BNUMBER: B-279173.5
DATE: July 22, 1998
TITLE: Acepex Management Corporation, B-279173.5, July 22, 1998
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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Acepex Management Corporation
File: B-279173.5
Date:July 22, 1998
James F. Nagle, Esq., Oles Morrison & Rinker, for the protester.
Brian J. Donovan, Esq., Jones & Donovan, for OMSERV Corporation, an
intervenor.
Marian E. Sullivan, Esq., and John E. Lariccia, Esq., Department of
the Air Force, for the agency.
John L. Formica, Esq., and Jerold D. Cohen, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
1. Agency conducted meaningful discussions where it brought its
principal concerns about the protester's proposal to the protester's
attention through discussion questions that were not misleading; the
agency was not required to hold discussions regarding every weakness
identified in the proposal.
2. Agency's determination, under an evaluation factor for "cost
(price)," that the awardee's price for purposes of a fixed-price
contract was realistic, complete, and reasonable based on a comparison
with the other offerors' line item and total prices and the government
estimate is unobjectionable.
3. Protest that the contracting agency unreasonably evaluated the
protester's and awardee's competing proposals under certain technical
evaluation criteria, including past performance, is denied where the
record shows that the evaluation was reasonable; the protester's mere
disagreement does not render the agency's judgment unreasonable.
DECISION
Acepex Management Corporation protests the award of a contract to
OMSERV Corporation under request for proposals (RFP) No.
F04626-97-R0004, issued by the Department of the Air Force for
military family housing maintenance (MFHM) services for Travis Air
Force Base (AFB), California.
We deny the protest.
The RFP, issued on June 16, 1997, provided for the award of a
fixed-price contract for a base period with four 1-year options. The
successful contractor under the RFP will be required to provide, with
limited exception, all personnel, equipment, tools, materials,
supervision, and other items necessary to perform the MFHM services.
RFP sec. C.1.1.
The RFP stated that award would be made to the responsible offeror
submitting the proposal determined to be most advantageous to the
government, and listed the following evaluation criteria: (1) Past
Performance, (2) Staffing, (3) Quality Controls, (4) Maintenance
Management, and (5) Cost (Price). RFP sec. M-16C.b. The RFP specified
that the first four criteria would be evaluated under a
color/adjectival rating scheme to assess how well the offeror's
proposed approach meets the evaluation standards and requirements set
forth in the solicitation, and for proposal risk to assess "the risk
associated with [the] offeror's proposed approach as it relates to
accomplishing the requirements of the solicitation."[1] Id. The RFP
added that "[e]ach offeror's cost (price) proposal . . . will be
evaluated to determine realism, completeness, and reasonableness in
relation to the solicitation requirements." Id. at sec. M-16C.b.(5).
The RFP included detailed instructions for the preparation of
proposals and requested that the offerors' proposals consist of three
volumes. Volume 1 was to include, among other things, a completed
price schedule; volume 2 was to include the technical proposal,
divided into three sections addressing staffing, quality control, and
maintenance management; and volume 3 was to describe relevant past
performance. RFP sec. L-903.
The agency received 15 proposals, and included 10 proposals in the
competitive range. Discussions were held, and best and final offers
(BAFO) were requested, received, and evaluated. The agency
conditionally awarded a contract to Crimson Enterprises as the offeror
submitting the proposal determined most advantageous to the
government.[2]
Three offerors, including Acepex, filed protests with our Office
challenging the propriety of the conditional award to Crimson, each
arguing, among other things, that the agency failed to conduct
meaningful discussions. On February 17, 1998, the agency informed our
Office that it would reopen discussions, request and evaluate new
BAFOs, and make a new source selection decision. Shortly thereafter,
our Office dismissed the protests as academic. BMAR & Assoc., Inc.;
Satellite Servs., Inc.; Acepex Management Corp., B-279173 et al., Feb.
18, 1998.
The agency then conducted written discussions with the 10 offerors,
and requested and received new BAFOs. OMSERV's proposal was rated by
the cognizant source selection evaluation team (SSET) as "blue" with
"low" risk under the maintenance management and quality controls
evaluation criteria, and "green" with "low" risk under the past
performance and staffing evaluation criteria, at a price of
$17,350,352. Acepex's proposal was evaluated as "green" with "low"
risk under each evaluation criterion, at a price of $20,307,543. The
source selection authority determined that OMSERV's proposal, which
was the lowest-priced one received and was one of three proposals to
have received two "blue" with "low" risk and two "green" with "low"
risk ratings, represented the best value to the government.[3]
Acepex protests that the agency "failed to engage in meaningful
discussions by misleading [Acepex]."
In evaluating Acepex's proposal before the first round of protest
filings, the SSET noted that Acepex's proposed "staffing level of 37
full time equivalents is relatively low for our contract size. This
could pose a problem in delivering quality customer service . . . ."
The SSET also noted that the work to be performed by Acepex's
subcontractors would be limited to work on carpet, asbestos and lead
abatement, and roofing. The SSET accordingly rated Acepex's proposal
under the staffing criterion as having "moderate" risk. Initial
Proposal Analysis Report (Protest Report Tab 23) at 11.
The agency found in evaluating Acepex's proposal under the maintenance
management evaluation criterion that Acepex's proposed "7-10 day
inventory stock level is not enough to deal with day to day
operations," and that it would "greatly affect operations specifically
during contingency and emergency situations." The SSET further
evaluated Acepex's proposed plan for answering emergency calls as
"weak," noting that Acepex would "use an answering system to screen
calls and dispatch workers" without any provision for notifying the
cognizant supervisor to confirm if the work would be or was performed.
The agency rated Acepex's proposal as having "moderate" risk under the
maintenance management evaluation criterion. Id. at 12.
When the agency reopened discussions in response to the protests filed
at our Office, it issued three clarification requests to Acepex. Each
clarification request noted an evaluation criterion by name and RFP
section, and the volume and section of the offeror's proposal to which
the request was addressed. Clarification request No. 1 asked for
information regarding Acepex's past performance on government and
commercial contracts. Clarification request No. 2 asked:
Explain how your company will provide and meet the requirements
of the Performance Work Statement with your proposed labor force
to ensure proper performance of service calls, change of
occupancy . . . and recurring maintenance work.
The agency also requested, in clarification request No. 3, that Acepex
"[c]larify how [its] inventory (7-10 days stocking) on a project this
size will support peak periods or contingencies," and explain "how the
on call supervisor will be notified to confirm the standby worker
performed work on emergency calls."
Acepex revised its past performance submission in response to the
first clarification request. The firm responded to the agency's
expressed concerns regarding Acepex's proposed staffing level by
raising its staffing level to 46 full-time equivalents (which included
the addition of a quality control inspector), and noting that "there
will be a significant amount of subcontracted work (e.g., roofing,
carpet, etc.)." Acepex also provided an explanation as to how it
arrived at this staffing level, stating that it was based in part on
the "quantities of jobs required by the RFP" and number of hours
needed to provide the services based on Acepex's "direct experience"
in providing such services. Protest Report, Tab 33.
With regard to the agency's questions concerning the adequacy of
Acepex's inventory levels, the protester stated that "[g]iven the
Government's concern, Acepex has revised its inventory plan and will
have sufficient parts and materials for 30 to 45 days in stock in
house." The offeror also explained that it had amended its plan for
responding to emergency calls by providing for the notification of
both the on-call supervisor and the worker and for their coordination
in providing and completing the necessary services. Id.
The agency determined that, because of Acepex's responses to the
clarification requests, its BAFO merited ratings of "low" (rather than
"moderate") risk under both the staffing and maintenance management
evaluation criteria.
Acepex complains that it was misled during discussions by
clarification requests Nos. 2 and 3, and thus made unnecessary
modifications to its proposal. Acepex argues that the agency, in
questioning Acepex's initial staffing level, "overlooked the clear
fact that Acepex proposed to contract out 24 percent of the major
work, and that involved major roofing, floor refinishing, floor
replacement, and carpeting." Protest at 5. The protester contends
that had the agency properly evaluated Acepex's initial proposal, it
would not have misled Acepex during discussions into raising its
staffing level and, concomitantly, its price. Acepex makes similar
claims regarding its proposed 7 to 10 day inventory levels and
handling of emergency calls. For example, Acepex contends that the 7
to 10 day inventory level it initially proposed is the
industry-accepted standard, and that it was thus misled into amending
its proposal to provide a greater inventory level and increased price.
Id. at 6.
Agencies are required to advise competitive range offerors of proposal
deficiencies so that the offerors are given an opportunity to satisfy
the government's requirements. Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a
joint venture, B-270505.2,
B-270505.3, Sept. 12, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 143 at 6. This obligation is
not satisfied by discussions that improperly mislead an offeror into
lowering the evaluated quality of its proposal. Pan Am World Servs.,
Inc., et al., B-231840 et al., Nov. 7, 1988, 88-2 CPD para. 446 at 11.
The record shows that the agency's discussions with Acepex were not
misleading. For example, contrary to the protester's arguments, the
agency did not inform Acepex that its staffing or inventory levels
were too low, nor did it request that Acepex increase its staffing or
inventory levels. Rather, the clarification requests, quoted above,
sought explanations from Acepex as to how it would accomplish the
requirements of the contract with the staffing and inventory levels
proposed. Acepex was free to provide explanations of how the agency's
needs would be met by the staffing and inventory levels initially
proposed, or to take some other action, such as raising its proposed
staffing and/or inventory levels. In this regard, we note that the
explanations set forth in Acepex's submissions to our Office during
the course of the protest regarding the adequacy of the staffing and
inventory levels it initially proposed were not set forth in Acepex's
initial proposal, its responses to the clarification requests, its
subsequent BAFO, or other documents it provided to the agency during
its consideration of Acepex's proposal. That is, prior to this
protest, the "clear fact" that Acepex proposed to subcontract 24
percent of the work required was not mentioned, nor did Acepex ever
assert that its proposed 7 to 10 day inventory level or its method for
answering emergency calls was, as Acepex now claims, in accordance
with industry standards.
Acepex adds that the agency failed to conduct meaningful discussions
because during discussions the agency did not point out certain
weaknesses in Acepex's proposal that were identified by the agency
evaluators. The protester lists a number of negative comments that
appear on the evaluators' worksheets, and contends that had these
perceived weaknesses been identified during discussions, Acepex could
have addressed them and thus enhanced its prospects for award.
An agency is not required to afford an offeror all-encompassing
discussions, or to discuss every aspect of an offeror's proposal that
receives less than a maximum score. Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini
Corp., a joint venture, supra. Neither is an agency required to
advise an offeror of a minor weakness that is not considered
significant, even where the weakness subsequently becomes the
determinative factor between two closely ranked proposals. Volmar
Constr., Inc., B-270364,
B-270364.2, Mar. 4, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 139 at 4-5. Contracting agencies
have wide discretion in determining the nature and scope of
discussions, and their judgments will not be questioned unless shown
to be without a rational basis. Textron Marine Sys., B-255580.3, Aug.
2, 1994, 94-2 CPD para. 63 at 24.
The record shows that the agency apprised the protester of the
principal areas of concern regarding the firm's proposal, e.g., the
nature and extent of Acepex's past performance, and the adequacy of
Acepex's proposed staffing and inventory levels and procedures for
answering emergency calls. The agency did not point out a variety of
relatively minor weaknesses, and there is nothing in the record to
suggest that these weaknesses materially affected the rating of
Acepex's proposal or kept Acepex from having a reasonable chance for
award. In sum, the protester was not deprived of meaningful
discussions.
Acepex argues that OMSERV's price is not realistic and that if the
agency had performed a "cost realism analysis," as allegedly required,
it would not have determined that OMSERV's price was "realistic,
complete, and reasonable."
As stated above, the RFP provided that an offeror's "cost (price)
proposal" would be evaluated for "realism, completeness, and
reasonableness in relation to the solicitation requirements." The
concept of cost realism generally applies to cost-reimbursement
contracts where the RFP requires the submission of cost data and it is
important for the government to measure the likely cost of performance
before choosing from among competitors in the procurement. Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sec. 15.605(c), 15.608, 15.805-3 (June
1997). Cost realism therefore ordinarily is not considered in the
evaluation of proposals for a fixed-price contract such as the one
involved here, since a fixed-price contract provides for a definite
price and places the risk and responsibility for all contract costs
and resulting profit or loss upon the contractor. Volmar Constr.,
Inc., B-272188.2, Sept. 18, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 119 at 5; Sperry Corp.,
B-225492, B-225492.2, Mar. 25, 1987, 87-1 CPD para. 341 at 3.
Accordingly, and although an agency may provide for a "cost realism"
analysis in the solicitation of fixed-priced proposals to measure an
offeror's understanding of the solicitation requirements, even a
fixed-price offer that is below cost is legally unobjectionable and
cannot be rated lower or downgraded in the price evaluation for source
selection by virtue of its low price. Id. at 3-4. On the other hand,
an agency will perform a price analysis in such a solicitation since
the risk of poor performance when a contractor is forced to provide
services at little or no profit is of legitimate concern. Volmar
Constr., Inc., B-272188.2, supra; see FAR sec. 15.805-2.
We recognize that the RFP here used the term "cost" in the evaluation
factor ("Cost (Price)"); we also recognize that in describing the
factor the RFP provided that "proposals will be evaluated for cost
realism." RFP sec. M-16C.b.(5)(a). Nevertheless, the RFP contemplated
the award of a fixed-price contract, the evaluation factor specified
"Price" along with "Cost," and the solicitation did not require the
submission of cost data (only a price schedule). Therefore, and
consistent with the nature of a fixed-price contract, the evaluation
factor cannot reasonably be viewed as being other than price, nor can
the RFP reasonably be read as committing the agency, in evaluating
proposals, to perform a cost analysis under FAR sec. 15.805-3, as opposed
to a price analysis to ascertain whether the offered prices were
reasonable and realistic. See The Cube Corp., B-277353, Oct. 2, 1997,
97-2 CPD para. 92 at 5.
Price analysis techniques that may be used to determine whether prices
are reasonable and realistic include a comparison of the prices
received with each other, FAR sec. 15.805-2(a); with prior contract
prices for the same or similar services, FAR sec. 15.805-2(b); and with
an independent government cost estimate. FAR
sec. 15.805-2(e). The depth of an agency's price analysis is a matter
within the agency's discretion. Ameriko-OMSERV, B-252879.5, Dec. 5,
1994, 94-2 CPD para. 219 at 4.
The Air Force's price analysis was based on a comparison of the
offerors' proposed line item and total prices with each other and with
the government estimate. In this regard, the price analysis matrix
prepared by the agency shows that OMSERV's total price was only 1
percent lower than the next lowest-priced proposal, and
6 and 12 percent lower than the third and fourth lowest-priced
proposals. Further, OMSERV's price was only 15 percent lower than
Acepex's, and 16 percent lower than the agency estimate. The agency
concluded based on its comparison of OMSERV's price with the agency
estimate and the prices of the other nine proposals received that
OMSERV's price was complete, reasonable, and realistic. Revised
Proposal Analysis Report (Protest Report Tab 38) at 5-6. Based on our
review, we have no basis to question the reasonableness of the
agency's determination. See The Cube Corp., supra, at 5-6.
Acepex protests that the agency's evaluation of its and OMSERV's
technical proposals was unreasonable. The evaluation of technical
proposals is a matter within the discretion of the contracting agency,
since the agency is responsible for defining its needs and the best
method of accommodating them. Marine Animal Prods. Int'l, Inc.,
B-247150.2, July 13, 1992, 92-2 CPD para. 16 at 5. In reviewing an
agency's evaluation, we will not reevaluate technical proposals, but
instead will examine the agency's evaluation to ensure that it was
reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's stated evaluation
criteria. MAR Inc., B-246889, Apr. 14, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 367 at 4. An
offeror's mere disagreement with the agency does not render the
evaluation unreasonable. McDonnell Douglas Corp., B-259694.2,
B-259694.3, June 16, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 51 at 18.
Acepex specifically challenges the agency's evaluation of its and
OMSERV's proposals as "green" with "low" risk under the past
performance evaluation criterion.
In evaluating Acepex's proposal under the past performance criterion,
the agency found that Acepex had 8 years of experience in performing
government contracts, and noted that the contract surveys it had
received "indicated satisfactory performance with no major problems
requiring corrective actions." The agency found, however, that
Acepex's experience in performing MFHM services was primarily as a
"subcontractor or in a joint venture with another company" and that
the subcontracts did not appear to have been similar in size and scope
to the contract contemplated by the RFP. The agency concluded that,
while Acepex's proposal merited a rating of "green," there was
"moderate potential . . . to cause disruption of schedule, increase in
cost or degradation of performance." The agency thus initially rated
Acepex's proposal under the past performance criterion as having
"moderate" risk. Initial Proposal Analysis Report, supra, at 11.
As previously mentioned, the agency issued a clarification request
regarding Acepex's past performance when it reopened discussions. In
responding to this request, Acepex represented that, among other
things, its experience as a subcontractor in providing MFHM services
includes "two current housing contracts
[which] are of the same size and complexity as the current
solicitation." The agency determined that, although Acepex lacked
experience as an MFHM services prime contractor, its proposal
represented "low" (rather than "moderate") risk because Acepex's
subcontracts were similar in size and scope to that contemplated by
the RFP. Revised Proposal Analysis Report, supra, at 10.
Acepex complains that the agency failed to contact five current
contract references Acepex had listed in its proposal, including the
contractor for which Acepex was performing the two MFHM subcontracts
mentioned above. Acepex notes that the SSET appeared somewhat
concerned because Acepex had performed as a subcontractor on the two
MFHM contracts discussed above, rather than as the prime contractor,
and argues that "the fact that the contractual device [was] a
subcontract should not be used against Acepex . . . ." Protester's
Comments at 17.
There is no legal requirement that all references in a proposal be
checked. Logicon RDA, B-261714.2, Dec. 22, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 286 at 7;
Dragon Servs., Inc., B-255354, Feb. 25, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 151 at 8;
Questech, Inc., B-236028, Nov. 1, 1989, 89-2 CPD para. 407 at 3. In
reviewing the manner and conduct of an agency in contacting or
choosing not to contact references listed by offerors in their
proposals, we look to see if the agency proceeded in a reasonable and
prudent manner. See Int'l Bus. Sys., Inc., B-275554, Mar. 3, 1997,
97-1 CPD para. 114 at 5.
The agency sent past performance questionnaires to six of the
references listed by Acepex in its proposal. The references chosen by
the agency included three of the references listed in Acepex's
proposal under the heading "military family housing maintenance
contracts and subcontracts" (Acepex was performing one of the
contracts during the evaluation), the reference listed by Acepex under
the heading "hospital housekeeping services" (for which Acepex had
performed four contracts and currently is performing a fifth), and at
least one of the references listed under the heading "custodial
services contracts" (Acepex is currently performing contracts for both
of these references). Despite Acepex's view to the contrary, we
simply cannot see how the agency--which contacted three of the
references listed for which Acepex had performed MFHM services, and a
number of the references for which Acepex currently was performing
services--acted unreasonably. Also, given the inherent differences
between acting as a prime contractor and as a subcontractor, it was
not unreasonable for the agency, when evaluating Acepex's proposal
under the past performance evaluation criterion, to have considered
Acepex's performance of MFHM services similar in size and complexity
as a subcontractor less favorably than if the same services had been
performed by Acepex as a prime contractor. See Robbins-Gioia, Inc.,
B-274318 et al., Dec. 4, 1996, 96-2 CPD para. 222 at 20 (where we did not
object to assigning a moderate risk rating to an offeror with no
specific experience as a general contractor even though we recognized
that the firm had performed similar tasks as a subcontractor).
We also see no basis to object to the Air Force's evaluation of
OMSERV's proposal under the past performance criterion ("green" with
"low" risk).
In evaluating OMSERV's proposal, the agency initially found that,
while OMSERV had successfully completed three MFHM services contracts
as the prime contractor, the contracts were smaller in size and
complexity than that contemplated by the RFP. The agency thus
evaluated OMSERV's proposal as "green" with "moderate" risk. Initial
Proposal Analysis Report, supra, at 13.
When the agency reopened discussions, it requested further information
from OMSERV regarding its past experience. OMSERV explained in its
response that, although it had not performed a contract equal in size
to that contemplated by the RFP, the three contracts it had performed
(all for the Air Force) were similar in complexity and scope, and when
considered together--as they had been performed concurrently for 2
years--in size. OMSERV submitted a chart in support of its
explanation, which compared the work required under the "combined"
contracts with the estimated work required under the Travis AFB
contract, regarding, for example, the number of service calls (17,000
for the combined contracts in comparison to an estimated 12,747 for
the Travis AFB contract), and change of occupancy maintenances (700
for the combined contracts in comparison to 715 estimated for the
Travis AFB contract). Based on this explanation, the agency raised
OMSERV's risk rating under the past performance evaluation criterion
from "moderate" to "low."
Acepex points out, as did OMSERV in its response to the agency's
clarification request, that 600 units required to be maintained by
OMSERV were demolished by the agency during the performance of one of
the three MFHM contracts, thus reducing the number of units maintained
by OMSERV under the combined contracts to 1,751, in contrast to the
2,486 units to be maintained at Travis AFB under this RFP. As noted
by the agency, however, prior to the demolition of the 600 units there
was a period that appears from the record to approximate 1 year during
which OMSERV was responsible for the maintenance of 2,351 units under
the three contracts. More importantly, the record demonstrates that,
regardless of the number of units, OMSERV was required to perform, as
mentioned above, a number of service calls and change of occupancy
maintenances in its performance of the three contracts that is
comparable to those estimated for performance under this RFP. In sum,
we do not agree that the agency acted unreasonably in evaluating
OMSERV's proposal under the past performance criterion as "green" with
"low" risk.[4]
Acepex also complains that the evaluation record fails to evidence
that the agency considered 8 of 12 "added value items" that Acepex
included in its proposal. For example, the protester points out that
the evaluation record does not specifically mention Acepex's offer to
provide each occupied unit with a refrigerator magnet "in the shape of
a house, with the phone numbers for the service call desk and
emergency after hours displayed," and customer survey cards to be
completed after a service technician responds to a service call or
performs recurring maintenance in a dwelling. Acepex adds that the
evaluation record also does not evidence that the agency considered
Acepex's offer, in response to the clarification request for further
information regarding its staffing, to provide an additional quality
control inspector.
The agency responds that, while Acepex's 12 added value items and
addition of a quality inspector were considered, "they were not
significant enough to merit higher ratings for Acepex's proposal or
special mention in the evaluation record." Supplemental Protest
Report at 4.
We find the agency's explanation plausible, given the relatively minor
import of the value added items not specifically mentioned in the
evaluation record. With regard to the quality control inspector, as
noted above, Acepex added the quality control inspector in its
response to clarification request No. 2, and the record reflects that
this response led to Acepex's proposal being evaluated as having
"low," rather than "moderate" risk under the staffing evaluation
criterion.[5] Even if we were to conclude that the lack of specific
mention of 8 of the 12 value added items and addition of one quality
control inspector was the result of the agency's failure to consider
these aspects of Acepex's proposal, we see no reasonable possibility
that Acepex would have been prejudiced by such an oversight, given
OMSERV's proposal's significantly superior technical rating and $3
million, or 16 percent, price advantage.[6]
The protest is denied.
Comptroller General
of the United States
1. The color/adjectival ratings used by the agency in evaluating
proposals were blue/exceptional, green/acceptable, yellow/marginal,
and red/unacceptable. With regard to risk, the ratings used were
high, moderate, and low. Source Selection Evaluation Guide (Tab 6) at
2, 6.
2. The procurement was undertaken as part of a cost comparison study
regarding whether to perform the services in-house or by contract.
The award was conditioned on completion of a public review period, any
requests for review made under the cost comparison appeals process,
and the availability of funds.
3. No proposal received a "blue" rating under more than two evaluation
criteria, and the two other proposals that received two "blue" with
"low" risk and two "green" with "low" risk ratings were higher priced
($20,667,655 and $26,667,796).
4. The protester also complains that its past experience as an MFHM
subcontractor should have been rated higher than OMSERV's "combined"
past experience as an MFHM prime contractor. As mentioned previously,
it was not unreasonable for the agency to consider Acepex's past
experience as an MFHM subcontractor less favorably than if the firm
had performed the same work as a prime contractor; this aspect of
Acepex's protest thus constitutes its mere disagreement with the
agency's evaluation, and does not provide a basis upon which to find
the evaluation unreasonable.
5. Specifically, the first two lines of Acepex's response to
clarification request No. 2 are as follows:
Given the Government's concern, Acepex has raised its
staffing levels to 46 [full time equivalents] (48
individuals). We have added a quality control inspector,
as well as increasing the staffing of general maintenance
workers, painters, plumbers, and janitors.
6. Acepex complains that the evaluation record, which consists of,
among other things, the evaluators' worksheets, proposal analysis
reports, and source selection statements, is poorly documented and
"should be deprived of any deference." For example, the protester
complains that one evaluator used an evaluation form apparently of his
own making, rather than the standard evaluation form used by the other
evaluators. While the evaluation record, including the evaluators'
worksheets, is not a model of clarity, the agency's evaluation of
proposals and its source selection are sufficiently detailed to allow
for the review of Acepex's protest, so that the record is
unobjectionable. See Matrix Int'l Logistics, Inc., B-272388.2, Dec.
9, 1996, 97-2 CPD para. 89 at 5; Southwest Marine, Inc.; Am. Sys. Eng'g
Corp., B-265865.3, B-265865.4, Jan. 23, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 56 at 10.