BNUMBER: B-278651
DATE: February 23, 1998
TITLE: Compro Computer Services, Inc., B-278651, February 23, 1998
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Matter of:Compro Computer Services, Inc.
File: B-278651
Date:February 23, 1998
Cyrus E. Phillips, IV, Esq., and Christopher H. Jensen, Esq.,
Kilcullen, Wilson and Kilcullen, for the protester.
Joshua Kranzberg, Esq., and Maj. Harry W. Longbottom, JAGC, Department
of the Army, for the agency.
Paul E. Jordan, Esq., and Paul Lieberman, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Solicitation provisions requiring contractors to possess certain
expertise and experience in computer maintenance do not constitute
definitive responsibility criteria--since they do not set out
specific, objective standards for determining an offeror's capability
to perform--but are performance obligations considered under the
contracting officer's general responsibility determination.
DECISION
Compro Computer Services, Inc. protests the award of a contract to
MFSI under request for proposals (RFP) No. DAAD01-97-R-0013, issued by
the Department of the Army for maintenance and parts support of
computer workstations at the U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground. Compro
contends that MFSI's proposal should have been rejected because MFSI
does not meet certain alleged definitive responsibility criteria
contained in the solicitation.
We deny the protest.
The solicitation, as amended, contemplated award of a fixed-price
contract for a base year with 4 option years to provide preventive
maintenance services, on-call maintenance services, and parts exchange
services for 39 Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI) workstations. These
computers are used in Yuma's testing and data reduction requirements.
The successful contractor is required to provide all necessary parts
and personnel to perform the maintenance as required under the terms
of the statement of work (SOW).
Section 12 of the SOW, entitled "Contractor Requirements," contains
individual sections which read as follows:
C.12.1. This section specifies the minimum requirements which
must be met by the KTR [contractor]. The KTR shall give evidence
that these requirements shall be met, thus assuring . . . that
the KTR has the background, experience, and resources that the
Government considers necessary for successful performance of the
resulting contract.
C.12.2. Corporate Maintenance Expertise: The KTR shall have
reserve expertise available to maintenance personnel. This
expertise shall extend to cover all aspects of the electronic and
eletro-mechanical components and corresponding software which
comprise the [SGI] Systems. The KTR shall have established lines
of communication with this reserve so that consultation is
available by telephone, or if needed, by personnel from this
reserve, who are expert in the referenced areas, who may be
transported to the [Yuma] site, on a temporary basis, to aid in
the diagnosis of malfunction or other maintenance considerations
at no additional cost to the Government.
C.12.3. Maintenance Personnel: Maintenance personnel supplied
under the terms of this contract must be factory trained in
maintaining the [SGI] Systems specified . . . . Contractor shall
be required to authenticate factory training.
The RFP at Attachment 7 detailed the evaluation plan including sample
evaluation sheets, the composition of the evaluation team, and the
scoring methodology. Proposals were evaluated on the basis of three
areas, in descending order of importance: technical/management, past
performance, and price. The technical/management area was divided
into two factors: technical/management merit, and corporate expertise
and understanding work performance merit. Each of these was further
divided into four subfactors. The factors were rated on a color coded
basis: red, fails to meet requirements of the SOW; yellow, weak, but
may meet requirements through clarifications; blue, meets minimum
requirements; and green, significantly exceeds requirements. RFP,
Attachment 7. Award was to be made to the offeror whose
technical/management and price proposals, considered together with
past and present performance, represented the best buy to the
government.
Compro and MFSI were the only offerors to submit proposals by the June
30, 1997, closing date. After receipt of proposals, the agency
amended the RFP, substantially reducing the level of effort required
under the SOW, and requested revised price proposals. The results of
the evaluation on all factors were as follows:
Factor/Subfactor Compro MFSI
Technical/Management Merit
1-factory trained personnel/prior experienceGreenBlue
2-plan for obtaining spare/repair partsBlue Green
3-adequate procedure for obtaining ECOs/ FCOs of original equipment
manufacturer[1] Blue Blue
4-clear identification of any subcontracting/ ability to provide full
maintenance service Green Blue
Corporate Expertise/ Understanding Work Merit
1-corporate/personnel expertise and understanding of criticality of
maintenance Green Blue
2-organizational structure Blue Green
3-experience in like services/understanding of scope of workGreenBlue
4-personnel satisfy security requirementsGreenGreen
Past Performance Risk Assessment[2] NegligibleLow
Price $442,188 $128,580
Due to the disparity in pricing, the contracting officer was concerned
that the offerors misunderstood the reduced level of effort.
Accordingly, she issued amendment No. 0004, which included a revised
SOW and equipment history information. Subsequently, the contracting
officer requested best and final offers from both firms. Compro did
not change its price, but MFSI raised its price to $186,185.96.
In making her award determination, the contracting officer considered
that MFSI's proposal met and, in many areas, exceeded the solicitation
requirements. She also considered MFSI's significantly lower price
and low performance risk rating. While Compro's technical score was
higher than MFSI's, the contracting officer determined that this
technical superiority was not worth the approximately 230 percent
higher price proposed by Compro. Accordingly, she awarded the
contract to MFSI. Compro did not request a debriefing and filed a
protest with the agency. After receiving a denial of its agency-level
protest, Compro filed this protest with our Office.
Compro asserts that MFSI's proposal did not demonstrate its ability to
meet the "definitive responsibility criteria" identified in section
C.12 which require contractors to provide evidence that the stated
maintenance expertise and factory training requirements "shall be
met." In this regard, Compro alleges that without proof of
appropriate agreements with SGI, which it possesses but MFSI does not,
MFSI has not met, and cannot meet, these requirements.
Definitive responsibility criteria are specific and objective
standards, qualitative or quantitative, established by a contracting
agency in a solicitation to measure an offeror's ability to perform a
contract. In order to be a definitive responsibility criterion, the
solicitation provision must reasonably inform offerors that they must
demonstrate compliance with the standard as a precondition to
receiving award. AT&T Corp., B-260447.4, Mar. 4, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 200
at 5.
Here, the provisions pointed to by the protester are not sufficiently
specific to establish definitive responsibility criteria; rather, the
provisions essentially require in general terms that each offeror have
the appropriate expertise, lines of communication, and factory
training in order to successfully perform the contract requirements,
and that it provide sufficient evidence thereof. The cited provisions
do not specify any particular license requirements, years of required
experience, or the time when an offeror must obtain the necessary
expertise. Accordingly, these experience and training provisions
represent performance obligations, enforceable by the agency in its
administration of the contract. Southern Nevada Communications,
B-241534, Feb. 11, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 146 at 3. As such, these
provisions concern the general responsibility of the awardee and its
ability to perform the contract consistent with all legal
requirements. The agency found MFSI to be a responsible contractor,
and our Office will not review the agency's affirmative determination
of MFSI's responsibility under the circumstances here. 4 C.F.R. sec.
21.5(c) (1997).
Compro also argues that MFSI's proposal should have been rejected as
technically unacceptable because MFSI allegedly cannot supply required
technical publications, ECOs/FCOs, and peripheral change notices
released by SGI, since MFSI allegedly lacks the requisite agreements
with SGI. In Compro's view, the only acceptable offeror is one, like
itself, which possesses SGI Channel Partner and ServicePro agreements,
which provide access to the necessary publications and expertise of
senior SGI engineers.
Contrary to Compro's position, nothing in the RFP requires a specific
agreement with SGI.[3] The RFP requires the contractor to provide a
technical publication, containing programming guides and tips,
technical articles, and answers to common questions. SOW at C.2.3.
Section C.2.6.2 requires the contractor to provide all services and
functions required to keep the systems current with the latest
hardware, software diagnostics and documentation, including purchasing
and incorporating the manufacturer's ECOs, FCOs, and peripheral
changes. Section C.2.6.4 makes the contractor responsible for
furnishing the government with ECO and FCO documentation and to make
the necessary corrections or substitutions of equipment schematics and
spare parts inventories.
As the agency observes, and the record reflects, MFSI's proposal
provides sufficient evidence of its ability to meet all contract
requirements. In this regard, MFSI's proposal states that it
subscribes to the update services of original equipment manufacturers,
has a contractual relationship with Great Eastern Technology, has
certificates showing factory training for its proposed technicians,
and evidence of its past performance of an SGI equipment maintenance
contract with the Navy. The agency has also submitted a letter from
SGI stating that "Great Eastern Technology of Woburn, MA is an
authorized reseller (VAD) [value added dealer] of SGI's products and
services." In view of MFSI's experience, expertise, and relationship
with Great Eastern, the agency reasonably concluded that MFSI's
proposal was technically acceptable, in accordance with the stated
evaluation criteria. Information Sys. & Networks Corp., 69 Comp. Gen.
284, 285 (1990), 90-1 CPD para. 203 at 3. Compro's mere disagreement with
the agency's judgment does not establish that the evaluation was
unreasonable. Medland Controls, Inc., B-255204, B-255204.3, Feb. 17,
1994, 94-1 CPD para. 260 at 3.[4]
The protest is denied.
Comptroller General
of the United States
1."ECO" refers to engineering change orders and "FCO" refers to field
change orders.
2. A "negligible" risk is "so small that it can be disregarded," while
a "low" risk means that "little doubt exists that the offeror will
successfully perform."
3. In this regard, the absence of any RFP reference to specific
agreements with SGI also serves to contradict Compro's position that
the RFP contained definitive responsibility criteria.
4. Our conclusion is not changed by a letter from an SGI "Sr. Division
Legal Counsel and Manager" who declined to make a declaration
concerning Great Eastern's status. While admitting that Great Eastern
has a current indirect reseller agreement with SGI, the counsel noted
in passing that Great Eastern did not have a ServicePro Agreement with
SGI and therefore was "not currently an authorized service provider
for SGI equipment." As noted above, the RFP simply does not require
contractors to possess any specific SGI agreements in order to perform
the contract. Whether MFSI is ultimately capable of performing the
contract is a matter of the agency's affirmative determination of
responsibility, a matter which we will not review under the
circumstances presented here. 4 C.F.R. sec. 21.5(c).