TITLE:  TRW, Inc., B-282162; B-282162.2, June 9, 1999
BNUMBER:  B-282162; B-282162.2
DATE:  June 9, 1999
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TRW, Inc., B-282162; B-282162.2, June 9, 1999

Matter of: TRW, Inc.

File: B-282162; B-282162.2

Date: June 9, 1999

C. Stanley Dees, Esq., Patrick K. O'Keefe, Esq., and Richard P. Castiglia,
Jr., Esq., McKenna & Cuneo, for the protester.

Thomas P. Humphrey, Esq., Robert M. Halperin, Esq., Joseph W.C. Warren,
Esq., Tejpal Singh Chawla, Esq., and Deborah W. Feinstein, Esq., Crowell &
Moring, for Motorola, Inc., the intervenor.

Joshua A. Kranzberg, Esq., and James R. McMurry, Esq., Department of the
Army, for the agency.

John L. Formica, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. Agency's evaluation of the awardee's past performance was reasonable
where the agency investigated and evaluated each of the contracts referenced
in the awardee's proposal; other information regarding the awardee's
allegedly deficient prior performance on subcontracts was not so "close at
hand" that it had to be considered by the agency.

2. Protest that the agency's cost realism evaluation of the awardee's
proposal was unreasonable is denied where the evaluation was detailed,
well-documented, and reasonably performed, and the protester only generally
asserts that the awardee's proposed staffing level may be too low.

  3. Protest that the agency should have excluded the awardee from the
     competition because a subcontractor, proposed by the awardee in its
     initial proposal but omitted from its revised proposals, allegedly has
     a conflict of interest is denied where the subcontractor did not
     participate in the preparation of the solicitation and there is no
     substantial evidence establishing that the awardee obtained

an unfair competitive advantage from the subcontractor's participation in
the preparation of the awardee's initial proposal.

DECISION

TRW, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Motorola, Inc. under request
for proposals (RFP) No. DAAH01-98-R-0424, issued by the Army Aviation and
Missile Command (AMCOM), Department of the Army for tactical operations
centers (TOC). TRW argues that the agency's evaluation of Motorola's past
performance and cost proposals was unreasonable. TRW also contends that the
award to Motorola was improper due to a conflict of interest involving one
of the subcontractors initially proposed by Motorola.

We deny the protest.

TOCs consist of integrated groupings of wheeled and/or tracked vehicles that
are connected by large tent-like shelters. Contracting Officer's Statement
at 1. TOCs house various communication and data processing equipment,
including a local area network, intercom, and large screen displays. The
purpose of a TOC is to provide a battlefield commander with an overall view
of tactical operations forces, and allow the commander and staff to plan,
monitor, and direct the operations of the forces. Id.

The RFP provided for the award of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the
upgrade, digitization, and standardization of 64 existing TOCs. Id.; RFP sect.
L-7. The RFP stated that award would be made to the offeror submitting the
proposal representing the best value to the government, considering
management, technical, cost, and past performance evaluation criteria. RFP
amend. 1, sect. M-3. The RFP stated that technical was more important than cost,
that cost was more important than management, and that management was
significantly more important than past performance. Id. The RFP added that
cost, management, and past performance together were more important than
technical, and that all evaluation criteria other than cost were
significantly more important than cost. Id.

The agency received three proposals, including Motorola's and TRW's, by the
RFP's closing date. Agency Report at 3. The proposals were evaluated, and
all three proposals were included in the competitive range. Agency Report,
Section D, tab 1.f, Determination of Competitive Range at 15. Discussions
were held, and revised proposals were received and evaluated. Agency Report,
Section D, tab 2.a. Updated cost proposals were subsequently requested, and
following their receipt, the agency requested and received best and final
offers (BAFO) from the offerors. Agency Report, Section D, tabs 2.b. and
2.c.

TRW's and Motorola's BAFOs were each rated as "good" under the technical and
management criteria, and "low risk" under the past performance criterion, at
evaluated costs of $55,691,732 and $49,323,820, respectively. Agency Report,
Section D, tabs 2.e.1., 2.e.2., 2.f.1., 2.f.2. The source selection
authority (SSA) determined that the proposals of TRW and Motorola were
essentially equal in merit, [1] and selected Motorola for award because of
its proposal's lower evaluated cost. Agency Report, Section D, tab 2.g.,
Memorandum For Record, at 16-17. After being informed by the agency that the
contract had been awarded to Motorola, and requesting and receiving a
debriefing, TRW filed this protest.

TRW first protests the agency's evaluation of Motorola's proposal under the
past performance evaluation criterion as "low risk." Our Office will examine
an agency's evaluation of an offeror's past performance only to ensure that
it was reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria and
applicable statutes and regulations, since determining the relative merit of
an offeror's past performance is primarily a matter within the contracting
agency's discretion. Pacific Ship Repair and Fabrication, Inc., B-279793,
July 23, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 29 at 3.

The RFP set forth detailed instructions for the preparation of proposals,
and requested, among other things, that proposals include a separate past
performance volume. RFP amend. 2, sect. L-22, Volume IV. This volume was to
include "past performance information regarding similar federal, state, and
local government contracts, key personnel, and major subcontractors
contracts." Id., para. A. Each offeror was required to "submit a description of
up to 5 government contracts including prime contracts and major
subcontracts received or performed during the past 3 years, which are
similar to the effort required by the solicitation, or which offerors
consider relevant in demonstrating their ability to perform the proposed
effort." Id., para. A(1).

The RFP informed offerors that the evaluation of past performance would
involve the consideration of "the offeror's record of past and current
performance to ascertain the probable ability to successfully perform the
required effort of this solicitation." RFP amend. 2, sect. M-4.IV. The RFP added
that "[w]hile the Government may elect to consider data obtained from other
sources, the burden of providing thorough and complete past performance
information rests with the offeror." Id.

The past performance volume of Motorola's proposal provided information on
two projects Motorola had performed, and three projects performed by its
major subcontractors. Agency Report, Section D, Tab 1.j., Performance Risk
Assessment, A.1. One of the projects reflected Motorola's performance as a
subcontractor to TRW on an Army contract for work on seven TOC shelters. The
past performance volume of Motorola's proposal was forwarded to the
cognizant performance risk assessment group (PRAG) for evaluation. Id.

The PRAG sent past performance questionnaires to "technical" and "contract"
points of contact for the projects referenced. The questionnaires set forth
a series of background questions concerning the relevant project's size,
scope, contract type and value, period of performance, and the overall
nature of the effort, followed by a series of questions under the following
headings: technical/management performance; subcontractor control;
cost/price; schedule/delivery capability; and management. The PRAG adds that
"[f]ollow-up calls were made to expedite the delivery of questionnaires,
answer questions, and validate the information provided." Agency Report,
Section D, Tab 1.j., Performance Risk Assessment, A.1.

The PRAG concluded, based upon the responses, that Motorola "has experience
in all technical areas covered by the [RFP's] statement of work," and that
"there is little doubt that [Motorola] can perform the required effort based
on its performance record." Agency Report, Section D, tab 1.j., Performance
Risk Assessment, A. In explaining this conclusion, the PRAG noted that "[o]n
all surveys, [Motorola] was cited as being cooperative in negotiations and
in resolving issues." Id., A.1. The PRAG also referred to the fact that the
completed questionnaires universally rated Motorola's performance as "low
risk," and that in the questionnaires Motorola "was cited for the ability to
capture a highly skilled workforce, having a strong management team, being
responsive to customer requirements, being cooperative, and pleasant to work
with." Id.

The protester does not challenge the reasonableness of the agency's
conclusion that Motorola's past performance merited a rating of "low risk"
based upon the information reviewed. Rather, TRW contends that Motorola, in
its role as a subcontractor to TRW on three other Army contracts for TOC
work, performed poorly and that the Army was aware of this poor performance
because of certain conversations between TRW and Army personnel. The
protester contends that, even though Motorola did not reference its
performance of these three subcontracts in the past performance volume of
its proposal, the agency was required to consider Motorola's allegedly poor
performance as TRW's subcontractor in its past performance evaluation, and
downgrade Motorola's proposal accordingly. Protest at 19-21.

While agencies generally need not evaluate all past performance references
or those not reflected in the proposals, our Office has recognized that in
certain limited circumstances an agency evaluating an offeror's past
performance has an obligation (as opposed to the discretion) to consider
"outside information" bearing on the offeror's past performance.
International Bus. Sys., Inc., B-275554, Mar. 3, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 114 at 5.
Where we have charged an agency with responsibility for considering such
outside information, the record has demonstrated that the information in
question was "simply too close at hand to require offerors to shoulder the
inequities that spring from an agency's failure to obtain, and consider, the
information." Id.; see GTS Duratek, Inc., B-280511.2, B-280511.3, Oct. 19,
1998, 98-2 CPD para. 130 at 14 (agency should have considered offeror's
performance of a prior contract where the contract was discussed in the
offeror's past performance proposal, was so relevant as to have served as
the basis for the government estimate for the subject solicitation, and the
contracting officer's technical representative for the contract was a member
of the technical evaluation team for the subject solicitation); G. Marine
Diesel, B-232619.3, Aug. 3, 1989, 89-2 CPD para. 101 at 4-6 (contracting officer
that was personally aware of the awardee's continuing difficulties in
performing a contract for services related to the subject solicitation, and
considered the performance difficulties relevant to the extent that the
contracting officer determined not to exercise the options in the contract
awarded under the subject solicitation, erred in not considering the
awardee's performance difficulties when determining whether the contract
under the subject solicitation had been properly awarded); G. Marine Diesel;
Phillyship, B-232619, B-232619.2, Jan. 27, 1989, 89-1 CPD para. 90 at 4-5
(agency should have considered awardee's prior experience under a directly
relevant contract where the contract was referenced in the awardee's
proposal and the agency personnel were familiar with the awardee's
performance). However, the "close at hand" information in these cases
generally concerned contracts for the same services with the same procuring
activity, or at least information personally known to the evaluators. See
Morrison Knudsen Corp., B-280261, Sept. 9, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 63 at 5-6.

Here, the contracts on which Motorola's performance was allegedly
unsatisfactory were between Motorola and TRW, with Motorola acting as a
subcontractor and TRW as the prime contractor to the agency; they were not
contracts between Motorola and the same procuring activity, such that the
agency would necessarily have information concerning Motorola's prior
performance close at hand. Additionally, the documentation provided by TRW
in support of its contention regarding Motorola's performance on its
subcontracts with TRW provides little support for TRW's claim. See
Protester's Comments, Apr. 19, 1999, at tab 9 and exhs. A-B. While the
documents reflect that the contracts between TRW and Motorola were modified,
there is only one document that reflects any concerns over the quality of
the work performed. Id. The concerns mentioned here appear to be relatively
minor in nature and are not, with the exception of an affidavit submitted by
a TRW employee, identified as attributable to work done by Motorola. In sum,
the record does not demonstrate that there was outside information so "close
at hand" regarding Motorola's prior performance that the agency either
improperly ignored or erroneously failed to obtain.

TRW also protests that the agency's evaluation of Motorola's cost proposal
was unreasonable. When an agency evaluates a proposal for the award of a
cost reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed estimated costs are not
dispositive, because, regardless of the costs proposed, the government is
bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs. Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect.sect. 15.305(a)(1); 15.404-1(d). Consequently, a
cost realism analysis must be performed by the agency to determine the
extent to which an offeror's proposed costs represent what the contract
should cost, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency. FAR 15.404-1(d)(2);
McDonnell Douglas Corp., B-259694.2, B-259694.3, June 16, 1995, 95-2 CPD para.
51 at 25. Because the contracting agency is in the best position to make
this cost realism determination, we review an agency's judgment in this area
only to see that the agency's cost realism evaluation was reasonably based
and not arbitrary. Infotec Dev. Inc., B-258198 et al., Dec. 27, 1994, 95-1
CPD para. 52 at 6.

The record reflects that the agency performed a detailed cost realism
analysis of the offerors' proposals. For example, in analyzing each
proposal, the cost evaluation team coordinated with the cognizant management
and technical evaluation teams to consider the number and mix of labor hours
proposed for the prime and subcontractors in conjunction with the offerors'
technical and management approaches to determine the impact on the relevant
offeror's technical and management approaches and most probable cost. The
cost evaluation team also reviewed the proposed direct and indirect costs,
including costs for labor, material, handling, travel, freight,
reproduction, receiving, cost of money, and general and administrative costs
as well as other direct and indirect costs. Agency Report, Section D, tabs
1.h.3 and 2.e.2. The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) also audited
Motorola's initial proposal, and the results of DCAA's audit were considered
and incorporated into the agency's cost realism analysis of Motorola's
proposal. Agency Report, Section D, tab 2.e.2. Based on our review of this
record, we find no basis to question the adequacy of the agency's cost
realism analysis.

In contending that the agency acted unreasonably, TRW focuses on the fact
that Motorola reduced its initial proposed costs from $54,387,992 to
$44,881,638 in its BAFO. TRW's protest and comments assert that Motorola's
labor costs must be understated because Motorola's BAFO reflects a lower
cost and less hours than Motorola initially proposed.

Motorola's BAFO included a separate cost volume, detailing the bases for
this reduction. The cost volume included, among other things, a narrative
summary setting forth the reasons for the cost reduction, a lengthy and
detailed "summary delta report by [contract line item/work breakdown
structure]," and a revised cost proposal. Agency Report, Section C, tab 4.b,
Motorola's Feb. 16, 1999 Cost BAFO. Motorola explained here that its cost
reduction was the result of, among other things, price agreements with its
subcontractors, a reduction in management/engineering hours "resulting from
further streamlining and pre-award design work," as well as a revision of
its labor skill mix and a consolidation of its training efforts. Id., BAFO
summary, at 1st unnumbered page.

Although Motorola's BAFO costs were initially accepted by the agency with a
relatively minor adjustment, the agency subsequently determined that the
reduction in Motorola's proposed costs, which was in part the result of a
reduction of costs proposed by one of Motorola's subcontractors, was not
fully explained. Contracting Officer's Statement at 13. The agency
consequently determined that the most probable cost of Motorola's proposal
was $49,323,820. Id.

We conclude that, contrary to TRW's contentions, the record shows that the
agency carefully reviewed Motorola's explanation in its BAFO justifying the
lower staffing level--an explanation that is not challenged by TRW.
Moreover, TRW's arguments do not take into account the fact that some of the
labor hours are part of Motorola's BAFO subcontractor costs. More
importantly, TRW has not explained why the proposed staffing level was not
appropriate for Motorola's technical approach, stated what probable cost
adjustments should have been made to Motorola's costs, or specifically
challenged any other aspect of the agency's cost analysis. Under the
circumstances, TRW's challenge to this aspect of the agency's evaluation
constitutes, at best, its mere disagreement with the evaluation results, and
as such, does not provide a basis to find the evaluation unreasonable.
Global Assocs., Ltd., B-275534, Mar. 3, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 129 at 9; Motorola,
Inc., B-254489, B-254489.2, Dec. 15, 1993, 93-2 CPD para. 322 at 11.

TRW finally contends that Motorola is ineligible for award because Computer
Sciences Corporation (CSC), one of the subcontractors initially proposed by
Motorola, had an impermissible conflict of interest because of CSC's role as
the current technology, engineering and integration contractor supporting
the Program Executive Office for Command, Control, and Communication Systems
(PEO C3S). [2]

The protester first informed the agency of its concerns regarding CSC by
letter dated October 19, 1998. TRW stated in that letter that it understood
that "CSC's contract with the Government contains an organizational conflict
of interest clause, which . . . limits its participation with respect to
bidding related contract work that may give the company an unfair
competitive advantage." TRW added that "due to CSC's . . . contract, it may
have been in a privileged position to obtain TOC competition sensitive data
that is relevant to the [subject] RFP," and requested that the agency review
TRW's concerns and "take appropriate action to ensure the competitive
fairness under the TOC procurement." Agency Report, Section F, tab f.1.

TRW's letter was provided to the ADCCS PO on October 20, and that office
confirmed that the CSC contract in support of PEO C3S did have a clause
pertaining to organizational conflicts of interest (OCI). Agency Report at
3; Agency Report Section F, tab f.2. The ADCCS PO office added that no
action would be taken until a proposal identifying CSC as a subcontractor
was received. Id.

Motorola's initial proposal, received by the agency on November 4,
identified CSC as one of its proposed subcontractors. As a result of TRW's
letter and CSC's identification as one of Motorola's subcontractors, AMCOM
telephoned the contracting officer responsible for CSC's contract in support
of PEO C3S on November 17, and on November 18 sent the contracting officer a
copy of TRW's October 19 letter and the RFP's TOC specification. AMCOM
requested the contracting officer's views as to whether CSC had violated the
OCI clause in its PEO C3S contract. The contracting officer was also asked
whether there was any evidence of CSC being involved with the writing of
technical requirements for the TOC integration. Agency Report at 4; Agency
Report, Section F, tab f.3.

On December 2, AMCOM made a second, more formal request for information
regarding CSC's potential conflict of interest. Agency Report at 4; Agency
Report, Section F, tab f.4. This letter informed the contracting officer
responsible for CSC's PEO C3S contract that AMCOM needed to determine
whether CSC had violated the OCI clause in that contract, and the impact any
violation would have on Motorola's proposal under the subject RFP. Id. This
letter required that the contracting officer for CSC's PEO C3S contract
"determine the involvement of CSC in the presolicitation processes of the
Integration of the Army TOCs" by answering certain questions. The questions
set forth in the AMCOM letter asked, for example, whether CSC could be tied
either directly or indirectly to the presolicitation processes for the Army
TOCs, or if CSC could not be directly tied to these processes, whether it
could nevertheless possess "‘insider' information that would place
them in a more favorable competitive situation." Id. AMCOM subsequently sent
the Program Executive Officer, Command, Control and Communications Systems a
letter dated December 14 also requesting information regarding CSC's work in
support of PEO C3S, requesting that AMCOM be advised of "the extent of CSC's
involvement, and what the involvement was, in the planning, development and
writing of the TOC procurement requirement." Agency Report at 4; Agency
Report, Section F, tab f.5.

On December 18, AMCOM received a memorandum from an individual employed as
the Chief of the Force XXI Integration Office, PEO C3S, regarding CSC. [3]
This memorandum stated that "CSC has generally been afforded open access to
information across PEO C3S," and that in its performance of its support
contract, "CSC is clearly in a position to influence technical
requirements." Agency Report at 4; Agency Report, Section F, tab f.6. The
memorandum added that "[m]uch of the work performed by CSC has directly
contributed to the development of the systems architecture for the First
Digitized Division," and that an earlier version of the document depicting
this architecture "is called out in the TOC RFP." Id. The memorandum also
provided that CSC had "been active on the Cosite [Integrated Product Team],
a body which is identifying methods to optimize radio performance in a
congested environment" like TOCs. Id. The memorandum concluded with the
author stating that he was "unaware of any direct CSC involvement in the
planning, development and writing of the TOC procurement requirement, but I
cannot deny that the results of CSC's efforts did not become infused into
the requirement indirectly." Id.

On December 30, AMCOM sent a letter to Motorola stating that CSC "appears"
to have an OCI because of its contract in support of the PEO C3S. Agency
Report at 5; Agency Report, Section F, tab f.7. Specifically, the letter
stated that "[b]ecause of its integral involvement in the PEO C3S efforts
involving the TOC program, it appears CSC may have violated the OCI clause
of [its] contract." Id. The letter added that the "Government questions
whether CSC may continue as a member of the Motorola Team." The letter
requested that Motorola inform AMCOM of "what actions will be made to
eliminate this OCI as soon as possible" and that a "[f]ailure to rectify
this situation may cause Motorola's proposal to be considered nonresponsive
by the Government." Id.

By letter dated January 6, 1999, Motorola informed the agency that it had
"elected to withdraw CSC as a proposed subcontractor," and that "CSC [would]
not participate in further proposal efforts or resulting contract
performance." Agency Report, Section F, tab f.8. This letter included a
detailed description of the responsibilities CSC would have had during
contract performance, and how those responsibilities would now be handled.
The letter also provided a complete description of the proposal preparation
assistance performed by CSC. Id.

Shortly after receiving Motorola's response, the agency was informed by the
contracting officer responsible for CSC's contract in support of the PEO
C3S, and who had been provided with the RFP's specifications, that in his
view CSC did not have a conflict of interest. Agency Report, Section F, tab
f.10.

TRW asserts that CSC, because of its performance of the PEO C3S support
contract, "had special knowledge of certain TOC requirements that would
provide an unfair competitive advantage to the team on which it was a
member," as evidenced by the memorandum from the Chief of the Force XXI
Integration Office. Protester's Comments, Apr. 19, 1999, at 14. The
protester argues that Motorola's removal of CSC from its proposal and
reallocation of CSC's responsibilities were insufficient to mitigate the
conflict of interest and improper competitive advantage that resulted from
CSC's participation as a member of Motorola's "team."

A contracting officer is required to avoid, neutralize, or mitigate a
significant potential conflict of interest on the part of prospective
contractor before award. FAR sect. 9.504(a)(2). Substantial facts and hard
evidence are necessary to establish a conflict; mere inference or suspicion
of an actual or potential conflict is not sufficient. RMG Sys., Ltd.,
B-281006, Dec. 18, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 153 at 4. Because conflicts may arise in
factual situations not expressly described in the relevant FAR sections, the
regulation advises contracting officers to examine each situation
individually and to exercise "common sense, good judgment, and sound
discretion" in assessing "whether a significant potential conflict exists,
and, if it does, the development of an appropriate means for resolving it."
FAR sect. 9.505. Inasmuch as the contracting agency has discretion to determine
whether an actual or apparent conflict exists or will arise, and whether the
firm should be excluded from the competition, our review of an agency's
judgment in this regard is limited to determining whether the agency's
conclusions were reasonably based and not arbitrary. Aetna Gov't Health
Plans, Inc.; Foundation Health Fed. Servs., Inc., B-254397.15 et al., July
27, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 129 at 12.

The agency points out that "[n]either the contracting officer, nor anyone
else at AMCOM, ever found that Motorola's relationship with CSC ever
constituted an OCI," and argues that its conclusion that no OCI existed is
supported by the record. Agency Report at 10. In this regard, the agency has
provided, among other things, a declaration of the Chief of the Force XXI
Integration Office, PEO C3S, stating that "CSC was not provided any source
selection sensitive information with respect to the TOC acquisition."
Supplemental Agency Report, May 5, 1999, attach. 1 at 2. The declaration
adds that any advice received from CSC in its performance of its contract
supporting PEO C3S is at a "broad/high level, as opposed to the more
intricate details associated with any individual subordinate PEO C3S
subsystem such as TOCs." Id. The Chief of the Force XXI Integration Office
also states in the declaration that the product of CSC's involvement in the
Cosite Integrated Product Team and the systems architecture for the First
Digitized Division, as referenced in his letter of December 18 to AMCOM,
have been posted, respectively, to an agency website (to which more than 30
TRW personnel have access) and made available in the TOCs acquisition
reference library (to which all offerors had access). The Chief of the Force
XXI Integration Office adds that he reviewed Motorola's proposal, and
concluded "that no value had been added to Motorola's proposal as a result
of CSC's being my support contractor." Id. at 4. Specifically, the Chief
states the information reviewed "was not of a nature that it could have only
been obtained through ‘insider information.' The information was
rather, of a more generally available, rudimentary variety." Id. Moreover,
there is no evidence that CSC communicated proprietary or source selection
sensitive information to Motorola as part of the proposal preparation
process; as indicated above, Motorola, in its contemporaneous response to
the Army's concerns, stated in detail what contributions CSC made to
Motorola's proposal.

Thus, based on this record, we cannot find the agency's determination not to
exclude Motorola from the competition unreasonable. The record reflects that
the agency diligently investigated CSC's involvement in this procurement and
reasonably concluded that there were no hard facts or specific evidence that
CSC was directly

involved in the preparation of any aspect of the RFP, or that CSC's initial
participation in Motorola's proposal preparation efforts resulted in
Motorola having obtained any unfair competitive advantage.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

Notes

1. TRW's slight technical superiority was offset by Motorola's management
superiority. Agency Report, Section D, tab 2.g., Memorandum For Record, at
16

2. The agency explains that PEO C3S, located at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey,
is in charge of developing, fielding, and supporting the Army's command,
control and communications systems. Agency Report at 3 n.2. The Army Air
Defense Command and Control Project Office (ADCCS PO), a subordinate office
of PEO C3S and located in Huntsville, Alabama, is the originator of the TOC
requirement. Id. AMCOM, the issuer of this RFP, is also located in
Huntsville. Id.

3. According to a declaration submitted by the Chief of the Force XXI
Integration Office during this protest, the Force XXI Integration Office is
responsible for planning and implementing the Army's battlefield
digitization efforts. Supplemental Agency Report, May 5, 1999, attach. 1 at
1.