TITLE:  Arctic Slope World Services, Inc., B-284481; B-284481.2, April 27, 2000
BNUMBER:  B-284481; B-284481.2
DATE:  April 27, 2000
**********************************************************************
Arctic Slope World Services, Inc., B-284481; B-284481.2, April 27, 2000

Decision

Matter of: Arctic Slope World Services, Inc.

File: B-284481; B-284481.2

Date: April 27, 2000

Guy A. Randles, Esq., Darian A. Stanford, Esq., and Charles F. Adams, Esq.,
Stoel Rives, for the protester.

William A. Roberts, III, Esq., Phillip H. Harrington, Esq., and William S.
Lieth, Esq., Wiley, Rein & Fielding, for Chugach Eareckson Support Services,
an intervenor.

Capt. Jennifer M. Bell-Towne, Sharon A. Jenks, Esq., and Gregory H. Petkoff,
Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the agency.

Paul E. Jordan, Esq., and Paul Lieberman, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Protest that the contracting agency misevaluated the protester's and
awardee's competing proposals under certain technical evaluation criteria,
including past performance, is denied where the record shows that the
evaluation was reasonable; the protester's mere disagreement does not render
the agency's judgment unreasonable.

2. Contracting agencies are not obligated to afford all-encompassing
discussions that "spoon-feed" an offeror each item that must be addressed to
improve a proposal; agency reasonably led protester into the areas of its
proposal with shortcomings that warranted amplification or clarification.

3. Agency's determination, under a price evaluation factor, that the
awardee's proposed price for a fixed-price contract was realistic and
reasonable based on a comparison for similar service's prices under other
agency contracts, is unobjectionable.

4. Protest that evaluation of protester's proposal was influenced by bias on
the part of contracting officials is denied where the record shows that the
evaluation was conducted in accordance with the criteria announced in the
solicitation and contains no evidence of bias.

DECISION

Arctic Slope World Services, Inc. (ASWS) protests the award of a contract to
Chugach Eareckson Support Services (CESS) under request for proposals (RFP)
No. F65501-99-R-0022, issued by the Department of the Air Force for base
operations, maintenance and support services (BOS) at Eareckson Air Station
(AS), Shemya Island, Alaska. ASWS challenges the evaluation of proposals,
the conduct of discussions, and the award determination.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

Eareckson AS is a remote site with extreme weather conditions and
accompanying operational constraints, situated at the end of the Aleutian
Chain approximately 1,500 miles from Anchorage, Alaska. Air transport is the
primary means of access and re-supply. According to the RFP's performance
work statement (PWS), the successful contractor must provide all personnel,
equipment, tools, materials, supervision, and other items and services
necessary to perform station operations and maintenance as set forth in the
PWS. The RFP contemplated the award of a fixed-price contract with award
fee, plus fixed-price reimbursable and labor hour line items, for a phase-in
period, base year, four 1-year options, and one 6-month option for a total
performance period not to exceed 5 years and 2 months.

Proposals were evaluated on the basis of four factors (and related
subfactors), listed in descending order of importance: (1) management
(personnel, transition plan, quality, and training plan), (2) technical
((power production, electrical distribution and aircraft arresting system),
facilities, air field, security/COMSEC, communications-electronics,
environmental, and logistics); (3) past performance; and (4) price.
RFP sect. M-484.C.1. Offerors' responses under each item and factor were
evaluated on the basis of three equally important criteria: soundness of
approach; compliance with requirements; and understanding the requirement.
RFP sect. M-484.B. Evaluations under the management and technical factors were
expressed in the following colors/adjectives: blue (exceptional); green
(acceptable); yellow (marginal); and red (unacceptable). The management and
technical factors and subfactors also were evaluated for proposal risk: low,
moderate, or high.

Past performance was evaluated as a performance risk factor, based on
information obtained from references supplied by the offerors and from
others solicited by the agency. The past performance risk evaluation was
expressed in the following colors/adjectives: blue (exceptional); green
(satisfactory); tan (neutral); orange (marginal); and red (unsatisfactory).
Price was evaluated on the basis of whether the price was realistic,
reasonable, cost effective, and affordable, and to assess the offeror's
understanding of the RFP. RFP sect. M-484.C.1.D.1. Price was not rated or
scored. The management, technical, and past performance factors, when
combined, were significantly more important than price (RFP sect. M-484.A.1),
and award was not necessarily to be made to the lowest priced or the highest
technically evaluated proposal. RFP sect. M-484.A.2. Award was to be made to the
offeror whose proposal represented the best overall value to the government,
based on an integrated assessment of each offeror's proposal. RFP
sect. M-484.A.1.

Piquniq Management Corporation (PMC), a division of ASWS, was the incumbent
contractor for this effort. Three offerors, including ASWS and CESS,
submitted proposals by the July 7, 1999 closing date. After an initial
evaluation, the agency eliminated one proposal from the competitive range
and provided discussion questions to ASWS and CESS in the form of written
evaluation notices (EN) for clarifications and deficiencies. After reviewing
the offerors' responses, the agency provided additional ENs to both
offerors. At the conclusion of negotiations, both offerors were given the
opportunity to submit final proposals. The final evaluations under all
factors for the protester's and the awardee's proposals were as follows:

                           ASWS                     CESS

 Factor                    Rating/Proposal Risk     Rating/Proposal Risk

 Management                Green                    Green

 Personnel                 Yellow/High              Green/Moderate

 Transition                Green/High               Green/Moderate

 Quality                   Green/Low                Blue/Low

 Training                  Green/Moderate           Green/Low

 Technical                 Green                    Blue

 Power Production, et      Green/Low                Blue/Low
 al.

 Facilities                Yellow/Moderate          Green/Low

 Airfield                  Green/Low                Blue/Low

 Security/COMSEC           Green/Low                Green/Low

 Comm/Electronics          Green/Low                Green/Low

 Environmental             Green/Low                Blue/Low

 Logistics                 Green/Low                Green/Low

 Past Performance          Green/Moderate           Blue/Low

 Price                     $48,777,621              $49,423,946

Proposal Analysis Report (PAR) sect. III, at 7-8, 11-12, 16.

Based upon the stated evaluation criteria and an integrated assessment of
proposals, the source selection authority (SSA) determined that CESS's
higher technically-rated proposal represented the best overall value to
satisfy the Air Force's needs, notwithstanding its higher price. After
receiving notice of the award and a debriefing, ASWS filed this protest.
Performance of the contract has been stayed pending this decision.

ASWS alleges that the agency misevaluated its and CESS's proposals, failed
to provide it meaningful discussions, and made an improper award
determination. Based on our review of the record, we find none of these
allegations meritorious. [1]

RELEASE OF PROPRIETARY INFORMATION

As a threshold matter, the protester complains that the agency improperly
released ASWS's proprietary information to unidentified offerors.
Specifically, ASWS points out that at the preproposal conference, the agency
advised potential offerors of the number of personnel working on the
incumbent contract. ASWS also notes that at the debriefing, the contracting
officer stated that "current contract" information, including anything
incorporated into the contract, had been released outside the government and
expressed her willingness to release the incumbent's proposal to anyone
because it was incorporated by reference in the incumbent contract
documents. Debriefing Question Nos. 133-34, 136-41, 145-47. There is nothing
improper in releasing information on the number of personnel performing an
incumbent contract. Rothe Dev., Inc., B-279839, July 27, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 31
at 3. With regard to possible release of the incumbent proposal,
notwithstanding the contracting officer's broad statements on releasability,
there is no evidence in the record that the proposal was ever released to
anyone. At the debriefing, the contracting officer stated that "to the best
of [her] knowledge, no one [had] requested [the] proposals." Debriefing
Question No. 148. Even assuming some release of PMC's proposal, for the
issue to warrant sustaining the protest, the protester would have to show
competitive prejudice arising from that release. Rothe Dev., Inc., supra.
Because CESS was the only offeror which could have caused ASWS competitive
harm, to establish prejudice, the record would have to evidence that CESS
received PMC's proprietary information. While CESS acknowledges that one of
its joint venture partners received a redacted copy of the incumbent
contract in 1996, PMC itself had reviewed the information to be released and
the agency redacted certain information identified by PMC. Protester's
Comments, Mar. 8, 2000, exh. R, Letter from PMC to the Air Force (Aug. 22,
1996). Moreover, CESS denies that it ever requested or received a copy of
the incumbent proposals. Intervenor's Comments, Mar. 17, 2000, at 27. In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, we have no basis to conclude that
the agency improperly released any proprietary PMC information to CESS or
one of its joint venture partners.

TECHNICAL EVALUATION

An agency's method for evaluating the relative merits of competing proposals
is a matter within the agency's discretion, since the agency is responsible
for defining its needs, and the best method for accommodating them. Advanced
Tech. and Research Corp., B-257451.2, Dec. 9, 1994, 94-2 CPD para. 230 at 3.
Where an evaluation is challenged we will examine the record to determine
whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and consistent with stated
evaluation criteria and with procurement statutes and regulations. AmClyde
Eng'rd. Prods. Co., Inc., B-282271, B-282271.2, Jun. 21, 1999, 99-2 CPD para. 5
at 5. The protester's mere disagreement with the agency's judgment does not
establish that an evaluation was unreasonable. BFI Waste Sys. of Nebraska,
Inc., B-278223, Jan. 8, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 8 at 2.

ASWS identifies several areas in which it contends the agency's evaluation
of its proposal was flawed. [2] Specifically, ASWS contends that the agency
improperly evaluated its management proposal under the "personnel,"
"training," and "transition" subfactors and its technical proposal under the
"airfield" subfactor. Based on our review of the record, including the
proposals, evaluations, and submissions of the parties, we find that the
evaluation was reasonable, in accordance with the stated evaluation
criteria, and otherwise unobjectionable.

For example, under the personnel subfactor, the evaluators assessed the
offerors' ability to meet or exceed personnel requirements in the PWS
specifically considering the "sufficiency of personnel proposed, depth of
qualifications, experience and education of proposed personnel, [and] levels
of responsibility." RFP sect. M-484.C.1.A.1. ASWS's proposal was rated
"yellow/high risk" under this subfactor primarily because its proposed
deputy project manager (DPM) was proposed to perform many of the project
manager (PM) responsibilities, but did not possess the same experience as
the PM. Further, based on its review of the qualifications provided for
ASWS's PM, who was currently performing those responsibilities on the
incumbent contract, the agency also inferred that the PM would not be a
"team player working with the government to accomplish the mission." PAR
sect. III, at 8. ASWS disputes this assessment, arguing that the DPM was not a
required position; that the DPM in fact met all experience requirements as
interpreted by ASWS; and that the PM's failure to include "accomplishing the
mission" and "customer service" in his resume was not a valid basis for
downgrading the ASWS proposal. Protest at 7.

We find nothing unreasonable in the agency's evaluation. Notwithstanding the
proposal of the DPM as a non-required position, the DPM was proposed to
perform a number of the PM's responsibilities. That being the case, it was
reasonable for the agency to expect that he would possess experience
comparable to that of the PM. Further, the PWS explicitly required the
designation of an alternate PM, who was to possess similar qualifications to
the PM. RFP sect. C.5.1.1.2.1.1. With regard to how well the DPM met the
experience requirements, ASWS redefined the requirement during discussions
maintaining that it "[did] not interpret the PWS as requiring the [proposed
PM] to have 10 years as a Project Manager, but rather 10 years of experience
in project or program management, which in our view can be acquired without
actually being the Project Manager." Protest, exh. E, at 2. Since the RFP
required 10 years "managerial experience in project or program management .
. . at least five (5) years of which are managing service contracts" (RFP
sect. C.1.2.2.2.1.1), we believe the agency reasonably felt the proposed DPM
should possess more management experience than was reflected on his resume.
Likewise, we find nothing unreasonable in reviewing the proposed (and
incumbent) PM's resume using past experience with the PM to infer whether he
would be a team player with the government in performing the contract. An
agency may properly use information known by its own evaluators, as with any
other references, to aid in the evaluation of proposals, including
evaluating offeror experience. Safeguard Maintenance Corp., B-260983.3, Oct.
13, 1995, 96-2 CPD para. 116 at 12. [3]

Under the "transition plan" subfactor, the government assessed the offerors'
ability to meet or exceed the PWS transition requirements considering
whether the proposal demonstrated a sound approach to effectively plan,
control, organize, and manage tasks including inventories, logistics,
personnel, and how transition would be accomplished without placing at risk
current day-to-day operations. RFP sect.sect. M-484.C.1.A.2, L-483.I.2. ASWS's
proposal was rated "green/high risk" because ASWS placed full transition
responsibility on a four-member "tiger team" led by a quality control
manager to conduct all transition activities, with no other personnel
brought in until the transition period was complete. PAR sect. III, at 7. ASWS
observes that "[a]s the incumbent with its full management and operational
staff in place, [its] transition for the new contract would obviously be
straightforward and minimal" since "the real transition work to conduct is
mainly administrative in nature." Protest at 8.

We find nothing unreasonable in the agency's assessment that ASWS's
approach, though technically compliant, was risky. In this regard, some
2,500 individual items of government-owned equipment had to be inventoried,
including a determination of whether the items are in working order, along
with inventorying of government-furnished buildings and other facilities.
RFP sect. C.3.1.2.3 and Technical Exh. 5 (33 pages of equipment and facilities).
In the agency's view, the inventory alone is "massive" and "extremely time
consuming." Supplemental Agency Report at 7-8. Moreover, notwithstanding
ASWS's stated plan to have its current personnel accomplish the inventorying
over a 6-month period leading up to contract award (ASWS Proposal at 39) and
its stated recent accomplishment of an inventory over a 1-week period (ASWS
Supplemental Comments at 15-16), the transition effort was to be separate
from the day-to-day operations. Attempts to work the additional transition
responsibilities into the normal effort could risk degrading that effort.
Supp. Agency Report at 8. Accordingly, despite its status as the incumbent,
ASWS's plan to use a 4-member team for the transition effort was reasonably
viewed as a risky approach. An offeror is responsible for affirmatively
demonstrating the merits of its proposal and risks the rejection of its
proposal if it fails to do so. DBA Sys., Inc., B-241048, Jan. 15, 1991, 91-1
CPD para. 36 at 4.

With regard to the evaluation of ASWS's proposal under the "training plan"
management subfactor, it was evaluated as "green/moderate risk" and under
the "airfield" technical subfactor as "green/low risk." Each of these
evaluations referenced a single weakness. For training, it was a concern
that ASWS personnel receiving their training "on-the-job" will not have the
depth of experience that those working in a specialty for a number of years
would have. PAR sect. III, at 8. For the airfield subfactor, the evaluators
noted that the proposal left out the airfield manager in the monthly
airfield inspection. Notwithstanding ASWS's view that the "training"
observation is "nonsensical" (Protest at 8), the fact remains that the RFP
calls for hiring and retaining qualified personnel as well as requiring the
contractor to ensure that initial and required/recurring training is
accomplished. RFP sect.sect. C.1.2.2.1.7, C.5.3.12.5.2, C.5.4.1.23.1. While the
difference in capability is obvious when comparing newly trained personnel
with experienced personnel, the agency reasonably concluded that ASWS's
reliance on on-the-job training made its plan more risky. Likewise with
regard to the airfield, while ASWS is correct that there is no requirement
for the airfield manager himself to attend the inspections and ASWS proposed
to have the manager's supervisor attend, the agency reasonably found a
weakness in the absence of the manager with day-to-day responsibility for
the airfield. In any event, since both subfactors were rated green, removal
of these weaknesses would have had no significant impact on the roll-up
final scores of green for both management and technical aspects of the
proposal. In sum, the agency's evaluation of ASWS's proposal under the
technical and management criteria was unobjectionable.

MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS

ASWS contends that it was denied meaningful discussions in the same four
areas under the management and technical evaluations. [4] In negotiated
procurements, contracting agencies generally must conduct discussions with
all offerors whose proposals are within the competitive range. Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 15.306(d)(1). While the FAR requires the
contracting officer to indicate or discuss all aspects of the proposal that
could, in the opinion of the contracting officer, be altered or explained to
enhance materially the proposal's potential for award, the rule remains that
agencies are not obligated to afford all-encompassing discussions; rather
they must be meaningful, leading an offeror into the areas of its proposal
requiring amplification or revision. Johnson Controls, Inc., B-282326, Jun.
28, 1999, 99-2 CPD para. 6 at 4. The agency is not required to "spoon-feed" an
offeror as to each and every item that could be raised to improve its
proposal. Du & Assocs., Inc., B-280283.3, Dec. 22, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 156 at
7-8.

Based on our review of the record, it shows that the Air Force conducted
appropriate and meaningful discussions with ASWS during successive rounds of
written discussions. For example, with regard to the proposal of the DPM,
during the first round of negotiations, the agency sent ASWS two ENs, one
questioning the experience of the PM (ENDM2) and a second asking for
elaboration on the benefit of a DPM (ENCM3). When ASWS responded to ENCM3
explaining that the DPM would regularly perform some of the tasks intended
for the PM, the agency sent ASWS a third EN (ENCM3(2)) emphasizing the need
for the proposed DPM to have the same education and experience requirements
as the PM. Even though ASWS responded to all three ENs, it did not fully
satisfy the agency's concerns, in part because the protester "redefined" the
agency experience requirements to explain how its DPM met them (see
evaluation discussion above). After reviewing this response, the agency did
not believe additional discussions would be productive. We believe that
three ENs in this regard were sufficient to apprise ASWS of the agency's
concerns.

With regard to the transition plan, the agency sent the protester an EN
based on ASWS's proposal statement that "we guarantee the government an easy
transition period." ENCM4. The EN asked ASWS to "quantify the guarantee and
define ‘easy.'" Under the heading, "Nature of Clarification," the EN
stated, "Proposal has made a big promise -- a guarantee. This is unusual and
needs to be clearly understood." In response, ASWS emphasized its status as
incumbent and its confidence that its experience would allow it to assume
the new contract with no reduction in operational capability. It therefore
saw the transition as "easy" and guaranteed that its "transition [would]
start as scheduled and be completed on time." Response to ENCM4. While the
evaluators found this resolved the item and rated the plan "green," they
found that it remained a high risk due to the tiger-team approach. We
believe this EN was sufficient to lead ASWS into an area of its proposal
requiring more information. Thus, the discussions were meaningful on this
matter. While ASWS complains that the agency should have followed up with
its risk concerns, since ASWS did not elaborate on its plan in its first
response, in our view, the agency reasonably concluded that additional
questions would not be productive.

The agency did not send any ENs specifically identifying agency concerns
about the lack of long-term experience in on-the-job trained personnel or
about the absence of the airfield manager at monthly inspections. However,
an agency is not required to advise an offeror as to each and every item
that could be raised as to improve its proposal. Du & Assocs., Inc., supra.
Here, these two issues were viewed simply as weaknesses under individual
management and technical subfactors which both were rated "green." In these
circumstances, the protester was not entitled to all encompassing
discussions including these minor aspects of its proposal.

ASWS contends that, had it known of the concern about the airfield manager,
it could have agreed to include him in the monthly inspections. ASWS also
states, without discussing how, that it would have changed its on-the-job
training plan. Our Office will not sustain a protest unless the protester
demonstrates a reasonable possibility that it was prejudiced by the agency's
actions, that is, unless the protester demonstrates that, but for the
agency's actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving the
award. McDonald-Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at 3; see
Statistica, Inc., v. Christopher, 102 F. 3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Based on the remaining evaluations, and the fact that ASWS was rated "green"
overall in both the management and technical factors, there is no plausible
basis to conclude that additional information from ASWS on either matter
would have lowered its risk rating under the training subfactor or improved
its color ratings to "blue" under either subfactor.

PAST PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

ASWS protests the agency's evaluation of its proposal under the past
performance evaluation criterion, arguing that ASWS's rating should have
been "blue" instead of "green." Specifically, ASWS contends that the agency
"inexplicably" questioned only 13 of its 24 references. Protest at 15. Our
Office will examine an agency's past performance evaluation only to ensure
that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria
and applicable statutes and regulations, since determining the relative
merit of an offeror's past performance is primarily a matter within the
contracting agency's discretion. Pacific Ship Repair and Fabrication, Inc.,
B-279793, July 23, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 29 at 3-4. In conducting a past
performance evaluation, an agency has discretion to determine the scope of
the offerors' performance histories to be considered, provided all proposals
are evaluated on the same basis and consistent with the solicitation
requirements. Federal Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-250135.4, May 24, 1993, 93-1
CPD para. 398 at 12. Based on our review of the record, we find nothing
unreasonable in the agency's conduct of the performance evaluation or in the
rating given ASWS's proposal.

The RFP provided that the past performance assessment would be a
"subjective, but unbiased judgment about the quality of an offeror's past
performance." RFP sect. M-484.C.1.C.1. The government's judgment was based upon
"(1) records of objective measurements and subjective ratings of specified
performance attributes, if available, and (2) statements of opinion about
the quality of specific aspects of an offeror's performance, or about the
quality of an offeror's overall performance." RFP sect. M-484.C.1.C.2. The
government reserved the right both to limit the number of references to be
contacted and to contact references other than those provided by the
offerors. Id.

Here the agency determined that only 14 of the protester's past performance
references were similar to the solicited effort from a dollar amount and
requirements standpoint and sent questionnaires to those references. For
example, the agency did not send a questionnaire to a former customer where
the $36,000 contract was for transient commercial aircraft line maintenance
nor to a customer where the $806,000 contract was for grounds maintenance.
The agency received 12 responses to its inquiries and averaged the numerical
ratings from each questionnaire. [5] The agency sent questionnaires to 11
references supplied by CESS and averaged the numerical ratings of the six
responses it received. Since the agency based its choice of references to
contact in a reasonable manner, contacted a similar selection of references
for ASWS and CESS, and calculated the performance ratings in the same
fashion, we see nothing unreasonable in the agency's evaluation methodology.
Likewise, we see nothing unreasonable in ASWS's "green" past performance
rating. The average of its ratings was 4.06 points out of a maximum of 5.
While ASWS disagrees and contends that it should have received a "blue"
rating based on its past performance, its score was reasonably considered to
be "green." [6]

ASWS next argues that the agency improperly considered the contractor
performance assessment report (CPAR) from its incumbent contract. It was the
"marginal" ratings on the CPAR that resulted in ASWS's lowest past
performance ratings. In the protester's view, this CPAR represented a biased
and unsupported evaluation of its performance because the agency improperly
rejected the protester's detailed response to the CPAR. We disagree. The
record reflects that the contracting officer and the program management
office reviewed the protester's "voluminous" rebuttal (approximately 4
inches of material) and found nothing to change the agency's position.
According to the agency, some "95% of PMC's comments are not relevant to the
time frame for the rating. The remaining 5% are in the correct time frame,
however do not dispute any of the Government[‘]s facts justifying the
rating." Agency Report, Tab 15, Summary of Actions. [7] ASWS submitted a
copy of the rebuttal to our Office but failed to identify any specific
instance where the agency's assessment was incorrect. Based on our review of
the submissions, we see no basis for finding the CPAR or the agency's
reliance on it in the past performance evaluation to be unreasonable.

BIAS ALLEGATIONS

ASWS attributes its past performance and other evaluation scores to bias on
the part of the contracting officer. Specifically, ASWS alleges that the
contracting officer did not expeditiously handle PMC's claims under the
incumbent contract; responded to a past performance questionnaire in an
unrelated procurement with a negative response despite her lack of
experience with PMC's past performance; indicated in that same response her
intention not to exercise the final option of the incumbent contract; and
was responsible for the negative CPAR. In support of these allegations, ASWS
submitted copies of the lengthy rebuttals it furnished in response to the
past performance questionnaire and the CPAR, along with excerpts from
depositions taken in its pursuit of claims under the incumbent contract.
Otherwise, ASWS relies on the record of the evaluations as evidence of bias.

Government officials are presumed to act in good faith; we will not
attribute unfair or prejudicial motives to procurement officials on the
basis of inference or supposition. Triton Marine Constr. Corp., B-250856,
Feb. 23, 1993, 93-1 CPD para. 171 at 6. In addition to producing credible
evidence showing bias, the protester must demonstrate that the agency bias
translated into action that unfairly affected the protester's competitive
position. Id.

Here, ASWS has furnished no credible evidence to support its allegation; it
merely infers bias based on the evaluation and the statements of the
contracting officials whom the current contracting officer had replaced. In
this regard, while disputing the contracting officer's past performance
opinions, its protest submissions do not identify where the opinions are in
error. Likewise, while the excerpted depositions indicate that the former
contracting officials did not think highly of the current contracting
officer or her qualifications, how well the contracting officer performs her
job and how quickly she settles claims are not indications of bias. In this
regard, while the protester disagrees with the handling of its contract
claims and the intention not to exercise an option, the Air Force explains
that the claims are being resolved and that it did exercise the final option
of the incumbent contract. The protester would have us attribute bias in the
evaluation of proposals on the basis of inference and supposition and
contrary to a record which establishes the propriety of the agency's
evaluation of ASWS's proposal; in these circumstances, there is no basis to
question the motives of any of the contracting officials.

PRICE EVALUATION

ASWS challenges the price evaluation based on the agency's acceptance of
certain of CESS's reimbursable rates which ASWS characterizes as
unreasonably low. In this regard, ASWS observes that CESS's proposed
reimbursable rates for extended airfield operations and "mandays" are a
fraction of what ASWS proposed. [8] Based on the protester's experience in
performing the incumbent contract, it maintains that the agency could not
have found CESS's rates to be realistic.

The RFP provided that an offeror's price proposal would be evaluated to
determine if the "estimate is realistic, reasonable, cost effective,
affordable and to assess the offeror's understanding of the solicitation."
RFP sect. M-484.C.1.D. Cost realism, ordinarily is not considered in the
evaluation of proposals for a fixed-price contract such as the one involved
here, since a fixed-price contract provides for a definite price and places
the risk and responsibility for all contract costs and resulting profit or
loss upon the contractor. Volmar Constr., Inc., B-272188.2, Sept. 18, 1996,
96-2 CPD para. 119 at 5. While an agency may provide for a price realism
analysis in the solicitation of fixed-priced proposals, a fixed-price offer
that is below cost is legally unobjectionable and cannot be rated lower or
downgraded in the price evaluation for source selection simply by virtue of
its low price. Sperry Corp., B-225492, B-225492.2, Mar. 25, 1987, 87-1 CPD para.
341 at 3-4. The FAR provides a number of price analysis techniques that may
be used to determine whether prices are reasonable and realistic including
comparison of the prices received with each other and comparison of
previously proposed prices for the same or similar items. FAR
sect. 15.404-1(b)(2). The nature and extent of an agency's price realism
analysis are matters within the sound exercise of the agency's discretion.
Cardinal Scientific, Inc., B-270309, Feb. 12, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 70 at 4.

Here, the agency's price evaluation included analysis of both price
proposals, a review of the operation and management line items, salary and
benefit rates, general and administrative costs, and a comparison of support
prices, such as the manday and extended airfield rates. PAR sect. IV, at 16.
With regard to the rates challenged by ASWS, while its proposed prices are
higher than those proposed by CESS, the agency explains that CESS's manday
and extended airfield rates are comparable to the rates charged at other
Alaska bases. For example, one of CESS's joint venture partners performs
these services at the King Salmon and Galena Air Stations in Alaska. The
rates for extended airfield operation proposed by CESS are slightly higher
than those rates. Similarly, the rates proposed for additional mandays are
slightly lower than those at King Salmon and Galena. While ASWS argues that
the conditions at Eareckson are harsher and require greater effort than King
Salmon or Galena, there is no requirement that an agency's price comparison
be based on identical rates or performance situations. Here the price
evaluators questioned these rates and the contracting officer satisfied
herself that the rates were reasonable and realistic based on her
comparative analysis. Since these rates are fixed, the risk of successful
performance at the proposed price lies with CESS. Whether a contract can be
performed at the offered price is a matter of the offeror's responsibility.
Compro Computer Servs., Inc., B-278651, Feb. 23, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 58 at 6
n.4. We will not review an agency's affirmative determination of
responsibility absent circumstances not present here. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.5(c).

AWARD DETERMINATION

Finally, ASWS asserts that the agency's determination to award the contract
to CESS at a higher price than proposed by ASWS is not supported by a proper
price/technical tradeoff. Source selection officials have broad discretion
in determining the manner and extent to which they will make use of the
technical and cost evaluation results, and their judgments are governed only
by the tests of rationality and consistency with the stated evaluation
criteria. Chemical Demilitarization Assocs., B-277700, Nov. 13, 1997, 98-1
CPD para. 171 at 6. Where, as here, the RFP provides that non-price factors are
significantly more important than price, the selection official retains
discretion to select a higher-priced but also technically higher-rated
submission, if doing so is in the government's best interest and is
consistent with the solicitation's stated evaluation and source selection
scheme. University of Kansas Med. Ctr., B-278400, Jan. 26, 1998, 98-1 CPD para.
120 at 6-7.

Here the SSA based his selection on the evaluation criteria in section M of
the RFP and his integrated assessment of the proposals, the results of the
negotiations, and the capability of CESS to perform the requirement. Source
Selection Document at 1. He noted the results of the evaluation, including
CESS's green management rating, blue technical rating, and blue past
performance rating as well as ASWS's green ratings in all three areas.
Specifically, he noted that the joint venture partners comprising CESS would
bring "extensive experience to the operation and maintenance of Eareckson AS
with a high degree of technical expertise and quality service for this
program." Source Selection Document at 2. While noting that CESS's price was
higher than ASWS's, "the low risk, high degree of technical expertise,
quality service program, and better past performance ratings of CESS ma[d]e
their proposal a better overall value to the Government." Id. Although not
as detailed as ASWS might desire, the SSA's determination is consistent with
the RFP's source selection plan and is supported by the evaluation record.
Under these circumstances, there is no basis to question the SSA's
determination.

In a related argument, ASWS contends that in making the award determination,
the SSA improperly considered the percentage difference between ASWS's and
CESS's proposals based on the total prices proposed by the offerors which
included some $20 million in estimated reimbursable line items. Had the SSA
used the reduced totals, the percentage difference associated with CESS's
higher proposed price would be 2.3 percent instead of the 1.3 percent relied
upon by the SSA. Where an RFP provides for use of reimbursable, plug-type
numbers to be included in all offerors' proposals, the agency should
essentially delete this common cost in assessing the price differential
between competing proposals. See CRAssociates, Inc., B-282075.2, B-282075.3,
Mar. 15, 2000, 2000 CPD para. ___ at 10. In fact, the RFP provides that cost
reimbursable items will not be evaluated. RFP sect. M.C.1.D.1.f. However, in
view of the relatively small percentage of the total price represented by
the $646,000 difference between the two price proposals, we see no basis to
conclude that the failure to exclude the common costs for purposes of the
differential percentage calculation had any significant impact on the SSA's
award determination.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

Notes

1. In its comments on the agency report, ASWS raised a number of issues for
the first time. In this regard, it objected to certain aspects of the
procedures involved in the evaluation team's composition and experience; the
price evaluation; the past performance evaluation; and the evaluation of
CESS's technical proposal. Protest grounds must be raised within 10 days of
the time a protester knows or should have known of the basis for the
protest. Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(a)(2) (2000). When a
protester files supplemental protest grounds, each new ground must
independently satisfy the requirements of our regulations. Pacific
Architects & Eng'rs., Inc., B-262243, B-262243.2, Dec. 12, 1995, 95-2 CPD
para. 253 at 12-13. ASWS learned of these new or supplemental grounds when it
received the agency report on February 25, 2000, but did not raise them
until it filed its comments on the agency report on March 8, more than 10
days later. Accordingly, they are untimely and not for consideration on the
merits. We note that none of the supplemental grounds has merit. For
example, ASWS argues that the agency improperly found CESS's proposed
project manager (PM) acceptable when, despite a resume indicating he worked
for a CESS partner, in fact he did not work for CESS at the time the
proposal was submitted. In addition, after award of the contract, the
proposed PM was replaced by another CESS employee. CESS explains that it
mistakenly submitted an old resume of its proposed PM dating from when he
was working for a CESS partner. CESS Supplemental Comments, Mar. 17, 2000,
at 2. At the time CESS submitted its proposal, the PM was performing similar
duties for another employer, and had agreed to accept the PM position at
Eareckson if CESS was awarded the contract. The RFP did not require that the
offeror provide evidence of a commitment from the person proposed for this
position. In fact, RFP sect. C.5.1.1.2.1 does not require the designation of a
PM and alternate until 10 calendar days after contract award. After the
proposed PM subsequently decided not to accept the position, CESS notified
the Air Force of a substitution of an equally qualified PM. Id. at 3. CESS's
mistake did not contravene any RFP requirement and neither CESS's nor the
agency's actions in this regard provide a basis for sustaining the protest.

2. In its protest, ASW identified other alleged flaws in the evaluation of
its proposal under the remaining technical and management subfactors. The
Air Force responded to each of the allegations in its agency report and,
with the exception of the areas discussed above, ASWS failed to rebut the
Air Force's position. In the absence of any meaningful rebuttal, there is no
basis on which to sustain these protest grounds. Arjay Elecs. Corp.,
B-243080, July 1, 1991, 91-2 CPD para. 3 at 1 n.1. In addition, ASWS disputes
virtually every aspect of the evaluation of CESS's proposal, generally on
the basis of CESS's lack of experience as the incumbent. Without more,
ASWS's mere disagreement with the agency's judgment does not establish that
the evaluation was unreasonable. BFI Waste Sys. of Nebraska, Inc., supra.

3. We do not agree with ASWS that this and other evaluation comments based
on the evaluators' personal knowledge of the incumbent contract constitute
an improper "double counting" of past performance. Rather, these represent
simply a matter of evaluators reasonably weighing proposal information
against personal knowledge in judging an offeror's technical and management
capability.

4. ASWS identified another four areas in its original protest in which it
believed it did not receive meaningful discussions. The agency responded to
each of these allegations in its report and the protester did not rebut them
in its comments. Accordingly, we have no basis to conclude that the agency
did not provide meaningful discussions in these areas. Arjay Elecs. Corp.,
supra.

5. One questionnaire was returned with narrative comments, but no numerical
ratings. The agency reviewed the information, but was unable to include the
responses in the numerical average of ratings.

6. ASWS also contends that CESS's 4.83–point past performance rating
should not have been rated "blue," primarily because CESS was a newly formed
joint venture which had not performed a BOS contract of this scope before.
While CESS had not performed a BOS contract as a joint venture, its joint
venture partners had performed BOS contracts of similar size and scope. The
RFP provided for evaluation of an offeror's performance as a prime or
subcontractor as well as information on parent and subsidiary companies'
past performance. RFP sect.sect. L.483.III.1,.3. An agency may properly consider the
separate qualifications of joint venture partners in evaluating the
qualifications of the joint venture. Dynamic Isolation Sys., Inc., B-247047,
Apr. 28, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 399 at 7 n.7; Beneco Enters., Inc., B-239543.3,
June 7, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 545 at 7. Moreover, ASWS itself acknowledges that
it is "through its affiliated corporations [that it] has a wealth of
pertinent experience in the type of BOSS Contracts involved in this
procurement, including the predecessor contract." Protest at 15. ASWS's mere
disagreement with the agency's evaluation of similar experience regarding
CESS does not make the evaluation unreasonable. BFI Waste Sys. of Nebraska,
Inc., supra.

7. Among the issues identified by the CPAR were that the power plant had not
met the requirement to provide continuous electrical power, which resulted
in significant cost to the government and the issuance of 161 contractor
deficiency reports, 71 percent of which were related to facility operations
and maintenance. CPAR, June 30, 1999, Block 16.

8. Extended airfield operations represent those hours on weekends and
holidays not otherwise within the normal workday. The contractor is expected
to provide all required labor to support a single aircraft mission during
weekends and holidays. A manday is defined as a period in which a visitor
remains on station overnight and is furnished lodging in addition to meals,
and transportation to and from the terminal. RFP sect. C.5.4.5.3. The contractor
is expected to provide all labor necessary to support mandays over and above
those estimated for a fiscal year.