BNUMBER:  B-281517; B-281550 
DATE:  February 19, 1999
TITLE: Island Components Group, Inc., B-281517; B-281550, February
19, 1999
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Matter of:Island Components Group, Inc.

File:     B-281517; B-281550

Date:February 19, 1999

John J. Tiner for the protester.
Benjamin G. Perkins, Esq., Defense Logistics Agency, for the agency.
Jennifer Westfall-McGrail, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office 
of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the 
decision.

DIGEST

Protests objecting to agency's evaluation of vendors' past delivery 
performance on the basis of data that do not distinguish between 
original and revised delivery dates are denied where agency 
demonstrates that delivery dates are never revised for the vast 
majority of contract line items; that data that do not distinguish 
between compliance with original and revised delivery dates still 
furnish meaningful information regarding a vendor's delivery 
performance; and that the agency will have no cost-effective means by 
which to evaluate past performance if it is not permitted to use the 
data.

DECISION

Island Components Group, Inc. protests the Defense Supply Center 
Richmond's (DSCR) inclusion in request for quotations (RFQ) Nos. 
SPO400-99-T-1755 and SPO430-99-Q-B271 of a clause providing for the 
evaluation of vendors' past performance on the basis of scores 
computed using the agency's Automated Best Value Model (ABVM).  The 
protester argues that the data regarding delivery performance used by 
DSCR in computing the ABVM scores is open to manipulation by vendors 
because it does not distinguish between original and revised delivery 
dates and thus should not be relied upon.

We deny the protests.

DSCR issued RFQ No. SPO400-99-T-1755 for 21 electrical contact brush 
holder assemblies on October 30, 1998, with a due date for quotations 
of November 14.  It issued RFQ No. SPO430-99-Q-B271 for 10 tachometer 
generator motors on November 10, with a due date for quotations of 
November 30.  Each RFQ included DSCR's ABVM clause, which provides for 
selection of the vendor whose quotation represents the best value to 
the government, price and past performance considered.[1]  The clause 
explains that each vendor will be assigned an ABVM score, derived by 
combining delivery and quality scores,[2] for each Federal Supply 
Class in which it has performed.  The delivery score is based on a 
formula which considers the percentage of items tendered on or before 
the contract delivery date and the number of days the other items are 
past due.[3]  The quality score is based on reported product and 
packaging deficiencies.  The scores are recalculated each month as new 
performance data become available.[4]

SAMMS, the computer system that maintains the data used to compute the 
ABVM scores, currently has only one data field to measure delivery 
date.  If a contract is modified to change the delivery date, the new 
date appears in this field, without any indication that it is a 
revised date, and the system measures the vendor's performance from 
the new date.  Thus, the system has no way of distinguishing between a 
contractor who meets an original delivery date and a contractor who 
meets an extended one.

Island Components argues that because the current system is incapable 
of distinguishing between vendors who have complied with their 
original delivery commitments, and those who have complied with 
delivery dates extended through contract modifications, vendors with 
deep pockets can in effect purchase more favorable ABVM ratings by 
agreeing to pay DSCR to extend delivery dates with which they are 
unable to comply.  This is unfair, the protester maintains, because 
some vendors may not have the financial resources to pay for such 
extensions, and as a result may receive comparatively lower ABVM 
scores.  Until it has a system in place that will allow it to 
distinguish between vendors who have complied with their original 
delivery commitments and those who have complied with revised delivery 
schedules, DSCR should not evaluate vendors' delivery performance, the 
protester asserts.

Agencies enjoy broad discretion in the selection of evaluation 
criteria, and we will not object to an agency's use of particular 
criteria so long as they reasonably relate to the agency's needs in 
choosing the vendor that will best serve its interests.  Leon D. 
DeMatteis Constr. Corp., B-276877, July 30, 1997, 97-2 CPD  para.  36 at  para.  
3-4.  The question for our consideration here is thus whether the use 
of data that do not distinguish between original and revised delivery 
dates provides the agency with a reasonable basis for assessing a 
vendor's delivery performance.

The agency maintains that although it is not currently getting as 
detailed a picture regarding delivery performance as it would like due 
to the inability of the SAMMS system to distinguish between original 
and revised delivery dates (a situation which it has taken steps to 
correct[5]), the current data do provide it with a reasonable basis 
for assessing vendors' past performance.  In this regard, the agency 
points out that the delivery date is extended for less than 2 percent 
of contract line items;[6] thus, for more than 98 percent of contract 
line items, SAMMS accurately reflects whether a vendor has complied 
with its original delivery deadline.  The agency also notes that 
although the current system does not permit it to distinguish between 
vendors who comply with their original delivery commitments and those 
who comply with extended dates, it does allow it to distinguish 
between those who are willing to compensate the government for their 
lateness (through payment of consideration) and those who are not, 
which is a valid matter for it to consider in determining the vendors 
with whom it wishes to do business.

DSCR further argues that until it is able to compile a body of new 
data distinguishing between original and revised delivery dates, it 
should be permitted to rely on data that does not so distinguish 
because it cannot calculate ABVM scores without it, and without ABVM 
scores, its contracting officers will be unable to evaluate delivery 
performance without examining performance on individual contracts, a 
burdensome and labor intensive procedure that is simply not 
cost-effective for most DSCR procurements, given their small dollar 
values.[7]

We think that DSCR has demonstrated that use of its current data 
provides a reasonable basis for assessing vendor past performance.  
For the vast majority of contract line items, the inability of the 
system to distinguish between original and extended delivery dates is 
of no consequence since the delivery date has not been extended.  
Thus, the potential inequity Island Components posits--the ability of 
a company with adequate financial resources to improve its ABVM score 
by compensating the government in exchange for delivery date 
extensions--is not of widespread concern.  Further, although not 
permitting the agency to distinguish between vendors who comply with 
their original commitments and those who comply with revised 
schedules, the data do allow DSCR to distinguish between vendors who 
are willing to compensate the government for their lateness and those 
who are not, a factor that we think the agency may legitimately 
consider in evaluating delivery performance.  Finally, we think that 
the value to the agency of the ABVM scoring system outweighs any 
hypothetical unfairness to those companies that choose not to offer 
compensation.  As the agency states, without the data, the agency will 
be unable to generate past performance scores on an automated basis, 
which means that it would have no cost-effective means of evaluating 
past performance.  

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. The ABVM clause gives the contracting officer the option of 
weighting performance more heavily than price, weighting price more 
heavily than performance, or giving the two equal weight; in both of 
the RFQs in question here, the two factors were given equal weight.

2. The ABVM clause also gives the contracting officer the discretion 
to make quality performance more important than delivery performance, 
delivery performance more important than quality performance, or the 
two of equal value; again, in both RFQs here, the two were given equal 
weight.

3. The delivery rating is computed using the following formula:
("days late" rating x .4) + ("percent on time" rating x .6).  The 
"days late" rating is calculated by subtracting from 100 the total 
number of days late on all late items divided by the number of line 
items shipped during the rating period.  The "percent on time" rating 
is calculated by subtracting from 100 the number of line items late 
divided by the number of line items shipped during the rating period.  

4. The agency is currently in the process of transitioning from a 
12-month rating period to a 24-month rating period; starting in 
October 1998, an additional 1 month has been added to the rating 
period each month, so that at the time the agency submitted its report 
in response to this protest in December 1998, the rating period was 15 
months.

5. DSCR notes that it has taken steps to address the shortcomings in 
its current data collection system by requesting that an additional 
date field and a field indicating the cause for a delay (i.e., whether 
government or contractor) be added to SAMMS.  The change is expected 
to be implemented by late 1999.  To address the situation in the 
interim, the agency has issued an order to a contractor to make 
changes to the Automated Best Value System (through a non-SAMMS 
interface) to capture the reasons for contract delivery extension and 
to account for contractor-caused delays in measuring contractor 
delivery performance.  These changes are expected to be implemented by 
March 1999.

6. DSCR notes that while its data systems do not capture information 
regarding the number of line items for which delivery extensions were 
granted, its records do enable it to identify the number of line items 
for which modifications were issued (a set of which delivery 
extensions are a subset).  These figures show, for example, that of 
the 345,627 contract line items awarded by DSCR in 1997, only 4,177 
(i.e., approximately 1 percent) were modified; similarly, of the 
329,023 contract line items awarded by DSCR in 1998, only 2,686 (i.e., 
less than 1 percent) were modified.

7. DSCR offers, by way of illustration, the following data regarding 
December 1998:  of 33,841 purchase requests open, 19,330 had estimated 
values of less than $2,500, while another 10,523 had estimated values 
between $2,500 and $25,000.  In other words, approximately 88 percent 
of the purchase requests had estimated values below $25,000.