TITLE:   Scientific and Commercial Systems Corporation; Omni Corporation, B-283160; B-283160.2; B-283160.3; B-283160.4; B-283160.5, October 14, 1999
BNUMBER:  B-283160; B-283160.2; B-283160.3; B-283160.4; B-283160.5
DATE:  October 14, 1999
**********************************************************************
Scientific and Commercial Systems Corporation; Omni Corporation, B-283160;
B-283160.2; B-283160.3; B-283160.4; B-283160.5, October 14, 1999

Decision

Matter of: Scientific and Commercial Systems Corporation; Omni Corporation

File: B-283160; B-283160.2; B-283160.3; B-283160.4; B-283160.5

Date: October 14, 1999

Thomas C. Papson, Esq., and Richard P. Castiglia, Esq., McKenna & Cuneo, for
Scientific and Commercial Systems Corporation; and Paul F. Khoury, Esq.,
Scott M. McCaleb, Esq., Eric W. Leonard, Esq., and Daniel A. Silien, Esq.,
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, for Omni Corporation, the protesters.

Douglas L. Patin, Esq., and Robert J. Symon, Esq., Spriggs & Hollingsworth,
for Information Dynamics, Inc., an intervenor.

Vincent A. Salgado, Esq., and Jerald Kennemuth, Esq., National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, for the agency.

Aldo A. Benejam, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Protesters' contentions that agency improperly evaluated proposals are
denied where the record shows that the agency evaluated in accordance with
the criteria announced in the solicitation, and the record reasonably
supports the evaluators' conclusions.

2. Protester's argument that an upward adjustment made to its proposed costs
to account for unacceptable reductions in staffing was improper is denied,
where the record shows that the agency had a reasonable basis for the
adjustment.

DECISION

Scientific and Commercial Systems Corporation (SCSC) and Omni Corporation
protest the award of a contract to Information Dynamics, Inc. (IDI) under
request for proposals (RFP) No. 3-038038, issued by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) for support services at the NASA Glenn
Research Center in Ohio. [1] The protesters primarily argue that the
agency's evaluation of proposals and the award decision were flawed.

We deny the protests.

Background

NASA's Glenn Research Center (GRC) defines and develops advanced technology
for high priority national needs. The work of the GRC is directed towards
new propulsion, power, and communications technologies for application to
aeronautics and space to ensure the nation's leadership in these areas. The
GRC's end products primarily consist of reports made available to potential
users in various fields, including the aircraft engine, energy, automotive,
and space industries. RFP sect. C, at C-1. The GRC is staffed with scientists
and engineers who plan, conduct or oversee and report on the research tasks
and projects at the facility. The contract contemplated by the RFP is to
obtain services in support of those projects.

The RFP for the management operations contract (referred to in the record as
the MOC-1 contract) was issued on December 7, 1998 as a total small business
set-aside. The RFP contemplated the award of a cost-plus-incentive-fee type
contract for a 2-year base period, with up to three 1-year option periods.
Id. sect.sect. F.2, L.3; Agency Report (AR), exh. 3, Industry Briefing, Dec. 15,
1998. The RFP identified seven discrete tasks for which the successful
offeror is to provide management operations. [2]

Section M.3 of the RFP listed mission suitability, cost and fees, and
relevant experience and past performance (REPP) as evaluation factors of
equal importance. RFP sect.sect. M.3, M.4.b. The RFP stated that within the mission
suitability factor, the agency would evaluate the following subfactors
(numerical weights shown in parentheses): quality control (500 points);
management plan (350 points); and key personnel (150 points), for a maximum
total of 1,000 points. Id. amend. 1, sect. M.4.a. The RFP stated that the agency
would perform a cost analysis in accordance with Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) sect. 15.404, and that the agency would determine a probable
cost for each offeror. Id. sect. M.3 FACTOR-2 COST AND FEES, at M-4. Of the
three factors, cost and REPP were not scored, but were evaluated by the
source evaluation board (SEB) for consideration by the source selection
authority (SSA). RFP sect. M.2. Offerors were required to submit proposals in
three separate volumes: mission suitability (volume I), cost and fees
(volume II), and REPP (volume III).

Ten firms, including Omni, SCSC, and IDI, submitted proposals by the
respective due dates. [3] The SEB evaluated proposals by assigning point
scores and adjectival ratings to each subfactor and an overall adjectival
rating (ranging from poor to excellent) under the mission suitability
factor, and an adjectival rating under the REPP factor. The agency did not
conduct discussions. The following table shows the results of the evaluation
for the protesters and the awardee:

 Factor/Subfactor     Omni    SCSC         IDI

 Mission Suitability    Good     Very      Very
                                 Good      Good
 Quality Control Plan   270
                                 417       483
 Management Plan        206
                                 315       305
 Key Personnel          38
                                 105       101
 Totals                 514
                                 837       889

 REPP                 Good    Excellent    Very
                                           Good

 Probable Costs       $98.8   $100.4       $99.1

 (in millions)

AR, exh. 20, MOC-1 Presentation of Final Findings to SSA, June 8, 1999.
Based on the results of the SEB's evaluation, the SSA concluded that the
proposals submitted by IDI and SCSC, which received the two highest mission
suitability scores, were significantly superior to those of the other
offerors. AR exh. 23, Source Selection Statement, June 8, 1999, at 12. The
SSA noted that IDI's proposal had the highest mission suitability rating,
primarily due to its comprehensive quality control plan, the most heavily
weighted subfactor within that area. The SSA also noted that IDI had
proposed the lowest cost and the second-lowest total evaluated cost, and had
received a "very good" rating under the REPP factor. The SSA analyzed the
SEB's findings regarding SCSC's and IDI's proposals and noted several
meaningful differences between those two firms' proposals. Based on this
analysis, the SSA selected IDI for award. These protests followed
debriefings by the agency. [4]

SCSC's Protest

SCSC argues that the evaluation of its own proposal and IDI's under all
evaluation factors was unreasonable. Specifically, SCSC argues that had the
SEB properly evaluated its proposal, its point score under the mission
suitability factor would have been higher than IDI's. The protester contends
that several "strengths" the evaluators noted in its proposal should have
been considered "significant," while several weaknesses were improperly
assigned. SCSC also argues that the agency improperly made an upward
adjustment to its proposed costs. [5]

Omni's Protest

Omni raises various challenges to the evaluation of its proposal under the
mission suitability and REPP factors. [6] With respect to the mission
suitability factor, Omni argues that the agency unreasonably evaluated its
proposal under the quality control subfactor because, in assigning a
weakness to its proposal, the evaluators misunderstood the difference
between "quality assurance" and "quality control." The protester also argues
that the agency improperly failed to evaluate the majority of the key
personnel section of its proposal because the evaluators incorrectly
concluded that Omni had exceeded the solicitation's page limitation. The
protester also contends that the evaluation of proposals under the mission
suitability factor was the result of disparate treatment.

Omni further maintains that the evaluators improperly downgraded Omni's
proposal under the REPP factor. In this regard, Omni argues that while the
RFP instructed offerors to provide REPP information only for themselves and
"major subcontractors," the SEB improperly credited other offerors'
proposals under the REPP factor for their description of "minor
subcontractors," and improperly assigned weaknesses to Omni's proposal as a
result of the absence of such information in its proposal.

Discussion

Our Office will not engage in an independent evaluation of proposals nor
make an independent determination of their relative merits. Litton Sys.,
Inc., B- 239123, Aug. 7, 1990, 90-2 CPD para. 114 at 9. Rather, we review the
agency's evaluation only to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent
with the terms of the solicitation. Sensis Corp., B-265790.2, Jan. 17, 1996,
96-1 CPD para. 77 at 6. A protester's mere disagreement with the agency's
conclusions does not render the evaluation unreasonable. ESCO, Inc.,
B-225565, Apr. 29, 1987, 87-1 CPD para. 450 at 7. The protesters' various
challenges to the evaluation of their own and IDI's proposals are discussed
by individual factor and subfactor below. Based on our review of the record,
including the SEB's narratives in support of its evaluation, we conclude
that the evaluation of proposals is reasonably supported. In this decision,
we discuss some of the more significant issues with respect to both
protesters' contentions.

Evaluation of Proposals: Mission Suitability Factor

Quality Control Plan Subfactor

The RFP required the successful offeror to produce various reports at
specified times throughout performance of the contract. RFP sect. C, at C-6
through C-9. Under "QUALITY CONTROL," section L of the RFP instructed
offerors to describe in detail a plan to ensure that the services would meet
the contract's performance standards, and listed several items that offerors
should include in their proposals, including:

  a. Reporting--Discuss the processes you would use to ensure timely and
     accurate completion of all regularly-scheduled required reports, e.g.,
     task-specific, government property, safety, and financial reports.
     (Emphasis added.)

RFP amend. 1, sect. L.16, at L-7 through L-8. The RFP further distinguished
between administrative and technical reporting requirements. In addition,
under the quality control plan subfactor, section M of the RFP explained how
the offerors' proposed inspection systems would be evaluated and
specifically stated that "[t]he reporting processes will be evaluated based
on how well they would ensure all reporting requirements are met." RFP
sect. M.3, at M-2.

SCSC's proposal earned 417 points (out of a maximum possible score of 500
points) under the quality control plan subfactor. The SEB identified two
weaknesses in SCSC's proposal under this subfactor-(1) that SCSC's proposal
did not adequately describe a process for assuring that reporting
requirements under the contract are met; and (2) that employees would share
fees for performance below the standard performance level (SPL). AR, exh.
20, MOC-1 Presentation of Final Findings to SSA, June 8, 1999, at 13. With
regard to the second weakness, the SEB understood that SCSC proposed to
[DELETED]. By contrast, the SEB assessed no weaknesses to IDI's proposal
under this subfactor.

SCSC argues that the SEB unreasonably identified the first weakness because
SCSC [DELETED]. SCSC Comments, Aug. 19, 1999, at 17-18. SCSC also alleges
that NASA improperly assigned a "significant" strength to IDI's proposal for
its automated system for reporting. With respect to the second identified
weakness, SCSC maintains that the SEB misunderstood its proposal because its
incentive plan [DELETED].

Regarding SCSC's reporting, notwithstanding the RFP's specific instructions,
SCSC's proposal contained only a very brief section addressing the RFP's
reporting requirements. For example, while SCSC proposed [DELETED], the SEB
noted that SCSC's proposal contained no discussion of the processes that
SCSC would use to ensure that all of the RFP's reporting requirements are
met. Nor did the proposal identify the specific reports or their submission
dates. The SEB also found that SCSC's proposal did not discuss any process
by which SCSC would recognize a reporting requirement and did not include a
system of tracking submission dates. Although SCSC's proposal did include a
chart listing the required reports and the individuals responsible for
generating them, the SEB found that the proposal contained no detailed
discussion of the process SCSC would use to ensure their timely and accurate
production as required by the RFP. Moreover, SCSC's proposal failed to
distinguish technical from administrative reports or to recognize the
magnitude of the RFP's requirements. [7] Given the RFP's instructions for
offerors to discuss their processes for ensuring the timely production of
all required reports, we think that the evaluators reasonably expected a
discussion of the offeror's processes for ensuring compliance with all
reporting requirements, not a mere listing of the reports. Since SCSC's
proposal provided no such discussion, the SEB reasonably identified this as
a weakness.

By contrast to SCSC's proposal, our review reveals that the SEB reasonably
found that IDI's proposal provided considerable detail about its processes
for ensuring compliance with all of the RFP's reporting requirements. For
example, the evaluators were particularly impressed with IDI's proposal to
use [DELETED]. Further, contrary to SCSC's assertion, IDI also proposed to
[DELETED]. Further, the agency explains that, as contrasted with SCSC's
proposal, IDI's proposal clearly acknowledged the important distinctions
among the numerous technical and administrative reporting requirements.
Finally, contrary to the protester's assertion, the record shows that the
"significant" strength assigned IDI's proposal in this area was based on
several factors, of which IDI's [DELETED] was but one considered by the SEB.

SCSC further contends that the second weakness identified in this area,
regarding its proposal to share the technical performance incentive fee for
performance below the SPL, was unreasonable because the RFP does not
prohibit sharing incentive fees for performance below the SPL. Specifically,
the SEB noted SCSC's proposal to share technical performance fees with its
employees when overall contract performance fell below the government's
minimum required level of performance, as a weakness. SCSC states, however,
that its incentive program provides motivation for its employees to perform
at the highest levels and is more advantageous than IDI's.

As relevant here, the RFP explained the technical performance fee adjustment
as follows:

c. Technical Performance Incentive Fee Adjustment The Contractor's Technical
Performance Fee shall be determined based on comparison between the
Contractor's weighted technical performance score and the related [SPL]. A
performance score will be determined at the end of every six months of
performance, based on the individual standards and relative weights itemized
in Attachment A. For superior (relative to the SPL) performance, the fee
will be increased by ___% for every score point, or fraction thereof, above
the SPL. For inferior performance, the fee will be decreased by ___% for
every score point below the SPL. The maximum fee will be ___% of the target
fee, the fee at the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) is ___% of the target
fee, and the minimum fee will be 0.0 %. [8]

RFP sect. B.2.c, at B-7. According to the RFP's scheme, offerors were permitted
to set a target fee for performing at the SPL. This provision thus allows
for proportional adjustments, either upward or downward, for performance
above or below the SPL. The RFP further required offerors to describe how,
and at what organizational level, its employees would be held accountable
for meeting performance standards. RFP amend. 1, sect. L.16, subfactor 1.b.,
QUALITY CONTROL, Accountability, at L-7.

SCSC contends that the evaluators essentially misunderstood its approach.
SCSC explains that its incentive program contemplates [DELETED]. SCSC
Comments, Aug. 19, 1999, at 10. SCSC argues that the SEB unreasonably
assigned a weakness for its incentive plan because its intent is
to[DELETED], as the evaluators concluded. Id.

Based on our review of the record, we do not agree with the protester that
the evaluators misunderstood its approach. SCSC stated in its proposal that
[DELETED]. AR, exh. 9, SCSC vol. I, Mission Suitability Proposal, at SF2 37.
Notwithstanding SCSC's argument to the contrary, its proposal does not
clearly establish a [DELETED]. Rather, based on the information in SCSC's
proposal, the evaluators correctly concluded that under SCSC's plan,
[DELETED]. In the SEB's [DELETED] did not indicate that SCSC intended to
hold its employees adequately accountable for meeting the performance
standards as required by the RFP. In our view, the evaluators' assigning a
weakness in this area is consistent with the RFP, which required offerors to
discuss how and at what organizational levels their employees would be held
accountable for meeting the performance standards. If SCSC intended to
implement [DELETED], as it now maintains, it should have more clearly
explained it in its proposal. [9]

We now turn to the evaluation of Omni's proposal under the quality control
plan subfactor, where Omni's proposal earned 270 points. AR, exh. 20, supra,
at 16. The SEB identified two strengths in the proposal, including that Omni
proposed to make employees aware of performance requirements and results and
the proposed financial incentives to meet or exceed the performance
standards. However, the SEB identified three specific weaknesses in this
area, including Omni's proposed inspection plan for initiating corrective
actions when performance fell below acceptable quality levels. The SEB also
found unclear how Omni's proposed inspection methods and frequencies would
apply to the specific contract tasks; and that Omni had provided little
assurance that the proposed inspection system would be ready when required.
Id. The agency explains that its main concern with Omni's inspection system
is that it indicates that Omni lacks a basic understanding of the
performance-based nature of the MOC-1 contract.

Omni argues that the agency unreasonably assigned its proposal a weakness
with respect to its proposed inspection system because NASA misunderstood
the differences between the government's role in conducting "quality
assurance" and the contractor's obligation to provide "quality control" in
the context of a performance-based contract. Omni Comments, Aug. 16, 1999,
at 22. Omni asserts that it recognized this difference, explained it in its
proposal, and therefore, should have received a strength, not a weakness, in
this area. Omni also argues that the SEB improperly failed to assign a
strength to its proposal in this area for its automated system for meeting
reporting requirements.

The record does not support the protester's assertion that the weakness
assigned its proposal concerning Omni's inspection system was the result of
an alleged misunderstanding of the roles of the government and the
contractor. The agency explains that while the contracting officer
inappropriately quoted from Omni's proposal regarding the roles of the
government and the contractor under a performance-based contract, the
weakness was assigned primarily because Omni's discussion of its proposed
inspection system was too general and lacked any details of the inspections
that it considers appropriate for specific tasks. COS, Aug. 6, 1999, para. 3.20.
In this connection, the agency states that Omni's quality plan is "quite
general in nature," is not tied to any specific task, and merely contains a
blanket statement that the firm has [DELETED]. Moreover, the agency explains
that while Omni stated in its proposal that its inspection system has been
tested and proven, the SEB found no contract in Omni's proposal that was
sufficiently similar in scope to the MOC-1 contract to conclude that its
established inspection system could be applied to the MOC-1 contract without
substantial customization. AR, Sept. 3, 1999, at 15. In view of the agency's
explanation, we find no basis to object to the SEB's assigning a weakness to
Omni's proposal in this area.

Omni also argues that its comprehensive system for reporting should have
earned its proposal a strength in this area. In this connection, Omni states
that it proposed an [DELETED] as an oversight system to ensure the quality
delivery of services, including reporting, that are required under the
contemplated MOC-1 contract. Omni Comments, supra, at 30. Omni contends that
the evaluation of proposals in this area reflects disparate treatment
because NASA failed to assign Omni's proposal a strength while doing so for
IDI's proposal, despite "nearly identical automated reporting systems." Id.
The protester's contentions are without merit.

The agency explains that unlike IDI's system, and contrary to the
protester's assertion that it proposed a "nearly identical automated
reporting system," Omni's [DELETED], while IDI proposed a system for
tracking required reports. COS, Aug. 6, 1999, para. 3.12. In the SEB's view,
Omni's system did not constitute a process for ensuring the timely
completion of required reports, as required by the RFP. In addition, the
agency explains that, despite the RFP's instructions, Omni's description of
its system was very generic, and did not relate its system to the individual
tasks or the statement of work. By contrast, the agency states, and the
record shows, that IDI provided a more detailed description of its automated
system in its proposal. In addition, the SEB assigned a "significant"
strength to IDI's proposal under the quality control plan subfactor for its
excellent quality assurance, including [DELETED] AR, exh. 20, supra, at 13.
In light of the RFP's specific instructions to offerors to describe in
detail a plan to ensure that the required services would be met, including
processes for completing scheduled reports, and the SEB's findings, we see
no basis to object to the evaluation of proposals in this area.

Management Plan Subfactor

The RFP specifically stated that offerors' management plans should provide
information under the following three elements which would be separately
evaluated: phase-in plan, personnel management, and business management. RFP
amend. 1, sect.sect. L.16, at L-8 through L-9, and M.3, M-2 through M-4. Under the
phase-in plan, offerors were instructed "to provide details of the proposed
procedures, methods and techniques to be used to continue the services at
required performance standards during the phase-in period, including
transitioning of current tasks." Id. at L-8. The RFP further instructed
offerors to provide "details as to the staffing of the required complement,
including sources of personnel, recruiting methods, and how initial
orientation will be accomplished." Id. sect. L.16, at L-8.

Within the management plan subfactor, SCSC's proposal earned 315 points (out
of a possible maximum of 350 points). AR, exh. 20, supra, at 18. Both SCSC's
and IDI's proposals received one significant strength each, and several
other strengths which the SEB did not view as significant. However, the SEB
noted that SCSC's proposal had no detailed discussion of its employee
orientation on the new performance-based contract approach, and identified
this as a weakness under this subfactor.

SCSC argues that the SEB unreasonably assigned a weakness under this
subfactor because its proposal included [DELETED] AR, exh. 9, SCSC Mission
Suitability Proposal, vol. I, at SF2 2. SCSC contends that absent this
allegedly improperly assigned weakness, the evaluation of its proposal under
the management plan subfactor would have resulted in an adjectival rating of
"excellent" and a corresponding higher point score.

The agency explains that the evaluators viewed new employee orientation as
an important aspect of the management plan, particularly because the RFP
contemplated a performance-based contract, as contrasted with the existing
contract which is a cost-plus-award-fee effort. COS, Aug. 6, 1999, para. 3-19.
In light of this difference in approach, the SEB believed that the
successful offeror should provide specific orientation to its employees
regarding the significance of their effort in a performance-based contract
environment. The SEB also concluded that to be most effective, this
orientation should be provided during the phase-in period to assure that
employees understood the performance standards and begin working towards
meeting those standards early on during contract performance. The SEB found,
however, that SCSC's proposal did not adequately address employee
orientation during the phase-in period.

While SCSC's proposal included a [DELETED], our review of the proposal
reveals that beyond that brief presentation, SCSC provided no detailed
discussion on employee orientation. In fact, the employee orientation
section of SCSC's proposal consisted of four rather vague, very general
sentences such as [DELETED] as AR, exh. 9, supra, at SF2 3. In our view,
given the significant differences in the nature of the contractual vehicle
contemplated by the RFP, the agency reasonably concluded that such cursory
treatment of employee orientation during phase-in clearly fails to provide
the level of detail of the offeror's proposed procedures, methods and
techniques as called for in the RFP.

In further support of the evaluation in this regard, the proposal states
that SCSC's [DELETED]. Further, while SCSC's proposal generally lists the
areas to be covered during orientation, it fails to mention the transition
to the performance-based nature of the MOC-1 contract, which the SEB viewed
as a significant change from the existing contract. Since the existing
contract is not performance-based, the SEB considered it important for
offerors to specifically address in their proposals how all employees,
particularly [DELETED], would be fully briefed on the new performance-based
requirements of the contract. In view of the differences between the current
contract and the MOC-1 contract, the SEB reasonably concluded that even if
SCSC were to [DELETED], it was important that the proposal explain how those
employees would be provided adequate orientation to ensure their full
understanding of the performance-based nature of the MOC-1 contract. Based
on our review of the record, including the RFP's instructions, we think that
the evaluators reasonably considered SCSC's failure to provide more emphasis
and details in its proposal on employee orientation, to be a weakness.

SCSC contends that the SEB unreasonably assigned a strength to IDI's
proposal for its government/contractor interface, but did not assign SCSC's
proposal a similar strength despite the fact that, according to the
protester, there is no meaningful difference between the two proposals in
this area. In this connection, the record shows that SCSC's proposal
described various "possible" government/contractor interfaces, AR, exh. 9,
at SF2 44, which the evaluators did not find particularly worthy of a noting
as a strength. By contrast, IDI's proposal identified direct interfaces with
key agency officials such as, for example, the safety office. The agency
explains that IDI's proposed level of interaction between the government and
contractor personnel indicated a greater understanding of the importance the
agency places on quality control, safety, and diversity. The SEB thus found
that IDI's level of interface at the organizational levels described in its
proposal simply would result in more effective communications on these
important issues, resulting in the SEB's reasonably assigning a strength to
IDI's proposal on this basis.

We now turn to the evaluation of Omni's proposal under the management plan
subfactor, where Omni's proposal earned 206 points out of 350 available
points. The SEB identified Omni's transition team as a weakness under the
phase-in element primarily because Omni proposed [DELETED] as key personnel
in its transition team. The evaluators felt that having incumbent personnel
on the transition team would inevitably cause interruptions to the
continuity of the efforts under the current contract, and downgraded the
proposal accordingly.

Omni argues that the weakness assigned its proposal because it offered
incumbent personnel in its transition team was unreasonable because its
proposal addressed the potential for work disruption during the phase-in
period and outlined a strategy to mitigate any adverse effects of contract
phase-in. Omni Comments, Aug. 16, 1999, at 24. Additionally, Omni contends
that assigning the weakness was unreasonable because out of [DELETED]
transition team members, Omni proposed using [DELETED] and proposed to offer
a "right of first refusal" to [DELETED] other incumbent employees to assist
during the phase-in process. Id. at 24-25.

Regarding the phase-in plan, the RFP instructed offerors as follows:

The Offeror should provide details of the proposed procedures, methods and
techniques to be used to continue the services at required performance
standard during the phase-in period, including transitioning of current
tasks. Specific areas of concern during the phase-in period are continuity
of present work effort, adequacy of staffing levels and staff
qualifications, and transition of existing collective bargaining agreement.
The Offeror should address the transition of the present work effort to the
proposed organization, the potential for work interruption and how it would
be eliminated or minimized and technical hiring evaluation criteria and
plan.

RFP sect. L.16, at L-8. The RFP further stated that the agency's primary areas
of concern are "continuity of present work effort, adequacy of staffing
levels and staff qualifications, timely transfer of existing tasks,
mechanisms for making any off-site facilities operational and minimizing
work interruptions." RFP sect. M.3, SUBFACTOR 2-MANAGEMENT PLAN (a) -Phase-In
Plan, at M-2 (emphasis added).

Omni proposed [DELETED] as part of its transition team, and [DELETED] (both
of which the RFP identified as critical tasks), [DELETED] AR, exh. 30, Omni
Corp., vol. I--Mission Suitability, March 10, 1999, at 2-2. The agency
explains that the SEB viewed Omni's proposal to have incumbent employees on
its transition team as a weakness primarily because the duties of transition
managers are not limited to after-hours contact with incumbent personnel,
but include such activities as establishing contact with NASA managers and
familiarization with the technical requirements and workloads in all areas
of the required tasks.

It is undisputed that the purpose of the phase-in team is to ensure an
orderly transition of the work from the incumbent contractor to the awardee.
As such, the agency states that transition team members have
responsibilities critical to the smooth transitioning of the incumbent
effort to the new contract. We find reasonable the agency's position that
incumbent employees, as Omni proposed, could not properly carry out those
responsibilities simultaneously with their current duties. Further, although
Omni proposed [DELETED] it was not unreasonable for the SEB to evaluate the
proposal assuming that the [DELETED] would be employed by Omni and that Omni
clearly intended to assign all [DELETED] individuals as key personnel on its
transition team. Since [DELETED] of the employees Omni proposed on its
transition team are employees on the incumbent contract, and given the
responsibilities of the transition managers, we think that the evaluators
reasonably concluded that incumbent employees could not be expected to
perform all of their responsibilities, without some disruptions either to
the effort under the existing contract, or to the transition tasks under the
new contract, or both. Accordingly, we think that the evaluators reasonably
considered Omni's proposed transition team a weakness under this subfactor.
[10]

In contrast to Omni's and SCSC's proposal, the orientation section of IDI's
phase-in plan clearly describes a very comprehensive approach that includes
such topics of employee importance as [DELETED]. IDI's proposal also
specifically states that [DELETED]. AR, exh. 12, IDI Mission Suitability
proposal, vol. I, at I-50. The SEB thus found that by comparison to the
protesters' proposals, IDI clearly understood the importance of orientation
of its employees, and recognized this aspect of the proposal in the
evaluation as a "[t]horough preparation for phase-in." as a strength. AR,
exh. 20, supra, at 18.

Omni also contends that its proposal should have received a strength under
the management plan factor for its cultural diversity plan. In this
connection, Omni argues that it has had in place a cultural diversity plan
for several years, and that the firm has been successful in increasing the
minority component of its workforce. Omni Comments, Aug. 16, 1999, at 32.

Regarding the cultural diversity plan, the RFP stated as follows:

The Offeror's plan should include a strategy to achieve, maintain and manage
cultural diversity among the entire staff, including management and
supervisory positions. This plan should include recruiting plans and sources
for under-represented groups and methods for achieving diversity goals.

RFP amend. 1, sect. L.16, at L-8 through L-9. Section M of the RFP further
advised that the offeror's plan for achieving or maintaining cultural
diversity among the entire staff, including management, would be evaluated
based on the extent of the planned recruiting efforts and quality of the
identified sources. Id. sect. M.3, at M-3.

The record shows that the SEB considered Omni's cultural diversity plan to
meet the RFP's requirements, but noted nothing in the plan as exceptional or
worth being identified as a strength. Specifically, the agency explains that
Omni's proposal failed to present a strategy for achieving, maintaining or
managing any particular goal among its staff. While the evaluators
recognized that Omni's proposal generally addressed cultural diversity, the
evaluators considered the discussion in this area to be lacking a "strategy"
for achieving and maintaining cultural diversity.

Omni has not provided any persuasive argument that this aspect of the
evaluation was unreasonable. The fact that Omni may have had in place a
cultural diversity plan for several years, as it now asserts, and that the
firm has been successful in increasing the minority component of its
workforce, does not replace its obligation to provide in its proposal a
sufficiently detailed discussion of a strategy to achieve, maintain, and
manage cultural diversity among its entire staff as required by the RFP.
Offerors are responsible for preparing their proposals in a manner that
establishes that what is offered will meet the government's needs, and
agencies are not obligated to search out omitted information or to credit
offerors for information that they may have, but failed to submit with their
proposal. Campbell Eng'g, Inc., B-231126, Aug. 11, 1988, 88-2 CPD para. 136 at
4. In view of the SEB's finding that there was nothing exceptional in Omni's
cultural diversity plan worth noting, we think the agency was reasonable in
not crediting the protester with a "strength" in this area.

Key Personnel Subfactor

SCSC's proposal earned 105 points under the key personnel subfactor. AR,
exh. 20, supra, at 23. The SEB noted three strengths in SCSC's proposal--the
logistics experience and impressive accomplishments of SCSC's proposed
project manager; the extensive experience of SCSC's proposed management
team; and that SCSC's entire management team is committed to the
contract--none of which was deemed to be significant. Id. The SEB downgraded
SCSC's proposal in this area primarily based on its finding of the limited
educational qualifications and experience of the firm's proposed quality
control/safety manager (QC/SM).

SCSC argues that two of the noted strengths--particularly the strength
regarding its proposed project manager--should have been viewed as
"significant." SCSC further argues that even though it recognizes that its
proposed QC/SM is less experienced than her counterpart at IDI, that lesser
experience did not justify assigning a weakness to the proposal which
accounted for a reduction of 45 points in this area. SCSC Comments, Aug. 19,
1999, at 22, 29.

Section M of the RFP specifically stated that the offeror's proposed
qualifications for each key position would be evaluated to determine how
well the offeror understood the qualifications needed to ensure successful
completion of tasks. RFP amend. 1, sect. M.3, SUBFACTOR 3, KEY PERSONNEL, at
M-4. The record shows that the SEB concluded that the limited educational
level and experience of SCSC's proposed QC/SM were not suited to that
position. In particular, the SEB noted that the QC/SM's [DELETED], were of
little relevance in a position that calls for quality control and safety
duties. The agency further states that the position does not involve any
[DELETED] responsibilities, rendering her training in [DELETED] irrelevant
to the position. Given the limited qualifications of SCSC's proposed QC/SM,
which SCSC does not dispute, and in light of the agency's explanation, we
see no basis to object to the SEB's finding this a weakness in the proposal.
Since the QC/SM is a key position, we find nothing inherently unreasonable
in the SEB's deducting 45 points from the maximum number of points available
under this subfactor in light of the identified weaknesses. The protester's
argument that the weaknesses the SEB identified in its proposal with respect
to its proposed QC/SM did not justify a 45-point deduction in its score
reflects mere disagreement with the SEB's judgment as to how many points
should have been deducted for the identified weakness, which does not
establish that the evaluation was unreasonable. Arsenault Acquisition Corp.;
East Mulberry, LLC, B-276959, B-276959.2, Aug. 12, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 74 at 4.

SCSC also argues that its proposal should have earned a "significant"
strength under the key personnel subfactor because of the extensive
experience of its proposed project manager, [DELETED], including the fact
that he is currently managing a contract similar in size and scope as the
MOC-1 effort at the [DELETED]. SCSC points out that under [DELETED]
management, that contract experienced a cost underrun, earned a [DELETED]
percent cost incentive fee award, and achieved a [DELETED] percent
performance score during its first year. SCSC Protest Letter, July 6, 1999,
at 26; SCSC Comments, Aug. 19, 1999, at 22; Comments, Sept 10, 1999, at 34.
SCSC also argues that its proposal deserved a "significant" strength for its
highly experienced management team.

The RFP specifically stated that the level of commitment of the offeror's
project manager would be evaluated. RFP amend. 1, sect. M.3, SUBFACTOR 3, KEY
PERSONNEL, at M-4. The agency explains that the SEB concluded that assigning
a "significant" strength under the key personnel subfactor was warranted
only if the entire management team was found to be highly qualified, and any
aspect of the proposal "increased [the] probability of excellent
performance." COS, Aug. 6, 1999,

para. 3.33.

The evaluation record shows that the SEB recognized SCSC's proposed project
manager's qualifications, assigning the proposal a strength on this basis,
but concluded that assigning a "significant" strength was not warranted. The
agency points out that the evaluators were mindful of the fact that SCSC
provided no assurance that key personnel proposed at the inception of the
contract, such as [DELETED], would remain working on the MOC-1 effort. In
support of the evaluators' concern, the agency points out that SCSC proposed
[DELETED]. Given that the SEB found that SCSC's proposed QC/SM was not
"highly qualified," and that SCSC provided no assurance that [DELETED] would
be committed to this effort for the entire duration of the contract, [11] we
think that the SEB reasonably found that while SCSC's proposal warranted a
strength for its key personnel, that strength was not "significant." [12]

SCSC also maintains that the SEB artificially inflated IDI's score in this
area because it assigned the awardee's proposal 101 points, even though the
SEB found IDI's project manager's lack of task specific experience a
weakness in IDI's proposal, as well as noting weaknesses in other key
personnel. The agency explains that the evaluators did not view IDI's
proposed project manager's lack of task specific experience to be a
significant weakness because he has extensive management experience with
other types of tasks. COS, Aug. 6, 1999, para. 3.35. In addition, the agency
points out that IDI's proposed project manager's subordinates each have such
task specific experience. In view of the extensive task specific experience
of the project manager's subordinates, we think that the SEB reasonably
concluded that this area of the proposal did not appreciably increase the
risk of unsuccessful performance, and thus did not constitute a
"significant" weakness. Accordingly, we have no basis to object to the
overall assessment of IDI's proposal in this area.

Turning now to the evaluation of Omni's proposal, where the proposal
received only 38 of 150 available points, Omni argues that the SEB
improperly failed to consider the key personnel information contained in 8
pages of its mission suitability proposal (volume I) because the evaluators
erroneously concluded that Omni had exceeded the page limitation established
in the RFP for that volume. Omni asserts that the pages that NASA failed to
evaluate contained critical information required by the RFP including its
rationale for selecting key personnel, its methods for ensuring that key
personnel are in place at contract inception, its approach to personnel
replacement, and the resumes, commitments and salaries. Omni Comments, Aug.
16, 1999, at 4, 20.

As relevant to this aspect of Omni's protest, the RFP established a limit of
100 pages for the mission suitability proposals (volume I). RFP sect. L.9.a, at
L-4. The agency concedes that the SEB "erroneously failed to read or
evaluate 8 pages of Omni's proposal applicable to the key personnel
subfactor," because the evaluators mistakenly concluded that Omni's proposal
exceeded the page limitation. AR, Aug. 6, 1999, at 13-14. NASA states,
however, that based on the portions of the proposal evaluated, the SEB found
Omni's proposed low qualification requirements and compensation package for
its management team to be a major weakness. [13] NASA contends that given
that major weakness, the overall rating of "good" assigned Omni's proposal
in the mission suitability area could not have improved even if the
information contained in the unevaluated pages had been considered. Id. at
15.

In addition, the agency states that even if Omni's proposal received the
maximum number of points available for this subfactor, its mission
suitability score would have increased only 112 points, from 514 to 626
points, COS para. 3.29; its proposal would have remained within the "good" range
of adjectival ratings; [14] and its proposal's total point score under the
mission suitability factor would remain 211 points below SCSC's proposal
(which earned 837 points) and 263 points below IDI's proposal (which earned
889 points), the two highest scoring proposals.

In further support for its position, the agency has provided a declaration
from the SSA who states that after Omni filed this protest he was advised of
the error in the evaluation of Omni's proposal and was asked whether he
would have considered Omni's proposal for award of the MOC-1 contract if it
had received the maximum number of points available under the key personnel
subfactor (i.e., 150 points). The SSA states that he considered the question
in light of the results of the overall evaluation of SCSC's and IDI's
proposals and the relative ranking of Omni's proposal. The SSA concludes
that he "would not have considered Omni to be a serious candidate for award
even if it had received the entire 150 points available under Key
Personnel." AR attach., Declaration of Donald J. Campbell, Aug. 3. 1999, at
2.

Omni relies on our decision in Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, B-277263.2,
B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 91, to argue that the SSA's
post-protest written determination was prepared in the heat of the
adversarial process and should not be accorded any weight, and that the
SSA's reevaluation does not recognize the strengths Omni's proposal would
have received had NASA properly evaluated its proposal. We disagree.

The Boeing case involved a post hoc reevaluation and cost/technical tradeoff
late in the protest process where no tradeoff had been made during the
initial source selection. Further, the agency continued to assert there was
no error, but in order to immunize itself against losing the protest,
submitted a reevaluation that it argued was not necessary. Unlike the
situation here, the substantial nature of the agency's errors and the
resulting closeness of the proposals meant that, after the errors were
corrected in Boeing, the outcome was not clear. We thus concluded that it
was not appropriate to give weight to the agency's after-the-fact decisional
materials prepared for the purpose of ensuring that our Office would
conclude there was no prejudice to the protester.

In our view, the Boeing decision does not require that we disregard the
SSA's post-protest determination here. As the SSA points out, even if the
SEB had accorded Omni's proposal the maximum number of points available
under the key personnel subfactor, its total score under the mission
suitability factor would not surpass the scores of the two highest-rated,
slightly higher cost, proposals of SCSC and IDI by a relatively wide margin.
In fact, the record shows that Omni's total point score under the mission
suitability factor would remain lower than the scores of six other offerors'
proposals. AR, exh. 20, supra, at 28. In addition, the SSA's statement
points out that an adjustment to the score assigned to Omni's proposal under
the key personnel subfactor would not affect its adjectival "good" rating
under the REPP factor. That rating is one adjectival rating lower than that
assigned IDI's proposal (very good) and two adjectival ratings below that
assigned SCSC's proposal (excellent) under that factor. NASA further points
out that Omni's probable cost of $98.8 million was only approximately
$300,000 lower than IDI's probable cost of $99.1 million, and only $1.6
million lower than SCSC's probable cost of $100.4 million.

In short, there is nothing in the record here to support a conclusion that
the resulting 112-point change in Omni's mission suitability score, standing
alone, would materially alter the agency's cost/technical tradeoff decision.
Instead, we think that when considered in light of Omni's marginal cost
advantage over IDI's proposal and when compared to the other higher-rated
proposals, the resulting increase of 112 points on a 1000-point scale, while
not necessarily de minimis, is not sufficient to show that the SSA's
conclusion--that he would not have considered Omni a serious candidate for
award--is unreasonable. See Marathon Watch Co. Ltd., B-281876,

B-281876.2, Apr. 22, 1999, 99-1 CPD para. 89.

REPP evaluation

SCSC contends that the strengths accorded its proposal under the REPP factor
should have been considered "significant." In this regard, SCSC further
argues that the SSA did not consider the full extent of the advantage of
SCSC's proposal over IDI's in this area.

Competitive prejudice is an essential element of every viable protest.
Diverco, Inc., B-259734, Apr. 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 209 at 3. Our Office will
not sustain a protest unless the protester demonstrates a reasonable
possibility that it was prejudiced by the agency's actions, that is, unless
the protester demonstrates that, but for the agency's actions, it would have
had a substantial chance of receiving the award. McDonald-Bradley, B-270126,
Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at 3; see Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102
F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For the agency's actions to be prejudicial
here, there must be some showing that had the agency in the evaluation
considered any of the strengths identified in SCSC's proposal under this
area as "significant," its proposal would have received a better overall
assessment under the REPP factor. There is no such indication in the record.

Even assuming that the evaluators had considered any of the strengths SCSC
points to as "significant," SCSC's overall rating of "excellent" under this
factor could not have improved. Moreover, given IDI's overall higher score
under the mission suitability factor and its lower total evaluated cost,
there is no basis to conclude that the SEB's finding a strength in SCSC's
proposal "significant" under this factor would have materially affected the
award decision.

With respect to the evaluation of Omni's proposal in this area, Omni argues
that NASA unreasonably penalized Omni for following the RFP's instructions.
In this connection, Omni contends that the SEB improperly downgraded its
proposal because Omni failed to submit information in its REPP volume
concerning the experience of its "minor subcontractors," which, if
considered by the SEB, would have shown that Omni had the requisite
experience. Omni also argues that rather than assigning a weakness, the SEB
should have given its proposal a "neutral" rating in accordance with FAR
sect. 15.305(a)(2)(iv), which provides that "[i]n the case of an offeror without
a record of relevant past performance or for whom information on past
performance is not available, the offeror may not be evaluated favorably or
unfavorably on past performance." Based on our review of the record, we
disagree with Omni on both counts.

The RFP provides that

The Offeror's experience will be evaluated to determine how familiar the
Offeror is with the tasks and terms and conditions similar to those
contained in sections A through J of this RFP. Generally, the more
experience the Offeror has, the higher the rating it will receive. . . .
Also, more importance will be placed on experience with the more critical
tasks of imaging technology (Task 2.0) and metrology (Task 4.0). If the
Offeror has no experience, the evaluation will result in a neutral rating.

RFP amend.1, sect. M.3, FACTOR 3--RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND PAST PERFORMANCE, at
M-5. The RFP further stated that if the offeror proposes "major
subcontracting," its experience and success in managing large subcontracts
will be evaluated. Id.

The RFP clearly placed offerors on notice that their experience would be
evaluated and emphasized that the agency would place more importance on
experience with two critical tasks--imaging technology and metrology. The
record shows that the evaluators concluded that Omni had simply failed to
provide evidence of such experience with respect to those specific tasks,
noted it in the evaluation as a weakness, and reasonably assigned Omni's
proposal an overall adjectival rating of "good" under the REPP factor.
Further, contrary to the protester's argument, the RFP did not prohibit
offerors from submitting evidence of their "minor" subcontractors'
experience in these areas. Thus, Omni's argument that it was improperly
penalized for its failure to submit such information is without merit.

Omni's other argument--that in the absence of such specific experience, the
SEB should have assigned its proposal a "neutral" rating--is equally
meritless. The SEB assigned Omni's proposal an overall adjectival rating of
"good" under the REPP factor based on its evaluation of Omni's REPP volume,
placing an emphasis on Omni's lack of demonstrated experience in the two
critical tasks identified in the RFP (imaging technology and metrology). In
this regard, the SEB noted that Omni's proposal generally exceeded the RFP's
minimum requirements in this area, but demonstrated limited relevant
experience in the critical tasks. As noted above, the rating scheme applied
by the SEB prescribed a rating of "good" to reflect an approximate mid-point
(51-70 percent) between poor and excellent in any particular area. Given the
SEB's evaluation scheme, and since an overall rating of "good" is more
favorable than a "neutral" rating, we fail to see how Omni was prejudiced by
the agency's decision to assign a "good" rather than a "neutral" rating
under this subfactor. [15]

Proposed Costs

The agency made a net upward adjustment to SCSC's costs of $2.3 million, in
part to account for unacceptable reductions in proposed staffing for task
7.0 (clerical support). As a result of that adjustment, the agency
calculated SCSC's total proposed costs as $100.4 million, including target
fees. AR, exh. 20, supra, at 36. SCSC argues that the agency unreasonably
adjusted its proposed costs upward because the agency improperly rejected
SCSC's staff reductions for task 7.0. [16]

As relevant to this aspect of SCSC's protest, the RFP contained historical
data, including information on incumbent staffing for all of the required
tasks. RFP attachment M. The agency explains that task 7.0, clerical
support, is unique in that it calls for direct services to various NASA
functions and organizations which provide funding for each position from
their respective budgets. Under the current contract, these tasks are
performed by dedicated personnel located within the various NASA
organizations supported. AR at 17; COS, Aug. 6, 1999, para. 3.39.

The agency states that NASA has previously attempted to reduce staffing,
particularly clerical support, by using pools and other cross-utilization
methods, but has been unsuccessful because its efforts have been
unacceptable to the using organizations. COS para. 3.39. Consequently, the RFP
specifically stated that staffing levels in the area of clerical support
would "remain constant," highlighted that any changes under the contract
would be requested by the issuance of a task order, and warned that "[t]he
Contractor shall not unilaterally reduce personnel in any of [the clerical
support] tasks." RFP sect. C, Task 7.0 CLERICAL SUPPORT, at C-116.

SCSC proposed reductions in staffing from historical levels of approximately
16 full-time equivalent (FTE) positions, including approximately [DELETED]
FTEs for clerical support. SCSC recognized in its proposal that the agency's
previous attempts to pool clerical personnel have not been favorably
received by most of the customers. SCSC proposal, vol. I, Scheduled Clerical
Support Tasks (Task 7.2-7.14) at 21. Notwithstanding this acknowledgment,
however, SCSC stated in its proposal that it would achieve the proposed
staffing reductions through [DELETED]. Id. at 22. SCSC did not explain how
it arrived at those reductions; nor did it explain how its method of
achieving the staffing reductions in the clerical support area would
overcome the known objections previously raised by the funding
organizations.

The SEB reviewed SCSC's proposed staffing reductions and concluded that SCSC
had not provided an adequate rationale for the proposed staffing reductions
for task 7.0. In particular, the evaluators found that SCSC's proposal
failed to adequately discuss how the firm would address the concerns of the
various customers using clerical support services under the contract.
Accordingly, the SEB made an upward adjustment to SCSC's proposed costs
totaling $2.3 million to reflect adding back the staff reductions, including
the reductions under task 7.0.

SCSC takes issue with the agency's rationale in support of the upward
adjustment for task 7.0, arguing that its proposed staffing reductions for
that task reflect the desires of the funding organizations at GRC. SCSC
Comments, Aug. 19, 1999, at 36. Specifically, SCSC contends that each of its
proposed reductions for the various elements of task 7.0 was based on
suggestions by the user organizations on how their needs may be fulfilled
more efficiently and on the experience of the current supervisor of the
clerical services department at GRC.

When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost-reimbursement
contract, an offeror's proposed estimated cost of contract performance is
not controlling, since it is only an estimate and may not provide a valid
indication of the final actual cost the government will be required to pay.
See General Research Corp., B-241569, Feb. 19, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 183 at 5.
Consequently, a cost realism analysis must be performed by the agency to
determine the extent to which an offeror's proposed costs represent what the
contract should cost, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency. FAR
sect. 15.404-1(d)(2); ManTech Envtl. Tech., Inc., B-271002 et al., June 3, 1996,
96-1 CPD para. 272 at 8. Because the contracting agency is in the best position
to make this cost realism determination, our review of an agency's exercise
of judgment in this area is limited to determining whether the agency's cost
realism analysis is reasonably based and not arbitrary. Grey Adver., Inc.,
B-184825, May 14, 1976, 76-1 CPD para. 325 at 17-18, 27-28.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the agency's cost
realism analysis and upward adjustment of SCSC's proposed costs was
reasonably based. In determining to adjust SCSC's costs, the SEB reviewed
SCSC's proposal and considered the impact SCSC's proposed staffing
reductions would have on the various organizations that would use the
clerical support services under the MOC-1 contract. In general, the SEB
found that task 7.0 was essentially a level-of-effort requirement, wherein
the requiring organizations fund a desired set number of personnel based
upon their available funding and needs. AR, exh. 19, Pricing and Audit Data
for MOC-1, at 2. The evaluators found that "[n]o offeror has provided
rationale for reductions which specifically address the desires of the
funding organization." Id. In other words, the SEB found that although SCSC
acknowledged in its proposal that previous attempts to pool clerical
personnel had not been successful, SCSC had provided no explanation of how
the firm intended to address the concerns of the user organizations which
had previously objected to staffing reductions, particularly in the clerical
support area.

SCSC asserts in its comments that the proposed reductions were based on
feedback it received from the funding organizations. SCSC Comments, Aug. 19,
1999, at 37. In support of its assertion, SCSC has provided a declaration
from [DELETED], the current supervisor of the clerical services department
at GRC. [DELETED]. However, there is no indication in SCSC's proposal that
its staffing reductions were based on either [DELETED] as SCSC now
maintains. For example, for one position where SCSC proposed a reduction of
.75 FTE (Code 5000 Senior Scientist Group), the proposal simply states that
[DELETED]. SCSC does not explain, however, how [DELETED]. Nor does SCSC's
proposal explain how [DELETED]. More importantly, notwithstanding the
agency's concerns as expressed in the RFP, SCSC's proposal failed to explain
how SCSC arrived at its proposed FTEs; nor does the proposal explain how
some apparently unrelated [DELETED] could be combined. Since, based on its
experience, the agency expected that any proposed staffing reductions in the
clerical support area would be met with continued objections from the user
organizations, and since the agency is ultimately responsible for paying the
actual costs of additional clerical personnel, we think that the agency's
unwillingness to accept SCSC's staffing reductions in that area, is
unobjectionable.

Cost/Technical Tradeoff

The objections raised by SCSC and Omni to the cost/technical tradeoff are
predicated on the assumption that it was defective because it resulted from
defective underlying technical and price evaluations. As discussed above, we
conclude that the evaluation of proposals was reasonably based. Given our
conclusion, there is no basis to object to the tradeoff decision on the
grounds asserted by the protesters.

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

Notes

1. Previously known as the NASA Lewis Research Center and often referred to
in the record as "LeRC." To avoid confusion, we refer to the agency's
facility under its current name.

2. NASA issued the RFP to procure the following services: logistics, imaging
technology, scientific and technical publishing, metrology services,
library, administrative services, and clerical support. RFP sect. C.1.

3. The RFP specified separate due dates for submitting proposal volumes.
Volume III, REPP information, including completed past performance
questionnaires, was due by February 1, 1999, while volume I, mission
suitability proposals and volume II, cost and fee information, were due
March 1. Id. sect. L.15.

4. As a preliminary matter, IDI requests that we dismiss Omni's protest as
untimely, arguing that by postponing its debriefing by 1 week due to a
scheduling conflict, Omni failed to diligently pursue the basis for its
protest. In support of its position, IDI cites our decisions in Pentec
Envtl., Inc., B-276874.2, June 2, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 199 (protest dismissed
where protester delayed debriefing for more than 1 month so that it could
first obtain and evaluate information under the Freedom of Information Act
and so that its president could attend an unrelated business conference and
take a vacation), and Professional Rehabilitation Consultants, Inc.,
B-275871, Feb. 28, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 94 (protest dismissed as untimely where
protester failed to request debriefing until 2 months after it was informed
that it had not received award). Unlike the cases cited by IDI, however, we
think that Omni's request to postpone its debriefing by only 1 week does not
rise to the level of failing to diligently pursue the information that forms
the basis for its protest. Accordingly, its protest, filed on July 19, 1999,
within 10 days after Omni received its debriefing, is timely. 4 C.F.R.
sect. 21.2(a)(2) (1999).

5. In its initial protest, SCSC argued that its proposal should have
received "significant strengths" with respect to specific areas such as its
process improvements; "[International Standardization
Organization]-compliant" system; phase-in plan; and personnel management.
SCSC Protest, July 6, 1999, at 21-24. In addition, SCSC challenged the
agency's upward adjustment to the firm's proposed costs with respect to task
6 (administrative support) and argued that the agency improperly failed to
follow its own regulations in evaluating proposals. Id. at 28-30. SCSC also
argued that IDI's proposal should have received "significant weaknesses" for
its proposed project manager and its unrealistic supervisory span of
control. Id. at 27-28. SCSC expressly withdrew these allegations following
receipt of the agency report. Letter from SCSC to General Accounting Office
4-5 (Aug. 23, 1999).

6. In its initial protest, Omni also challenged the agency's probable cost
evaluation and alleged that agency failed to perform a proper risk
evaluation of IDI's and Omni's proposals. Omni Protest, July 19, 1999, at
23-27, 30-31. Following receipt of the agency report, Omni expressly
withdrew these allegations. Letter from Omni to General Accounting Office
(Aug. 17, 1999).

7. Administrative reports cover such areas as contract management, metrics,
and performance standards. RFP sect. C.5. Technical reports cover extensive
requirements for each of the seven tasks; for task 1, for example, the RFP
listed 38 individual reports. Id., at C-18 through C-56.

8. The agency explains that the SPL is the government's required level of
performance. Contracting Officer's Statement, (COS), Aug. 6, 1999, para. 3.11,
at 5. On the other hand, the "Acceptable Quality Level" or AQL, is
performance below the SPL and represents the lowest acceptable level of
performance. Id.

9. In a supplemental protest, SCSC alleges that the SEB improperly assigned
a strength to IDI's proposal, but not to SCSC's, for its "trained and
experienced inspectors." The record shows that the SEB's finding of a
strength was based primarily on IDI's emphasis on having trained and
certified inspectors, while SCSC's proposal did not. We see no basis to
object to the assigning of a strength to IDI's proposal in this regard.

10. Omni also challenges several other aspects of the evaluation under the
management plan subfactor. For example, Omni objects to the assignment of a
weakness to its proposal under the personnel management element because the
evaluators found that Omni's proposal provided no assurance that the total
compensation plan was adequate for exempt personnel. Omni also argues that
its proposal should have earned a strength for its employee training plan.
We have reviewed the record including Omni's arguments in this regard, and
the agency's explanations and find the evaluation in this regard
unobjectionable.

11. SCSC asserts that [DELETED] signed a commitment letter pledging 100
percent of his time to the MOC-1 effort. Although he has pledged 100 percent
of his time to the effort, [DELETED] commitment clearly does not provide any
assurance that he would remain assigned to the MOC-1 effort for the entire
period of the contract. Thus, contrary to the protester's assertion,
[DELETED] commitment letter does not overcome NASA's concern.

12. SCSC relies on our decision in J.A. Jones Management Servs., Inc.,
B-254941.2, Mar.16, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 244, to suggest that the agency
improperly downgraded its proposal under the key personnel subfactor because
it "double counted" the weakness related to its proposed QC/SM by also
attributing that weakness to its project manager. Except for its unsupported
assertion, the protester has not shown, and there is no evidence in the
record showing, that the evaluators improperly "double counted" this
weakness.

13. In this connection, the RFP incorporated by reference FAR sect. 52.222-46,
Evaluation of Compensation for Professional Employees, which requires
offerors to provide a total compensation plan setting forth salaries and
fringe benefits proposed for professional employees. RFP sect. L.1, at L-1.
Omni's argument that the evaluators did not read the section of its proposal
relevant to this major weakness is without merit. The record shows that the
SEB evaluated this portion of Omni's proposal and reasonably concluded that
Omni's qualification criteria for various key managerial positions and their
corresponding salaries were too low.

14. Within the mission suitability factor, the SEB reached a consensus on
point scores and adjectival ratings based on the following scheme: excellent
(91-100 percent); very good (71-90 percent); good (51-70 percent); fair
(31-50 percent); poor (0-30 percent). For example, a proposal rated "good"
could receive a point score between 51 and 70 percent of the maximum total
point scores available for the factor or subfactor. Under this scheme, if
Omni's proposal were rated "excellent" and received 150 points under the key
personnel subfactor, its total score under the mission suitability factor
would increase to 626 points which is 63 percent of 1000, and is within the
"good" adjectival range.

15. In a supplemental protest, Omni points to the final SEB's REPP committee
report to argue that the agency failed to evaluate its proposal in three
areas under the REPP factor (description of past partnering arrangements;
involvement or experience with ISO-9000; and lessons learned and successes
in managing similar efforts). Our review of the record shows, however, that
the individual evaluators considered these aspects of Omni's proposal, but
simply concluded that there was no particular strength or weakness worth
noting in the REPP subcommittee's final report. Omni also maintains that
NASA identified, but then improperly ignored, weaknesses in IDI's proposal
regarding alleged cost overruns related to its performance of a contract at
NASA's Johnson Space Center (JSC). Contrary to the protester's assertion,
however, the record shows that in response to an inquiry by the REPP
evaluation subcommittee chairperson to clarify this point, JSC stated that
there were no cost overruns, and that, in fact, IDI had achieved cost
underrun on that contract. Omni's arguments in this regard are therefore
without factual basis.

16. In a supplemental protest, SCSC argues that the total evaluated cost for
IDI presented to the SSA was approximately $200,000 less than that
determined by NASA's cost evaluation committee. The agency explains that
SCSC mistakenly relies on a dollar amount generated by an automated
spreadsheet programmed to calculate award fees as a percentage of total
costs. As a result of the agency's upward adjustment to IDI's costs, the
spreadsheet program automatically adjusted associated fees by a
proportionate amount, in contravention of the RFP's language which explained
that proposals would be evaluated based on total probable cost, proposed
target fees, and the total proposed award fee. Prior to presentation to the
SSA, the SEB limited allowable award fees to the amount proposed by each
offeror. Accordingly, by evaluating IDI's proposal on the basis of its
probable costs and actual proposed fees, the SEB acted in accordance with
the RFP.