that the tradeoff decision here was well within the
discretion of the SSA. Loral Aeronutronic, B-259857.2, B-259858.2, July 5,
1995, 95-2 CPD para. 213 at 16.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

Notes

1. In this decision we will refer collectively to the 14 labor categories,
and the various skill levels within them, as "the labor categories."

2. The AF explains that most of these personnel will work out of facilities
at Eglin AFB, but there is a limited requirement for certain off-site
facility costs.

3. Since all travel will be at the direction of the government, the agency
assigned a "plug number" for travel costs, and used this figure in its
evaluation. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 11, 135.

4. The total cost figure used in this table, and in the Air Force evaluation
of total cost, is calculated using offerors' proposed average FBLRs. Tr. at
13-14.

5. "TAMS 2" is the Air Force acronym for this contract.

6. The SSA's testimony also undercuts INS's contentions that the SSA was
misled by unequal treatment of its proposal in the evaluation briefing
materials, or that she failed to fully understand the differences between
these proposals. For example, INS points to instances in the materials,
including in the Source Selection Decision document, where there are
references to the total number of hours for which INS's proposal contains
labor rates below those of the incumbents, rather than references to the net
amount of its shortfall. Our chief concern is whether the evaluation
materials in their entirety communicate to the SSA the principal strengths
and weaknesses of the proposals. Lear Siegler Servs., Inc., B-280834,
B-280834.2, Nov. 25, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 136 at 7. Here, there is no doubt that
they did. During the hearing, the SSA demonstrated a thorough understanding
of the underlying differences between the proposals submitted by INS and
MBI; thus, any argument that she was misled, confused by, or did not
understand the evaluation materials is simply not supported by the record.