BNUMBER: B-279251.2; B-279251.3
DATE: June 1, 1998
TITLE: Exploration Products, B-279251.2; B-279251.3, June 1, 1998
**********************************************************************
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Exploration Products
File: B-279251.2; B-279251.3
Date:June 1, 1998
Michael A. Hordell, Esq., and Laura L. Hoffman, Esq., Gadsby & Hannah,
for the protester.
Marian E. Sullivan, Esq., and P. Alan Luthy, Esq., Department of the
Air Force, for the agency.
John Van Schaik, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq. Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Selection of higher-priced proposal for small shelter/environmental
control units was reasonable where testing of the protester's proposed
equipment showed that the equipment did not meet a number of mandatory
specifications.
DECISION
Exploration Products protests the award of a contract to Alaska
Industrial Resources, Inc. under request for proposals (RFP) No.
F08626-97-R-0107, issued by the Department of Air Force for a quantity
of small shelter/environmental control units (SS/ECU). Exploration
argues that its SS/ECU was not properly evaluated and that the Air
Force should have communicated with the firm concerning certain
failures of its equipment during government testing.
We deny the protest because Exploration's SS/ECU was unacceptable and
Exploration could not be awarded the contract due to its failure to
meet certain mandatory specifications.
The RFP stated that the objective of the contract is to procure a
commercially-available, nondevelopmental shelter and ECU to replace
the agency's current shelters for housing and work areas and that the
primary focus is to acquire a system that is less of a burden to
transport than the current SS/ECU. The RFP included a "System
Performance Specification" which described the performance
requirements and physical characteristics of the new SS/ECU. That
document stated, at section 1.1, that "[t]he primary objective of the
specification is to outline the performance and physical
characteristic requirements for a new system that reduces the
transportability (weight and volume) and cost burdens of the existing
. . . shelter system."
The acquisition was structured to permit the Air Force to make
multiple awards for a limited number of units for testing and then to
downselect to a single contractor to supply the units. The RFP stated
that the government anticipated awarding up to three contracts,
although it reserved the right to award fewer. The first four line
items in the RFP were for four complete SS/ECUs (line item 0001), test
samples of materials used in the shelters (0002), training for the
SS/ECUs (0003), and maintenance and repair during testing (0004). All
remaining line items were options to be exercised after the downselect
decision.
The RFP contemplated award to the offeror whose proposal was most
advantageous to the government based on an assessment of the following
four areas, listed in descending order of importance:
1.technical capability
2.logistics and readiness
3.cost/price
4.general considerations
Under the technical capability area, the RFP listed the following
three factors in descending order of importance: (1) key performance
parameters, (2) manufacturing capability, and (3) system integration,
technical tradeoffs, and other performance parameters. The RFP also
indicated that proposals would be rated for proposal risk and
performance risk under each of the factors and that past performance
would be evaluated and assessed in each area at the factor level.
Concerning the downselect decision, the RFP stated:
Once the proposal review is completed, the Government intends to
subject the contract award candidates to comprehensive tests and
technical field evaluations within the parameters outlined in the
System Performance Specification . . . . Knowledge gained from
results of this evaluation/testing will be used by the source
selection team to update and verify the initial evaluation of the
3 candidates/contractors. These updated evaluations will serve
as the down select criteria for determining which of the three
candidates/contractors proposed systems provides the "Best Value"
to the Government.
The Air Force received nine technical proposals. After evaluation,
the agency conducted discussions and then determined that four
proposals were acceptable and requested price proposals from those
firms. The proposals of Exploration and Alaska received ratings of
acceptable or better on all of the technical capability and logistics
and readiness evaluation factors, the only factors that were rated.[1]
At that point, the Air Force awarded contracts to Exploration and
Alaska.
Pursuant to the first two line items, Exploration and Alaska provided
shelter systems and material samples to be tested at the Army's
Aberdeen Proving Test Center and Holloman Air Force Base. Pursuant to
line item 0003, the firms also trained government personnel to
assemble their SS/ECUs. Based on the tests, the original evaluation
ratings were updated. The ratings assigned to Alaska and Exploration
were all "acceptable" at this point with the exception of
Exploration's ratings on the key performance parameters factor and the
system integration, technical tradeoffs, and other performance
parameters factor, both of which were in the technical capability
area. Exploration's ratings on those factors were reduced to
"unacceptable."[2]
A Downselect Proposal Analysis Report dated February 4, 1998 explains
the two unacceptable ratings assigned to Exploration's proposal.
Under the key performance parameters factor, the report lists a series
of weaknesses. According to the report, although the RFP requirement
was for an ECU with a volume of 48 cubic feet or less, the volume of
Exploration's ECU was 62 cubic feet. The report also states that
Exploration's ECU would not start at 125 degrees, as required by the
specifications. Also under that factor, the report states that the
fabric of Exploration's shelter ripped at attaching points of straps,
numerous zippers broke, and the floor was easily punctured. Under the
system integration, technical tradeoffs, and other performance
parameters factor, the report states that Exploration's shelter failed
a [deleted] test for [deleted], its anchoring system was only adequate
for sidewalls, [deleted], and the shelter failed a [deleted] test.
In a "Source Selection Down Select Decision Document," the Air Force's
source selection authority repeats the weaknesses noted in
Exploration's SS/ECU in the Downselect Proposal Analysis Report and
states that those weaknesses "made their proposal unacceptable."
According to the report, there were no differences between the two
proposals in the logistics and readiness area or in terms of past
performance. The report notes that the prices submitted by the two
firms
($ [deleted] for Exploration, and $25,147,464 for Alaska) had been
evaluated for reasonableness and that Alaska's price was slightly
above the government estimate while Exploration's price was below the
government estimate.
In spite of the fact that Exploration's proposal was technically
unacceptable, the Air Force's source selection authority performed a
tradeoff analysis in which he determined that Alaska's proposed system
offered the best value to satisfy the agency's needs. The source
selection document states that the testing clearly demonstrated that
the technical advantages of Alaska's SS/ECU far outweighed the
differences in price between the two proposals. According to the
source selection authority, given Alaska's combination of demonstrated
technical capabilities, and low risk, it was in the best interests of
the government to award the contract to Alaska.
PROTEST ALLEGATIONS
In its protest, Exploration first challenged the determination that
its SS/ECU failed to meet the requirement for an ECU with a volume at
least 25 percent less than the ECU it is to replace. According to
Exploration, based on the RFP, it understood the requirement for a 25
percent reduction in volume and weight to apply to the complete
system, not to each of the system components. Exploration also argues
that, since its entire SS/ECU weighed 25 percent less and had 25
percent less volume than the current SS/ECU, it should have received
at least an acceptable rating under the key performance parameters
factor.
Exploration's initial protest also argued that its SS/ECU was not
tested in a manner consistent with the RFP. Although Exploration's
protest generally referred to "inconsistencies between the . . .
testing and evaluation and the solicitation's stated criteria," the
protest offered only one example of an alleged error in the testing.
In that single example, Exploration argued that the method used to
test the [deleted] capability of its shelter placed [deleted] on the
shelter. According to Exploration, if tested properly, its shelter
would have passed. Exploration also argued in its protest that the
problems with the fabric, zippers and floor of its shelter were graded
under the wrong factor.
Exploration also argued in its protest that agency personnel should
have contacted the firm during the testing of its SS/ECU when they
encountered "obvious discrepancies which logically should have been
checked with Exploration . . . ." The only example of an "obvious
discrepanc[y]" referenced by Exploration in its protest was the
existence of stake loops at the base of the walls of the firm's
shelter. The firm argues that the "obvious existence of those loops,
and the problem that was experienced with the SS/ECU system during the
wind test," should have demonstrated to the agency that it was
necessary to contact Exploration to clarify whether those stake loops
should be used. According to Exploration, had the agency done so, the
problem could have been identified and the stakes could have been
appropriately placed. In a related argument, Exploration also argued
that the agency unreasonably failed to request technical support from
Exploration pursuant to line item 0004, under which the government
could call for maintenance and repair during the testing.
Finally, Exploration argues that the Air Force's best value analysis
was unreasonable and flawed. According to Exploration, in light of
the failure to evaluate Exploration's SS/ECU properly and particularly
considering the cost saving that would result from an award to
Exploration, the decision to award to Alaska was flawed.
ANALYSIS
Technical Evaluation
As explained, during the testing phase of the acquisition,
Exploration's SS/ECU was found not to meet four mandatory requirements
of the specifications and, as a result, Exploration's SS/ECU was
unacceptable. First, the evaluators concluded that the specifications
required a volume of 48 cubic feet or less for the ECU and, as
explained above, Exploration's ECU was 62 cubic feet. Second,
Exploration's ECU would not [deleted], as required by the
specifications. Third, Exploration's shelter failed to pass the
[deleted] test of [deleted]. Fourth, Exploration's shelter failed the
[deleted] test.
We regard benchmarks, or, by analogy, demonstration tests of the type
required here, as extensions of the technical evaluation of proposals,
the principal purpose of which is to provide a demonstration of the
capability of offered products to perform the required functions.
Rand McNally-TDM, Inc., B-248927, Oct. 7, 1992, 92-2 CPD para. 352 at 5.
Consistent with this view, we have been critical of strict pass/fail
benchmarks, which lead to the automatic exclusion of otherwise
potentially acceptable offers, and have held instead that such tests
provide "strong evidence" of system capabilities which must be
considered in determining technical acceptability. See NBI, Inc.,
B-201853.3, Aug. 9, 1982, 82-2 CPD para. 114 at 6. As far as the agency's
actual determination of technical acceptability is concerned, we will
not make an independent determination of the merits of an offeror's
proposal, or in the case of a demonstration, the performance of the
offeror's product; rather, we will review the evaluation record,
including the results of any test demonstration, to ensure that the
agency's technical judgment is based upon the requisite "strong
evidence," has a rational basis, and is consistent with the stated
evaluation criteria. Rand McNally-TDM, Inc., supra, at 5.
Here, we find that the record supports the agency's determination that
Exploration's ECU exceeded the volume requirement set forth in the
specifications and failed to operate at [deleted], also a requirement
of the specifications. In addition, we conclude that Exploration has
not timely challenged the [deleted] test of its shelter and the
resulting determination that its shelter does not meet the [deleted]
requirements of the RFP.
Addressing first the volume requirement, the RFP specification, at
section 3.2.1.1, states that "[t]he new SS/ECU System components shall
each reduce transport weight and packed volume by at least 25 percent
over the current system components." Since the specifications state
at section 3.1 that the currently used ECU has a packed volume of
approximately 64 cubic feet, the maximum permitted volume for the new
ECU is 48 cubic feet. Exploration's ECU, with a volume of 62 cubic
feet, did not meet this requirement.
Exploration does not deny that the ECUs which it provided for testing
exceeded 48 cubic feet. Rather, Exploration argues that it understood
the requirement for a 25 percent reduction in volume and weight to
apply to the complete SS/ECU, not to each of the system components.
According to Exploration, this understanding was based on the RFP
evaluation criteria--specifically, the first factor in the technical
capability evaluation area, which reads in relevant part as follows:
The offeror's proposal must demonstrate a complete understanding
of the [SS/ECU] System Performance Specification requirements.
The offeror's proposed design will be evaluated to determine the
suitability of the approach selected. The proposal will be
evaluated to determine if the proposed system will weigh at least
25% less and has at least a 25% lower packed volume than the
baseline system described in the Performance Specification.
According to Exploration, based on this provision, as well as the fact
that the specifications repeatedly used the term "system," its
understanding was that the requirement was for a 25 percent reduction
in weight and volume of the entire SS/ECU, not each of the components
of the SS/ECU. Exploration argues that its SS/ECU met this
requirement.
Where a dispute exists as to the meaning of solicitation language, we
will resolve the matter by reading the solicitation as a whole and in
a manner that gives effect to all provisions of the solicitation. See
Lithos Restoration, Ltd., B-247003.2, Apr. 22, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 379 at
4. To be reasonable, an interpretation must be consistent with the
solicitation when read as a whole and in a reasonable manner. Id.
Here, the only reasonable reading of the RFP was that the weight and
volume reduction requirements applied to both components of the
SS/ECU, the shelter itself and the ECU, and not just to the SS/ECU as
a whole. Although the evaluation factor relied upon by Exploration
refers to the "system" weighing at least 25 percent less and having a
25 percent lower packed volume, that factor also required that "[t]he
offeror's proposal must demonstrate a complete understanding of the
[SS/ECU] System Performance Specification requirements"-- the
specifications, which include the requirement that the "new SS/ECU
System components shall each reduce transport weight and packed volume
by at least 25 percent over the current system components." We think
the use of the term "system" in the evaluation factor must be read in
the context of its reference to the specifications which required that
each system component be reduced by 25 percent in volume. Read in the
context of the solicitation as a whole, and giving meaning to each
provision, we conclude that offerors were reasonably on notice that
the ECU was required to have a volume 25 percent less than that of the
existing ECU.[3] Under the circumstances, Exploration's proposed ECU
was unacceptable due to its failure to meet the volume reduction
requirement.[4]
Turning to the ECU [deleted] requirement, the System Performance
Specification requires the ECU to operate at [deleted]. The
Downselect Proposal Analysis Report indicates that Exploration's "ECU
would not [deleted] as required-Cut off Design on ECU." In addition,
the source selection memorandum states that "the ECU would not
[deleted] requirement due to a built in cut off switch . . . ."
Exploration essentially does not challenge the determination that its
ECU did not meet this requirement. In its discussion of the failure
of its ECU to meet the requirement to operate [deleted], Exploration
explains that when agency officials raised the matter with the firm
during testing, the firm's representatives responded that the ECU
would not start at that [deleted] because it has "a cut off safety
design feature [that] kept the ECU from running over a certain
[deleted]," and that they "informed the [agency] as to this feature
and provided instruction as to how to adjust the feature." In a later
reference to this issue, Exploration states that "the ECU would not
start due to a cut off switch design feature, which was resolved after
speaking to Exploration . . . ."
The record does not support Exploration's assertion that the ECU's
failure to operate at [deleted] was "resolved" or that the cut off
feature was "adjust[ed]." In fact, the contracting officer explains
that Exploration's ECU would not start at [deleted] because the safety
switch would not allow it to start and it could not be adjusted. The
contracting officer reports that the ECU never started at [deleted],
as required by the specifications; only after the [deleted] of the
test chamber was lowered to [deleted] did the ECU start. Under the
circumstances, Exploration's SS/ECU was unacceptable due to its
failure to meet the requirement that its ECU operate at [deleted].
As explained above, Exploration's SS/ECU also was considered
unacceptable because it failed the [deleted] test. The specifications
required that shelters be able to withstand [deleted]. Concerning the
[deleted] test, the test report states: "Requirement not met.
Exploration shelter failed to withstand [deleted]."
In its comments on the agency report, for the first time, Exploration
challenged the [deleted] test and the agency's conclusion that the
Exploration shelter did not meet the [deleted] requirements. This
contention is untimely. On March 17, the Air Force released to
Exploration's counsel a video tape of the [deleted] test of its
shelter, along with other relevant documents. However, Exploration
did not challenge the conduct of the [deleted] test until it filed its
comments on the contracting agency report on April 9. In that
submission, for the first time, Exploration argued that the Air Force
"did not conduct the [deleted] test consistent with stated criteria,"
and that the shelter was not properly assembled by the agency.
Exploration's challenge of the methodology used in the [deleted] test
and of the agency's conclusion that its shelter did not meet the
[deleted] test requirements of the specifications is untimely. Under
our Bid Protest Regulations, protests not based upon alleged
solicitation improprieties must be filed not later than 10 days after
the basis for protest is known. 4 C.F.R. sec. 21.2(a)(2). Where a
protester initially files a timely protest and supplements it with new
and independent grounds of protest, the new allegations must
independently satisfy these timeliness requirements; our Regulations
do not contemplate the unwarranted piecemeal presentation of protest
issues. Litton Sys., Inc., Amecom Div., B-275807.2, Apr. 16, 1997,
97-1 CPD para. 170 at 4, n.1. Here, while Exploration's initial protest
was filed in a timely manner, that protest did not challenge the
[deleted] test or the conclusion that Exploration's shelter does not
meet the [deleted] test requirements.[5] Exploration's objection to
the methodology used in the [deleted] test and to the agency's
conclusion that its shelter does not meet the [deleted] test
requirements were not raised until April 9 when its comments on the
agency report were submitted to our Office--which was more than 10
days after the firm learned of the grounds for those objections when
it came into possession of the video tape of the [deleted] test on
March 17. See Watkins-Johnson Co., B-252790, July 7, 1993, 93-2 CPD para.
8 at 3-4. Accordingly, we will not consider Exploration's challenge
of the [deleted] test or the conclusion that its shelter did not meet
the [deleted] test requirements.
Discussions
Exploration also argues that the Air Force failed to conduct
meaningful discussions with the firm. According to Exploration,
during the testing of its SS/ECU, government personnel called the firm
three times concerning the failure of the firm's ECU to [deleted].
Under the circumstances, Exploration argues that the agency should
have contacted the firm when it encountered "obvious discrepancies
which logically should have been checked with Exploration . . . ."[6]
Protest at 10. The only example of an "obvious discrepanc[y]" which
Exploration included in its protest was the existence of stake loops
at the base of the walls of the firm's shelter. Although Exploration
concedes that it omitted from its manual the direction to insert
stakes through these loops, the firm argues that "the obvious
existence" of the loops, "and the problem that was experienced with
the SS/ECU system during the [deleted] test," Protest at 11, should
have demonstrated to the agency that it was necessary to contact
Exploration to clarify whether those loops should be used. According
to Exploration, had the agency done so, the problem could have been
identified and the stakes appropriately placed.
Although we have criticized the strict application of pass/fail test
criteria that lead to the automatic and final exclusion of a
potentially acceptable proposal, this generally involved situations
where the offeror has been unable to demonstrate compliance with only
one of a number of mandatory requirements and is eliminated from the
competition solely for that reason. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., B-245834,
Feb. 3, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 136 at 3. Here, as explained above,
Exploration's SS/ECU was found not to meet at least three mandatory
requirements during the testing: (1) the shelter, with a volume of 62
cubic feet, exceeded the required maximum volume of 48 cubic feet; (2)
the ECU would not [deleted], as required; and (3) the shelter failed
to pass the [deleted] test.
Moreover, with respect to the specific issue which Exploration argues
should have been discussed with the firm--the stake loops--the record
does not demonstrate that this problem was so obvious that the agency
should have known to raise it with the firm. The contracting officer
explains that the instructions provided with Exploration's shelter
included no information concerning these stake loops and Exploration's
personnel trained Army and Air Force personnel for 2 days on how to
erect the Exploration SS/ECU. The contracting officer further
explains:
This training consisted of Exploration's training team setting up
and tearing down their shelter system and instructing U.S. Army
and [Air Force] personnel on the proper procedures for doing the
same. The Exploration shelter was erected and disassembled
numerous times during these two days of training. Not once
during this period did the experts . . . identify that these
items were missing, therefore it stands to reason that the US
Army personnel would not recognize this problem with the
Exploration shelter when they (the US Army) were trained by
[Exploration's] experts. Finally, there were no left over guy
wires or stakes when the shelter system was erected, and so it is
inconceivable that the [Air Force], having two days of training,
should have recognized a problem with the [Exploration] shelter.
Upon receipt of the protest, the Government checked
[Exploration's] shelters at both Aberdeen and Holloman AFB for
stake loops. Upon visual review there were no stake loops
located on the endwalls. There are four small fabric grommets
that are too small to place existing stakes through.
The Air Force also explains that there was no indication that the
grommets served a purpose. Under the circumstances, since
Exploration's own personnel failed to instruct agency personnel to use
those stake loops in the 2 days of training and apparently failed to
even notice that the stake loops were not being used during the
numerous times the shelter was erected, we cannot agree with
Exploration that this problem was an "obvious discrepanc[y]." On the
contrary, since Exploration's own personnel did not recognize that
parts and instructions were missing and the shelter was not properly
erected, we do not think it is reasonable to hold agency personnel
responsible for recognizing these problems.[7]
Other Issues
As explained above, Exploration also argues that the [deleted] test of
its shelter was not performed in a manner consistent with the RFP,
that problems with the fabric, zippers, and floor of its shelter were
graded under the wrong evaluation factor, and that the Air Force's
best value analysis was unreasonable. We will not consider these
issues since, under our Bid Protest Regulations, a party is not
interested to maintain a protest if it would not be in line for award
if the protest were sustained. 4 C.F.R. sec. 21.0(a), 21.1(a); System
Resources Corp., B-270241, et al. Feb. 12, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 69 at 5.
As indicated above, based on the testing results, the source selection
authority concluded that Exploration's proposal was unacceptable and
we consider that conclusion to be reasonable. Alaska is the sole
acceptable offeror, and since Exploration's proposal was unacceptable,
it could not form the basis for an award. Learjet, Inc., B-274385 et
al., Dec. 6, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 215 at 6. In addition, Exploration has
not challenged the acceptability of Alaska's proposal. Thus, even if
we were to sustain Exploration's remaining protest grounds, Alaska's
SS/ECU would remain technically acceptable, and Exploration's SS/ECU
would be unacceptable. See also Intertec Aviation, B-239672.4, Apr.
4, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 348 at 7 (contracting agency is not required to
consider lower cost proposals in its award decision where those
proposals have been judged technically unacceptable). Accordingly,
Exploration would not be in line for award, and we will not consider
these additional issues.
The protest is denied.
Comptroller General
of the United States
1. Ratings of exceptional, acceptable, marginal, and unacceptable were
assigned.
2. An unacceptable rating was defined as: "Fails to meet a minimum
requirement of the RFP and the deficiency is uncorrectable without a
major revision to the proposal."
3. Exploration also argues that the RFP was ambiguous since the
specifications called for a reduction in volume and weight of the
components while the evaluation criteria referred to the "proposed
system" meeting those requirements. Even if we were to agree with
Exploration that there was an ambiguity in the RFP, since
Exploration's contention of an ambiguity is based on an alleged
conflict between two provisions of the RFP, such an ambiguity could
not be latent, i.e., a defect which could not be detected prior to
closing. See Inland Marine Indus., Inc., B-249914, B-249918, Dec. 24,
1992, 92-2 CPD para. 442 at 3. In other words, any ambiguity concerning
these requirements was apparent on the face of the solicitation and
thus had to be protested prior to closing. Bid Protest Regulations, 4
C.F.R. sec. 21.2(a)(1) (1998).
4. Exploration also argues that it [deleted]. According to
Exploration, it was only due to this improvement, which it made at the
Air Force's suggestion, that its ECU did not meet the volume
requirement. Air Force officials, on the other hand, deny that they
suggested to Exploration that the firm [deleted]. We need not resolve
this factual disagreement. Even accepting Exploration's version of
events, the Air Force never waived the volume reduction requirement
and it was Exploration's responsibility to provide an ECU that met
that requirement.
5. Prior to its protest, Exploration was informed that its "Shelter
did not pass [deleted] requirements," and was given an explanation of
how the shelter failed the test. Nonetheless, Exploration's protest
did not challenge either that conclusion or the explanation of the
test. The only discussion of the [deleted] test in Exploration's
protest was under the heading "The USAF Failed to Conduct Meaningful
Discussions." Under that heading, Exploration argued that during the
testing, agency personnel should have noticed that there are stake
loops at the base of the walls of its shelter. In addition,
Exploration argued that due to the problems experienced during the
[deleted] test, the agency should have known to raise this matter with
Exploration in discussions. In other words, the only allegation in
Exploration's protest concerning the [deleted] test was a contention
that the matter should have been the subject of discussions; we do not
read the protest as having challenged the conduct of the [deleted]
test or the resulting conclusion that the shelter did not meet the
[deleted] requirement.
6. To the extent that Exploration argues that the communications with
it concerning the [deleted] range of its ECU constituted
discussions--leading to a duty to conduct discussions on other
issues--we do not agree. Those communications, which did not involve
information essential for determining the acceptability of the firm's
proposal and offered no opportunity to revise the proposal, did not
constitute discussions. Federal Acquisition Regulation sec. 15.601 (June
1997). Therefore, the downselect award decision was made without
discussions, consistent with the RFP, which indicated that the agency
intended to make award without discussions. Exploration refers to no
authority, and we are aware of none, which would require discussions
in these circumstances.
7. Exploration also argues that it was unreasonable for the agency to
fail to utilize Exploration's technical support as permitted by line
item 0004, under which the government could call for maintenance and
repair during the testing. We do not agree. As the Air Force points
out, the RFP stated that the purpose of line item 0004 was "to provide
service and parts necessary to resolve major or catastrophic failures
requiring other than minor repair of the system or components." RFP,
attachment 3, at 2. According to the Air Force, the purpose of line
item 0004 was to allow contractors to repair their SS/ECUs if a
catastrophic failure occurred during testing--so that the test could
continue--rather than to provide offerors with opportunities to repair
their SS/ECU every time it failed. We think that is a reasonable
reading of this provision.