BNUMBER:  B-279251.2; B-279251.3 
DATE:  June 1, 1998
TITLE: Exploration Products, B-279251.2; B-279251.3, June 1, 1998
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Exploration Products

File:     B-279251.2; B-279251.3

Date:June 1, 1998

Michael A. Hordell, Esq., and Laura L. Hoffman, Esq., Gadsby & Hannah, 
for the protester.
Marian E. Sullivan, Esq., and P. Alan Luthy, Esq., Department of the 
Air Force, for the agency.
John Van Schaik, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq. Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Selection of higher-priced proposal for small shelter/environmental 
control units was reasonable where testing of the protester's proposed 
equipment showed that the equipment did not meet a number of mandatory 
specifications.

DECISION

Exploration Products protests the award of a contract to Alaska 
Industrial Resources, Inc. under request for proposals (RFP) No. 
F08626-97-R-0107, issued by the Department of Air Force for a quantity 
of small shelter/environmental control units (SS/ECU).  Exploration 
argues that its SS/ECU was not properly evaluated and that the Air 
Force should have communicated with the firm concerning certain 
failures of its equipment during government testing.

We deny the protest because Exploration's SS/ECU was unacceptable and 
Exploration could not be awarded the contract due to its failure to 
meet certain mandatory specifications.

The RFP stated that the objective of the contract is to procure a 
commercially-available, nondevelopmental shelter and ECU to replace 
the agency's current shelters for housing and work areas and that the 
primary focus is to acquire a system that is less of a burden to 
transport than the current SS/ECU.  The RFP included a "System 
Performance Specification" which described the performance 
requirements and physical characteristics of the new SS/ECU.  That 
document stated, at section 1.1, that "[t]he primary objective of the 
specification is to outline the performance and physical 
characteristic requirements for a new system that reduces the 
transportability (weight and volume) and cost burdens of the existing 
. . . shelter system."  

The acquisition was structured to permit the Air Force to make 
multiple awards for a limited number of units for testing and then to 
downselect to a single contractor to supply the units.  The RFP stated 
that the government anticipated awarding up to three contracts, 
although it reserved the right to award fewer.  The first four line 
items in the RFP were for four complete SS/ECUs (line item 0001), test 
samples of materials used in the shelters (0002), training for the 
SS/ECUs (0003), and maintenance and repair during testing (0004).  All 
remaining line items were options to be exercised after the downselect 
decision. 

The RFP contemplated award to the offeror whose proposal was most 
advantageous to the government based on an assessment of the following 
four areas, listed in descending order of importance:

     1.technical capability 
     2.logistics and readiness
     3.cost/price 
     4.general considerations 

Under the technical capability area, the RFP listed the following 
three factors in descending order of importance:  (1) key performance 
parameters, (2) manufacturing capability, and (3) system integration, 
technical tradeoffs, and other performance parameters.  The RFP also 
indicated that proposals would be rated for proposal risk and 
performance risk under each of the factors and that past performance 
would be evaluated and assessed in each area at the factor level.

Concerning the downselect decision, the RFP stated:

     Once the proposal review is completed, the Government intends to 
     subject the contract award candidates to comprehensive tests and 
     technical field evaluations within the parameters outlined in the 
     System Performance Specification . . . .  Knowledge gained from 
     results of this evaluation/testing will be used by the source 
     selection team to update and verify the initial evaluation of the 
     3 candidates/contractors.  These updated evaluations will serve 
     as the down select criteria for determining which of the three 
     candidates/contractors proposed systems provides the "Best Value" 
     to the Government.

The Air Force received nine technical proposals.  After evaluation, 
the agency conducted discussions and then determined that four 
proposals were acceptable and requested price proposals from those 
firms.  The proposals of Exploration and Alaska received ratings of 
acceptable or better on all of the technical capability and logistics 
and readiness evaluation factors, the only factors that were rated.[1]  
At that point, the Air Force awarded contracts to Exploration and 
Alaska.  

Pursuant to the first two line items, Exploration and Alaska provided 
shelter systems and material samples to be tested at the Army's 
Aberdeen Proving Test Center and Holloman Air Force Base.  Pursuant to 
line item 0003, the firms also trained government personnel to 
assemble their SS/ECUs.  Based on the tests, the original evaluation 
ratings were updated.  The ratings assigned to Alaska and Exploration 
were all "acceptable" at this point with the exception of 
Exploration's ratings on the key performance parameters factor and the 
system integration, technical tradeoffs, and other performance 
parameters factor, both of which were in the technical capability 
area.  Exploration's ratings on those factors were reduced to 
"unacceptable."[2]

A Downselect Proposal Analysis Report dated February 4, 1998 explains 
the two unacceptable ratings assigned to Exploration's proposal.  
Under the key performance parameters factor, the report lists a series 
of weaknesses.  According to the report, although the RFP requirement 
was for an ECU with a volume of 48 cubic feet or less, the volume of 
Exploration's ECU was 62 cubic feet.  The report also states that 
Exploration's ECU would not start at 125 degrees, as required by the 
specifications.  Also under that factor, the report states that the 
fabric of Exploration's shelter ripped at attaching points of straps, 
numerous zippers broke, and the floor was easily punctured.  Under the 
system integration, technical tradeoffs, and other performance 
parameters factor, the report states that Exploration's shelter failed 
a [deleted] test for [deleted], its anchoring system was only adequate 
for sidewalls, [deleted], and the shelter failed a [deleted] test.

In a "Source Selection Down Select Decision Document," the Air Force's 
source selection authority repeats the weaknesses noted in 
Exploration's SS/ECU in the Downselect Proposal Analysis Report and 
states that those weaknesses "made their proposal unacceptable."  
According to the report, there were no differences between the two 
proposals in the logistics and readiness area or in terms of past 
performance.  The report notes that the prices submitted by the two 
firms 
($ [deleted] for Exploration, and $25,147,464 for Alaska) had been 
evaluated for reasonableness and that Alaska's price was slightly 
above the government estimate while Exploration's price was below the 
government estimate.

In spite of the fact that Exploration's proposal was technically 
unacceptable, the Air Force's source selection authority performed a 
tradeoff analysis in which he determined that Alaska's proposed system 
offered the best value to satisfy the agency's needs. The source 
selection document states that the testing clearly demonstrated that 
the technical advantages of Alaska's SS/ECU far outweighed the 
differences in price between the two proposals.  According to the 
source selection authority, given Alaska's combination of demonstrated 
technical capabilities, and low risk, it was in the best interests of 
the government to award the contract to Alaska.

PROTEST ALLEGATIONS

In its protest, Exploration first challenged the determination that 
its SS/ECU failed to meet the requirement for an ECU with a volume at 
least 25 percent less than the ECU it is to replace.  According to 
Exploration, based on the RFP, it understood the requirement for a 25 
percent reduction in volume and weight to apply to the complete 
system, not to each of the system components.  Exploration also argues 
that, since its entire SS/ECU weighed 25 percent less and had 25 
percent less volume than the current SS/ECU, it should have received 
at least an acceptable rating under the key performance parameters 
factor.

Exploration's initial protest also argued that its SS/ECU was not 
tested in a manner consistent with the RFP.  Although Exploration's 
protest generally referred to "inconsistencies between the . . . 
testing and evaluation and the solicitation's stated criteria," the 
protest offered only one example of an alleged error in the testing.  
In that single example, Exploration argued that the method used to 
test the [deleted] capability of its shelter placed [deleted] on the 
shelter.  According to Exploration, if tested properly, its shelter 
would have passed.  Exploration also argued in its protest that the 
problems with the fabric, zippers and floor of its shelter were graded 
under the wrong factor.  

Exploration also argued in its protest that agency personnel should 
have contacted the firm during the testing of its SS/ECU when they 
encountered "obvious discrepancies which logically should have been 
checked with Exploration . . . ."  The only example of an "obvious 
discrepanc[y]" referenced by Exploration in its protest was the 
existence of stake loops at the base of the walls of the firm's 
shelter.  The firm argues that the "obvious existence of those loops, 
and the problem that was experienced with the SS/ECU system during the 
wind test," should have demonstrated to the agency that it was 
necessary to contact Exploration to clarify whether those stake loops 
should be used.  According to Exploration, had the agency done so, the 
problem could have been identified and the stakes could have been 
appropriately placed.  In a related argument, Exploration also argued 
that the agency unreasonably failed to request technical support from 
Exploration pursuant to line item 0004, under which the government 
could call for maintenance and repair during the testing.  

Finally, Exploration argues that the Air Force's best value analysis 
was unreasonable and flawed.  According to Exploration, in light of 
the failure to evaluate Exploration's SS/ECU properly and particularly 
considering the cost saving that would result from an award to 
Exploration, the decision to award to Alaska was flawed.  

ANALYSIS

Technical Evaluation

As explained, during the testing phase of the acquisition, 
Exploration's SS/ECU was found not to meet four mandatory requirements 
of the specifications and, as a result, Exploration's SS/ECU was 
unacceptable.  First, the evaluators concluded that the specifications 
required a volume of 48 cubic feet or less for the ECU and, as 
explained above, Exploration's ECU was 62 cubic feet.  Second, 
Exploration's ECU would not [deleted], as required by the 
specifications.  Third, Exploration's shelter failed to pass the 
[deleted] test of [deleted].  Fourth, Exploration's shelter failed the 
[deleted] test.  

We regard benchmarks, or, by analogy, demonstration tests of the type 
required here, as extensions of the technical evaluation of proposals, 
the principal purpose of which is to provide a demonstration of the 
capability of offered products to perform the required functions.  
Rand McNally-TDM, Inc., B-248927, Oct. 7, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  352 at 5.  
Consistent with this view, we have been critical of strict pass/fail 
benchmarks, which lead to the automatic exclusion of otherwise 
potentially acceptable offers, and have held instead that such tests 
provide "strong evidence" of system capabilities which must be 
considered in determining technical acceptability.  See NBI, Inc., 
B-201853.3, Aug. 9, 1982, 82-2 CPD  para.  114 at 6.  As far as the agency's 
actual determination of technical acceptability is concerned, we will 
not make an independent determination of the merits of an offeror's 
proposal, or in the case of a demonstration, the performance of the 
offeror's product; rather, we will review the evaluation record, 
including the results of any test demonstration, to ensure that the 
agency's technical judgment is based upon the requisite "strong 
evidence," has a rational basis, and is consistent with the stated 
evaluation criteria.  Rand McNally-TDM, Inc., supra, at 5.

Here, we find that the record supports the agency's determination that 
Exploration's ECU exceeded the volume requirement set forth in the 
specifications and failed to operate at [deleted], also a requirement 
of the specifications.  In addition, we conclude that Exploration has 
not timely challenged the [deleted] test of its shelter and the 
resulting determination that its shelter does not meet the [deleted] 
requirements of the RFP.

Addressing first the volume requirement, the RFP specification, at 
section 3.2.1.1, states that "[t]he new SS/ECU System components shall 
each reduce transport weight and packed volume by at least 25 percent 
over the current system components."  Since the specifications state 
at section 3.1 that the currently used ECU has a packed volume of 
approximately 64 cubic feet, the maximum permitted volume for the new 
ECU is 48 cubic feet.  Exploration's ECU, with a volume of 62 cubic 
feet, did not meet this requirement.  
 
Exploration does not deny that the ECUs which it provided for testing 
exceeded 48 cubic feet.  Rather, Exploration argues that it understood 
the requirement for a 25 percent reduction in volume and weight to 
apply to the complete SS/ECU, not to each of the system components.  
According to Exploration, this understanding was based on the RFP 
evaluation criteria--specifically, the first factor in the technical 
capability evaluation area, which reads in relevant part as follows:

     The offeror's proposal must demonstrate a complete understanding 
     of the [SS/ECU] System Performance Specification requirements.  
     The offeror's proposed design will be evaluated to determine the 
     suitability of the approach selected.  The proposal will be 
     evaluated to determine if the proposed system will weigh at least 
     25% less and has at least a 25% lower packed volume than the 
     baseline system described in the Performance Specification. 

According to Exploration, based on this provision, as well as the fact 
that the specifications repeatedly used the term "system," its 
understanding was that the requirement was for a 25 percent reduction 
in weight and volume of the entire SS/ECU, not each of the components 
of the SS/ECU.  Exploration argues that its SS/ECU met this 
requirement.

Where a dispute exists as to the meaning of solicitation language, we 
will resolve the matter by reading the solicitation as a whole and in 
a manner that gives effect to all provisions of the solicitation.  See 
Lithos Restoration, Ltd., B-247003.2, Apr. 22, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  379 at 
4.  To be reasonable, an interpretation must be consistent with the 
solicitation when read as a whole and in a reasonable manner.  Id. 

Here, the only reasonable reading of the RFP was that the weight and 
volume reduction requirements applied to both components of the 
SS/ECU, the shelter itself and the ECU, and not just to the SS/ECU as 
a whole.  Although the evaluation factor relied upon by Exploration 
refers to the "system" weighing at least 25 percent less and having a 
25 percent lower packed volume, that factor also required that "[t]he 
offeror's proposal must demonstrate a complete understanding of the 
[SS/ECU] System Performance Specification requirements"-- the 
specifications, which include the requirement that the "new SS/ECU 
System components shall each reduce transport weight and packed volume 
by at least 25 percent over the current system components."  We think 
the use of the term "system" in the evaluation factor must be read in 
the context of its reference to the specifications which required that 
each system component be reduced by 25 percent in volume.  Read in the 
context of the solicitation as a whole, and giving meaning to each 
provision, we conclude that offerors were reasonably on notice that 
the ECU was required to have a volume 25 percent less than that of the 
existing ECU.[3]  Under the circumstances, Exploration's proposed ECU 
was unacceptable due to its failure to meet the volume reduction 
requirement.[4]

Turning to the ECU [deleted] requirement, the System Performance 
Specification requires the ECU to operate at [deleted].  The 
Downselect Proposal Analysis Report indicates that Exploration's "ECU 
would not [deleted] as required-Cut off Design on ECU."  In addition, 
the source selection memorandum states that "the ECU would not 
[deleted] requirement due to a built in cut off switch . . . ."

Exploration essentially does not challenge the determination that its 
ECU did not meet this requirement.  In its discussion of the failure 
of its ECU to meet the requirement to operate [deleted], Exploration 
explains that when agency officials raised the matter with the firm 
during testing, the firm's representatives responded that the ECU 
would not start at that [deleted] because it has "a cut off safety 
design feature [that] kept the ECU from running over a certain 
[deleted]," and that they "informed the [agency] as to this feature 
and provided instruction as to how to adjust the feature."  In a later 
reference to this issue, Exploration states that "the ECU would not 
start due to a cut off switch design feature, which was resolved after 
speaking to Exploration . . . ."

The record does not support Exploration's assertion that the ECU's 
failure to operate at [deleted] was "resolved" or that the cut off 
feature was "adjust[ed]."  In fact, the contracting officer explains 
that Exploration's ECU would not start at [deleted] because the safety 
switch would not allow it to start and it could not be adjusted.  The 
contracting officer reports that the ECU never started at [deleted], 
as required by the specifications; only after the [deleted] of the 
test chamber was lowered to [deleted] did the ECU start.  Under the 
circumstances, Exploration's SS/ECU was unacceptable due to its 
failure to meet the requirement that its ECU operate at [deleted].

As explained above, Exploration's SS/ECU also was considered 
unacceptable because it failed the [deleted] test.  The specifications 
required that shelters be able to withstand [deleted].  Concerning the 
[deleted] test, the test report states: "Requirement not met.  
Exploration shelter failed to withstand [deleted]." 

In its comments on the agency report, for the first time, Exploration 
challenged the [deleted] test and the agency's conclusion that the 
Exploration shelter did not meet the [deleted] requirements.  This 
contention is untimely.  On March 17, the Air Force released to 
Exploration's counsel a video tape of the [deleted] test of its 
shelter, along with other relevant documents.  However, Exploration 
did not challenge the conduct of the [deleted] test until it filed its 
comments on the contracting agency report on April 9.  In that 
submission, for the first time, Exploration argued that the Air Force 
"did not conduct the [deleted] test consistent with stated criteria," 
and that the shelter was not properly assembled by the agency.  
Exploration's challenge of the methodology used in the [deleted] test 
and of the agency's conclusion that its shelter did not meet the 
[deleted] test requirements of the specifications is untimely.  Under 
our Bid Protest Regulations, protests not based upon alleged 
solicitation improprieties must be filed not later than 10 days after 
the basis for protest is known.  4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(2).  Where a 
protester initially files a timely protest and supplements it with new 
and independent grounds of protest, the new allegations must 
independently satisfy these timeliness requirements; our Regulations 
do not contemplate the unwarranted piecemeal presentation of protest 
issues.  Litton Sys., Inc., Amecom Div., B-275807.2, Apr. 16, 1997, 
97-1 CPD  para.  170 at 4, n.1.  Here, while Exploration's initial protest 
was filed in a timely manner, that protest did not challenge the 
[deleted] test or the conclusion that Exploration's shelter does not 
meet the [deleted] test requirements.[5]  Exploration's objection to 
the methodology used in the [deleted] test and to the agency's 
conclusion that its shelter does not meet the [deleted] test 
requirements were not raised until April 9 when its comments on the 
agency report were submitted to our Office--which was more than 10 
days after the firm learned of the grounds for those objections when 
it came into possession of the video tape of the [deleted] test on 
March 17.  See Watkins-Johnson Co., B-252790, July 7, 1993, 93-2 CPD  para.  
8 at 3-4.  Accordingly, we will not consider Exploration's challenge 
of the [deleted] test or the conclusion that its shelter did not meet 
the [deleted] test requirements.

Discussions

Exploration also argues that the Air Force failed to conduct 
meaningful discussions with the firm.  According to Exploration, 
during the testing of its SS/ECU, government personnel called the firm 
three times concerning the failure of the firm's ECU to [deleted].  
Under the circumstances, Exploration argues that the agency should 
have contacted the firm when it encountered "obvious discrepancies 
which logically should have been checked with Exploration . . . ."[6]  
Protest at 10.  The only example of an "obvious discrepanc[y]" which 
Exploration included in its protest was the existence of stake loops 
at the base of the walls of the firm's shelter.  Although Exploration 
concedes that it omitted from its manual the direction to insert 
stakes through these loops, the firm argues that "the obvious 
existence" of the loops, "and the problem that was experienced with 
the SS/ECU system during the [deleted] test," Protest at 11, should 
have demonstrated to the agency that it was necessary to contact 
Exploration to clarify whether those loops should be used.  According 
to Exploration, had the agency done so, the problem could have been 
identified and the stakes appropriately placed.

Although we have criticized the strict application of pass/fail test 
criteria that lead to the automatic and final exclusion of a 
potentially acceptable proposal, this generally involved situations 
where the offeror has been unable to demonstrate compliance with only 
one of a number of mandatory requirements and is eliminated from the 
competition solely for that reason.  Checkpoint Sys., Inc., B-245834, 
Feb. 3, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  136 at 3.  Here, as explained above, 
Exploration's SS/ECU was found not to meet at least three mandatory 
requirements during the testing:  (1) the shelter, with a volume of 62 
cubic feet, exceeded the required maximum volume of 48 cubic feet; (2) 
the ECU would not [deleted], as required; and (3) the shelter failed 
to pass the [deleted] test.

Moreover, with respect to the specific issue which Exploration argues 
should have been discussed with the firm--the stake loops--the record 
does not demonstrate that this problem was so obvious that the agency 
should have known to raise it with the firm.  The contracting officer 
explains that the instructions provided with Exploration's shelter 
included no information concerning these stake loops and Exploration's 
personnel trained Army and Air Force personnel for 2 days on how to 
erect the Exploration SS/ECU.  The contracting officer further 
explains:

     This training consisted of Exploration's training team setting up 
     and tearing down their shelter system and instructing U.S. Army 
     and [Air Force] personnel on the proper procedures for doing the 
     same.  The Exploration shelter was erected and disassembled 
     numerous times during these two days of training.  Not once 
     during this period did the experts . . . identify that these 
     items were missing, therefore it stands to reason that the US 
     Army personnel would not recognize this problem with the 
     Exploration shelter when they (the US Army) were trained by 
     [Exploration's] experts.  Finally, there were no left over guy 
     wires or stakes when the shelter system was erected, and so it is 
     inconceivable that the [Air Force], having two days of training, 
     should have recognized a problem with the [Exploration] shelter.  
     Upon receipt of the protest, the Government checked 
     [Exploration's] shelters at both Aberdeen and Holloman AFB for 
     stake loops.  Upon visual review there were no stake loops 
     located on the endwalls.  There are four small fabric grommets 
     that are too small to place existing stakes through.  

The Air Force also explains that there was no indication that the 
grommets served a purpose.  Under the circumstances, since 
Exploration's own personnel failed to instruct agency personnel to use 
those stake loops in the 2 days of training and apparently failed to 
even notice that the stake loops were not being used during the 
numerous times the shelter was erected, we cannot agree with 
Exploration that this problem was an "obvious discrepanc[y]."  On the 
contrary, since Exploration's own personnel did not recognize that 
parts and instructions were missing and the shelter was not properly 
erected, we do not think it is reasonable to hold agency personnel 
responsible for recognizing these problems.[7] 

Other Issues

As explained above, Exploration also argues that the [deleted] test of 
its shelter was not performed in a manner consistent with the RFP, 
that problems with the fabric, zippers, and floor of its shelter were 
graded under the wrong evaluation factor, and that the Air Force's 
best value analysis was unreasonable.  We will not consider these 
issues since, under our Bid Protest Regulations, a party is not 
interested to maintain a protest if it would not be in line for award 
if the protest were sustained.   4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.0(a), 21.1(a); System 
Resources Corp., B-270241, et al. Feb. 12, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  69 at 5.  
As indicated above, based on the testing results, the source selection 
authority concluded that Exploration's proposal was unacceptable and 
we consider that conclusion to be reasonable.  Alaska is the sole 
acceptable offeror, and since Exploration's proposal was unacceptable, 
it could not form the basis for an award.  Learjet, Inc., B-274385 et 
al., Dec. 6, 1996, 96-2 CPD  para.  215 at 6.  In addition, Exploration has 
not challenged the acceptability of Alaska's proposal.  Thus, even if 
we were to sustain Exploration's remaining protest grounds, Alaska's 
SS/ECU would remain technically acceptable, and Exploration's SS/ECU 
would be unacceptable.  See also Intertec Aviation, B-239672.4, Apr. 
4, 1991, 91-1 CPD  para.  348 at 7 (contracting agency is not required to 
consider lower cost proposals in its award decision where those 
proposals have been judged technically unacceptable).  Accordingly, 
Exploration would not be in line for award, and we will not consider 
these additional issues. 

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States

1. Ratings of exceptional, acceptable, marginal, and unacceptable were 
assigned.

2. An unacceptable rating was defined as:  "Fails to meet a minimum 
requirement of the RFP and the deficiency is uncorrectable without a 
major revision to the proposal."

3. Exploration also argues that the RFP was ambiguous since the 
specifications called for a reduction in volume and weight of the 
components while the evaluation criteria referred to the "proposed 
system" meeting those requirements.  Even if we were to agree with 
Exploration that there was an ambiguity in the RFP, since 
Exploration's contention of an ambiguity is based on an alleged 
conflict between two provisions of the RFP, such an ambiguity could 
not be latent, i.e., a defect which could not be detected prior to 
closing.  See Inland Marine Indus., Inc., B-249914, B-249918, Dec. 24, 
1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  442 at 3.  In other words, any ambiguity concerning 
these requirements was apparent on the face of the solicitation and 
thus had to be protested prior to closing.  Bid Protest Regulations, 4 
C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(1) (1998). 

4. Exploration also argues that it [deleted].  According to 
Exploration, it was only due to this improvement, which it made at the 
Air Force's suggestion, that its ECU did not meet the volume 
requirement.  Air Force officials, on the other hand, deny that they 
suggested to Exploration that the firm [deleted].  We need not resolve 
this factual disagreement.  Even accepting Exploration's version of 
events, the Air Force never waived the volume reduction requirement 
and it was Exploration's responsibility to provide an ECU that met 
that requirement.

5. Prior to its protest, Exploration was informed that its "Shelter 
did not pass [deleted] requirements," and was given an explanation of 
how the shelter failed the test.  Nonetheless, Exploration's protest 
did not challenge either that conclusion or the explanation of the 
test.  The only discussion of the [deleted] test in Exploration's 
protest was under the heading "The USAF Failed to Conduct Meaningful 
Discussions."  Under that heading, Exploration argued that during the 
testing, agency personnel should have noticed that there are stake 
loops at the base of the walls of its shelter.  In addition, 
Exploration argued that due to the problems experienced during the 
[deleted] test, the agency should have known to raise this matter with 
Exploration in discussions.  In other words, the only allegation in 
Exploration's protest concerning the [deleted] test was a contention 
that the matter should have been the subject of discussions; we do not 
read the protest as having challenged the conduct of the [deleted] 
test or the resulting conclusion that the shelter did not meet the 
[deleted] requirement.

6. To the extent that Exploration argues that the communications with 
it concerning the [deleted] range of its ECU constituted 
discussions--leading to a duty to conduct discussions on other 
issues--we do not agree.  Those communications, which did not involve 
information essential for determining the acceptability of the firm's 
proposal and offered no opportunity to revise the proposal, did not 
constitute discussions.  Federal Acquisition Regulation  sec.  15.601 (June 
1997).  Therefore, the downselect award decision was made without 
discussions, consistent with the RFP, which indicated that the agency 
intended to make award without discussions.  Exploration refers to no 
authority, and we are aware of none, which would require discussions 
in these circumstances.

7. Exploration also argues that it was unreasonable for the agency to 
fail to utilize Exploration's technical support as permitted by line 
item 0004, under which the government could call for maintenance and 
repair during the testing.  We do not agree.  As the Air Force points 
out, the RFP stated that the purpose of line item 0004 was "to provide 
service and parts necessary to resolve major or catastrophic failures 
requiring other than minor repair of the system or components."  RFP, 
attachment 3, at 2.  According to the Air Force, the purpose of line 
item 0004 was to allow contractors to repair their SS/ECUs if a 
catastrophic failure occurred during testing--so that the test could 
continue--rather than to provide offerors with opportunities to repair 
their SS/ECU every time it failed.  We think that is a reasonable 
reading of this provision.