BNUMBER:  B-278921.2      
DATE:  June 17, 1998
TITLE: Braswell Services Group, Inc., B-278921.2, June 17, 1998
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.

Matter of:Braswell Services Group, Inc.

File:B-278921.2     
        
Date:June 17, 1998

Patricia H. Wittie, Esq., and Karla J. Letsche, Esq., Wittie & 
Letsche, for the protester. 
Sharon Hershkowitz, Esq., Jannika E. Cannon, Esq., Lisa L. Hare, Esq., 
and Catherine A. D'Andrea, Esq., Department of the Navy, for the 
agency. 
Linda C. Glass, Esq., and Paul I. Lieberman, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Agency reasonably evaluated protester's past performance as 
unsatisfactory where record shows that the protester's most relevant 
contract performance was reasonably perceived as inadequate by the 
agency, notwithstanding protester's allegations that the agency 
overstated the scope and significance of the performance deficiencies.

2.  Agency reasonably evaluated awardee's past performance record as 
satisfactory, which was the rating closest to a neutral assessment, 
where the agency did not have available on file past performance 
rating information for the awardee which it viewed as sufficient to 
permit a full evaluation; satisfactory rating did not overstate the 
record, since agency had orally received a favorable overall 
assessment of the awardee's relevant performance by a cognizant 
contracting official.  

3.  Agency selection of slightly higher-priced proposal with a 
satisfactory past performance rating instead of the lower-priced 
proposal with an unsatisfactory rating was reasonable and consistent 
with the solicitation's evaluation scheme, which weighted past 
performance as slightly more important than price.

DECISION

Braswell Services Group, Inc. protests the award of a fixed-price 
contract to Earl Industries under request for proposals (RFP) No. 
N62670-98-R-0003, issued by the Department of the Navy for the 
restricted availability (RAV)[1] of the USS DEWERT.  Braswell argues 
that the Navy's past performance evaluation was unreasonable and that 
the agency failed to award the contract on the basis of the best value 
to the government, as required by the RFP.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The RFP was issued on December 8, 1997 by the supervisor of 
shipbuilding  conversion and repair (SUPSHIP), U.S. Navy, 
Jacksonville, Florida and consisted of approximately 40 work items.  
The period of performance was March 23 through May 6, 1998.  The RFP 
was restricted to offerors possessing Master Ship Repair Agreements 
(MSRA).[2]  Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal was 
most advantageous to the government under two criteria:  (1) past 
performance and (2) price.  Past performance was to be evaluated based 
on the following factors:  quality of product or service, timeliness 
of performance, and contracting/business relations, with greater 
consideration being given to contracts requiring the same or similar 
type and complexity of work as that required by the RFP.  Section 
M-6(c)(1) of the RFP provided that for award determination, "[p]ast 
performance is approximately equal to [p]rice, with [p]ast 
[p]erformance being more important than [p]rice."  The solicitation at 
section L-2-8 permitted offerors to submit any information considered 
relevant to the Navy's evaluation of their past performance and to 
provide corrective action taken to prevent recurrence of past 
performance problems.  This section indicated that the Navy has 
performance information readily available and sought primarily 
"additional information," requiring offerors to submit a list of all 
ship repair work performed for the government in the last 3 years that 
exceeded $500,000, "to assist the [Navy] in performing the past 
performance evaluation."  

The Navy received proposals from six offerors by the January 14 
closing date.  One offeror withdrew prior to evaluation of proposals.  
The past performance evaluation team (PPET) reviewed the past 
performance file that it had for each of the five remaining offerors.  
SUPSHIP Jacksonville had available past performance evaluations for 
the last Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) scheduled availability 
performed by three offerors, including Braswell.  Braswell's 
evaluation was primarily based on its performance in 1997 of repairs 
to the USS MOOSBRUGGER, which was included in its past performance 
file.  Under the USS MOOSBRUGGER evaluation, Braswell received an 
overall rating of unsatisfactory with a marginal rating for quality of 
product or service and timeliness of performance and an unsatisfactory 
rating for contracting business relations.  Braswell's past 
performance file also contained two lists of contracts it submitted 
with its proposal and letters Braswell had written to rebut various 
aspects of the USS MOOSBRUGGER evaluation.  Earl had not previously 
completed a CNO availability under SUPSHIP Jacksonville and 
consequently it had no relevant past performance information on file.  

After reviewing the past performance of the three offerors on file, 
the PPET summarized these offerors' respective strengths, weaknesses, 
and risks, and arrived at an overall adjectival past performance 
rating.  The PPET concluded that none of the documents in Braswell's 
past performance file affected Braswell's overall unsatisfactory past 
performance rating under the USS MOOSBRUGGER evaluation.  The PPET did 
change Braswell's risk assessment in the quality of product or service 
subfactor from significant to moderate based on Braswell's proposed 
corrective actions, primarily because of Braswell's stated commitment 
to place its environmental coordinator on site and to improve 
timeliness of quality deficiency reports (QDR) resolution.  Since Earl 
and another offeror did not have any past performance information on 
file, [DELETED], they each received an overall rating of 
"satisfactory."  

On February 3, the best value evaluation board (BVEB) reviewed the 
findings of the PPET and ranked the offerors based on their past 
performance ratings as follows:

     (1)  Offeror A-  Satisfactory, with overall risk deemed slight
     (1)  Offeror B-  Satisfactory, with overall risk deemed slight
     (2)  Earl   -  Satisfactory, with overall risk deemed moderate
     (2)  Offeror C-  Satisfactory, with overall risk deemed moderate
     (3)  Braswell-  Unsatisfactory, with overall risk deemed 
significant

The BVEB then considered the total price submitted by the offerors and 
ranked them as follows:

     Offeror B                $   776,735
     Braswell                 $   892,639
     Earl                     $   947,000
     Offeror C                $ 1,013,352
     Offeror A                $ 1,458,995

The BVEB then compared each offeror to each other and ranked the best 
value to the government of offerors in descending order as follows:  
(1) Offeror B; (2) Earl; (3) Braswell; (4) Offeror C; and (5) Offeror 
A.  The BVEB recommended award to Offeror B as representing the best 
value and on February 9, the contracting officer agreed.  On February 
12, Offeror B withdrew its offer.  On February 20, the contracting 
officer awarded the contract to Earl as representing the best value to 
the government.  

On March 3, SUPSHIP Jacksonville provided a written debriefing to 
Braswell and notified Braswell of its and Earl's past performance 
ratings.  On March 9, Braswell filed this protest with our Office.  On 
March 20, the head of the procuring agency determined that urgent and 
compelling circumstances warranted continuation of contract 
performance, notwithstanding the pendency of the protest.  Performance 
of the contract has been completed.

PAST PERFORMANCE

Braswell challenges the agency's evaluation of past performance and 
maintains that the agency improperly relied on the USS MOOSBRUGGER 
past performance evaluation on file to rate Braswell's performance as 
unsatisfactory.  Braswell argues that the USS MOOSBRUGGER evaluation 
was arbitrary and irrational in that it excluded all positive aspects 
of Braswell's performance and that the Navy ignored proposed and 
implemented corrective action.  Braswell also contends that the agency 
failed to evaluate past performance in accordance with the terms of 
the solicitation by ignoring the list of prior ship repair work that 
Braswell submitted in its proposal.

As indicated above, the solicitation provided that the agency would 
evaluate past performance based on the information contained in its 
files but also allowed offerors to supplement the file with additional 
information the offerors considered essential to the Navy's 
evaluation.  To assist in the past performance evaluation, offerors 
were asked to provide a list of all ship repair work with a value over 
$500,000 performed for the government in the last 3 years.

The agency's past performance file on Braswell consisted of the one 
evaluation for the USS MOOSBRUGGER.  Under that evaluation, Braswell 
had been rated unsatisfactory overall with a significant risk of poor 
performance.  Braswell received a marginal rating for quality of 
product or service and timeliness of performance and an unsatisfactory 
rating for contracting/business relations.  The risk of failure with 
respect to timeliness and contracting/business relations was 
considered significant while the risk of failure in the quality of 
product or service was changed by the PPET from "significant" to 
"moderate" based on the agency's review of Braswell's proposed 
corrective actions.  The USS MOOSBRUGGER evaluation listed several 
strengths for Braswell:  it noted that there were no major 
discrepancies, that reports were generally accurate, that the firm 
generally met contract milestones, that technical problems were 
promptly identified, and that there was no major rework.  However, it 
also contained the following weaknesses:  the time to satisfactorily 
close QDRs/safety deficiency reports (SDRs) was excessive; management 
assignments were ineffective; the firm was obstructive in contract 
administration and unresponsive to contract changes; excessive time 
was used to scope and negotiate changes; there was an inability to 
accommodate change work; the firm's remote environmental management 
was not effective; and the firm was unreasonable, uncooperative and 
disputatious.  The PPET concluded that most of Braswell's weaknesses 
were connected to its management and its ability to price and 
accommodate changes.  Although the PPET found that Braswell did 
generally meet contract milestones, the agency determined that this 
was usually after significant growth work was removed from the 
contract and that several bid items had to be completed independently 
of the contract to allow those milestones to be met.  The PPET also 
concluded that Braswell had provided no information in its proposal 
that would alter this past performance rating.

We will review an evaluation of an offeror's performance risk to 
ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated 
evaluation criteria.  Dragon Servs., Inc., B-255354, Feb. 25, 1994, 
94-1 CPD  para.  151 at 6.  An agency's evaluation of past performance may 
be based upon the procuring agency's reasonable perception of 
inadequate prior performance, even where the contractor disputes the 
agency's interpretation of the facts.  Pannesma Co. Ltd., B-251688, 
Apr. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  333 at 6.  This record provides us no basis 
upon which to object to the Navy's conclusion regarding Braswell's 
past performance.  In its proposal, Braswell provided a list of prior 
ship repair work, much of it for relatively small dollar value 
contracts (substantially less than $500,000) with no additional or 
explanatory information.  The protester's successful performance of 
these listed contracts does not negate the agency's conclusion about 
the firm's performance of the USS MOOSBRUGGER availability, a prior 
SUPSHIP Jacksonville contract.  While the solicitation allowed 
offerors to submit information in addition to that which SUPSHIP 
Jacksonville had readily available, it also placed offerors on notice 
that SUPSHIP Jacksonville intended to rely primarily on its own 
internal documentation regarding an offeror's performance history.  
Moreover, the USS MOOSBRUGGER was the most recent example of 
Braswell's work for SUPSHIP Jacksonville that involved repairs of a 
type and complexity similar to that required by the USS DEWERT.  

It is clear that there existed significant problems in the performance 
of the ship repairs on the USS MOOSBRUGGER, the contract which the 
agency reasonably viewed as most relevant in terms of the type and 
complexity of work required.  A significant percentage of the problems 
involved responding to and negotiating growth work, which resulted in 
delays in pricing and negotiating changes and disputes over contract 
administration procedures.  For example, Braswell disputed most QDRs 
and SDRs before acknowledging that corrective action was necessary, 
resulting in lengthy cycle time; Braswell assigned only one person to 
perform the functions of material control manager, purchasing agent, 
and government furnished material clerk, resulting in the need for the 
government to expend additional resources with respect to these 
functions; and Braswell used an off-site corporate safety director, 
causing delayed responses to problems.  Additionally, Braswell applied 
a labor rate of $13.56 per hour with no overhead, no general and 
administrative expense, and no profit factors for the USS MOOSBRUGGER 
when work was deleted, while insisting on a labor rate of $24.68 for 
work added to the contract by change order.  Braswell's explanations 
and disputes with respect to various specific incidents and aspects of 
these problems do not call into question the reasonableness of the 
agency's assessment that Braswell's performance was seriously flawed.

The record also does not support Braswell's contention that SUPSHIP 
Jacksonville did not take into consideration its proposed corrective 
action to alleviate some of the concerns in the USS MOOSBRUGGER 
evaluation.  On the contrary, the agency reviewed and considered 
Braswell's proposed corrective action in assessing Braswell's risk of 
successful performance and as a result changed its risk of failure 
from significant to moderate with respect to quality of product or 
service.    Although Braswell offers explanations and interpretations 
of the record that provide a more favorable picture of Braswell's 
performance on the USS MOOSBRUGGER than the agency's, this does not 
alter the fact that there was sufficient evidence for the agency to 
conclude that the firm had a series of substantial performance 
problems under the prior contract, which warranted a negative past 
performance assessment.  

With respect to Braswell's contention that its list of other contracts 
was not properly considered in the past performance evaluation, there 
is no legal requirement that all references listed in a proposal be 
checked.  Questech, Inc., B-236028, Nov. 1, 1989, 89-2 CPD  para.  407 at 3.  
Even presuming that Braswell's listed references would have reported 
favorably on Braswell's performance, the agency was reasonably 
entitled to rely on its file record of the USS MOOSBRUGGER evaluation 
as providing the most relevant information for purposes of this 
procurement.

Braswell also argues that the Navy's evaluation of Earl's past 
performance was unreasonable and improper.  Specifically, Braswell 
objects that Earl's proposal failed to contain a list of prior ship 
repair work that it had, in fact, performed and of which the agency 
was aware.  

Earl's failure to list prior work in its proposal does not in itself 
call into question the propriety of the past performance evaluation, 
since the purpose of that list was to merely assist the agency in 
performing the past performance evaluation.  The solicitation language 
makes clear that a list provided by an offeror was intended only to 
supplement the agency information of record, which the agency planned 
to use as its primary source for past performance evaluation.  In 
fact, here, Earl's failure to provide past performance information 
could only have had a negative impact on its past performance 
evaluation.  As noted above, Earl received a satisfactory/neutral 
rating with a moderate risk of successful performance.  The record 
includes an affidavit from the Chief of the Contracts Office at 
SUPSHIP Portsmouth stating that he told the contracting officer at 
SUPSHIP Jacksonville that his office did not collect past performance 
data on contracts awarded prior to February 1, 1998, and that he did 
not have any written information other than miscellaneous quality 
assurance documents but "that both contractors did good work and would 
probably have received very good past performance ratings on completed 
ship repair packages."   Thus, had Earl identified that work in its 
proposal and been formally evaluated on it, as the protester appears 
to believe should have happened, Earl would apparently have received a 
higher rating than the satisfactory/neutral that it received for past 
performance.    

For the same reason, the record does not support the protester's 
contention that Earl should have received less than a satisfactory 
rating.  As explained above, SUPSHIP Jacksonville had no past 
performance data on Earl in-house and Earl did not submit a list of 
prior contracts.  The Navy believed that, in accordance with Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  15.608(a)(2)(iii) (June 1997), which 
provides that firms "lacking relevant past performance history shall 
receive a neutral evaluation for past performance," it was appropriate 
to rate Earl satisfactory with an overall risk of moderate.  The mere 
fact that an offeror does not list any previous contracts does not, by 
itself, warrant a neutral past performance evaluation where the agency 
is aware of such contracts.  Here, however, while the Navy was aware 
of work Earl was performing for SUPSHIP Portsmouth, the agency did not 
have past performance information on any completed contract of Earl's 
(which it believed was needed for purposes of an evaluation), and had 
only an oral statement regarding the ongoing work at SUPSHIP 
Portsmouth.  While having even limited past performance information 
would normally preclude assigning a neutral rating, here, as explained 
above, such a rating could only have been less advantageous to Earl 
than would an assessment based on the oral information provided by 
SUPSHIP Portsmouth.  Under these circumstances, the Navy's evaluation 
of Earl's past performance as satisfactory/neutral was not 
unjustifiably favorable.

Braswell also argues that, even assuming that Earl was entitled to a 
neutral rating, the agency improperly equated neutral with 
satisfactory, thus giving Earl a substantive rating which encompassed 
specific, positive attributes and no weaknesses.  We see no basis to 
question the agency's evaluation of Earl's proposal in this regard.  
[DELETED]:

     [DELETED]   

Based on the agency's definition of a satisfactory rating, we cannot 
say that it does not equate to a "neutral" rating.  Here, the Navy's 
definition of satisfactory generally reflects an average evaluation 
with no major strengths or weaknesses, and was thus the rating closest 
to a neutral assessment.  The agency reasonably equated a lack of past 
performance information with a past performance history that was 
neutral, in the sense that it was neither positive nor negative.  See 
Oceaneering Int'l, Inc., B-278126, B-278126.2, Dec. 31, 1997, 98-1 CPD  para.  
133 at 7.  Indeed, while the agency reasonably evaluated Earl's past 
performance as essentially neutral because of a lack of enough 
information for a full evaluation, the limited information that was 
available for Earl may have warranted a more favorable evaluation.  In 
either instance, Braswell was not adversely impacted by the 
evaluation.  

SELECTION DECISION

In its initial protest, Braswell argued that the Navy's best value 
determination was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion, and not in 
accordance with the Navy's SSP, because even with an "unsatisfactory" 
past performance rating, Braswell's price was so far below that of the 
awardee that it was entitled to award.  Braswell refined this argument 
to the position that the best value decision was flawed because it is 
based on an irrational and arbitrary past performance evaluation of 
Braswell and the awardee.  As explained above, we find unobjectionable 
the agency's past performance evaluation of both offerors.  In a best 
value procurement, price is not necessarily controlling in determining 
the offer that represents the best value to the government.  Rather, 
that determination is made on the basis of whatever evaluation factors 
are set forth in the solicitation, with the source selection official 
often required to make a price/technical tradeoff to determine if one 
proposal's technical superiority is worth the higher cost that may be 
associated with that proposal.  In this regard, price/past performance 
tradeoffs are permitted when such tradeoffs are consistent with the 
solicitation's evaluation scheme.  USA Elecs., B-275389, Feb. 14, 
1997, 97-1 CPD  para.  75 at 3.  Where, as here, an RFP identifies past 
performance and price as the evaluation criteria, proposals must be 
evaluated on that basis, and ultimately the selection official may 
have to decide whether a higher-priced proposal submitted by an 
offeror with a better past performance rating represents the best 
value to the government.  Id.

Here, the Navy reasonably determined that the difference in price 
between the two proposals was less significant than the concerns over 
Braswell's unsatisfactory past performance record.   See H.F. 
Henderson Indus., B-275017, Jan. 17, 1997, 97-1 CPD  para.  27 at 2-3.  
Accordingly, we see nothing improper in the source selection decision.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States

1. A "RAV" is a short, labor-intensive repair effort or "availability" 
for the accomplishment of specific items of work while the ship is in 
its homeport and rendered incapable of performing its assigned mission 
and tasks.  

2. Braswell maintains an agreement for boat repair (ABR), not an MSRA, 
but is permitted to compete for MSRA-restricted work based on a prior 
settlement agreement with the agency.