BNUMBER:  B-279759.2; B-279759.3 
DATE:  February 16, 1999
TITLE: Systems Integration & Research, Inc.; Presearch Inc., B-
279759.2; B-279759.3, February 16, 1999
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.

Matter of:Systems Integration & Research, Inc.; Presearch Inc.

File:B-279759.2; B-279759.3
        
Date:February 16, 1999

James J. McCullough, Esq., and Catherine E. Pollack, Esq., Fried, 
Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson for Systems Integration & Research, Inc.; and Jacob 
B. Pompan, Esq., Pompan, Murray, Ruffner & Werfel, for Presearch Inc., 
the protesters.
Kenneth D. Brody, Esq., McMahon, David & Brody, for DTI Associates, 
Inc., an intervenor. 
Thomas W. Essig, Timothy Hickey, Esq., Andrew C. Saunders, Esq., and 
John M. Davis, Esq., Naval Sea Systems Command, for the agency. 
Aldo A. Benejam, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Agency's acceptance of awardee's proposed uncompensated overtime 
and direct labor rates is unobjectionable where solicitation does not 
prohibit uncompensated overtime; agency reasonably relied on reviews 
and recommendations by Defense Contract Audit Agency of the awardee's 
direct labor rates, escalation rates, overhead, and general and 
administrative rates; and agency independently considered projected 
cost of awardee's performance.

2.  Allegation that agency improperly evaluated protester's proposal 
is denied where the record shows that the agency evaluated the 
proposal in accordance with the evaluation factors announced in the 
solicitation and record reasonably supports protester's overall 
technical rating.

DECISION

Systems Integration & Research, Inc. (SIR) and Presearch Inc. protest 
the award of a contract to DTI Associates, Inc. under request for 
proposals (RFP) No. N00024-97-R-5487, issued by the Department of the 
Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, for management support services.[1]  
SIR argues that the Navy failed to conduct a proper cost realism 
analysis to account for DTI's proposed uncompensated overtime and 
labor rates in both the technical and cost evaluations, which resulted 
in a flawed cost/technical tradeoff decision.  Presearch contends that 
the Navy improperly evaluated its proposal.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

The RFP, issued on August 20, 1997, as a total small business 
set-aside, contemplated the award of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract 
for a base period with up to four 1-year option periods.  RFP 
Amendment No. 0004,  sec.  B.[2]  Offerors were instructed to submit 
proposals in four separate volumes:  offer (volume I); written 
capability information (volume II); supporting cost data (volume III); 
and oral presentation (volume IV).  Id.  sec.  L-3.  Section M of the RFP 
stated that the agency would first determine the acceptability of each 
offer on a pass/fail basis.  Id.  sec.  M, at 130.  The agency would then 
evaluate the "relative capability" of each offeror in the following 
areas, which were of equal importance:  resumes, past performance 
information, and the oral presentation.  Id. at 134.  With respect to 
cost, the RFP stated that the evaluation would be based on an analysis 
of the realism and completeness of the cost data, the traceability of 
cost to the offeror's capability data, and the proposed hours and 
labor mix.  The RFP stated that the government would estimate the 
overall cost to the government including fee.  Id. at 131-32.  The 
"relative capability" area was to be considered more important than 
projected cost.  Award was to be made on the basis of the proposal 
deemed to represent the best value to the government.  Id. at 130.

Initial Evaluation and Source Selection

Six firms submitted initial proposals by the time set on October 17, 
1997, and the contracting officer (CO) determined that all six 
proposals were acceptable.  A technical evaluation review panel (TERP) 
evaluated the resumes and past performance information,[3] and a cost 
analysis panel (CAP) evaluated the cost data with the assistance of 
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).  Oral presentations were 
made from October 23 to October 27.  In accordance with section L of 
the RFP, all offerors were provided with the same task on the day they 
were scheduled for their oral presentation, and were given 1 hour in 
which to prepare their response to the task.  The task consisted of a 
two-part acquisition support question requiring the preparation of a 
milestone chart and a "budget reclama" (sample tasks 1(a) and 1(b)), a 
management philosophy question, and a facilities capability question.  
Each offeror was allotted 1 hour for its oral presentation, which was 
videotaped and was attended by the TERP members. 

After individually evaluating the offerors' resumes, past performance 
information, and oral presentations, the TERP convened to reach a 
consensus in assigning strengths, weaknesses, and risks to each 
offeror's "relative capability," as well as an overall adjectival 
rating of either outstanding, good, satisfactory, or poor to the 
proposals.  The TERP chairperson then prepared a consolidated report 
reflecting the individual members' narrative descriptions of each 
proposal's strengths, weaknesses, and risks.  

The CAP reviewed all of the cost data submitted by each offeror and 
requested that DCAA review and verify each offeror's proposed direct 
and indirect labor rates, as well as each offeror's proposed 
uncompensated overtime (UOT) and compensation plan.  The CAP then 
reviewed DCAA's report and recommendations, made its own independent 
determination of the reasonableness of each offeror's proposed cost, 
and prepared a report.  In early 1998, the TERP and CAP met with the 
contract award review panel (CARP) to discuss their preliminary 
findings; and in February, the TERP and the CAP presented their 
respective reports to the CARP.  Although the CARP ultimately adopted 
both reports, it also identified a few additional minor weaknesses in 
the "relative capability" area in SIR's and DTI's proposals, and 
adjusted the overall adjectival ratings accordingly, with the 
following results:

          Offeror     Rel. Capability   Projected Cost

           Presearch  Satisfactory      $39,294,207

           Offeror A  Satisfactory       39,980,753

           DTI        Satisfactory       43,029,517

           Offeror B  Satisfactory       46,780,098

           Offeror C  Satisfactory       47,634,764

           SIR        Outstanding        47,482,590
Agency Report (AR) at 10.

Based on its review of the projected cost and "relative capability" 
ratings, the CARP ranked the offerors in order of "best value" as 
follows:  SIR, DTI, Presearch, and offerors A, B, and C.  CARP Report, 
Mar. 16, 1998, at 10.

The CARP also made a cost/technical tradeoff assessment between the 
two highest-ranked proposals--SIR's and DTI's.  In its recommendation, 
the CARP focused on four significant weaknesses in DTI's proposal.  
For instance, the CARP noted that DTI's proposed Deputy Program 
Manager had no similar experience indicating her capability to help 
manage a contract of the magnitude contemplated by the RFP.  The CARP 
viewed this as a significant risk in DTI's proposal because 
ineffective management of the subcontractors or the volume of work 
could severely harm the programs supported.  The CARP also noted that 
DTI proposed two unpriced subcontractors, but did not provide any 
resumes or cost information for those firms.  In addition, the CARP 
noted that the role of DTI's proposed principal officers was unclear, 
and that DTI had provided no justification to support its use of over 
[DELETED] percent of UOT,[4] which the CARP considered to present a 
risk of cost growth.  Id. at 11-12.  Based on its review, the CARP 
concluded that SIR was technically superior in the amount and quality 
of experience of its proposed personnel, and recommended award to SIR 
as offering the best value to the government over DTI and the other 
offerors.  Id. at 12.  

The source selection authority (SSA) concurred with the CARP's 
recommendation, and on March 23, the Navy awarded the contract to SIR.  
DTI subsequently filed a protest in our Office following a debriefing 
by the agency.  In response to DTI's protest, the Navy terminated 
SIR's contract; reopened the competition; conducted discussions with 
all offerors in the competitive range, and requested and evaluated 
best and final offers (BAFO).

Subsequent Evaluation and Source Selection

As part of the process of reopening the competition, by letters dated 
May 19, the Navy informed all offerors of the corrective actions the 
Navy was taking in response to DTI's protest.  That letter stated that 
the weaknesses and risks identified at the respective offeror's 
debriefing would constitute the basis for discussions and, for each 
offeror, the letters contained an attachment listing those weaknesses, 
risks, and other discussion items.  The letter sent to DTI 
specifically described the significant weaknesses and risks the TERP 
had identified in DTI's proposal with respect to the proposed Deputy 
Program Manager, unpriced subcontractors, UOT, and the unclear role of 
the principal officers.  The Navy's letters also forwarded amendment 
No. 0003 to the RFP, which reissued the solicitation in its entirety, 
and stated that while oral presentations would not be repeated, 
offerors could submit to the Navy their comments on the weaknesses 
identified in that area.  

Offerors responded to the May 19 letters by submitting information on 
some or all of the weaknesses and risks identified.  According to the 
agency, some of the offerors not only commented on the oral 
presentation weaknesses but also provided new answers to sample tasks 
1(a) and 1(b).  AR at 14.  The TERP reviewed all of the information 
submitted by the offerors, including the comments on the sample task 
weaknesses and risks, and prepared a report on its findings.  TERP 
Report, June 24, 1998.

On June 19, the agency issued amendment No. 0004 to the RFP, 
requesting BAFOs by July 6.  Among other things, this amendment 
changed sections L-3 and M of the RFP to permit offerors an 
opportunity to provide new, written information on the management 
philosophy and facilities capability questions asked during the oral 
presentations.  RFP amendment No. 0004, at 104-105, 131.  The 
amendment required offerors to submit this information as a new 
written volume with their BAFOs, and stated that the agency would 
evaluate this new information as part of the oral presentation 
subfactor.  Id. at 104.

Five of the six firms that had submitted initial proposals, including 
SIR, DTI, and Presearch, responded to amendment No. 0004.[5]  The CO 
determined that all five proposals were acceptable and updated the 
past performance information for each firm.  The TERP reevaluated 
proposals based on the BAFO responses to amendment No. 0004, and, as 
it had done with initial proposals, the CAP conducted a new cost 
realism analysis of each offeror's cost proposal with DCAA's 
assistance.  The TERP and the CAP then convened to discuss their 
findings and prepared reports, which were submitted to the CARP.

The CARP concurred with the findings of the TERP and the CAP, with the 
following results:

          Offeror     Rel. Capability   Projected Cost

           Presearch  Satisfactory      $33,061,468

           DTI        Good               34,016,173

           SIR        Outstanding        40,100,063

           Offeror A  Satisfactory       41,343,585

           Offeror B  Satisfactory       41,671,288  
AR at 18.

The CARP then ranked the offerors in the following order:  DTI, SIR, 
Presearch, with offerors A and B in fourth and fifth place, 
respectively.  The CARP then compared the subfactor ratings and 
respective strengths, weaknesses and risks for all offerors; the 
subfactor ratings showing the technical differences between the three 
highest-ranked proposals are shown below:

         Offeror Past Perf.   Resumes      Oral Present.

           SIR   Good         Outstanding  Outstanding

           DTI   Good         Good         Satisfactory

           PresearchGood      Satisfactory Poor
CARP Report, Sept. 25, 1998, at 5; AR at 18.

Based on its review, the CARP found SIR and DTI to be essentially 
equal in past performance, and considered those firms' proposals to be 
slightly better than Presearch's.  SIR's proposal was deemed superior 
in both the resumes and oral presentation areas, having no weaknesses 
under those subfactors.

On the other hand, DTI received no weaknesses under the resumes 
subfactor and the CARP found that the firm proposed personnel almost 
as well qualified as SIR's.  While DTI's response to the sample tasks 
had some weaknesses and risks, the CARP found that the firm had 
demonstrated a thorough knowledge of defense acquisition procedures 
and proposed an excellent array of available facilities.  Based on its 
review, the CARP concluded that SIR's personnel and oral presentation 
had an advantage over DTI's, but that it was not sufficient to justify 
paying an 18-percent cost premium for SIR's proposal.  CARP Report, 
Sept. 25, 1998, at 16.  Accordingly, the CARP recommended to the SSA 
that award be made to DTI.  Id.  The SSA agreed with the CARP's 
recommendation and the Navy awarded the contract to DTI.  These 
protests to our Office followed debriefings by the agency.

SIR's Protest

SIR contends that the Navy failed to perform an adequate cost realism 
analysis of DTI's proposal.  Specifically, SIR argues that in its 
evaluation, the Navy failed to properly account for DTI's proposed 
UOT.[6]  SIR also maintains that the Navy failed to conduct a 
meaningful cost realism analysis of DTI's proposed compensation levels 
which, according to SIR, are unrealistically low for the Washington, 
D.C. metropolitan labor market.  In this connection, SIR argues that 
the Navy failed to reasonably evaluate whether DTI could attract and 
retain the quality of personnel required to perform the contract at 
DTI's average hourly labor rate of [DELETED] compared to SIR's average 
hourly labor rate of [DELETED].[7]  According to SIR, rather than 
evaluating the reasonableness of DTI's unrealistically low average 
hourly labor rates, the Navy based its decision to select DTI for 
award solely on the firm's low proposed cost.

Cost Realism Evaluation

When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost 
reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed estimated costs of 
contract performance and proposed fees are not considered controlling 
since an offeror's estimated costs may not provide valid indications 
of the final actual costs that the government is required, within 
certain limits, to pay.  See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  
15.605(c) (June 1997); ManTech Envtl. Tech., Inc., B-271002 et al., 
June 3, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  272 at 8.  An agency is not required to 
conduct an in-depth cost analysis or to verify each and every item in 
conducting a cost realism analysis.  Rather, the evaluation of 
competing cost proposals requires the exercise of informed judgment by 
the contracting agency involved, since it is in the best position to 
assess the realism of cost and technical approaches and must bear the 
difficulties or additional expenses resulting from a defective cost 
analysis.  Because the contracting agency is in the best position to 
make this cost realism determination, our review is limited to 
determining whether the agency's cost realism analysis is reasonably 
based and not arbitrary.  The Warner/Osborn/G&T Joint Venture, 
B-256641.2, Aug. 23, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  76 at 5.

Section M of the RFP advised offerors that the agency would evaluate 
proposed cost based on its analysis of the realism and completeness of 
the cost data; the traceability of the cost to the offeror's 
capability data; and the proposed allocation of staff hours and labor 
mix.  RFP amendment No. 0004, at 131-34.  The RFP notified offerors 
that the government would consider the realism of the proposed labor 
rates and would evaluate the proposed compensation in accordance with 
FAR  sec.  52.222-46, "Evaluation of Compensation for Professional 
Employees."  Id.  Finally, the RFP provided that the government would 
estimate its overall cost based on pertinent cost information, and 
that if the offeror's proposed costs were considered to be 
unrealistic, they would be adjusted accordingly.  Id.  Section L of 
the RFP recommended a standard 40-hour work week, and required 
offerors to precisely define their work week if a different work week 
was proposed.  Id. at 112.  The RFP did not prohibit the use of UOT.

The agency explains that it was concerned that UOT could lead to 
unrealistically low proposed rates that could impair an offeror's 
ability to attract and retain professional employees.  AR at 20-21.  
Therefore, the agency included the following provision in section L:

             COMPANY POLICY ON UNCOMPENSATED EFFORT

     Briefly summarize the compan[y's] policy on [UOT] and state what 
     if any impact it may have on this effort.  If [UOT] is included 
     in any of the cost estimates used it should be clearly identified 
     with an explanation as to why it is needed and how it is 
     consistent with the RFP [ sec. ] L clause, 'Requirements Concerning 
     Work Week' and RFP [ sec. ] I-1 clause, DFARS 252.237-7019 
     Identification of Uncompensated Overtime.  Contractor and 
     subcontractors shall provide five years of history of salary 
     rates and retention, by employee, for those employees who have 
     performed and are proposed to perform using [UOT].  Explain any 
     salary increases and/or breaks in employment for these employees. 
     Contractor and subcontractors shall provide a company-wide 
     retention rate for the last five years where [UOT] was employed. 

RFP amendment No. 0004, at 115.

The record shows that the CAP conducted a reasonable cost realism 
analysis of each offeror's cost proposal.  The proposals were also 
reviewed to ascertain and verify the proposed labor mix, the 
percentage of prime versus subcontractor effort, other direct costs, 
and total staff hours proposed against the RFP's requirements.  CAP 
Report, undated at 4.  The CAP also reviewed the use of UOT where 
proposed.  Id.  In addition, the CAP requested that cognizant DCAA 
branch offices verify specific BAFO cost elements including direct 
labor rates, indirect rates, and other costs.  Letters from Navy to 
DCAA (July 13, 1998).  For each offeror that proposed UOT, the Navy 
specifically requested that DCAA review, verify, and comment on the 
offeror's policy, 5-year salary rates history and retention rate, and 
company-wide retention rate, and provide a risk assessment of the 
offeror's compensation plan and indicate whether the offeror has a 
DCAA-approved cost accounting system which records all hours worked, 
including uncompensated hours for all employees, regardless of 
contract type.  Id. at 1.

DTI's Uncompensated Overtime

In accordance with the RFP's instructions, DTI's BAFO included cost 
information for DTI and its proposed subcontractors, including direct 
labor rates, indirect costs, and escalation rates.  DTI did not 
propose any contingent hires--that is, all of the personnel it 
proposed were already employees of DTI or its proposed subcontractors.  
DTI and two of its proposed subcontractors [DELETED] proposed that 
their employees would perform UOT in accordance with their respective 
company's established work schedule and compensation policies.

DTI's proposal was based on a [DELETED] workweek for its FLSA-exempt 
employees, which equates to a total of approximately [DELETED] hours 
of UOT over the life of the contract, including options.  DTI provided 
a copy of its employee compensation plan, which included its formal 
written policy that FLSA-exempt employees work [DELETED] hours per 
week.  DTI's proposal, volume III, at 67.  In addition, as required by 
section L of the RFP, DTI provided a table of its FLSA-exempt 
employees' 5-year salary histories.  The salary history DTI submitted 
shows that of the 14 key personnel DTI proposed, 6 have been employed 
by DTI since 1994.  DTI also provided a chart showing its company-wide 
retention rate for 1994-98.  Id. at 66-67.  That chart shows that DTI 
has had a steady retention rate of approximately [DELETED] percent 
over the past 5 years. Id.

DTI also provided employee salary history for the two proposed 
subcontractors that proposed UOT--[DELETED].  [DELETED] proposed a 
total of [DELETED] hours of UOT based on its established 
[DELETED]-hour work week for its professional personnel.  The salary 
history submitted by [DELETED] shows that of the nine key personnel 
the firm proposed, five have been employed with the company since 
1994.  [DELETED] proposed [DELETED] hours of UOT in accordance with 
its established corporate compensation policy for FLSA-exempt 
employees.  [DELETED] salary history shows that all four of the key 
personnel proposed for this effort have been employed by the company 
since 1993.

The record shows that DCAA reviewed DTI's compensation policies and 
procedures, labor distribution, and billing system and verified that 
DTI's established policy is for FLSA-exempt employees to work a 
[DELETED]-hour work week, and that DTI's system records all hours 
worked, including UOT.  DCAA Memorandum, July 16, 1998.  DCAA took no 
exception to DTI's use of UOT.  Id.  DCAA also reviewed [DELETED] UOT 
policy and found that it was not significantly different from other 
firms whose employees work UOT.  DCAA Memorandum, Aug. 5, 1998.  
Additionally, DCAA informed the Navy that it had reviewed [DELETED] 
compensation plan many times in the past and that [DELETED] accounting 
system and labor recordkeeping were adequate.  DCAA Memorandum, July 
27, 1998.  DCAA also verified that the information provided regarding 
[DELETED] 5-year history of its employees' salary rates, dates of 
hire, and the amount of UOT worked was generally accurate.  Id.

The record thus shows that DTI's proposal and DCAA's reviews 
demonstrated that DTI and its subcontractors proposed the use of 
current employees; proposed the use of UOT in accordance with their 
established company policies; had accounting systems that adequately 
track UOT; and had retained employees with their proposed compensation 
structure.  DCAA specifically reviewed DTI's and its subcontractors' 
salary and retention histories and found no adverse impact associated 
with the companies' use of UOT.  Further, rather than relying solely 
on DCAA's reports, the record shows that the CAP independently 
analyzed DTI's proposed costs.  The CAP concurred with DCAA's 
evaluation, and, with the exception of adjustments to DTI's indirect 
rate, made no adjustments to DTI's proposed costs.  Based on our 
review of the record, we conclude that SIR's argument that the agency 
failed to perform an adequate cost realism analysis of DTI's proposal, 
is without merit.

DTI's Direct Labor Rates

SIR argues that the agency failed to account for DTI's lower proposed 
direct labor rates in its BAFO.  In this connection, SIR asserts that 
DTI reduced its direct labor rates by [DELETED] percent for employees 
proposed in both the initial proposal and DTI's BAFO, and that DTI and 
one of its subcontractors substituted lower-paid employees in DTI's 
BAFO for higher-paid employees that had been proposed in the initial 
proposal.  SIR argues that the agency failed to consider risks 
associated with DTI's lower direct labor rates. 

We have reviewed the Navy's cost realism analysis of DTI's proposed 
direct labor rates and conclude that it was reasonable.  In response 
to the Navy's request, DCAA verified that DTI and two of its proposed 
subcontractors [DELETED] proposed direct labor rates that matched 
those in DCAA's files.  DCAA Branch Offices' Memoranda, July 15, 1998.  
DCAA found that the direct labor rates proposed for [DELETED] 
personnel were slightly higher than the rates in DCAA's files, but 
DCAA took no exception to the proposed direct or indirect rates.  Id.  
The record shows that in calculating the government's projected cost 
for DTI, the CAP used the higher proposed rates for [DELETED] because 
the CAP considered those rates more realistic.  CAP Report, undated, 
at 21.

With respect to [DELETED], DCAA found that the proposed direct labor 
rates for some of that firm's employees were slightly lower than the 
rates contained in DCAA's files, and DCAA did not have any rate 
information for some of [DELETED] proposed employees.  Id. at 22.  
However, because the information in DCAA's files was unaudited and 
more than 10 months old, DCAA did not take exception to [DELETED] 
proposed rates.  Id.  Although the CAP took no exception to [DELETED] 
proposed rate, it noted a potential cost risk in the unaudited nature 
of the proposed rates.  Id.  With respect to another proposed 
subcontractor, [DELETED], DCAA was unable to verify that firm's labor 
rates because [DELETED] is a relatively new business and DCAA had no 
information in its files.   Id. at 23.  However, since the direct 
rates for the proposed personnel were similar to rates for similarly 
qualified individuals proposed by other offerors, the CAP made no 
adjustments to [DELETED] proposed rates.  Id. at 23.

DCAA also reviewed DTI's and its subcontractors' proposed escalation 
rates and took no exception; the CAP thus made no adjustments to the 
proposed escalation rates.  In addition, the record shows that DCAA 
reviewed DTI's proposed fringe benefits, overhead, and general and 
administrative rates, and took exception to those rates because they 
did not match DCAA's approved provisional billings indirect rates for 
DTI in 1998.  The CAP accepted DCAA's recommended indirect rates and 
adjusted DTI's proposed costs from [DELETED] to a projected cost of 
[DELETED].  Id. at 17-18.

With respect to SIR's allegation that DTI reduced its proposed direct 
labor rates by [DELETED] percent for all of its employees in its BAFO, 
the agency states that SIR's contention is not accurate.  The agency 
explains that DTI based its direct labor rates for its initial 
proposal on projected rates, while its direct labor rates in its BAFO 
were based on actual labor rates; the actual rates simply were lower 
in many cases than the initial projected rates.  The agency performed 
a cost realism analysis of the labor rates DTI proposed in its BAFO 
and, as explained above, determined that DTI's labor rates were 
realistic.   

Contrary to SIR's argument, we see no basis to conclude that the 
agency failed to properly consider risks associated with DTI's direct 
labor rates.  The record shows that DTI's proposed labor rates were 
based on the wages and salaries that DTI and its subcontractors are 
currently paying their employees to perform under similar contracts.  
There is no evidence in the record that DTI and its proposed 
subcontractors would not be able to retain their employees at the 
rates proposed.  Cf. Combat Sys. Dev. Assocs. Joint Venture, 
B-259920.2, June 13, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  162 at 17 (agency unreasonably 
accepted awardee's proposed UOT without considering the impact of the 
proposed but unannounced pay and benefits cuts).  The record shows 
that the Navy obtained DCAA's verification that DTI's proposed rates 
were the current rates being paid by DTI and its proposed 
subcontractors in comparable positions at the time the firm submitted 
its BAFO, and that those rates were realistic.  In the absence of 
evidence showing that the rates DTI proposed were unrealistically low, 
the Navy could properly rely upon DCAA's advice in performing its cost 
realism analysis.  Delta Research Assocs., Inc., B-254006.2, Nov. 22, 
1993, 94-1 CPD  para.  47 at 6.  In sum, the agency had a reasonable basis 
for accepting DTI's proposed labor rates, having obtained DCAA's 
verification and comments that the proposed rates reflected DTI's 
actual rates and that DTI had historically maintained a stable 
workforce with its compensation structure.  See Id.

SIR also argues that the Navy's technical evaluation failed to give 
adequate consideration to the impact on performance of DTI's 
compensation rates and level of UOT.  According to SIR, had the Navy 
properly considered the performance risk associated with DTI's 
proposed compensation and UOT levels on contract performance, DTI 
would not have received an overall rating of "good" in the "relative 
capability" area.  The protester's arguments in this regard are 
without merit.[8]

As already explained, the CAP, CARP and SSA reasonably found DTI's 
compensation rates and proposed amount of UOT acceptable and 
realistic.  The record further shows that the CAP conducted a thorough 
cost realism analysis of DTI's cost data.  This included an analysis 
of direct and indirect labor rate history, UOT history, and the firms' 
compensation plans.  The record shows that the TERP's analyses 
included an evaluation of the resumes for key personnel.  The CARP and 
the SSA also reviewed the TERP's evaluation and conducted their own 
independent assessment and reasonably concluded that DTI's proposal 
offered the best value.  The TERP evaluated the qualifications of 
DTI's proposed key personnel under the resumes subfactor within the 
"relative capability" area and reasonably found no performance risks.  
The CAP also was aware that DTI had proposed the specified number of 
staff hours and the preferred labor mix.  The CARP and the SSA 
independently reviewed DTI's personnel qualifications, compensation 
rates, and the amount of proposed UOT and reasonably found no 
performance risk.  Based on our review of the record, we have no basis 
to question the Navy's evaluation of DTI's proposal.

Presearch's Protest

Presearch argues that the agency's evaluation of Presearch's technical 
proposal under the resumes subfactor was unreasonable.[9]  In this 
regard, Presearch contends that the Navy improperly downgraded 
Presearch's proposal because it failed to indicate which personnel the 
firm proposed on a part-time basis.  Presearch argues that this was an 
invalid criticism of its proposal since it proposed no part-time 
personnel and none were required by the RFP.[10]

Our Office will not engage in an independent evaluation of proposals 
nor make an independent determination of their relative merits.  
Litton Sys., Inc., B-239123, Aug. 7, 1990, 90-2 CPD  para.  114 at 9.  
Rather, we review the agency's evaluation to ensure that it was 
reasonable and consistent with applicable statutes and regulations as 
well as with the terms of the solicitation.  Sensis Corp., B-265790.2, 
Jan. 17, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  77 at 6.  Based on our review of the record 
here, including the TERP's narrative in support of the evaluation, we 
conclude that the "satisfactory" rating assigned the protester's 
proposal under the resumes subfactor within the "relative capability" 
area is reasonably supported.

Section L-3.1 of the RFP instructed offerors to submit detailed 
resumes for all key personnel proposed.  In addition, the RFP 
instructed that "[i]f a proposed individual is a contingent hire (i.e. 
not already working for the offeror and available to work on the 
solicited effort)," the resume was to state that the proposed employee 
was a contingent hire and identify all contingencies.  RFP, amendment 
No. 0004, at 100.  The RFP listed the following labor categories as 
comprising key personnel:  program manager, deputy program manager, 
senior engineers, senior analysts, information manager, risk and 
schedule expert, and special consultants.  Id. at 98.

Section M of the RFP explained that in evaluating resumes, the 
government would assess each offeror's relative understanding of the 
requirements.  The Navy was also to consider the relevance and quality 
of the education, experience, knowledge, skills, and abilities of the 
proposed key personnel.  In addition, the RFP stated that the 
government would consider the dedication of the proposed key personnel 
to the effort and the risk associated with any contingent hires.  RFP  sec.  
M,  para.  1.2.1, 
at 130-31.

In its BAFO, Presearch proposed one unnamed senior engineer as a "new 
hire," with no direct labor hours for the base year (although it 
appeared that this individual was a full-time employee in the option 
years of the contract).  Presearch's cost volume at 4.  In addition, 
Presearch listed one unnamed senior analyst as a "new hire" with 2,080 
direct labor hours listed for the first option year, but with no 
direct labor hours listed for the base period or the other option 
periods.  Although both individuals were to fill "key personnel" 
positions as specified in the RFP, contrary to the RFP's explicit 
instructions Presearch did not submit resumes or any additional 
information for these "new hires."  Further, Presearch failed to 
explain whether these individuals were proposed on a full-time or 
part-time basis, or whether they were subcontractor employees.  
Presearch also failed to provide a resume or any information 
concerning another key personnel employee identified only as [DELETED] 
a senior analyst.

Under the resumes subfactor, the TERP assigned Presearch's proposal an 
overall rating of "satisfactory," identifying three strengths, two 
weaknesses, and no risks in this area.  In support of the strengths, 
the TERP recognized Presearch's proposed program manager, a proposed 
senior engineer, and the proposed information manager to have 
extensive experience and recognized expertise in their respective 
fields.  The TERP identified two weaknesses under this subfactor, 
however.  The TERP found that because of lack of information for key 
personnel, the TERP could not evaluate whether the level of effort 
Presearch proposed would adequately support the requirement, and noted 
this as a weakness in the proposal.  The TERP also noted that 
Presearch had provided no resume for employee [DELETED], whom 
Presearch proposed as a full-time employee, and noted this as a 
weakness.  TERP Report, Aug. 24, 1998.  The record shows that the CARP 
reviewed the TERP's findings and, contrary to the protester's 
assertions, recognized the strengths that the TERP had identified in 
Presearch's proposal in the resumes area.  Further, the TERP did not 
downgrade its proposal for proposing part-time employees; rather, the 
evaluators were primarily concerned with the lack of resumes and 
information for several of Presearch's proposed key personnel.

In our view, the TERP's rating of "satisfactory" under the resumes 
subfactor reasonably reflected the evaluators' concern that by failing 
to provide resumes or any other information for the proposed "new 
hires" or the employee identified as [DELETED] in direct contravention 
of the RFP's instructions, the agency could not reasonably evaluate 
the quality, education, experience, knowledge, skills and abilities of 
the proposed key personnel, or their dedication to the effort.  
Presearch's disagreement with the TERP's conclusions in this regard 
does not render the evaluation unreasonable.[11]  ESCO, Inc., 
B-225565, Apr. 29, 1987, 87-1 CPD  para.  450 at 7.

In its comments on the agency report, Presearch raises several issues 
for the first time.  For example, Presearch argues that the Navy's 
evaluation of its proposal under the "oral presentation" subfactor was 
flawed because the TERP failed to assign its proposal a strength 
concerning its facilities, and failed to assign a strength to its 
proposal in the management philosophy area for adding another firm to 
its team.  The protester also maintains that the agency failed to 
conduct meaningful discussions with Presearch regarding the weaknesses 
the TERP identified under the resumes subfactor.  As explained in 
greater detail below, these contentions, raised for the first time in 
the comments on the agency report, are untimely.

Under our Bid Protest Regulations, protests not based upon alleged 
solicitation improprieties must be filed not later than 10 days after 
the basis for protest is known.  4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(2).  Where a 
protester initially files a timely protest and supplements it with new 
and independent grounds of protest, the new allegations must 
independently satisfy these timeliness requirements; our Regulations 
do not contemplate the unwarranted piecemeal presentation of protest 
issues.  Litton Sys., Inc., Amecom Div., B-275807.2, Apr. 16, 1997, 
97-1 CPD  para.  170 at 4 n.1.

While Presearch's initial protest was filed in a timely manner, that 
protest did not challenge the evaluation of its proposal under the 
"oral presentation" subfactor.  Presearch either knew or should have 
known that the TERP did not assign a strength to its proposal for its 
facilities capability or management philosophy questions under the 
"oral presentation" subfactor since its November 4 debriefing, when 
the contracting officer informed the protester of the strengths, 
weaknesses, and risks identified in its proposal by the TERP in its 
report.  In addition, in response to the protest, the agency provided 
Presearch with a copy of the TERP report showing that Presearch's 
proposal received no strengths under the "oral presentation" subfactor 
on December 2.

Presearch's objections were not raised until December 21, when its 
comments on the agency report were submitted to our Office--more than 
45 days after Presearch learned of the bases for those objections from 
its debriefing and more than 10 days after the agency provided 
Presearch with the TERP report.  Accordingly, we will not consider 
Presearch's challenge that its proposal should have received strengths 
under the "oral presentation" subfactor.  See Watkins-Johnson Co., 
B-252790, July 7, 1993, 93-2 CPD  para.  8 at 3-4.  

In its comments, Presearch also argues that the agency failed to 
conduct meaningful discussions regarding the weaknesses the TERP had 
identified under the resumes subfactor.  This allegation is also 
untimely.  In the CO's letter to Presearch dated May 19, 1998, 
reopening the competition, the agency specifically notified Presearch 
of the weaknesses and risks the TERP identified in its proposal for 
discussions in the past performance, oral presentation, and resumes 
areas.  In addition, as already explained, during the November 4 
debriefing, the contracting officer informed Presearch of all of the 
strengths, weaknesses and risks assigned to its BAFO by reading them 
from the TERP report, including the weaknesses assigned in the resumes 
area.  Thus, by the November 4 debriefing, Presearch had in its 
possession the CO's May 19 letter listing the discussion items, and 
knew the weaknesses the TERP assigned to its BAFO under the resumes 
area.   Accordingly, if Presearch believed that the agency failed to 
conduct meaningful discussions with the firm, Presearch should have 
raised this allegation, at the latest, within 10 days from its 
November 4 debriefing.  Presearch did not raise this issue until it 
filed its comments in our Office on December 21.  Accordingly, this 
ground is untimely and will not be considered.

The Cost/Technical Tradeoff

SIR and Presearch argue that the agency's cost/technical tradeoff 
decision was flawed because the underlying evaluations on which it was 
based--specifically, the evaluation of DTI's cost and technical 
proposals in the areas discussed above, and the evaluation of 
Presearch's proposal in the resumes area--were flawed.  As discussed 
above, we conclude that the evaluation of DTI's technical and cost 
proposals was reasonable, and that the evaluation of Presearch's 
technical proposal
was unobjectionable.  Given these conclusions, there is no basis to 
object to the tradeoff on the grounds asserted by the protesters.[12]

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. The RFP sought management support services for the Program 
Executive Offices for Theater Air Defense/Surface Combatants and 
Expeditionary Warfare.  The agency explains that the required services 
generally fall into the categories of program planning, acquisition 
planning, and business operations support, and states that while not 
technically complicated, these tasks often require short time periods 
for their performance.

2. The agency synopsized the RFP in the Commerce Business Daily on 
July 7, 1997, and issued the solicitation over the Internet on August 
20.  The RFP was amended several times.  

3. For each offeror, the CO also obtained responses from references to 
a past performance questionnaire that was included as part of section 
L-3 of the RFP.  The CO then forwarded the responses and his notes to 
the TERP for evaluation.

4. The CARP noted that DTI and its subcontractors proposed [DELETED], 
which was more than [DELETED] percent of the total number of staff 
hours estimated in the initial RFP (1,229,280).

5. One firm which had submitted its own proposal in response to the 
initial RFP teamed with Presearch as a proposed subcontractor in 
Presearch's BAFO and did not submit a separate response to amendment 
No. 0004.

6."UOT" refers to the unpaid overtime hours (hours in excess of 8 
hours per day/40 hours per week) incurred by salaried employees who 
are exempt from coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA), 29 U.S.C.  sec.  201-19 (1994).  Under the FLSA, exempt employees 
need not be paid for hours worked in excess of 8 hours per day or 40 
hours per week. 

7. SIR calculated these average hourly labor rates by dividing DTI's 
[DELETED] and SIR's [DELETED] total proposed BAFO costs, exclusive of 
fixed fees, by the total number of labor hours specified in the RFP 
for the base and option periods (1,061,493).  Comments at 6 n.4 and 
exhibit 1B.

8. SIR also asserts that in its BAFO, DTI proposed the use of several 
non-key personnel who were lower paid than personnel initially 
proposed.  SIR argues that the Navy improperly failed to consider 
whether these lower-paid personnel might be less qualified or less 
experienced than the personnel DTI initially proposed.  The RFP 
provided, however, that the Navy would consider the relevance and 
quality of the education, experience, knowledge, and skills of the 
proposed key personnel.  There was no requirement for the agency to 
evaluate non-key personnel.  Accordingly, SIR's argument in this 
regard is without merit.

9. The Navy argues that the protest should be dismissed because 
Presearch is not an interested party under our Bid Protest 
Regulations, 4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.0(a) (1998).  The agency asserts that, 
since Presearch's technical proposal was ranked third behind SIR's, 
even if its protest were sustained Presearch would not be next in line 
for award because there is a higher-rated intervening offeror.  The 
agency's argument overlooks the substance of Presearch's 
challenge--that the agency improperly evaluated its proposal.  
Specifically, Presearch argues that had the agency conducted a proper 
evaluation of the resumes subfactor within the "relative capability" 
area, its proposal would have received a higher overall technical 
rating and that with its lower proposed cost, it would have been 
selected as offering the best value to the government.  Thus, if we 
found that Presearch's arguments had merit and sustained its protest, 
it is possible that upon reevaluation, Presearch's proposal would be 
in line for award.  We therefore consider Presearch an interested 
party to maintain the protest.  See Pan Am World Servs., Inc., et al., 
B-231840 et al., Nov. 7, 1988, 88-2 CPD  para.  446 at 6.

10. In its protest, Presearch also argued that the agency improperly 
failed to consider Presearch's responses to the oral presentation 
sample tasks (submitted in response to the CO's May 19, 1998 letter 
reopening the competition), and that the Navy conducted improper 
discussions regarding those responses.  Presearch later withdrew these 
allegations.  Comments, Dec. 21, 1998, at 19 n.3.

11. Presearch asserts that the evaluation was unreasonable because in 
evaluating its initial proposal, the TERP found no weaknesses in the 
resumes area.  The agency points out, however, and the record shows, 
that the TERP had assigned four risks to Presearch's initial proposal 
under the resumes subfactor.  The agency explains that as defined in 
the source selection plan, a risk "implies that action must be taken 
to avoid future failure," and that risks in this context are similar 
to weaknesses.  Supplemental Agency Report, Dec. 31, 1998, at 10-11 
n.4.

12. In its protest, SIR also asserted that the agency's decision to 
select DTI's lower-cost, lower-technically rated proposal was 
inconsistent with the evaluation criteria, which stated that an 
offeror's "relative capability" in the areas of personnel, past 
performance, and oral presentation, was more important than cost.  The 
protester abandoned this contention in its comments on the agency 
report, however, confining itself to the argument, set out above, that 
the tradeoff decision was improper because the underlying evaluation 
of DTI's proposal was flawed.  In any event, we have reviewed the 
tradeoff decision and see no basis to question it.  The record shows 
that the agency properly compared the strengths and weaknesses of 
SIR's and DTI's proposals and reasonably concluded that SIR's 
technical
superiority--principally in one area, personnel--was not worth the 
cost premium--approximately $6 million--involved in award to SIR.  See 
Dayton T. Brown, Inc., B-229664, Mar. 30, 1988, 88-1 CPD  para.  321 at 4.