TITLE:  Communication Technologies, Inc., B-283491; B-283491.2, November 30, 1999
BNUMBER:  B-283491; B-283491.2
DATE:  November 30, 1999
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Communication Technologies, Inc., B-283491; B-283491.2, November 30, 1999

Decision

Matter of: Communication Technologies, Inc.

File: B-283491; B-283491.2

Date: November 30, 1999

Lee P. Curtis, Esq., Scott Arnold, Esq., W. Hartman Young, Esq., and Linda
A. Mayer, Esq., Howrey & Simon, for the protester.

Andrew P. Hallowell, Esq., Pamela J. Mazza, Esq., and Antonio R. Franco,
Esq., Piliero, Mazza & Pargament, for ARTEL, Inc., an intervenor.

H. Jack Shearer, Esq., and McKenzie Whitaker, Esq., Defense Information
Systems Agency, for the agency.

Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protester's contentions that the agency unreasonably evaluated its proposal
with an eye toward ensuring that the awardee would prevail (after the source
selection authority directed a reevaluation of proposals in certain areas
before making his selection decision) is denied where the record shows no
evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency evaluators, and where the
evaluation was reasonable and in accordance with stated evaluation criteria.

DECISION

Communication Technologies, Inc. (Comtek) protests the award of a contract
to ARTEL, Inc. by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), pursuant to
request for proposals (RFP) No. DCA200-98-R-0060, issued to procure
engineering services in support of the Defense Switched Network (DSN), the
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), and other related networks.
Comtek argues that the agency's selection decision was improperly based on
unreasonable evaluation conclusions in the areas of past performance and
experience, and an unreasonable view that the ARTEL proposal offered a
better approach to working with DISA's large business network support
contractor.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

This procurement is the small business set-aside component of two related
service contracts awarded by DISA. The instant contract is referenced by
DISA as the DISN Network Management Support Services--Global (DNMSS-G)
Associate Support Contract (ASC), hereinafter, the ASC contract; the related
large business contract is referenced by DISA as the DNMSS-G Network
Engineered Contract (NEC), hereinafter, the NEC contract. Both solicitations
were issued on December 1, 1998. The ASC RFP anticipated award of an
indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract with a 2-year base period
and three 1-year options. RFP sect. F-1. The RFP sought engineering, program
development, testing, installation, provisioning, and operations and
maintenance in support of the DSN, the Defense Red Switch Network (which
handles secured communications), and DISA's Metropolitan Area Networks.
Agency Report (AR) at 4-5. The RFP contained a $2.5 million minimum purchase
guarantee, and a $100 million maximum value. RFP sect. H-2. In addition, the RFP
included the limitation on subcontracting clause at Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) sect. 52.219-14, which requires that at least 50 percent of the
cost of performance incurred for personnel shall be for employees of the
small business prime contractor. RFP sect. I, at 1.

The RFP advised offerors that the agency would make award to the offeror
whose proposal represented the best value after consideration of three major
areas--technical/management, past performance/experience, and cost/price.
RFP sect. M-2. The RFP provided the following guidance on the relative weight of
these three areas:

In award selection, "Technical/Management" is more important than "Past
Performance/Experience," which is significantly more important than
"Price/Cost." "Past Performance/Experience" and "Price/Cost" together are
approximately equal to "Technical/Management."

RFP sect. M-3.d. Under the technical/management evaluation area, the RFP
identified several detailed evaluation factors and subfactors; however,
these details are not relevant to this decision as there is no challenge to
the evaluation under these factors or subfactors.

Under the past performance/experience area--the area that is largely the
focus of this protest--the RFP advised that past performance and experience
would be "approximately equal in importance." RFP sect. M-6.a. In preparing
their proposals, offerors were required to identify for evaluation between
three and five prior contracts similar to the ASC contract. RFP sect. L-12.c.3.
In addition, offerors were required to identify three similar contracts for
any of the offeror's major subcontractors (defined as any subcontractor
expected to perform at least 10 percent of the work). RFP sect.sect. L-12.c.1., 3.
The RFP also included separate specific instructions about the kind of
information that should be provided with respect to the past performance and
experience portions of this evaluation area: instructions related to
experience were set forth at RFP sect. L-12.c.5., instructions related to past
performance were set forth at RFP sect. L-12.c.6.

With respect to the evaluation of past performance and experience, the RFP
stated for both areas that the agency would evaluate similar prior
contracts. RFP sect.sect. M-6.b., e. In addition, the RFP identified four past
performance subfactors of equal weight: quality of service, timeliness of
performance, cost/price control, and customer satisfaction. RFP sect. M-6.c.
With respect to the evaluation of experience, the RFP advised that the
government did not want to preclude qualified new contractors, and indicated
that lack of experience in comparable contracts could be mitigated by
superior performance on other contracts, experience of corporate officers or
key personnel, or teaming arrangements with experienced contractors. RFP
sect. M-6.f. There were no experience subfactors.

On March 11, 1999, the agency received initial proposals. After an initial
evaluation, discussions, and oral presentations, the four offerors remaining
in the competitive range, including Comtek and ARTEL, submitted final
revised proposals on June 16. After completing the final evaluation, the
source selection evaluation board (SSEB) scheduled a briefing for the source
selection advisory council (SSAC) and the source selection authority (SSA)
on June 30. The events of this meeting, and the reevaluation that followed,
are relevant to several of the grounds of this protest. [1]

During the June 30 briefing, the SSA realized that the evaluators had
reviewed past performance, but had not reviewed experience, even though
experience was to be evaluated separately under the RFP. Declaration of SSA,
Oct. 21, 1999, at 2. The SSA concedes that there was some discussion of
avoiding a formal evaluation by stating that the two offerors with the
highest scores and best prices (ARTEL and Comtek) were approximately equal
in this area. Id. Despite this discussion, the SSA states that he directed
the SSEB to reconvene, evaluate experience in accordance with the terms of
the solicitation, and prepare a written SSEB report. Id. In addition, the
SSA notes that while he was aware that the briefing concluded with a
recommendation for award to ARTEL, he considered the evaluation incomplete,
and did not pay attention to the recommendation. Id.

Upon resolution of the experience scoring issues--the mechanics of which are
discussed in greater detail below--the SSEB presented its revised briefing
slides to the SSAC on July 28. AR at 8. Using a rating scale of 1 to 10, the
SSEB rated ARTEL higher than Comtek in 9 out of 10 evaluated
technical/management factors or subfactors. AR at 9. The SSEB combined the
scores for past performance and experience--both of which were scored on a
scale of 1 to 5--to create a 1 to 10 scale for the past
performance/experience area similar to the scale used for the technical/
management area. With respect to price, the agency evaluated the discounted
life cycle cost (DLCC) of the two proposals, as it had advised it would in
the solicitation, RFP sect. M-7.b., and concluded that ARTEL's DLCC of $39.5
million was approximately 4 percent higher than Comtek's DLCC of
$38.0 million. AR at 10. A numerical price score was generated by a formula
not at issue in this protest.

To compare the relative merits of the proposals, the SSEB converted the
numerical score for each area to a composite overall score by multiplying
the score by the relative weight for the area established in the source
selection plan (SSP). AR at 11. These weights were: technical/management, 50
percent; past performance/ experience, 30 percent; and price, 20 percent.
The resulting overall scores are set forth below:

                            ARTEL     COMTEK

 Technical/Management       3.98      3.14

 Past Performance/          2.34      1.98

 Experience

 Price                      1.23      1.28

 TOTAL SCORE                7.54      6.39

AR at 11.

On August 4, the SSAC adopted the SSEB's findings, and identified six areas
where ARTEL or Comtek exceeded the government's requirements. After
concluding that the proposals were essentially equal in three of the areas,
the SSAC found ARTEL superior in the remaining three areas--planning and
management approach, commitment to a relationship with the NEC contractor,
and risk management. AR at 12. Thus the SSAC recommended award to ARTEL
despite its slightly higher price.

On August 5, the SSA adopted the SSAC's tradeoff analysis and concluded that

ARTEL's technical proposal demonstrated a superior approach to planning and
management issues, a firmer commitment to a working relationship to the
DNMSS-G/NEC contractor, and significant benefits in risk management.
Furthermore, the SSEB found ARTEL significantly superior to all other
offerors in terms of past performance and experience. ARTEL proposed the
second lowest price, approximately 4% higher than the next offeror's
proposed price. The added benefits of ARTEL's overall proposal are
meaningful and of such value as to justify the slightly additional cost.

Source Selection Decision Memorandum, Aug. 5, 1999, at 2.

This protest followed.

DISCUSSION

Comtek's initial protest raised nine separate challenges to DISA's award
decision, which were supplemented by three additional challenges.
Subsequently, almost every issue raised in the protester's initial filing
was expressly withdrawn or abandoned, and the remaining portion of Comtek's
protest is largely focused on the evaluation of past performance/experience.

Evaluation of Experience

Comtek argues that the agency's evaluation of experience--performed after
the SSA noted that the evaluators had overlooked this area--was unreasonable
because the evaluation considered only the experience of the offeror, and
not the experience of the offeror's team. Comtek contends that this approach
was chosen to ensure that ARTEL would continue to be the recommended
awardee. Before turning to the specific issues raised by these arguments,
further background about the experience evaluation is set forth below.

After the SSA directed the evaluators to consider experience, as required by
the solicitation, the chair of the past performance and experience
evaluation team (PPEET) first noted that the agency's internal SSP provided
no guidance on evaluating experience (as it, too, apparently overlooked the
experience evaluation requirements of the RFP). Declaration of PPEET Chair,
Oct. 21, 1999, at 2. After discussing this matter with legal counsel, the
PPEET Chair adopted the same numerical/adjectival scale used for evaluating
past performance. This scale was as follows:

Exceptional 5 Superior performance, no previous problems

Very Good 4 Better than merely acceptable

Satisfactory 3 Acceptable, requirements were met with minor

Agency resources

Marginal 2 Less than fully acceptable

Unsatisfactory 1 Plainly deficient

SSEB Final Report, July 18, 1999, Attach. 2 (Past Performance and Experience
Chair Report), at 3-4.

Upon completion of her review, the PPEET Chair noted that there was a
significant difference between the experience scores of the offerors and
their proposed

subcontractors. PPEET Chair Declaration, supra. The relevant scores for
ARTEL and Comtek are set forth below:

                          ARTEL        COMTEK

 Offeror Experience       3.80         3.00
 Only

 Subcontractor            1.42         2.92
 Experience Only

 Prime/Sub Experience     2.61         2.96
 50/50

Second Agency Report (2nd AR) at 27. Thus, the PPEET Chair explained she was
unsure whether to include the subcontractor scores, and if so, to what
extent (since different offerors relied to different degrees on
subcontracting to supplement their proposals). PPEET Chair Declaration,
supra. This "dilemma" arose because, in her view, there was an ambiguity
between the RFP's sections L and M. Specifically, she concluded that section
L of the RFP suggested the agency would consider contract references for
both contractors and major subcontractors, while section M suggested that
only the experience of the offeror would be evaluated--unless the offeror
lacked experience and needed a review of teaming members to mitigate its
inexperience. PPEET Chair Declaration, supra, at 2-3; 2nd AR at 24-26.

In attempting to resolve this dilemma, the PPEET Chair again sought advice
from agency legal counsel. DISA's legal counsel agreed that the solicitation
was ambiguous, and the PPEET Chair ultimately elected to use the higher of
either the offeror's own score, or the combined prime/subcontractor
score--which in the case of the protester and the awardee meant the score
for offeror experience only. Thus, ARTEL and Comtek received experience
scores of 3.80 and 3.00, respectively, rather than 2.61 and 2.96,
respectively. 2nd AR at 26-27.

In support of its arguments, Comtek points to several facts that, it
contends, show that the evaluators were trying to preserve the same
selection decision they originally recommended to the SSA. First, Comtek
points to the SSA's admission that the evaluators discussed on June 30
whether to simply state that the two offerors were equal in experience and
thereby avoid performing an evaluation. Second, Comtek notes that experience
was first evaluated using both the offeror and its major subcontractors--an
approach which gave Comtek a higher score than ARTEL for experience. Third,
Comtek notes that reviewing only the experience of the offeror itself,
rather than its team, is the opposite of the approach taken to review the
past performance portion of this area.

The agency responds that Comtek is, in essence, arguing that its evaluators
are acting in bad faith. The agency counters that the PPEET Chair reasonably
concluded that the solicitation was ambiguous in this area, and reasonably
sought legal advice on the most appropriate approach to performing the
evaluation given the perceived ambiguity. In addition, DISA argues that its
approach is supported by our decision in USATREX Int'l, Inc., B-275592,
B-275592.2, Mar. 6, 1997, 98-1 CPD para. 99 at 4, where we concluded that an
agency may properly limit its consideration of experience to the prime
offeror's experience under a solicitation reserved for firms qualifying
under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, and including the limitation
on subcontracting clause set forth at FAR sect. 52.219-14--as the solicitation
does here. [2]

We agree with the agency that despite the protester's arguments to the
contrary, Comtek is essentially arguing that the agency's evaluators, its
selection official, and its legal counsel, are all acting in bad faith. See,
e.g., Protester's 2nd Comments at 5-6. Without strong evidence to support
such a conclusion, we will not assume that agency employees act in bad
faith. Indian Affiliates, Inc., B-243420, Aug. 1, 1991, 91-2 CPD para. 109 at 5.
Based on our review of the record, we have no basis to conclude that DISA
acted in bad faith here. TMI Servs., Inc., B-276624.2, July 9, 1997, 97-2
CPD para. 24 at 5.

With respect to the agency's explanation that its first attempt to evaluate
experience raised concerns about the fairness of considering subcontractors
in this review, we see nothing about those concerns that is unreasonable. As
the table above shows, consideration of subcontractor experience lowered the
experience scores of both offerors, although there is no doubt that the
impact was significantly more adverse for ARTEL than for Comtek. Given the
considerations set forth below, we cannot conclude that the agency's reason
for expressing this concern was to preserve the award to ARTEL.

In the agency's view there is an ambiguity between sections L and M of the
RFP. There is little debate that section L of the RFP suggests that the
agency intends to review the experience of both the prime offeror and its
subcontractors. As stated above, RFP sect. L.12.c.3. requires offerors to
identify between three and five prior contracts for themselves, and three
prior contracts for their major subcontractors; RFP sect. L.12.c.5.A. provides
that "[t]he Government will utilize these descriptions in evaluating
contractor/subcontractor experience." It is the paragraphs set forth below
that lead to the disagreement about whether there is an ambiguity created by
section M:

The Government will evaluate the offerors on their experience in performing
contracts of similar size, scope and complexity. Accordingly, it will
evaluate the degree of similarity of five required contract references to
the current work. The Government considers the performance of five similar
contracts (performed currently or within the last three years) to
demonstrate adequate previous experience. Therefore, a contractor will not
increase its experience evaluation by submitting references to more than
five similar contracts.

In considering such relevant experience, the Government does not want to
preclude qualified new contractors from participation in this solicitation.
Lack of experience in comparable contracts may be mitigated by superior
performance on other types of contracts (i.e., smaller or commercial
contracts), the experience level of corporate officers/key personnel in the
company and/or appropriate teaming arrangements (i.e., the teaming of an
experienced contractor(s) with a relatively inexperienced one).

RFP sect. M-6.e.-f. (emphasis added). The agency reads this language to conclude
that only the experience of offerors will be evaluated, absent extenuating
circumstances.

In recognition of the ambiguity in the solicitation, the agency attempted to
ameliorate the possible unfairness of selecting one approach over another,
given that an offeror might have tailored its response to the opposite
interpretation. The agency decided to use whichever number was higher for
the offeror in question. Thus, both Comtek and ARTEL were evaluated using
the score for their experience alone, while one of the other offerors was
evaluated using the higher score obtained by considering the contribution of
its subcontractors.

We think the solution adopted here--while perhaps not an ideal approach to
resolving a solicitation ambiguity--reflects a fair resolution of this
issue. If we assume that Comtek crafted its proposal hoping to receive the
benefit of both its experience and the experience of its subcontractors--and
given that Comtek's primary subcontractor is the incumbent large business
contractor that performed this work, we can safely assume that it
did--Comtek has received a higher score than it would have received
otherwise. Comtek's only complaint is that ARTEL received a greater relative
advantage than Comtek from the agency's approach. Given our view that the
agency was not unreasonable in its interpretation of section M of the RFP,
and given the agency's decision to adopt whichever interpretation yielded
the highest score for each offeror, we conclude that Comtek has been treated
fairly here, and that there was no attempt to select whichever approach
would preclude award to Comtek.

Evaluation of Past Performance

In the area of past performance, Comtek filed a supplemental protest arguing
that the agency's evaluation record showed that DISA's past performance
scores for ARTEL did not fairly represent the nature of the underlying
comments received from references. In fact, comments to this effect were
found in the materials developed by the PPEET (and provided with the agency
report), wherein for each of the four past performance subfactors, the PPEET
included comments like the one below:

Although given numerical scores of 4 and 5, the narrative often describe[s]
the job as meeting the [Statement of Work] requirements. There is little
description of what ARTEL & FCI did that was more than satisfactory. This
discrepancy between the score and the narratives is a weakness on the part
of the [contracting officer's representative/ contracting officer] . . . .

AR, Tab 13, attach. 17, at 1.

In its second agency report, DISA conceded that there were inconsistencies
between some of the narrative comments and the numerical scores awarded by
the past performance respondents. To address this, DISA conducted a review
of each of the narratives and underlying numerical scores for both Comtek
and ARTEL before recalculating the past performance score used in its
evaluation. The result of the reevaluation was that ARTEL's past performance
score of 4.0 stayed the same, while Comtek's score was increased under each
of the four past performance subfactors, raising its past performance score
overall from 3.59 to 3.88. 2nd Agency Report at 38. In response, Comtek
argues that the PPEET Chair's approach to recalculating the past performance
scores was unreasonable, and identifies three separate instances where it
alleges that the review of narratives and underlying scores unfairly favored
ARTEL.

Comtek argues that the agency's approach to recalculating the past
performance scores is unreasonable because it allegedly differs from the
approach used in the initial evaluation. Specifically, Comtek notes that the
initial approach relied upon averaging scores given by the PPEET Chair and
her two subordinate evaluators, while the reevaluation was performed using a
percentage-based approach. Thus, Comtek complains that this approach must
have been adopted to ensure that ARTEL would continue to receive a higher
score. Comtek argues that if the scores were averaged, it would have
prevailed in this area with a rating of 4.19 to ARTEL's 4.16--rather than
the 3.88 and 4.0 ratings received from the reevaluation performed by the
agency.

We disagree with Comtek's assertions, and the premises upon which they are
based. The record here shows that the agency's review of ARTEL's score in
this area considered 54 potential responses for each of the four subfactors
in the past performance area. 2nd AR at 36. To reevaluate these responses,
the PPEET Chair calculated the percentage of each of the five possible
numerical scores that were assigned under each subfactor. A table showing
how the responses were reviewed for ARTEL, under each past performance
subfactor, is set forth below:

                 Quality   Timeliness  Cost       Customer
                                       Control    Satisfaction

 5 -             38%       38%         31%        49%
 Outstanding

 4 - Very Good   38%       36%         39%        38%

 3 -             25%       25%         27%        13%
 Satisfactory

 2 - Marginal    0         2%          2%         0

 1 -             0         0           0          0
 Unacceptable

2nd AR, attach. 20. By reviewing the range of responses set forth above, the
PPEET Chair (acting alone now, as the two other PPEET evaluators were no
longer available for this procurement) assigned a rating of 1 to 5 based on
where the greatest concentration of responses occurred.

Comtek's claim that scores were initially averaged is only partially
accurate. In the earlier evaluation the scores assigned by the three PPEET
evaluators were averaged; in the subsequent evaluation, the two PPEET
evaluators were no longer available and the PPEET chair was performing the
evaluation alone. Thus, averaging the scores of multiple evaluators was no
longer an issue. On the other hand, the averaging of the scores awarded by
references responding to the past performance questionnaire, which Comtek
also seeks, was never done. In our view, there is nothing about the approach
described above that is inherently unreasonable, and the approach is not
rendered unreasonable simply because it is different from the approach taken
initially. In short and again, there is no basis for our Office to conclude
that DISA has chosen this approach unreasonably or to inflict harm on
Comtek. [3]

We also conclude that Comtek has failed to show how it was prejudiced as a
result of the allegedly unfair review of the narrative responses and
numerical scores received from the underlying references. In this regard,
all of the evaluation materials associated with the agency reassessment of
past performance were provided to Comtek under a protective order, yet
Comtek raises only three instances of judgments that were allegedly unfair.
[4] Two of the three adjustments involved an increase in the underlying
response score for ARTEL; however, the record shows that the agency
ultimately made no adjustment to ARTEL's score in the past performance area.
Thus, these adjustments had no impact on the evaluation here. The third
challenge involves a situation where the agency elected not to increase the
score of one of Comtek's subcontractors on one response under one past
performance evaluation subfactor. In our view, and considering the fact that
Comtek makes no attempt to show that increasing its score for this one of
22 responses under one of 4 past performance subfactors would change its
score in the past performance area--and our review of the record strongly
suggests it would not--we see no basis to conclude that Comtek was
prejudiced by the agency's reevaluation.

Evaluation of the Relationship with the NEC Contractor

In a final remaining challenge, Comtek argues that the SSA erred when he
concluded that the ARTEL proposal offered a "a firmer commitment to a
working relationship to the [NEC] contractor." Soure Selection Decision
Memorandum, supra, at 2. The contractor's ability to work with the large
business NEC contractor was one of the management evaluation subfactors
identified in the solicitation. RFP sect. M-4.d.4.C. In Comtek's view, this
conclusion was irrational since during the course of the evaluation here,
Comtek's major subcontractor, GTE, was selected to be the NEC contractor.
Since Comtek and GTE have worked together before, are offering to do so
again, and already have in place a non-disclosure agreement related to their
current proposal, Comtek contends that using this conclusion as a
discriminator between the proposals is irrational.

We have reviewed all of Comtek's allegations, the underlying evaluation
materials, and the agency's arguments, and we disagree with Comtek's
assertions in this area. First, the agency argues, and our review of the
materials shows, that ARTEL's proposal was more thorough in this area. In
addition, the agency's review was based on the representations and
approaches made in the proposal--especially since during most of the time
the agency was evaluating these proposals, GTE had not yet been selected for
award. Finally, we also agree with the agency's view that Comtek's
agreements with GTE about their relationship as prime contractor and
subcontractor for the ASC contract may not necessarily translate to their
relationship as prime

contractors for the ASC and NEC efforts. As a result, we see nothing
unreasonable about the SSA's conclusion that ARTEL's proposal's commitment
in this area was preferable to the commitments found in Comtek's proposal.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

Notes

1. Since the record shows that the SSEB, SSAC, and SSA all ultimately agreed
that ARTEL and Comtek offered the most advantageous proposals--the other two
offerors had lower scores and higher prices--this decision focuses only on
ARTEL and Comtek.

2. Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes the Small Business
Administration to enter into contracts with government agencies and to
arrange for performance through subcontracts with socially and economically
disadvantaged business concerns. 15 U.S.C. sect. 637(a) (1994). For purposes of
our consideration here, we see no importance in the fact that USATREX
involved an 8(a) set-aside, while the procurement here is reserved for any
small business, regardless of whether it qualifies as a socially
disadvantaged business under the 8(a) program.

3. In addition, the corrected scores Comtek argues would have resulted from
the use of averaging the past performance responses have a clearly de
minimis impact on the overall proposal scores assigned here. Specifically,
if we use the 4.19 and 4.16 past performance scores that Comtek argues it
and ARTEL should receive, respectively, add those scores to the 3.0 and 3.8
experience scores received, and apply the 30 percent weight used for this
area, the corrected past performance/experience scores for Comtek and ARTEL
are 2.16 and 2.39 respectively. Substituting these scores in the overall
proposal score formula, Comtek's and ARTEL's scores both increase--from 6.39
and 7.54, to 6.58 and 7.60, respectively. Thus, even if Comtek's challenges
were upheld, the minimal change in scores would not warrant a new
cost/technical tradeoff. Advanced Data Concepts, Inc., B-277801.4, June 1,
1998, 98-1 CPD para. 145 at 4-5.

4. As stated above, the agency reviewed 54 such responses for ARTEL's
reevaluation; the corresponding number for Comtek was 22 responses. 2nd AR
at 36-37. If the materials had displayed other examples of unfairness,
Comtek was in a position to raise them. Since it did not, we assume there
were no more.