BNUMBER:  B-281046; B-281012.2 
DATE:  December 22, 1998
TITLE: PCT Services, Inc., B-281046; B-281012.2, December 22, 1998
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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:PCT Services, Inc.

File:     B-281046; B-281012.2

Date:December 22, 1998

Thomas E. Abernathy IV, Esq., Smith, Currie & Hancock, for the 
protester.
John E. Lariccia, Esq., and Patrick F. Corbin, Esq., Department of the 
Air Force, for the agency.
Jeanne W. Isrin, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General 
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protest that information supporting high performance risk rating is 
inaccurate, and that rating therefore was improper, is denied where:  
(1) supporting information is substantial and well documented, and was 
obtained from most recent, and best-informed sources available 
regarding protester's performance; (2) there is no basis on the face 
of the information to question its accuracy; and (3) protester has not 
established that the agency lacked a reasonable basis with respect to 
any of the deficiencies cited. 

DECISION

PCT Services, Inc. protests the award of contracts by the Department 
of the Air Force for hospital aseptic management system (HAMS) 
services to:  (1) Integrity Management Services, Inc., under request 
for proposals (RFP) No. F41622-98-R-0022, to serve Tyndall Air Force 
Base (AFB), Florida; (2) Rite-Way Services, under RFP No. 
F41622-98-R-0023, to serve Kirtland AFB, New Mexico; (3) Rite-Way 
Services, under RFP No. F41622-98-R-0026, to serve the U.S. Air Force 
Academy, Colorado and F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming; and (4) Harry A. Stroh 
Associates, Inc. under RFP No. F41622-98-R-0027, to serve Keesler AFB, 
Mississippi and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana.  PCT submitted the 
low-priced offer under each solicitation, and argues that it 
improperly was denied the awards based on an unjustified high-risk 
performance rating in the evaluation.   

We deny the protest.

The RFPs, which had identical provisions, provided for award of 
fixed-price contracts for a base period with four 1-year options.  The 
RFPs stated that award would be made on a best value basis using the 
following evaluation factors:  technical, past performance and price.  
RFP, Evaluation at 1.  The technical factor was most important, and 
past performance and price were equally weighted.     RFP, Evaluation 
at 3.  Offerors were required to submit past performance information 
for relevant contracts performed within the past 2 years.  RFP, 
Instructions to Offerors at 5,  sec.  1(b)2.  Technically acceptable 
proposals would receive a high, moderate, low, or not applicable risk 
rating based on the evaluators' review of present and past performance 
information provided in the proposal or obtained through the use of 
simplified questionnaires, and data independently obtained from other 
government and commercial sources.  RFP, Evaluation at 2.  A best 
value analysis then would be made based on a tradeoff between price 
and past performance.  RFP, Evaluation at 3.  The RFP provided that 
award might be made to other than the technically acceptable, lowest 
evaluated price offeror if that offeror were judged to have a 
moderate, high, or not applicable performance risk rating.  Id.

PCT's proposal on each of the solicitations was the lowest-priced 
technically acceptable proposal received.  However, analysis of past 
performance evaluation data obtained and information supplied by PCT 
resulted in a high performance risk rating.  The tradeoff analysis 
resulted in a determination that the awardees' offers represented the 
best value to the government, despite PCT's lower price, in each case.

In evaluating PCT's performance risk, the agency reviewed:  (1) PCT's 
most recent past performance evaluation (in connection with a contract 
award for Hill, Luke and MacDill AFBs), completed on January 20, 1998; 
(2) updated performance information concerning contracts at Patrick, 
Dover (two of the contracts included in the January 1998 evaluation) 
and Kirtland AFBs, sources provided by PCT; and (3) information 
supplied by PCT in its proposal and, later, in rebuttal to 
deficiencies cited from the Dover and Kirtland information.  

In the January 1998 evaluation, PCT received a moderate risk rating 
based on a generally poor performance record, PCT's refusal to 
recognize or correct performance deficiencies (identified by the 
quality assurance evaluators (QAE) who answered the questionnaires), 
and its refusal to comply with contract requirements regarding change 
proposals.  Our review of the information for that evaluation reveals 
that, while one of the six installations queried for performance 
information stated that it definitely would contract with PCT in the 
future, two indicated that they definitely would not, and two more 
indicated that they probably would not, award to PCT again (the sixth 
did not indicate what it would do in the future).  Specific problems 
detailed included lack of corporate oversight, inadequate staffing, 
inadequate training and quality control, and insufficient equipment 
and supplies, the latter reportedly because PCT was not paying its 
vendors.[1]

The updated information obtained indicated that PCT's performance had 
not improved at Patrick since the January 1998 evaluation, and 
actually may have deteriorated at Dover.  Patrick cited continuing 
customer complaints, contract discrepancies, unresponsive management, 
labor problems, and general dissatisfaction.  The officials finished 
by commenting:  "Unless there has been a drastic change in management 
I would not recommend this company for future HAMS contracts."  July 
28, 1998 Electronic Mail Message from [deleted] to [deleted] (produced 
as part of agency's November 10 production of additional documents).  
An updated questionnaire from Dover again indicated that it probably 
would not award another contract to PCT (as indicated in the 
questionnaire furnished in connection with the January 1998 
evaluation).  Although satisfied with PCT in some respects, Dover also 
stated that (1) it had a monthly average of 10 customer complaints, 
written or verbal; (2) PCT required close scrutiny to get adequate 
performance; (3) PCT met contract standards for uniforms and personal 
protective equipment only after repeated complaints; and (4) PCT did 
not maintain an adequate staff to meet requirements on all shifts.  
Although Dover rated PCT as satisfactory overall, it rated the firm 
only marginal for staffing and timely task completion. 

Similarly, information obtained from Kirtland (deemed particularly 
significant because PCT was performing the contract at the time of the 
evaluation) detailed a large number of significant performance 
problems, as follows:  lack of corporate oversight/management support 
of/for the field employees, e.g., the QAE stated that he had seen a 
corporate representative only twice, the first time when the contract 
was awarded and the second in May 1998, 5 months before the 5-year 
contract was to expire, at the time the executive housekeeper was 
replaced; poor judgment on the part of the contract manager on some 
safety-related issues, e.g., using ladders instead of scaffolding to 
clean second- and third-floor windows outside the facility, 
compromising employee safety; inadequate training and quality control, 
e.g., the executive housekeeper did not have plans for either; 
frequent absence of the executive housekeeper during duty hours; 
insufficient provision of supplies to perform the contract and 
nonpayment of wages to employees in some cases, both reportedly as a 
result of PCT's financial problems; a large turnover rate (in its 
comments, PCT acknowledged a 53-percent rate), including three 
executive housekeepers over the 5-year contract; on at least one 
occasion, the wet/dry vacuum from surgery was improperly used in other 
areas of the hospital; failure to meet contract requirements for 
uniforms and personal protective equipment; secured doors left 
unlocked by PCT personnel on at least one occasion; marginal 
compliance with overall contract requirements for cleanliness; failure 
of PCT's stripper machine to comply with safety regulations when the 
batteries are being charged; failure to provide written work task 
schedules on all shifts; and inadequate staffing.[2]

On one of the Kirtland questionnaires, the QAE rated PCT only marginal 
for staffing and for the executive housekeeper's ability to recognize 
and resolve unanticipated difficulties; he rated PCT unsatisfactory in 
training and quality control.  On a second questionnaire, Kirtland's 
contract administrator rated PCT marginal for:  selection of key 
personnel, detailing employees' duties, the ability of the project 
staff to provide adequate expertise and management emphasis and 
responsibility, and submitting accurate and timely cost reports.  
Overall, both the QAE and the administrator rated PCT's performance 
marginal; the administrator stated she would not, and the QAE that he 
probably would not, award to PCT again.

PCT was given a chance to respond to the adverse information from 
Dover and Kirtland.  (The information provided by Patrick was 
essentially unchanged from the January 1998 evaluation, at which time 
PCT had been given a chance to respond to it.)  PCT's response raised 
further concerns.  For example, PCT acknowledged a 53-percent turnover 
rate in the last year of the Kirtland contract, and attributed it to 
"the fact that the [executive housekeeper] was padding the payroll 
with her relatives."  PCT's Rebuttal Concerning Past Performance at 
Kirtland, Tab 10 of Agency Report.  Also, in response to a cited 
deficiency that the executive housekeeper had been absent during 
normal duty hours without notification to the QAE, PCT stated that 
this was the Air Force's fault, since it was required by the contract 
to notify PCT of her absence.  Since the contract required PCT to 
notify the Air Force when the executive housekeeper was to be absent, 
contracting officials concluded that PCT had a basic misunderstanding 
of the requirement and PCT's responsibilities.   

PCT argues that the high-risk performance rating assigned to its offer 
is unjustified because it is based on inaccurate information.  In 
particular, PCT disputes the assertion that Kirtland received an 
average of 7 complaints per month and that Dover received an average 
of 10, arguing that the number of written complaints  only supports a 
monthly average of 1.13 complaints for Kirtland and 3 for Dover.  PCT 
further argues that, in any case, the deficiencies cited simply are 
insufficient to support a high risk rating.

We will review an evaluation of an offeror's performance risk to 
ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated 
evaluation factors.  PCT Servs., Inc., supra, at 4; SEAIR Transport 
Servs., Inc., B-274436, Dec. 12, 1996, 96-2 CPD  para.  224 at 5. 

The evaluation was unobjectionable.  First, the fact that the record 
does not include a sufficient number of written complaints to support 
the averages claimed by Kirtland and Dover is irrelevant, since the 
QAEs clearly indicated that the complaints received were both written 
and oral.  Given the numerous and varied deficiencies outlined above, 
there is no reason to question the veracity of the Kirtland and Dover 
officials with regard to the total number of complaints received.
Further, we agree with the agency that PCT's attempts to rebut several 
(but not all) of the deficiencies cited were unpersuasive.  For 
example, while PCT submitted evidence of 11 in-service training 
sessions which occurred between December 5, 1994 and March 9, 1998, 
the fact remains that PCT's employees were found to evidence a lack of 
training.  Moreover, even if that amount of training ordinarily would 
be viewed as sufficient to ensure that employees were properly trained 
(the record contains no information showing that this is the case), 
PCT's 53-percent employee turnover rate invites the conclusion that 
perhaps training was not being provided as fast as new employees were 
hired.  We note that, for most of the cited deficiencies, PCT does no 
more than assert that the activities' conclusions are wrong.  For 
example, the Kirtland information indicated that PCT failed to provide 
written work task schedules on all shifts as required; PCT maintains 
that work schedules were provided to the QAE.  The Dover information 
stated PCT did not maintain an adequate staff on all shifts; PCT 
maintains that staffing was adequate.  This mere disagreement is not 
sufficient to establish that the prior performance information 
provided to the agency was incorrect.  See PCT Servs., Inc., supra, at 
4-6; Pannesma Co., Ltd., B-251688, Apr. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  333 at 6.

PCT's argument that the cited deficiencies are inadequate to support a 
high risk rating is without merit.  Nothing in the RFP specified the 
number or type of deficiencies that would lead to certain risk 
ratings.  This being the case, the only question is whether the agency 
reasonably determined that the deficiencies reported by prior 
contracting activities were sufficient in quantity, type and 
seriousness to warrant a finding that PCT's proposal presented a high 
risk that the contract would not be performed properly.  We think the 
cited deficiencies clearly provided a reasonable basis for such a 
conclusion.[3]  

Noting that the high risk rating was based largely on information from 
Dover and Kirtland, PCT argues that since the Dover QAE rated PCT 
satisfactory overall and Kirtland's QAE rated PCT marginal, a 
high-risk rating was not warranted.  This argument is without merit.  
The adjectival ratings used by the activities notwithstanding, the 
agency properly could base its performance risk rating on the totality 
of the information presented.  As indicated above, we think the 
deficiencies reported by the activities provided a sufficient basis 
for the agency to rate PCT's proposal high risk.

PCT argues that the agency improperly failed to consider that its 
proposal included a new management plan outlining improvements PCT 
plans to make in future contracts.  This argument is without merit.  
First, our review indicates that the submission consisted of 1-1/2 
pages of projected changes in operating procedures, largely directed 
toward alleviating the lack of corporate oversight cited in the 
Kirtland questionnaires.  In any case, the record indicates that 
contracting officials considered all the information provided by PCT, 
which includes the new management plan, and found it an inadequate 
basis for assigning a better risk rating.  There is nothing 
unreasonable in this conclusion.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. PCT filed a protest objecting to the moderate risk rating assigned, 
which we denied.  See PCT Servs., Inc., B-279168, May 12, 1998, 98-1 
CPD  para.  152.

2. The record contains several further instances of the problems under 
PCT's Kirtland contract.  For example, a subcontractor that cleaned 
PCT's mops repeatedly called the QAE to request payments which PCT had 
failed to make; the subcontractor reportedly was paid by PCT only 
months later.  Kirtland also reported that it received a monthly 
average of seven customer complaints (written and verbal).  The record 
contains 26 written customer complaints from Kirtland regarding PCT's 
performance, most concerning cleaning deficiencies, inadequate trash 
removal, insufficient supplies, inadequately trained staff, and 
inappropriate conduct by PCT staff. 

3. We note also that, with respect to RFP Nos. F41622-98-R-0026 and 
F41622-98-R-0027, the agency also calculated performance risk ratings 
using a quantitative method based on the QAEs' responses as to whether 
they would award a contract to that offeror again.  PCT's score 
equated with a high risk rating.