TITLE:  The Futures Group International, B-281274.5; B-281274.6; B-281274.7, March 10, 2000
BNUMBER:  B-281274.5; B-281274.6; B-281274.7
DATE:  March 10, 2000
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The Futures Group International, B-281274.5; B-281274.6; B-281274.7, March
10, 2000

Decision

Matter of: The Futures Group International

File: B-281274.5; B-281274.6; B-281274.7

Date: March 10, 2000

John S. Pachter, Esq., and Jonathan D. Shaffer, Esq., Smith, Pachter,
McWhorter & D'Ambrosio, for the protester.

Joseph C. Port, Jr., Esq., and Howard Stanislawski, Esq., Sidley & Austin,
for Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, an intervenor.

A. Lindsey Crawford, Esq., and H. David Kotz, Esq., Agency for International
Development, for the agency.

Charles W. Morrow, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1. In response to a decision sustaining a protest and finding that the
agency had failed to conduct a reasonable cost realism analysis of the
awardee's proposed costs, the agency's corrective action--determining that
the awardee's probable costs were the lowest and confirming award to that
firm--was unreasonable, where the agency was advised by the Defense Contract
Audit Agency that the awardee's proposed uncapped indirect rates were
understated by an amount that would have affected the outcome of the
competition and there was an apparent change in the magnitude of the
contract work from that envisioned by the awardee's proposal.

2. Agency unreasonably discounted Defense Contract Audit Agency audit
finding, based on the awardee's actual contract performance, that the
awardee's proposed uncapped indirect rates were considerably understated for
the first 2 years of the 5-year contract and found that the awardee's
proposed rates should be judged only on the basis of the awardee's knowledge
when it submitted its proposal; a cost realism analysis, even on
reevaluation, should consider all information reasonably available as of the
time of the evaluation.

DECISION

The Futures Group International protests the award of a contract to Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu under request for proposals (RFP) No. M/OP-98-918, issued by
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to implement
a project intended to increase access to family planning and other
reproductive health products and services obtained through the commercial
and private sectors in developing countries. We previously sustained
Futures' protest of the award to Deloitte because USAID improperly evaluated
the realism of Deloitte's proposed indirect rates. The Futures Group Int'l,
B-281274.2, Mar. 3, 1999, 2000 CPD para.  . This protest concerns the corrective
action USAID undertook in response to our decision that culminated in USAID
again selecting Deloitte for award.

We sustain the protest.

ORIGINAL COMPETITION

The RFP, which contemplated the award of a cost-plus-award-fee contract for
a 5-year period, set forth a best-value award evaluation scheme, considering
technical, past performance, and cost realism. RFP sect.sect. B.2, B.4, M.1(a). The
RFP stated that the combination of all evaluation factors, other than cost,
were significantly more important than cost. RFP sect. M.2(d). For cost realism,
the RFP contemplated adjusting proposed costs based on the results of the
cost realism evaluation and considering the adjusted costs for evaluation
purposes. RFP sect. M.3.

Futures and Deloitte submitted proposals by July 15, 1998. USAID evaluated
the proposals, conducted discussions, and evaluated best and final offers
(BAFO) (received September 8). Futures' and Deloitte's proposals were both
rated outstanding under the non-cost factors. Initial Protest Agency Report,
exh. No. 2, Negotiation Memorandum, at 7; see id., exh. No. 8, Supplemental
Technical Evaluation, Sept. 11, 1998, at 1, attach. USAID also determined
Deloitte's $87,904,406 proposed BAFO cost and Futures' $94,290,894 proposed
BAFO cost were reasonable and realistic, and made no probable cost
adjustments. Id., exh. No. 2, Negotiation Memorandum, at 7, 16; Hearing
Transcript (Tr.) at 29, 38, 70-71. [1] USAID made award to Deloitte on
September 28, after determining that Deloitte's significantly lower cost
proposal represented the best value. Initial Protest Agency Report, exh. No.
2, Negotiation Memorandum, at 7.

Futures protested USAID's evaluation, including the cost realism evaluation,
arguing that USAID unreasonably accepted Deloitte's proposed overhead and
general and administrative (G&A) rates, notwithstanding that they were at
levels significantly below Deloitte's historic rates. On October 21, USAID
authorized performance of the Deloitte contract, notwithstanding the
protest, as being in the government's best interest. Memorandum for the Head
of the Contracting Activity, Oct. 21, 1998.

Deloitte's cost proposal proposed [DELETED] overhead rate and [DELETED] G&A
rate with no offered rate ceilings, which offer was not changed in its
revised cost proposal and BAFO. [2] Deloitte's Cost Proposal sect. B.5;
Deloitte's Revised Cost Proposal sect. B.5; Deloitte's BAFO sect. B.5. On file with
USAID's Overhead, Close Out, and Special Cost Division of the Contract Audit
Management Branch of the Office of Procurement (OCC) was a 1997 incurred
cost submission that showed Deloitte had historically experienced [DELETED]
overhead rate and [DELETED] G&A rate. Initial Protest Agency Report, exh.
No. 21, e-mail from OCC representative (Sept. 23, 1998); Tr. at 31-32.
Nothing in Deloitte's proposal explained or justified why its proposed rates
were substantially less than its historic rates. By Futures' unrebutted
calculations, if USAID had applied the historic rates to Deloitte's cost
proposal, Deloitte's evaluated costs would be increased by more than $14
million, such that Futures' proposal would have represented the lowest
evaluated cost. Protester's Comments on Initial Protest, Jan. 22, 1999.

After the submission of BAFOs and prior to award, OCC noted the discrepancy
between Deloitte's proposed and historic indirect rates to the contracting
office and "recommended that ceiling rates be used for the [overhead] and
G&A rates." Initial Protest Agency Report, exh. No. 2, Negotiation
Memorandum, at 9, and exh. 21, e-mail from OCC representative (Sept. 23,
1998). USAID did include caps on the rates in the awarded contract to
Deloitte, but did so at the [DELETED] and [DELETED] rates, although the
contract specialist testified that capping at the higher historic rates
rather than the lower proposed rates was an error. Deloitte Contract sect. B.6;
Tr. at 42-43. During the course of the protest, on February 2, 1999 (just
after the hearing), USAID modified the contract to incorporate ceiling rates
at the same level proposed by Deloitte. [3] Agency Submission on Initial
Protest, Feb. 2, 1999, at 3.

PRIOR PROTEST DECISION

We sustained the protest because the contemporaneous record did not evidence
that USAID reasonably found Deloitte's proposed rates realistic. As noted,
Deloitte's cost proposal did not explain or justify its proposed indirect
rates, which were substantially lower than its historic rates, nor did it
correlate the lower rates to the receipt of the contract, and there was no
evidence of any analysis by USAID that would support a determination that
Deloitte's proposed indirect rates were realistic, given its historic rates.
The Futures Group Int'l, supra, at 4-6.

At the hearing on the initial protest, a new and previously unadvanced
reason was stated as to why Deloitte's proposed overhead and G&A rates were
realistic. [4] The USAID contract specialist testified that the [DELETED]
rate was found realistic because Deloitte intended to form a Washington
office and the 1997 incurred cost submission reflected a [DELETED] suboffice
overhead rate. Tr. at 30. Deloitte argued at the hearing and in its
post-hearing comments that the [DELETED] overhead rate reflected a blended
rate comprised of Deloitte's suboffice overhead rate of [DELETED] and home
office rate of [DELETED], as indicated on Deloitte's 1997 incurred cost
submission, and that Deloitte was proposing to separately cost overhead at
the suboffice rate, as evidenced by the establishment of a Washington office
in its proposal. [5] Tr. at 112-14, 176; Agency's Post-Hearing Comments,
Feb. 9, 1999, at 12; Deloitte's Post-Hearing Comments, Feb. 9, 1999, at
16-18; see Initial Protest Agency Report, exh. No. 22, Deloitte 1997
Overhead Expense Table, Mar. 31, 1998, at 1; Deloitte's Technical Proposal
at III-14; Deloitte's Cost Proposal, Itemized Cost and Fee Calculation, item
6, Washington Office Cost.

These arguments were unsuccessful because the record did not contain any
evidence that USAID's conclusion that Deloitte's overhead rate was
reasonable was based on an understanding by the agency that Deloitte's
proposed Washington office was considered a suboffice with separate indirect
rates for accounting purposes. We noted that neither Deloitte's technical
proposal nor its cost proposal attributed the lower proposed rate to the
treatment of the Washington office as a suboffice, and stated:

Although Deloitte now describes the Washington office as its suboffice for
accounting purposes, its technical proposal did not refer to the office as
such and its cost proposal attributed the indirect rate to the home office,
which is the category denoted on the 1997 overhead expense sheet accounting
for the [DELETED] historical overhead rate. Thus, we fail to see how the
contract specialist could reasonably have determined that [DELETED] was the
correct historical rate to apply for evaluation purposes, even if he had
reviewed Deloitte's 1997 submission (without seeking further explanation
from Deloitte). [6]

The Futures Group Int'l, supra, at 7-8 n.13.

We sustained Futures' protest and recommended that, "consistent with th[e]
decision, the agency perform a proper cost evaluation, including a cost
realism analysis, reopen discussions if necessary, and make a new best-value
determination." [7] Id. at 12.

IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION

To implement the corrective action, USAID requested that the Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit Futures' and Deloitte's cost proposals,
particularly Deloitte's proposed overhead and G&A rates. Agency Report, Jan.
17, 2000, Supplemental Negotiation Memorandum, at 5. DCAA performed three
separate audits of Deloitte's cost proposal and two audits of Futures' cost
proposal. The record shows that DCAA conducted these audits based on the
assumption that Deloiite had proposed a suboffice rate for this procurement.
See, e.g., id., DCAA Audit Report No. 6311-99I21000003-S1, Sept. 10, 1999,
at 140. The audits were completed in mid-September 1999. In the first audit,
DCAA simply concluded:

[DELETED] We analyzed the contractor's computation of these rates and took
no exceptions.

Id., DCAA Audit Report No. 6311-99I21000002, Apr. 16, 1999, at 101. After
USAID's OCC verified that DCAA had not analyzed the realism of Deloitte's
proposed rates, but had simply verified Deloitte's arithmetic, it requested
DCAA to consider the realism of the proposed rates. Id., Supplemental
Negotiation Memorandum at 6. After further analysis, DCAA stated the
following concerning Deloitte's indirect rates:

It is our opinion the proposed Site Overhead and G&A rates are understated
in the short run. The potential underpricing of the proposal is due to the
fact the Commercial Market Strategies programs were not fully implemented as
planned. We believe the potential underpricing is attributable to these
extenuating circumstances and do not consider it to be intentional.

Id., DCAA Audit Report No. 6311-99I21000003-S1, Sept. 10, 1999, at 140; see
DCAA Audit Report No. 6311-99I21000003, July 30, 1999, at 114. Regarding the
[DELETED] overhead rate, DCAA stated:

[Deloitte] is currently performing this effort at the home office.
Therefore, no actual expense data is currently available for this site
overhead rate. We were able to compare the direct labor proposed to the
projected direct labor and year to date direct labor incurred through 6
March 1999.

. . . . . .

Based on this analysis, we are of the opinion the site overhead is
understated as proposed due to the extenuating circumstances. In addition,
the contractor accounts for two overhead rates, a home office rate and a
site rate. [DELETED]

Id., DCAA Audit Report No. 6311-9I21000003-S1, Sept. 10, 1999, at 140-41;
see DCAA Audit Report No. 6311-99I21000003, July 30, 1999, at 114-15.
Regarding G&A, DCAA stated:

We compared the total cost input proposed to the projected base for [FY]
1999 and compared historical G&A rates to proposed. In addition, we
annualized the six month year to date actual pool and base costs for G&A and
calculated a rate of [DELETED] percent. [Deloitte] is proposing a G&A of
[DELETED] percent. It is our opinion the G&A rate is understated as proposed
due to the extenuating circumstances.

[DELETED] In addition, when comparing historical site overhead rates and G&A
rates to proposed, it was noted that when [Deloitte] was performing similar,
though smaller efforts, the proposed rates appear to be more reflective of
the historical rates given the magnitude of [this] contract. Therefore, we
are of the opinion the site overhead and G&A rates are only understated in
the short run.

Id., DCAA Audit Report No. 6311-99I21000003-S1, Sept. 10, 1999, at 141; see
DCAA Audit Report No. 6311-99I21000003, July 30, 1999, at 115. DCAA
calculated that Deloitte's proposed costs were understated by approximately
$4.5 million for the first 2 years of the contract. Id., DCAA Audit Report
No. 6311-99I21000003, July 30, 1999, at 126-29; DCAA Audit Report No.
6311-99I21000003-S1, Sept. 10, 1999, at 152-54; see Protester's Comments,
Jan. 27, 2000, at 12.

USAID's OCC reviewed the DCAA audit reports and recommended the following
regarding Deloitte's overhead and G&A rates:

Since DCAA has determined that the proposed overhead and G&A rates are
potentially understated in years one and two, we recommend the proposed site
overhead and G&A rates be incorporated into [this] contract as ceiling
indirect rates . . . [DELETED] DCAA opinion is that the site overhead and
G&A rates will reach proposed levels during year two assuming [this]
contract is fully implemented.

The bid protest and related corrective action have adversely affected the
site overhead and G&A rates, therefore the proposed site overhead rate of
[DELETED] and G&A rate of [DELETED] were reasonable at the time they were
proposed. . . . In the absence of this delay in contract performance, the
proposed [DELETED] G&A is reasonable.

Agency Report, Jan. 17, 2000, OCC Memorandum 513-14 (Oct. 21, 1999).

In reevaluating the offerors' costs, the contract specialist referenced the
advice provided by OCC and found Deloitte's [DELETED] overhead and [DELETED]
G&A rates were reasonable and realistic, noted that rate ceilings at these
values were incorporated in the contract after the initial protest, and
stated:

It could be argued that for the assessment of realism, the initial period of
the contract should be burdened with the higher rates that DCAA found are
currently being experienced by Deloitte. However, since the purpose of the
cost realism assessment is to determine the likely contract cost based on an
evaluation of the information available at the time the proposals were
submitted, the USAID position incorporated the site overhead rate of
[DELETED] and G&A rate of [DELETED]. This position is reasonable since
available information indicates that these rates would have been the likely
result if Deloitte had been able to perform this contract consistent with
their technical approach, and had not been impacted by the protest.

Id., Supplemental Negotiation Memorandum, at 9.

After making various probable cost adjustments to the proposed costs, USAID
evaluated Deloitte's cost at $87,881,797 and Futures' cost at $91,130,804.
Id. at 38. No cost adjustments were made to Deloitte's proposed cost to
reflect the more than $4.5 million understatement in indirect costs found by
DCAA (discussed above). USAID again determined that Deloitte's proposal
represented the best value on the basis of its lower evaluated cost, and on
November 22 affirmed the Deloitte award. Id. at 39-40. This protest
followed.

PROTEST OF CORRECTIVE ACTION

Futures challenges the propriety of USAID's cost realism evaluation of
Deloitte's proposal, again arguing that USAID should have adjusted
Deloitte's cost to reflect its higher historical rates. Futures argues that
the DCAA audits of Deloitte's rates were flawed because USAID allowed DCAA
to assume that Deloitte had proposed a site rate instead of the home office
rate contained in its proposal. [8] Futures further argues that at a minimum
USAID should have adjusted Deloitte's indirect rates to account for the $4.5
million in understated costs referenced by DCAA, which itself would have
caused Deloitte's proposal to have a higher evaluated cost than Futures.
Futures also argues that Deloitte's indirect rate ceilings under the
contract should not have been considered for purposes of the cost realism
evaluation because the ceilings were negotiated after the award.

Where our Office sustains a protest and recommends corrective action, the
specific details of the corrective action necessarily depend on the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the procurement. Therefore,
we leave the details of implementing corrective action to the discretion and
judgment of the contracting agency. The agency, however, must exercise this
discretion reasonably and in a fashion that remedies the procurement
impropriety that was the basis for our protest recommendation. See CitiWest
Properties, Inc., B-274689.4, Nov. 26, 1997, 98-1 CPD para. 3 at 6.

ANALYSIS

Here, even though more than 8 months passed before the recommendation made
in our prior decision was implemented by confirming the award to Deloitte,
USAID elected not to conduct discussions or obtain revised and updated
proposals. The agency took this position, even though the DCAA audits had
revealed that the magnitude of the contract, as performed, was significantly
less than was anticipated by Deloitte's proposal, and in the face of DCAA
audits that revealed that Deloitte's indirect costs were understated by $4.5
million. As noted by Futures, if this figure were factored into the cost
realism analysis by the agency, then Futures' evaluated cost would be lower
than Deloitte's and its proposal would be in line for award. USAID
discounted DCAA's calculation of Deloitte's understated indirect costs,
basically finding that this understatement was solely the result of Futures'
protest [9] and that USAID's cost realism analysis was "to determine the
likely contract cost based on an evaluation of the information available at
the time the proposals were submitted." [10] Agency Report, Supplemental
Negotiation Memorandum, at 9.

USAID did not apply the proper standard in evaluating the cost realism of
Deloitte's proposal. The calculation of a probable cost through a cost
realism analysis, even on reevaluation, is required to "reflect the
Government's best estimate of the cost of any contract that is most likely
to result from the offeror's proposal" and this "probable cost shall be used
for purposes of evaluation to determine the best value." Federal Acquisition
Regulation sect. 15.404-1(d)(2)(i). The regulation does not contemplate that the
cost realism analysis will be limited to the information available at the
time proposals were submitted; rather, a cost realism analysis is required
to consider information reasonably available as of the time of the
evaluation. See L-3 Communications Corp., Oceans Sys. Div., B-281784.3,
B-281784.4, Apr. 26, 1999, 99-1 CPD para. 81 at 5-13.

Thus, USAID's decision, in calculating Deloitte's probable costs, to
completely discount the documented understatement in Deloitte's proposed
indirect rates was unreasonable. In this regard, we also note that, while
DCAA confirmed that Deloitte's proposed rates resembled suboffice rates
Deloitte charged on some smaller contracts (as is suggested in Deloitte's
1997 incurred cost document), the record show that Deloitte's proposed rates
were not based on current contract data, and that DCAA's audit review
revealed that Deloitte's actual indirect rates to date were in line with
Deloitte's higher [DELETED] historical rates and that Deloitte's accounting
system had not been audited. [11]

The record shows that one reason USAID felt comfortable accepting Deloitte's
rates as proposed was that during the course of Futures' prior protest, 1
day after the hearing, Deloitte agreed to cap its overhead and G&A rates at
the proposed level. See Agency Legal Memorandum at 24-25; Agency Report,
Jan. 17, 2000, Supplemental Negotiation Memorandum, at 9. Since the cap
represented a material change in Deloitte's proposal, however, it could not
be considered by the agency in the evaluation without having discussions
with all competitive range offerors. See Integrated Sys. Group, B-272336,
B-272336.2, Sept. 27, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 144 at 4-6 (post-award communications
regarding ambiguous prices constituted discussions

where they affected the offerors' relative proposed prices); Paramax Sys.
Corp.; CAE-Link Corp., B-253098.4, B-253098.5, Oct. 27, 1993, 93-2 CPD para. 282
at 6 (agreement by agency and awardee after award selection to lower the
awardee's proposed fees to make its proposal acceptable constituted
discussions requiring discussions with all competitive range offerors); see
also Serv-Air, Inc.; Kay and Assocs., Inc., B-258243 et al., Dec. 28, 1994,
96-1 CPD para. 267 at 6-7 (discussions were required to allow an offeror to
propose a cap on its proposed indirect rates).

Moreover, in the 8 months USAID took to implement its corrective action, the
circumstances of the competition materially changed. Specifically, Deloitte
materially changed its proposal by agreeing to a cap on its indirect rates
after contract award and the record evidences that, for whatever reason
(protest or otherwise), the contract work is not of the magnitude envisioned
by Deloitte's proposal in that the anticipated contract base has not been
generated. See United Tel. Co. of the Northwest, B-246977, Apr. 20, 1992,
92-1 CPD para. 374 at 7-12 (changed circumstances after award selection required
the submission of revised proposals).

Based on our review, we think that USAID acted unreasonably in confirming
the Deloitte award without conducting discussions. [12]

The protest is sustained.

We recommend that USAID reopen discussions with Futures and Deloitte, obtain
revised proposals based on USAID's actual requirements, and make a new
best-value determination. [13] In addition, we recommend that Futures be
reimbursed the cost of filing and pursuing its protest, including reasonable
attorneys' fees. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(d)(1). The protester should submit its
certified claim for such costs, detailing the time expended and the costs
incurred, directly to the contracting agency within 60 days of receiving
this decision.

Comptroller General
of the United States

Notes

1. A hearing was conducted in connection with our consideration of Futures'
prior protest.

2. No discussions were conducted with Deloitte regarding its proposed
indirect rates. Initial Agency Report, exh. 6.

3. Since this post-protest action was not part of the agency's cost
evaluation, it did not affect the outcome of our decision.

4. This reason had not been mentioned in any of the contemporaneous
evaluation documentation, or in any submission by the agency or the
awardee/intervenor up until the hearing, even though the realism of
Deloitte's indirect rates had been squarely raised by Futures and been
otherwise addressed by these parties.

5. Deloitte's home office is also located in the Washington, D.C. area. See
Deloitte Technical Proposal at III-2.

6. We also note that Deloitte's cost proposal expressly reported its
provisional billing rates for overhead and G&A at the historic [DELETED] and
[DELETED] levels. Deloitte Cost Proposal sect. 5.

7. Because of other apparent discrepancies in the record, we suggested that
a cost realism analysis of all aspects of the cost proposals be performed.
The Futures Group Int'l, supra, at 8 n.15. We denied Futures' protest of the
technical evaluation. Id. at 9-12.

8. Futures states that this assumption was inconsistent with, and/or
represented a change in, Deloitte's proposal, and that Futures could have
proposed a suboffice or site rate if allowed to modify its proposal.

9. USAID's claim that the understatement in Deloitte's indirect costs was
solely the result of the protest is not clearly supported by the record.
USAID states that, even though the agency promptly authorized performance
under the contract after the initial protest was filed, the protest caused
the agency's overseas missions to be reluctant to use their limited
resources to fund the programs covered by this contract and Deloitte to be
unwilling to lease space in a separate Washington office, which resulted in
Deloitte not achieving its projected revenue base, which presumably would
have supported its low proposed indirect rates. See Agency Legal Memorandum
at 24-25. However, there is no documentation in the record that shows that
the failure to generate the contract base anticipated by Deloitte in its
proposal was the result of the agency's overseas missions' concerns about
Futures' protest, and the protester suggests that there may be programmatic
reasons for this failure. See Protester's Comments, Jan. 27, 2000, at 15-17.
In addition, Deloitte, which reports that it has now set up this office
after the issuance of our prior decision sustaining the protest, has not
confirmed that the protest was the reason it did not promptly set up the
promised Washington office.

10. We note that USAID was not entirely consistent in deciding to limit its
review to the information available at the time proposals were submitted.
For example, even though a reasonable reading (and apparently USAID's
reading until the hearing) of Deloitte's proposal indicated that its
proposed overhead and G&A rates were home office rates, USAID and DCAA
performed the cost realism analysis as if they were clearly proposed as
suboffice rates. Moreover, when it analyzed Deloitte's proposed CAPS country
costs and found them reasonable as proposed, the agency relied on data
obtained from Deloitte stating that its costs were based on [DELETED]
countries at an estimated [DELETED] per country; however, Deloitte's
proposal indicated that its costs were based on [DELETED] per country for
[DELETED] countries. See Deloitte Revised Cost Proposal, CAPS Country
Programs, Note 6.A; Letter from Deloitte to USAID (Apr. 22, 1999); Agency
Report, Jan. 17, 2000, Supplemental Technical/Cost Realism Review Memorandum
399-400 (June 20, 1999). We need not decide if the communications with
Deloitte on these matters constituted discussions, since we recommend below
that discussions be reopened.

11. Where rate checks by DCAA are based on current contract data, the rates
are inherently more reliable, in that they are tested, easily confirmed
measures of realism. See L-3 Communications Corp., Oceans Sys. Div., supra,
at 12.

12. Futures also argues that USAID unreasonably evaluated and conducted
improper post-BAFO discussions concerning the realism of Deloitte's CAPS
country program costs. We need not consider this issue since we recommend
that discussions be reopened.

13. Where, as here, the contracting agency decides to continue performance
of a protested contract based on a finding that to do so would be in the
best interest of the government, the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984
requires our Office to make our recommendation without regard to any cost or
disruption from terminating, recompeting, or reawarding the contract. 31
U.S.C. sect. 3554(b)(2) (1994); 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(c) (1999).