TITLE:  Apex Marine Ship Management Company, LLC; American V-Ships, B-278276.25; B-278276.28, September 25, 2000
BNUMBER:  B-278276.25; B-278276.28
DATE:  September 25, 2000
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Apex Marine Ship Management Company, LLC; American V-Ships, B-278276.25;
B-278276.28, September 25, 2000

Decision

Matter of: Apex Marine Ship Management Company, LLC; American V-Ships
Marine, Ltd.

File: B-278276.25; B-278276.28

Date: September 25, 2000

Marc J. Fink, Esq., Anne E. Mickey, Esq., and Heather M. Spring, Esq., Sher
& Blackwell, for Apex Marine Ship Management Co., LLC; and Eric J. Marcotte,
Esq., Robert A. Mangrum, Esq., Scott A. Schipma, Esq., Paul S. Ebert, Esq.,
and Adam B. Walker, Esq., Winston & Strawn, for American V-Ships Marine,
Ltd., the protesters.

Kevin M. Kordziel, Esq., Laura K. Kennedy, Esq., and David A. Leib, Esq.,
Jenner & Block, for American Overseas Marine Corporation; Robert G. Fryling,
Esq., and Edward J. Hoffman, Esq., Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, for
Keystone Shipping Services, Inc.; Bradley Gilman, Esq., and Carl Winner,
Esq., Robertson, Monagle & Eastaugh, for Ocean Duchess, Inc.; Timothy F.
Noelker, Esq., Michael G. Roberts, Esq., Linda L. Shapiro, Esq., and Steven
E. Kellogg, Esq., Thompson Coburn, for Crowley Liner Services, Inc.,
intervenors.

Janis P. Rodriguez, Esq., Michael Rose, Esq., and J. Patrick Wiese, Esq.,
Maritime Administration, Department of Transportation, for the agency.

Paul E. Jordan, Esq., Glenn G. Wolcott, Esq., and Paul Lieberman, Esq.,
Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the
decision.

DIGEST

1. Agency's comprehensive technical evaluation report, which summarizes
individual evaluators' comments and assessments and explains the evaluated
strengths of each proposal on a factor-by-factor basis, provides an adequate
basis for GAO to review the agency's evaluation and determine that it was
not arbitrary.

2. Where proposals are considered acceptable and within the competitive
range, the agency is not obligated to discuss every aspect of a proposal
that receives less than the maximum score; here, agency satisfied its
obligation to provide meaningful discussions.

3. Price/technical tradeoffs in best value determination, based on combined
technical/risk scores, evaluators' recommendations, limits to numbers of
awards, and economy of scale pricing are reasonably supported by the record
as a whole, which includes comments of evaluators and reasoning of selection
board, as verified by consideration of a price-per-technical-point
calculation.

DECISION

Apex Marine Ship Management Company, LLC, and American V-Ships Marine Ltd.,
protest the award of contracts to other offerors under request for proposals
(RFP) No. DTMA91-97-R-00002, issued by the Maritime Administration (MARAD),
Department of Transportation, for the operation and maintenance of ships in
the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). [1] The protesters assert that the agency
improperly evaluated technical/management proposals, failed to conduct
meaningful discussions, and failed to make a proper best value
determination.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

This procurement has a long and tortured history. The solicitation was first
issued in August 1997, and has now been amended 32 times; as amended, it
seeks proposals for the operation and management of 74 RRF vessels. [2] The
RFP contemplated award of multiple fixed-price contracts, with certain
cost-reimbursable line items, at an estimated total cost in excess of $1
billion during a 5-year performance period. Each of the ships is to be
maintained within a designated readiness status, as specified by the
Department of Defense (DOD), which ranges from 4 to 30 days.

Twenty-three offerors submitted initial proposals by the original October
1997 closing date; eighteen proposals were included in the competitive
range. [3] In June 1998, the agency announced contract awards to 10
offerors. After various protests were filed, the agency determined that
errors had been made in the source selection process. As a result of this
determination, the agency rescinded the contract awards and reopened
discussions with the competitive range offerors. [4]

As part of its corrective action, the agency issued RFP amendment No. 0012,
which reflected various revisions and clarifications regarding the proposal
evaluation process. Among other things, section M of the RFP, as amended,
advised offerors as follows:

Technical/Management proposals will be evaluated quantitatively under
Technical/Management Evaluation Factors for understanding and compliance
with the requirements. Proposals will also be evaluated to assess the risks
associated with the offeror's proposed approach and the degree to which the
offeror's past performance on other relevant contracts provides the
Government with confidence that the offeror will accomplish the requirements
of the current solicitation for the proposed ship groups.

. . . . .

The evaluation factors and subfactors are listed in descending order of
importance, in other words, the most important factor is listed first, and
the least important factor is listed last. Factor A [past performance and
technical experience] is twice as important as Factors B [purchasing, cost
controls, and accounting] or C [management organization], which are of
relatively equal importance.[ [5]]

RFP sect.sect. M.3.1, M.3.2.

The technical/management evaluation factors and subfactors correspond to
RFP sect. L.10.4, which identifies various types of information offerors were
required to provide, and represent a total of 37 evaluation areas under
which proposals were evaluated.

Offerors were required to submit electronic price proposals with fully
burdened per diem prices for all ship groups on which they were proposing,
and were permitted to propose economies of scale (EOS) expressed in terms of
per diem discounts for each additional ship awarded in excess of three
vessels. Offerors were advised that prices would be evaluated on the basis
of the "notional schedule," [6] and would also be evaluated for
reasonableness and realism. RFP sect. M.4.1.

The RFP also advised offerors of certain limitations on how contracts would
be awarded. For example, the RFP stated that no offeror would be awarded
contracts for more than 12 ships, and that within the 12-ship limitation,
the agency would make a determination regarding the maximum number of ships
for which each offeror would be considered, based on each offeror's combined
technical/management and risk scores. RFP sect.sect. M.6.1, M.6.2. Offerors were
advised that non-price factors were more important than price, and that
multiple awards would be made on the basis of the agency's determination
regarding which proposals represented the best overall value to the
government.

Following various other legal challenges, [7] the agency reopened
discussions with all offerors in the competitive range on November 23, 1999.
Revised technical and price proposals were submitted in January 2000 and,
thereafter, the agency conducted another round of discussions with offerors
during February and March 2000. Final revised proposals were submitted on
March 24, 2000.

Throughout this procurement, the offerors' technical/management proposals,
and revisions, were evaluated by a technical evaluation team (TET) comprised
of six voting members, one of whom functioned as the chair. Each TET member
individually evaluated each proposal, assigning separate technical and risk
scores in each of the 37 evaluation areas. [8] Evaluators were required to
provide narrative explanations regarding "extreme" scores--that is,
technical/management scores of 0, 1, or 5 and risk scores of 0 or 5--and
permitted, but not required, to provide supporting comments for scores that
were other than "extreme." Revised [Source] Selection Plan (RSP) sect. 5.7.9.
Accordingly, the individual evaluators' worksheets contained individual
technical scores of 2, 3, or 4 and risk scores of 2 or 4 that were not
specifically supported by narrative explanations other than the definitions
contained in the source selection plan. The evaluators' scores were
aggregated and averaged in each evaluation area and, following the final
evaluation, the offerors' total scores reflecting the technical/management
and risk assessments were as follows:

 Offeror  Tech/Mgt.   Risk       Combined
 [9]      Score       Score      Score

 KEY      447         94         353

 IUM      438         114        324

 MTL      418         133        285

 MOR      391         126        265

 CLS      416         156        260

 AOM      415         165        250

 Off. 7   [deleted]   [deleted]  240

 Apex     388         148        240

 PCS      404         168        236

 PGM      395         160        235

 V-Ships  380         153        227

 Off. 12  [deleted]   [deleted]  171

 Off. 13  [deleted]   [deleted]  169

 Off. 14  [deleted]   [deleted]  133

 ODI      348         223        125

 Off. 16  [deleted]   [deleted]  80

 Off. 17  [deleted]   [deleted]  51

 Off. 18  [deleted]   [deleted]  4

Contracting Officer's Statement at 7.

The evaluators' scores and supporting comments were provided to the TET
Chair, who incorporated them into a comprehensive TET report in which the
evaluation of each offeror's proposal was comprehensively summarized.
Specifically, the TET report, which was over 200 pages in length, contained
separate sections discussing each offeror's proposal with regard to each
evaluation factor and subfactor. Upon completion of the final TET report,
each evaluator reviewed and approved the report.

After completing the final technical/management evaluation, the agency
developed the following graphical depiction of the offerors' scores and
grouped the proposals to determine the number of ships for which each
offeror would be considered. As shown below, Apex and V-Ships were placed in
the group of offerors considered for possible award of 6 to 8 ships.

[Image]

Contracting Officer's Statement, Encl. (ii).

The TET report and proposal groupings were then sent to the source
evaluation board (SEB), which made source selection decisions by first
considering the proposals with the highest technical/management ratings and
determining whether the prices proposed for those highest ranked offerors
represented the best value to the government. In making these best value
determinations, the agency calculated a "price/technical value ratio" (PTVR)
by dividing each offeror's proposed prices for each ship group by its
combined technical score, essentially calculating a "price per technical
point" for each proposal. Apex's and V-Ships' proposed prices were generally
higher than the prices proposed by offerors with comparable
technical/management scores, and neither protester's proposal offered the
lowest price per technical point for any ship group on which it had
proposed. [10] Based on the agency's subjective evaluations, and after
considering the PTVR for each offeror, the agency made source selection
decisions resulting in the following awards: Keystone and IUM, 11 ships
each; MTL and MOR, 9 ships each; CLS, AOM, and PGM, 8 ships each; PCS, 6
ships; and ODI, 3 ships. These protests followed.

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, we recognize the complexity of this procurement and
the attendant complications encountered by the agency in conducting it.
Beginning in 1997 with 23 initial proposals, the agency conducted multiple
evaluations and discussions with 19 competitive range offerors before making
the original 39 awards (then encompassing 89 ships) to 10 offerors, which
necessitated making a substantial number of best value determinations. [11]
In taking corrective action to resolve other issues, the agency attempted to
simplify the proposal and evaluation process to make the procurement more
manageable while still being fair to all offerors. Even as "simplified," the
evaluation involved 18 offerors, a significant volume of electronic price
proposals and 25 awards encompassing 33 ship groups (74 individual ships),
necessitating dozens of alternative best value determinations. In view of
the complexities involved in this undertaking, in reviewing these protests
we have taken into account the agency's good faith efforts to conduct the
procurement in a fair and efficient manner while ensuring that the
government obtains the best overall value.

Technical/Management Evaluation

Apex and V-Ships first challenge the adequacy of the agency's evaluation of
technical/management proposals, complaining that the evaluation record does
not adequately explain the basis for rating their proposals lower than the
highest rated proposals. The record does not support the protesters'
contentions.

In reviewing protests against allegedly improper evaluations, our Office
will examine the record to determine whether the agency's determination was
reasonable and consistent with the evaluation criteria listed in the
solicitation, Hattal & Assocs., B-243357, B-243357.2, July 25, 1991, 91-2
CPD para.90 at 7, and an agency must document its judgments in sufficient detail
to show that they are not arbitrary. U.S. Defense Sys., Inc., B-245563, Jan.
17, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 89 at 3. The amount and detail of documentation
necessary to demonstrate that an agency's judgments were reasoned and
rational will vary from procurement to procurement, and there is no absolute
requirement that evaluation records must include narrative explanations for
every

score assigned. See Delta Dental Plan of Cal. v. Perry, 1996 WL 83881 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) at *15, citing Champion-Alliance, Inc., B-249504, Dec. 1, 1992,
92-2 CPD para. 386 at 6-7 (contemporaneous summary evaluation narrative and
post-protest amplification sufficient documentation).

Based on our review of the agency record, we see no basis to question the
adequacy of the documentation supporting the agency's evaluation of
technical/management proposals. As discussed above, the agency generated a
comprehensive evaluation record supporting the agency's evaluation of each
competitive range offeror's proposal. Specifically, the lengthy final TET
Report contains separate detailed discussions regarding each offeror's
proposal. Each evaluation summary contains an initial section discussing the
general strengths and weaknesses of the proposal overall, followed by a
narrative discussion of the offeror's proposal with regard to each factor
and subfactor established in section M of the RFP. For example, the section
in the TET report discussing Apex's proposal began by stating that, overall:

Apex Ship Management is an above average proposal. Apex addressed all
factors. All personnel qualified both in education and experience with
[deleted] in major departments (engineering, operations and procurement).
Apex has had experience on MARAD ships with good results.

TET Report at APX 2.

This summary was followed by nine pages of text in which the agency
discusses Apex's proposal under each individual evaluation factor and
subfactor. By way of example, in discussing Apex's proposal under evaluation
factor B, purchasing, cost controls and accounting, the TET report refers to
various aspects of Apex's proposal, noting "[deleted] in the contracting
staff" and referencing Apex's [deleted] of procedural compliance and sole
source procurements; describes Apex's accounting system; and discusses other
specific aspects of Apex's proposal in some detail, as follows:

[Deleted]

TET Report at APX 7.

Similarly, regarding the evaluation of Apex's proposal under evaluation
factor C, management organization, the TET report discusses the port
engineers Apex proposed; notes that Apex [deleted]; discusses the fact that
"Apex is sometimes late in submittal of some reports, however, the reports
are always of the highest quality"; discusses the organizational supervisory
responsibilities and chain of command for various positions, addresses the
qualifications of various personnel; and discusses Apex's "contingency
plan," its quality assurance system, the manner in which accidents and
hazardous situations are handled, and the involvement of Apex's [deleted] in
day-to-day activities. [12] TET Report at APX 8-11.

The TET Report similarly addresses the various evaluated aspects of V-Ships'
proposal, stating at the outset that "V[-S]hips [M]arine has been a ship
manager and general agent for MARAD for over 12 years thereby demonstrating
ship operation and maintenance experience. Proposal is well written and
addresses all factors. PPI supports claims of above average performance."
TET Report at AMV 3. As to the factor-by-factor evaluation, under evaluation
factor A, past performance and experience, the TET report acknowledges
various aspects of V-Ships' past performance, referring to a particular
incident involving vessel propeller damage, stating "nice operations
solution, not much on maintenance," and describes V-Ships' proposal with
regard to the corporate systems subfactor in part as "restatement of RFP."
Under evaluation factor B, purchasing, cost controls and accounting, the TET
report noted that V-Ships' proposal "[p]rovided policies on small business,
good controls . . . good detail"; discussed V-Ships' purchasing procedures;
referred to V-Ships' proposal of modern preventative maintenance programs
and computerized status reports; and noted that V-Ships had "[taken]
[deleted] steps[,] most of which were recommended by DCAA to improve [its]
accounting system," that V-Ships "[h]as added [deleted]," and finally that
"[d]uring proposal[,] V-Ships had trouble securing [deleted] due to
complaint by facility of previous [deleted] problems." TET Report at AMV
4-5.

Following the factor-by-factor discussion of each offeror's proposal, the
TET Report contained the individual evaluators' narrative supporting
comments for the "extreme" scores. Because Apex's proposal was rated higher
than a majority of the competitive range proposals, and V-Ships' proposal
was rated only slightly lower, the narrative support for both proposals'
"extreme" scores include multiple descriptions of evaluated strengths.
Nonetheless, the TET Report also documents multiple evaluated strengths for
those proposals that were rated higher than Apex's and V-Ships'. [13]
Overall, the agency concluded that the strengths of the proposals rated
higher than Apex's and V-Ships' were more significant and/or offered greater
value than the evaluated strengths in Apex's and V-Ships' proposals.

In sum, based on our review of the evaluation record as a whole, we find
that it adequately supports the differing technical evaluation of the
various proposals. See KMS Fusion, Inc., B-242529, May 8, 1991, 91-1 CPD para.
447 at 7. Apex's and V-Ships' mere disagreements with the agency's multiple
judgments do not render the evaluation unreasonable. BFI Waste Sys. of Neb.,
Inc., B-278223, Jan. 8, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 8 at 2.

In addition to the general complaint that the evaluation was flawed for lack
of adequate documentation, Apex identifies a specific portion of its
technical/ management proposal which it maintains the agency misevaluated.
In an amendment to its proposal submitted on January 5, 1998, Apex stated:

[W]e are also most pleased to note that [Apex] has recently been awarded the
management of [deleted] . . . . The addition of these vessels to our
commercial fleet represents a major amendment to our proposal. As required
by Section L.10.4.1.2 of the solicitation, we have set forth below the
pertinent details for these vessels: [deleted]

The addition of these [deleted] vessels will necessitate the [deleted] . . .
and will provide the Company with expanded "surge capability" with regard to
the operation of the MARAD fleet.

Agency Report, Tab D.2, at 8-9.

In fact, Apex had not been awarded contracts for these vessels and,
subsequently, the contracts were awarded to another company. In pursuing
this protest, Apex's president acknowledges that its January 1998 submission
was factually inaccurate, stating:

Early in this solicitation . . . Apex was in line for award of management
contracts for several [deleted] vessels. We thought this would be a benefit
to MARAD as the agency had in the past complained about Apex's lack of
commercial ships as limiting our surge. Ultimately, however, Apex was not
awarded the [deleted] ships. They were instead awarded to [another company]
in 1998. This was a major issue at MARAD and was common knowledge in the
industry at the time.

. . . . .

[W]e did not consider it necessary to submit written notice of the change.

Affidavit of Apex President, July 19, 2000, para.para. 2, 4.

Not only did Apex "not consider it necessary to submit written notice of the
change," Apex's final proposal revision, submitted in January 2000,
specifically referenced RFP section L.10.4.1.2 (the RFP section that was
amended by the "award" of the [deleted] vessels) and affirmatively advised
the agency that "[t]his section remains as submitted in our amended
technical proposal." Apex Conformed Technical Proposal, Jan. 12, 2000, at 4.

Contrary to Apex's expectation that its factual misrepresentation regarding
"award" of the [deleted] vessels would enhance the agency's evaluation of
its proposal, the TET report states, at APX 3:

While the addition of [deleted] vessels on the commercial side gives
Government greater availability of off crews for surge, it also means
Government will compete for Apex's attention with commercial (profit making)
vessels. This is considered moderate but acceptable risk.

Apex now complains that the agency's risk assessment was improper because it
reflected the agency's consideration of "incorrect, improper and outdated
information." [14] Apex Comments on Agency Report, June 30, 2000, at 7. Apex
asserts that the agency's reliance on Apex's misrepresentation regarding
award of contracts for the [deleted] vessels--an inaccuracy that Apex "did
not consider necessary" to correct--constitutes a material flaw in the
procurement process which should provide a basis for sustaining Apex's
protest. Apex knew the information to be inaccurate at the time it was
submitted, but now complains it should not have been considered because it
was "incorrect." We find frivolous Apex's assertion that the procurement was
materially flawed because of the agency's consideration of the information
Apex itself provided in its proposal.

Grouping of Proposals

Apex next protests that the agency's determination regarding the number of
ships for which Apex would be considered was arbitrary and irrational,
asserting that it was unreasonable for the agency to have included Apex in
the group of offerors considered for 6 to 8 ships rather than in the group
of offerors considered for 8 to 10 ships. We disagree.

The record shows that the offerors were specifically advised that the agency
would make a determination regarding the number of ships for which each
offeror would be considered, and that this determination would be based on
the relative technical ranking of their proposals, along with the agency's
desire to distribute ships among a reasonably large number of ship managers.
In this regard, RFP amend. 0013 stated:

Question: What factors will MARAD consider in determining the number of
ships it feels an offeror can handle?

Answer: The determination in [RFP sect.] M.6.2 [regarding the maximum number of
ships an offeror may receive] is not based on the number of ships MARAD
feels an offeror can handle.

. . . . .

[I]n order to meet the mission needs and distribute the ships among a
reasonably large number of ship managers possessing a wide range of
expertise, MARAD may award fewer than 12 ships to many offerors, and may
award as few as 2 ships to a successful offeror.

MARAD will determine the number of ships an offeror may receive based on the
offeror's combined technical/management and risk assessment scores. . . . On
the basis of the combined score, each offeror will be ranked in comparison
to all other offerors. MARAD will graphically compare the offerors' rankings
and look for natural breaks in the scores. . . . Depending on the scores,
there may be several groupings of offerors. The top grouping will be
targeted to receive the most ships, and the subsequent groups will be
targeted to receive fewer ships. The exact score needed for each group and
number of ships considered for each group cannot be predetermined as the
number of offerors in each group and the range of scores will affect the
determination.

RFP amend. 0013 at 3-4.

As shown in the graph above, consistent with the quoted RFP provision
concerning the application of "natural breaks," the agency identified clear
groupings of certain proposals; specifically, the proposals of KEY and IUM
(scores of 353 and 324) were within 11 points of each other; the proposals
of Offeror 12 and Offeror 13 (scores of 171 and 169) were within 2 points of
each other; the proposals of Offeror 14 and ODI (scores of 133 and 125) were
within 8 points of each other; the proposals of Offeror 16 and Offeror 17
(scores of 80 and 51) were within 29 points of each other; and Offeror 18's
proposal (score of 4) was in a group by itself. The agency states that
grouping the proposals of MTL, MOR, CLS, AOM, Offeror 7, APX, PCS, PGM and
V-Ships (with scores ranging from 285 to 227) was more problematic.
Ultimately, the agency divided these proposals into two groups, the first
one comprised of the four higher rated proposals (with scores ranging from
285 to 250), since they were within 35 points of each other, and the second,
lower rated group comprised of Apex's, V-Ships' and three other offerors'
proposals (with scores ranging from 240 to 227), since they were within 13
points of each other. Apex essentially argues that the agency was required
to include the Apex proposal in the group of higher rated offerors. We
disagree.

Had the agency included Apex in the higher group, it would have created a
group with a 45 point range between the highest and lowest rated offerors--a
larger range than existed in any other group. Further, because there was a
second proposal (Offeror 7's) with the same score as Apex's, the agency
would have been required to include that proposal in the group as well,
creating a group comprised of six, rather than four proposals, all of which
would have been considered for award of 8 to 10 ships. In light of the
agency's stated desire to distribute the contracts among a reasonably large
number of offerors, as well as its statements that the grouping would be
based on the relative ranking of proposals and the number of proposals in
each group, we do not find arbitrary or unreasonable the agency's inclusion
of Apex's proposal with the group of lower rated proposals--all of which
were within 13 points of each other.

Weighting of Evaluation Factors

Apex and V-Ships next complain that the agency's evaluation of technical/
management proposals failed to comply with the RFP provisions regarding the
relative importance of the evaluation factors. Specifically, the protesters
refer to the following three provisions in RFP section M, wherein offerors
were advised that: "[t]he evaluation factors and subfactors are listed in
descending order of importance," RFP sect. M.3.2; "[f]actor A is twice as
important as [f]actors B or C," RFP sect. M.3.2; and "[a]ll subfactors [under
factor C] are approximately equal." RFP sect. M.3.2.3.

After reviewing the agency report, the protesters point out that the agency
accorded 49 points to factor A, 26 points to factor B, and 31 points to
factor C, arguing that this is inconsistent with the RFP provision that
factor A would be twice as important as factor C. Further, the protesters
note that the agency accorded from 15 to 0.5 points to the eight subfactors
established under factor C, arguing that this is inconsistent with the RFP
provision that these subfactors would be "approximately equal." [15]

The agency acknowledges that "the weighting used was not in exact
conformance with the statement of the weights in [RFP] Section M."
Supplemental Agency Report at 3. Nonetheless, the agency maintains that
neither protester was prejudiced by the agency's failure to follow the
arguably conflicting RFP provisions. We agree.

After reviewing the agency report, Apex submitted an alternative weighting
system which is generally consistent with the RFP provisions that factor A
be approximately twice as important as factor C and that the factor C
subfactors be approximately equal, yet in descending order of importance.
[16] Apex maintains that, if the evaluation factors had been properly
weighted under this alternative system, its score would have increased by
"approximately 10 to 11 points," which would have led to inclusion of Apex's
proposal in the group considered for 8 to 10 ships and, therefore, its
earlier consideration in the source selection process. [17] Apex's
Post-Hearing Comments at 8.

The agency has shown that, even if the proposals had been evaluated under an
alternative weighting system which is clearly consistent with the RFP
provisions, [18] neither of the protesters' proposals would have offered the
lowest price per technical point for any ship group and, therefore, that the
source selection decisions would not have been affected. We have reviewed
the record in this regard and find the agency's conclusions reasonable.
Accordingly, we decline to sustain the protests on the basis of the
protesters' assertions that the evaluation factor weights applied by the
agency were not precisely as stated in the RFP.

Meaningful Discussions

Apex and V-Ships next assert that the agency failed to conduct meaningful
discussions regarding the agency's evaluation of technical/management
factors. We disagree.

Agencies are required to conduct meaningful discussions with all competitive
range offerors. Stone & Webster Eng'g. Corp., B-255286.2, Apr. 12, 1994,
94-1 CPD para. 306 at 10-11. In order for discussions to be meaningful,
contracting officials must advise offerors of deficiencies in their
proposals and afford offerors an opportunity to revise their proposals to
satisfy the government's requirements. Id.; FAR sect.sect. 15.610(c)(2), (5). [19]
This does not mean that offerors are entitled to all-encompassing
discussions. Agencies are only required to lead offerors into areas of their
proposals that require amplification. Caldwell Consulting Assocs., B-242767,
B-242767.2, June 5, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 530 at 10.

Apex and V-Ships first maintain that the agency was required to conduct
discussions regarding any of the 37 evaluation areas in which any individual
evaluator gave their technical/management proposals a numerical score of 2.
[20] We disagree.

Here, the individual evaluators' scores did not represent the final scores
under any of the evaluation criteria. Rather, the final score in each
evaluation area was obtained by aggregating and averaging the six individual
evaluators' separate assessments. Neither of the protesters' proposals
received aggregated/averaged scores of 2 in any evaluation area and, in
fact, their final ratings for each evaluation area exceeded a score of 3 in
all instances. Accordingly, we find no merit in this aspect of the protests.

The protesters next maintain that the agency should have conducted
discussions in any area in which a proposal received an aggregated/averaged
score of 3. [21] In short, the protesters maintain that they should have
been offered an opportunity to improve their proposals in any area in which
their proposals, despite being rated "good" and as having "address[ed] a
factor completely," were also perceived as reflecting "unevenness." [22]

Where, as here, a proposal is considered acceptable and within the
competitive range, the agency is not obligated to discuss every aspect of
the proposal that receives less than the maximum score. Caldwell Consulting
Assocs., supra. Based on our review of the record here, we do not consider
scores of 3, that is, ratings of "good," to represent material weaknesses in
an offeror's proposal. Thus, the agency was not required to conduct
discussions in those areas. TRW, Inc., B-243450.2, Aug. 16, 1991, 91-2 CPD
para. 160 at 9.

Our conclusion is not changed by the TET chair's testimony that it was
"correct" that if an offeror "cleaned up these significant areas of
unevenness, [it] could materially improve [its] proposal." Tr. at 160. We
agree with this common sense notion that if every matter which keeps a
"good" proposal from receiving an "excellent" score is identified for an
offeror, it could improve its score. However, the TET chair's testimony in
this regard does not alter the standard our Office will apply to this
matter. As V-Ships recognizes in its post-hearing comments, an agency is not
required to "spoon-feed" an offeror as to each and every item that could be
raised to improve its proposal. Du & Assocs., Inc., B-280283.3, Dec. 22,
1998, 98-2 CPD para. 156 at 7-8.

V-Ships next contends, more specifically, that the agency failed to provide
complete discussions with regard to its evaluation under the "vessel
management" subfactor of evaluation factor C. With regard to V-Ships'
conformed proposal, the agency provided V-Ships with the following comments
during discussions:

Conformed document was hard to follow. New te[x]t was difficult to
distinguish from original. When new text was provided it was often general
in nature, for example, what does "[V-Ships] enhanced its control of the
technical aspects of its Management philosophy by subscribing to modern
preventative Maintenance programs and [deleted] classification status
Reports." mean?

Agency Report, AVS Tab D.10, at 2.

After explaining the meaning of the questioned aspect, the agency advised
V-Ships to address it in its next proposal submission. Id. The protester
observes that it addressed the one example identified by the agency in its
final revised proposal and that it received credit for its response. Tr. at
45-46, 121. Nonetheless, V-Ships complains that the agency should have
advised it of other specific areas that were considered to be "too general,"
so that V-Ships could have improved its score still more.

While it is true that the protester could have attempted to improve its
proposal with additional explanation, we believe the agency's discussions
were meaningful as provided. The agency identified the one area as an
example. By providing the protester with its view that there were overall
problems with the conformed proposal, the agency led it into the area which
V-Ships needed to improve its proposal. See Caldwell Consulting Assocs.,
supra. V-Ships was certainly aware of what aspects of its conformed proposal
represented "new text" and could review for itself those aspects which were
"general in nature." As such, it should have been capable of addressing
those matters in hopes of increasing its score without additional specific
rewriting guidance from the agency.

Apex also protests that the agency's discussions were less than meaningful
with regard to Apex's proposed prices. Apex complains that, although the
agency advised Apex during discussions in February 1999 that its prices were
so high as to be potentially non-competitive, the agency failed to repeat
this advice during final discussions in March 2000.

Although an agency must advise a competitive range offeror of weaknesses,
excesses, or deficiencies in its proposal, correction of which would be
necessary for the offeror to have a reasonable chance of being selected for
award, an agency has no obligation to tell an offeror that its price is
high, relative to other offerors, unless the government believes the price
is unreasonable. State Management Servs., Inc.; Madison Servs., Inc.,
B-255528.6 et al., Jan. 18, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 25 at 5-6; Marwais Steel Co.,
B-254242.2, B-254242.3, May 3, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 291 at 6.

Here, as Apex acknowledges, the agency advised Apex during discussions in
February 1999 that its prices were potentially non-competitive and that, in
response, Apex lowered its prices somewhat. During final discussions in
March 2000, the contracting officer states that she did not view Apex's
proposed prices as being unreasonably high, [23] and therefore did not,
again, specifically state that Apex's prices were so high as to be
potentially non-competitive. Nonetheless, the record does establish that the
contracting officer reminded Apex that other offerors might further lower
their prices with their final proposal submissions, which would render
Apex's prices relatively higher--thereby effectively advising Apex that it
might wish to consider further price reductions. In their final proposal
submissions following the March 2000 discussions, several offerors whose
prices had been higher than Apex's did, in fact, lower those prices--in
effect making Apex's proposed prices comparatively higher.

Based on our review of the record here, it is clear that, at the time final
discussions were conducted, the agency did not view Apex's proposed prices
as unreasonably high. Further, by reminding Apex that other offerors might
lower their prices with their final proposal submissions, the contracting
officer effectively suggested that Apex consider further price reductions of
its own. Finally, after final proposals were submitted, the agency still did
not consider Apex's prices to be unreasonably high; rather, it simply
concluded, upon consideration of Apex's and the other offerors'
technical/management ratings, that Apex's prices did not represent the best
value to the agency. [24] In sum, we find without merit Apex's assertion
that the agency's discussions were inadequate.

Best Value Determination

Finally, V-Ships contends that the agency's best value determinations were
flawed and not properly supported by the evaluation record. Specifically,
V-Ships argues that the SEB failed to identify which perceived technical
advantages justified payment of price premiums. [25] In this regard, V-Ships
notes that it offered lower prices on some ship groups that were ultimately
awarded to other offerors. [26]

In a negotiated procurement, the government is not required to make award to
the lowest-priced, technically acceptable offeror unless the RFP specifies
that price will be the determinative factor for award. General Servs. Eng'g,
Inc., B-245458, Jan. 9, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 44 at 9. Agency officials have
broad discretion in determining the manner and extent to which they will
make use of technical and price evaluation results. Price/technical
tradeoffs may be made; the extent to which one may be sacrificed for the
other is governed by the test of rationality and consistency with the
established evaluation factors. Id. Based on our review of the record,
including the TET report, the SEB's report to the SSO, the contracting
officer's statement, and testimony obtained at the GAO hearing, we conclude
that the record contains adequate support for the selection decisions. [27]

While the agency's source selection tradeoffs relied more heavily on the
proposals' numerical ratings and the agency's calculation of a PTVR than
V-Ships asserts is appropriate, we find the agency's actions reasonable.
Agencies are discouraged from relying on point scores alone; however, when
point scores are reasonable and supported by the record, an agency may use
the results of the scoring as indicative of whether evaluated technical
superiority is worth the associated cost premium. PCL/Am. Bridge,
B-254511.2, Feb. 24, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 142 at 5; see also General Offshore
Corp.-Riedel Co., a Joint Venture, B-271144.2, B-271144.3, July 2, 1996,
96-2 CPD para. 42 at 8. Where, as here, an agency is faced with evaluating a
significant number of proposals from offerors with wide and varied
experience, coupled with the need to make a substantial number of awards to
multiple contractors, an agency's reasonable attempts to simplify the source
selection process is not objectionable. See QualMed, Inc., B-257184.2, Jan.
27, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 94 at 7.

In making its award recommendations, the SEB began with the highest
scored/ranked offerors and worked downward, relying on the
technical/management ratings and prices proposed to determine the best mix
of vessels. Tr. at 202. At the GAO hearing, the SEB chair testified at
length regarding the bases for the SEB's determinations. By way of
background, the SEB chair pointed out that the ships being awarded are at
the "highest level of readiness that the [DOD] assigns any sealift asset,"
that the majority of the RRF fleet "are in the highest level of readiness,"
and that they represent a "critical aspect of [DOD's] ability to move cargo"
for overseas operations. Tr. at 179, 181-82. Accordingly, consistent with
the RFP provisions that technical/management considerations were more
important than price, the SEB gave first consideration to the higher ranked
proposals. Tr. at 227. With regard to limiting the number of ships to be
awarded any single offeror, the SEB considered the ability of offerors to
activate multiple ships on short notice. Tr. at 184-85. In making the
selections, the SEB also considered the TET report and the TET evaluators'
expertise in reviewing offerors' technical/ management proposals and risk,
vessel-type recommendations, and the strengths and weaknesses the TET report
identified. Tr. at 190.

Ultimately, the SEB considered multiple alternative award scenarios in
arriving at what it considered the overall best value determinations. Tr. at
203, 205. To verify and validate its selections, the SEB considered each
offeror's PTVR or "price per technical point." V-Ships proposal did not
offer the lowest PTVR for any ship group on which it proposed. On this
record, we see no basis to conclude that the source selection decisions are
unreasonable.

In a related argument, V-Ships contends that the agency should have
conducted a ship-by-ship best value determination, essentially comparing
every offeror against every other offeror that proposed on each ship group.
This aspect of the protest is untimely. The agency's intention to make award
selections as it did was part of a clearly disclosed evaluation scheme. In
this regard, RFP amendment No. 0012 advised offerors that the
technical/management and risk assessment score would result in a combined
score for each offeror. RFP sect. M.6.2. Further, during the August 7, 1998
conference with the offerors, the contracting officer answered the following
question:

[Question:] Please confirm that a best value determination will be made
which reflects the respective expertise and capabilities and experience
offerors have in managing ships of a particular class or type, included in
each offeror's bid and not just a generic technical ranking. [Answer:] The
specific technical experience to vessel type . . . is part of the best value
decision where we talked to the best mix of vessels and vessel types
commensurate with the offeror's technical and management proposal. We
understand that that expertise is important and that certainly will be taken
into consideration in the best value decision as stated here.

RFP amend. 0013, attach. A, at 65.

An agency representative then added, "But if this thing is indicating are we
going to have a separate best value for each class of ships or types of
ships, we're not." Id. An offeror then asked, "Will there be a different
technical rating or score?" Id. at 66. The contracting officer responded,
"No, because we are not requiring a separate technical proposal for each
class of ships. There will be one technical ranking." Id.

Clearly, this exchange between the agency and the offerors notified offerors
that each proposal would only receive a single, combined
technical/management and risk score and that, while offerors' experience
would be considered, there would be no separate best value determinations or
technical scores based on an offeror's particular experience relative to
each ship grouping. V-Ships' failure to raise this issue until after award
renders untimely its objection in this regard. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(a)(1) (2000).

The protests are denied. [28]

Anthony H. Gamboa

Acting General Counsel

Notes

1. The RRF is part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, which supports the
rapid deployment of U.S. military forces during national emergencies. The
RRF is specifically structured to transport military unit equipment during
initial surge for forces deploying anywhere in the world. RFP sect. C.1.1.1.

2. The solicitation divides the 74 ships into 33 ship groups based on
various factors including ship type. The ships for which services are sought
include what are referred to as tankers, barge carriers, break bulks and
roll-on roll-offs.

3. The proposal of another offeror was also initially included in the
competitive range, but that offeror subsequently withdrew its proposal.

4. Based on the agency's corrective action, we dismissed the protests as
academic. Thereafter, several awardees protested the agency's rescission
action. We denied those protests because we concluded that the agency's
corrective action was reasonable. Patriot Contract Servs., LLC et al.,
B-278276.11 et al., Sept. 22, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 77.

5. Section M of the RFP also identified various subfactors under the three
primary factors.

6. The "notional schedule" included specified numbers of days in a year that
a ship could be in a particular readiness status. It was designed to allow
the agency to normalize per diem rates for all phases over a 365-day period.
RFP sect. M.4.2.

7. In March 1999, an offeror filed another protest with this Office which
was subsequently withdrawn and refiled at the United States Court of Federal
Claims. That court determined that the protest was a maritime matter over
which it did not have jurisdiction, and the case was transferred to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Subsequently, the
matter was withdrawn. In April 1999, a maritime union filed suit against
MARAD challenging a solicitation provision relating to the Service Contract
Act, which affected the wages and fringe benefits that would be provided
under the contracts. On October 14, 1999, the court rendered a decision in
favor of the union, enjoining MARAD from awarding any contracts under the
solicitation. On November 23, 1999, MARAD issued RFP amendment No. 0027,
which incorporated provisions implementing the court order, and reopened
discussions with all competitive range offerors. Contracting Officer's
Statement at 4-5.

8. Each TET evaluator assigned technical scores from 0 to 5, which
corresponded to adjectival ratings that were defined in the agency's source
selection plan. For example, a technical/management rating of "5"
corresponded to "outstanding," and was defined as reflecting a proposal
that: "Addresses a factor completely, and with more than enough original
detail as to be convincing, leaving no doubt as to the capability and
assurance of consistent high performance. Very comprehensive, in-depth,
clear response." RSP sect. 5.7.6. Additionally, evaluators assigned risk scores
of 0, 2, 4, or 5, which were also defined in the source selection plan. For
example, a risk rating of "0" corresponded with "exceptional," which was
defined as: "Little risk. Risk is considered minimal due to but not limited
to organizational structure, education and/or experience of personnel,
redundancy of personnel and/or the availability of resources. This includes
offerors whose PPI [past performance information] surpasses contractual
performance requirements in an exceptionally fine, reliable manner." RSP
sect. 5.7.8.

9. Legend for offeror abbreviations: Keystone (KEY); Interocean Ugland
Management Corp. (IUM); Marine Transport Lines, Inc. (MTL); Mormac Marine
Enterprises, Inc. (MOR); Crowley Liner Services (CLS); American Overseas
Marine Corp. (AOM); Patriot Contract Services, LLC (PCS); Pacific Gulf
Marine, Inc. (PGM); Ocean Duchess, Inc. (ODI). Offerors receiving no awards
who are not parties to this protest are designated as "Off."

10. Apex proposed on only [deleted] of the 33 ship groups. For [deleted]
groups, the ultimate awardee's proposal had both a higher
technical/management rating and a lower price. For the remaining [deleted]
groups, contracts were awarded on the basis of proposals with slightly lower
technical/management ratings and considerably lower prices, that is,
proposals that offered lower prices per technical point. Agency Report
(Apex) at 9-10. Similarly, V-Ships proposed on only [deleted] of the 33 ship
groups, and its proposal was both higher priced and lower rated in [deleted]
of those [deleted] groups. For the remaining ship groups, V-Ships' proposal
did not offer the lowest PTVR. Agency Report (V-Ships) at 13.

11. In this regard, though the evaluation employed computer review of
electronic price proposals, the agency estimated that the original scheme
was so complex that it would allow each offeror to submit up to 7 million
generic EOS proposals.

12. The record also reflects that Apex was specifically advised during
discussions that its proposal was poorly organized. Specifically the
agency's written discussion questions to Apex stated: "Throughout this
proposal, Apex chose to merge factors instead of specifically addressing
factors. This left it to the Government to decipher and give[ ] credit where
applicable. Each of the factors is touched somewhere, but not as a coherent
response. Makes evaluation a challenge." Agency Report, APX Tab D.1, at 1.
This point was reiterated by one of the evaluators that testified at the
hearing GAO conducted in connection with this protest. Hearing Transcript
(Tr.) at 316. In this regard, section M of the RFP specifically advised
offerors that "[e]valuation of an offeror's proposal shall be based on the
information presented in the proposal . . . . The quality of organization
and writing reflected in the proposal will be considered to be an indication
of the quality of organization and writing which would be prevalent in the
proposed deliverable data." RFP sect. M.7.6.

13. For example, under the "general corporate experience" subfactor (RFP
sect. L.10.4.1.1), the evaluation record supports Keystone's significantly
better technical and risk evaluations in comparison with V-Ships' proposal
evaluations. In this regard, all six evaluators found Keystone's proposal to
be exceptional with regard to risk and noted that its proposal "described
clear lines of authority between parent, affiliates, and offeror [and]
described a corporate history of maintenance and operation of a large number
of ocean going vessels of varied ship types and types of plants. Corporate
experience is lengthy with repeated service contracts. Outstanding tech with
many years in managing many ships contributing to low risk." TET Report at
KEY 11.

14. Apex asserts that it discussed its failure to receive the contract for
the [deleted] ships with various agency personnel. Affidavit of Apex
President para.para. 2, 3. At the GAO hearing, the identified personnel testified
that such discussions had not occurred, Tr. at 87-88, 355, and one of the
witnesses elaborated, stating, "had I heard of it [the loss of the contract
for the [deleted] ships], I would have had lots of questions." Tr. at 88.

15. The agency argues that this aspect of the protest is untimely since the
RFP was patently ambiguous regarding how the evaluation factors would be
applied. Specifically, the agency asserts that the RFP provision that
"evaluation factors and subfactors are listed in descending order of
importance" conflicts with the provision that "[factor C] subfactors are
approximately equal," and, therefore, that this patent ambiguity should have
been protested before the proposals were submitted. We need not resolve this
matter in light of our conclusion that, even accepting the assertion that
the proposals should have been evaluated in an alternative manner under
evaluation factor C, the source selection decisions would not have been
affected.

16. The alternative evaluation system established a total weight for factor
C that was approximately half the value the agency applied to factor A, and
established weights for the factor C subfactors that are very close, yet in
descending order.

17. In its post-hearing comments, V-Ships also proposed an alternative
weighting scheme under which it argued that its proposal's combined score
would be higher than two awardees' proposals.

18. The agency response properly rejects any changes to the evaluation
system other than those necessary to meet the RFP's stated provisions that
the primary evaluation factors be listed in descending order of importance,
that factor A would be twice as important as factor C, and that all factor C
subfactors be approximately equal but in descending order.

19. The RFP in this procurement was issued prior to the effective date of
the comprehensive rewrite of FAR Part 15 (FAC 97-02). Accordingly, the FAR
provisions in effect at that time are applicable to this procurement.

20. The agency's source selection plan provided that a numerical score of 2
corresponded with an adjectival rating of "Fair," further defining this
rating as: "Does not fully address factor, or does so with little original
detail so as to raise questions as to the ability of the offeror to fully
meet the requirements of the factor. Weaknesses remain, but are confined to
areas with minor impact on performance and are acceptable." RSP sect. 5.7.6.

21. The source selection plan established that a numerical rating of 3
corresponded with an adjectival rating of "good," further defining this
rating as: "Addresses a factor completely but with significant areas of
unevenness, which may impact performance." RSP sect. 5.7.6.

22. V-Ships argues that the language regarding "unevenness" effectively
makes this rating a negative score. We disagree. When all evaluation
definitions are read together, it is plain that the differences were simply
intended to address varying levels of offeror competence and the
"unevenness" reference, in context, was not intended to indicate a material
weakness.

23. Less than a third of the prices proposed by Apex were in the upper third
of the prices proposed.

24. Apex complains that "[the agency] knew that Apex's price competitiveness
would be substantially affected by its low ranking score. Nevertheless it
did not advise Apex that this might be a problem." Supplemental Protest at
11. Based on this assertion, Apex appears to be suggesting that the agency
had a differing obligation regarding price discussions with each offeror,
depending on each offeror's relative technical/ management rating. We do not
believe the agency had any such differing obligation.

25. The source selection official (SSO) states that he relied on the
recommendations of the SEB in making the source selection decisions.
Declaration of SSO, July 19, 2000. Because the SSO relied on the expertise
of the evaluators, SEAIR Transport Servs., Inc., B-274162, Nov. 25, 1996,
96-2 CPD para. 198 at 2, our review of the best value determinations is based on
adequacy of the documentation and reasonableness of the SEB recommendations.

26. As noted above, V-Ships proposed on only [deleted] of the 33 ship
groups, and its proposal was both higher priced and lower technically rated
for [deleted] of these [deleted] groups, eliminating any need for
cost/technical tradeoffs regarding those groups. With regard to the
remaining groups, the record supports the reasonableness of the agency's
tradeoff determinations.

27. V-Ships argues that we should ascribe little weight to the contracting
officer's statement because it was prepared in response to the protest. We
disagree. The SEB chair testified that the discussion of the SEB's
selections in the contracting officer's statement accurately reflected the
agency's decisions. Tr. at 209. In this regard, the contracting officer was
a voting member of the SEB and attended all of its sessions. Tr. at 173,
224-25. Since the contracting officer had personal knowledge of the
information regarding selection decisions and recounted decisions made at
the time of the selections, her statement has probative value in our review
of the adequacy of those decisions.

28. Both Apex's and V-Ships' protests refer to various additional issues, or
present alternative arguments, which this decision does not directly
address. We have considered all of the issues and arguments raised and
conclude that none of them provides a basis to sustain either protest.