BNUMBER:  B-278168; B-278168.2 
DATE:  January 5, 1998
TITLE: Joint Threat Services, B-278168; B-278168.2, January 5, 1998
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Joint Threat Services

File:     B-278168; B-278168.2

Date:January 5, 1998

Stuart Young, Esq., DynCorp, for the protester.
William L. Walsh, Jr., Esq., J. Scott Hommer, III, Esq., and Wm. Craig 
Dubishar, Esq., Venable, Baetjer and Howard, LLP, for Research 
Analysis and Maintenance, Inc., an intervenor.
Craig E. Hodge, Esq., and Phillip A. Weaver, Esq., Department of the 
Army, for the agency.
Christine F. Davis, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of 
the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the 
decision.

DIGEST

1.  Agency reasonably downgraded the protester's management proposal 
and made an upward adjustment in determining the proposal's most 
probable cost, where the proposal did not demonstrate the protester's 
ability to perform the agency's requirements based upon a 
significantly reduced staff during the contract option years, during 
which the agency does not anticipate any significant reduction in its 
requirements.

2.  Agency was not required to discuss the protester's proposal to 
augment its staff with personnel from another contract, where the 
agency reasonably did not view this weakness as material until the 
protester proposed a significant staffing reduction in its best and 
final offer and increased its reliance upon this other contract's 
personnel to supplement its staff.

3.  The excellent rating accorded to the awardee's best and final 
offer did not improperly reflect the application of an unstated 
evaluation factor and was reasonably based upon numerous, uncontested 
proposal strengths, notwithstanding that the awardee's staffing levels 
were lower than the government estimate.

4.  Agency properly allowed the awardee to correct a clerical error in 
a cost proposal spreadsheet after the submission of best and final 
offers through clarifications, rather than discussions, where the 
existence of the mistake, and the amount actually intended, were clear 
from the face of the proposal, and the correction did not prejudice 
the interests of another offeror.

DECISION

Joint Threat Services (JTS), a joint venture,[1] protests an award to 
Research Analysis and Maintenance, Inc. (RAM) under request for 
proposals (RFP) No. DATM01-95-R-0020, issued by the U.S. Army Materiel 
Command, Operational Test and Evaluation Command Contracting Activity 
(OPTEC), for test support services for OPTEC's Threat Support Activity 
(OTSA).

We deny the protest.

The RFP, issued August 16, 1996, required the contractor to maintain 
current threat systems equipment and to support operational testing of 
the equipment, which encompassed transporting the equipment to the 
test site and operating and maintaining it until the test's 
completion.  To this end, the RFP called for an array of support 
services, including engineering and technical services, hardware and 
software maintenance services, flight and aviation support services, 
logistics and supply support services, and threat analysis and 
intelligence support services.

The RFP provided for the award of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for a 
base year with 4 option years on a best value basis.  The RFP sought 
separate proposals corresponding to four evaluation factors, listed in 
descending order of importance: technical, management, past 
performance, and cost (including options).  The RFP stated six 
technical subfactors of varying importance and four management 
subfactors of equal importance, as follows:

     Technical
        1.  Base Support
        2.  Threat Systems Support
        3.  Engineering and Technical Support
        4.  Training Support
        5.  Test Support
        6.  Threat Analysis and Intelligence Support
     
     Management
        1.  Management Approach
        2.  Resource Allocation
        3.  Project Experience, Expertise and Personnel
        4.  Logistics

Each technical and management subfactor contained two or more 
sub-subfactors. Proposals were to be evaluated under the technical and 
management factors with both numerical scores and adjectival ratings.

Proposed staffing was a component of both the technical and management 
evaluation.  Each technical subfactor provided for an evaluation of 
the offeror's understanding of the work to be performed, which 
encompassed consideration of the offeror's proposed staffing, and a 
few sub-subfactors were geared toward specific staffing concerns, such 
as the adequacy of the offeror's proposed engineering staff and mix.  
For the management evaluation, staffing concerns were encompassed by 
the Project Experience, Expertise and Personnel subfactor, which 
provided for a consideration of the offeror's "[a]bility to organize 
and allocate resources," the "[a]vailability of qualified personnel," 
"[p]ersonnel and staffing to include job qualifications," and 
"corporate and personnel experience to execute the requirements 
specified."

Various RFP enclosures (and an offeror's library) contained work load 
data upon which to estimate the government's requirements.  As 
relevant here, RFP enclosure 5 listed the tests performed for OTSA 
from 1992 to 1995.  This data reflected virtually continuous testing 
during that time frame, based upon an average 28 tests per year.  
Enclosure 8, on the other hand, showed OTSA's future test commitments 
based upon two schedules, dated March 6 and May 31, 1996, 
respectively.  The schedules were generated more than a year before 
the commencement of the contract base year (October 1, 1997, to 
September 30, 1998, as amended) and several years before the contract 
option years.  The schedules listed only the limited number of test 
commitments obtained by OTSA for the option years as of March 6 and 
May 31, 1996.  For example, neither schedule showed any test 
commitments during the final option year (October 1, 2001, to 
September 30, 2002, as amended).  The RFP referred offerors to 
enclosure 5 for "[h]istorical and projected workloads," and advised 
that enclosure 8 was "provided for information."

The RFP provided for a cost realism analysis and authorized the 
government to adjust offerors' proposed costs to reflect the 
government's estimate of the most probable cost (MPC) of performance.  
The RFP stated that the cost realism analysis would consider whether 
the costs proposed reflected the offeror's understanding of the 
requirement, were realistic in relation to the work to be performed, 
and were "consistent with the various elements of the technical and 
management proposals."  The RFP further warned that, "[a]ny 
inconsistency, whether real or apparent, between promised performance 
and cost should be explained in the proposal," and that failure to do 
so might justify the proposal's rejection.

On October 28, 1996, the agency received proposals from RAM and JTS.  
The proposals were referred to separate evaluation committees for each 
RFP factor, with the following results:

                     RAM                  JTS

Technical            89.27--Good          88.04--Good

Management           92.75--Excellent     76.25--Marginal

Combined             90.25--Excellent     84.75--Good

Performance Risk     Low Risk             Low Risk

Proposed Cost        $55 million          $57.04 million

Total MPC            $55.09 million       $57.54 million
In its initial proposal, RAM proposed a level staff of [deleted] 
full-time equivalent employees (FTE) per year, and JTS proposed a 
staff of [deleted] FTEs during the base year, [deleted] FTEs during 
the first option year, and [deleted] FTEs during the remaining option 
years.  JTS' base year staff included [deleted] pilots, which JTS 
proposed to augment during periods of simultaneous operations with 
[deleted] pilots stationed at Ft. Rucker, Alabama under a DynCorp 
contract.[2] 

The source selection evaluation board (SSEB), which summarized the 
findings of the technical committee and the management committee, 
criticized both proposals because they were understaffed in relation 
to the government estimate.  The SSEB also criticized JTS' offer to 
augment its pilot staff during simultaneous operations with Ft. Rucker 
pilots, who would require training to fly threat aircraft, thus 
creating a burdensome amount of work and adding to JTS' contract 
costs.  The SSEB recommended probable cost increases to redress 
perceived staffing weaknesses in JTS' and RAM's proposals, but this 
recommendation was not adopted by the source selection authority (SSA) 
in the initial cost evaluation.

On February 25, 1997, the SSA decided to eliminate JTS' proposal from 
the competitive range based upon the disparity in management ratings 
and the "expansive cost gap" between the two proposals.  In support of 
this decision, the SSA cited various weaknesses in JTS' management 
proposal, including an allegedly inadequate discussion of the RFP's 
physical security requirements "[a]lthough [physical security 
requirements were] not an evaluation subfactor in the . . . 
solicitation."  RAM's proposal, in contrast, was found to have 
provided a good discussion of the RFP physical security requirements.

JTS learned of its proposal's rejection on March 10 and filed an 
agency-level protest, arguing, among other things, that the rejection 
of its proposal based upon physical security considerations violated 
the RFP evaluation scheme, which did not state a criterion relating to 
physical security.  On April 1, OPTEC readmitted JTS' proposal to the 
competitive range.  The agency did not amend the evaluation scheme to 
encompass physical security considerations.

OPTEC conducted oral discussions with both offerors.  While the agency 
discussed certain staffing concerns with JTS, it did not discuss the 
protester's plan to augment its pilot staff with Ft. Rucker pilots.  
After oral discussions, the agency requested best and final offers 
(BAFO) by May 30.

Both offerors made staffing changes in their BAFOs, which contributed 
to a $5.44 million increase in RAM's BAFO costs and a $1.21 million 
decrease in JTS' BAFO costs.  RAM maintained a level staffing approach 
in its BAFO, but added [deleted] more FTEs per year in response to 
concerns raised during discussions, bringing RAM's proposed staff to 
[deleted] FTEs per year.  In contrast, JTS' BAFO altered the staffing 
approach used in its initial proposal, which offered relatively level 
staffing each contract year; JTS' BAFO cost proposal proposed a 
pronounced decline in staffing for the contract option years, offering 
[deleted] FTEs for the base year and [deleted] FTEs for the option 
years.

During the course of the protest proceedings, the individual 
responsible for JTS' initial and BAFO staffing proposals submitted an 
affidavit explaining the rationale for the change in JTS' BAFO.  
According to the affidavit, JTS, in its initial proposal, assumed that 
the option year test schedules appearing at RFP enclosure 8 "reflected 
the uncertainty of the operational test process" and were "not 
representative of the expected workload."  JTS therefore designed its 
initial proposal "to cover work levels similar to those experienced in 
the past as reflected by the data" provided generally in RFP enclosure 
5, which caused its proposal to "be significantly more expensive."  
After OPTEC eliminated JTS' proposal from the competitive range, 
citing the "expansive cost gap" that weakened its competitive 
standing, JTS assumed that its staffing levels were too high and that 
it should base its staffing approach "in response to the limited 
testing" shown in the option year test schedules appearing at 
enclosure 8.  JTS states that this assumption was corroborated during 
oral discussions when it asked if its staffing approach should account 
for a known requirement not listed in the enclosure 8 test schedule, 
but added by a recent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), to which the 
SSEB chairman allegedly replied, "You didn't see an MOU in the RFP did 
you?"  JTS concluded that the government desired a staffing approach 
based upon the limited testing shown in enclosure 8, which prompted 
JTS to propose a marked decline in its option years staff in its BAFO 
cost proposal.

The staffing cuts identified in the protester's BAFO cost proposal 
were never mentioned in its technical proposal and were only implied 
in its management proposal, notwithstanding that JTS' cost proposal 
promised "[a]n in-depth analysis of [the] reduction plan by 
department" in JTS' management proposal.  In the management and 
technical proposals, JTS included an organizational staffing chart 
that proposed [deleted] FTEs, without discriminating between the base 
and option years.  In the narrative portion of its management 
proposal, JTS alluded to the option year staffing cuts, as illustrated 
by the following passage entitled "Outyear Staffing":

     When there are no scheduled test or training support requirements 
     over an extended period, we will adjust airborne systems staffing 
     to the sustainment level of [deleted] personnel.[3]  To meet a 
     [deleted] person test requirement, we will draw on [deleted] 
     personnel from Fort Rucker ([deleted] pilots and [deleted] 
     aviation mechanics . . . ).  To meet a [deleted] person 
     requirement for simultaneous operations, we will draw on 
     [deleted] Fort Rucker personnel ([deleted] pilots and [deleted] 
     aviation mechanics . . . ). [4]

As indicated above, JTS' BAFO proposal altered its approach to the use 
of Ft. Rucker pilots.  In its initial proposal, JTS proposed to 
augment a [deleted]-person pilot staff with [deleted] Ft. Rucker 
pilots only during simultaneous operations, whereas JTS' BAFO proposed 
for the option years to augment a [deleted]-person pilot staff with 
[deleted] Ft. Rucker pilots during simultaneous operations as well as 
during normal testing functions.

Following the BAFO evaluation, JTS' and RAM's proposals were rated as 
follows:

                     RAM                  JTS 

Technical            90.58--Excellent     88.40--Good

Management           93.50--Excellent     78.50--Marginal

Combined             91.40--Excellent     85.65--Good

Performance Risk     Low Risk             Low Risk

Proposed Cost        $60.44 million       $55.83 million

Total MPC            $62.22 million       $62.61 million
Because the protester did not mention its option year staffing cuts in 
its technical proposal, JTS' "good" technical rating reflected an 
assumption that JTS' staff included [deleted] FTEs throughout the 
contract period.  The management evaluators, on the other hand, were 
aware that JTS proposed staffing reductions "[w]hen there are no 
scheduled test or training support requirements over an extended 
period" during the contract option years.  This approach was viewed 
unfavorably by the management committee and contributed to the 
"marginal" rating accorded JTS' management proposal, despite 
improvements made in other areas of the proposal during discussions.

The SSEB described JTS' approach to implementing staffing reductions 
in the option years as "flawed, unrealistic and risky."  The SSEB 
found that JTS' proposed option years staff was seriously understated 
in relation to the current incumbent staff (supplied, in part, by 
DynCorp), which, in the SSEB's opinion, evidenced JTS' "total lack of 
understanding for the basic RFP requirements."  The SSEB faulted JTS' 
BAFO for not providing an "in-depth analysis," as promised in its cost 
proposal, establishing how JTS could perform the contract based upon 
the staffing reductions, including the reduction of personnel 
described in JTS' proposal as "critical to the work performed on this 
contract," such as pilots.  In that regard, the SSEB also remarked 
that JTS' proposal to augment its pilot staff with Ft. Rucker pilots 
was of concern to the agency because there were "hidden costs" 
associated with training those pilots to operate threat aircraft and 
because there was no assurance that DynCorp could gain government 
approval to excuse these pilots from their other contract duties.  
Finally, the SSEB commented that JTS, by obscuring its intention to 
offer [deleted] FTEs throughout the option years in its technical and 
management proposals, "appears to have layered their BAFO and played a 
cat and mouse game by not fully disclosing the quantity and types of 
personnel to be reduced from the base year to the option years which 
include key and critical positions."

The SSA adopted the SSEB's technical and management ratings.  With 
regard to the cost realism analysis, the SSA rejected the 
recommendation of the SSEB chairman that the staffing levels in both 
proposals be normalized to the higher government estimate to redress 
perceived staffing shortages, finding that the evaluation process had 
not substantiated the need for such an adjustment and that each 
offeror's proposed staffing, not the government estimate, should serve 
as the basis for probable cost adjustments.

However, in determining the MPC of JTS' BAFO, the SSA decided to add 
the costs of the personnel cut by JTS during the option years.  
Because JTS failed to identify the staffing cuts in its technical 
proposal, and the technical committee evaluated the merit of JTS' 
technical approach assuming a constant [deleted] FTE staffing level, 
the SSA reasoned that JTS' probable cost should also reflect [deleted] 
FTEs "[i]n order to maintain the integrity of the evaluations for 
scored areas."  In addition, while JTS mentioned the staffing 
reductions in its management proposal, the SSA noted that the 
management committee did not believe that JTS had substantiated its 
ability to perform the option years of the contract with the truncated 
staff, absent "too much risk to mission," leading the SSA to conclude 
that the proposed option years staffing levels were unrealistic and 
should be adjusted upward.  As a separate matter, the SSA made a $1.1 
million upward adjustment to reflect the probable cost of training the 
Ft. Rucker pilots to fly threat aircraft under the instant contract.  
The above adjustments, plus another $2.1 million adjustment unrelated 
to the issues in this protest, elevated the protester's evaluated cost 
by $6.78 million from its proposed cost.

RAM's evaluated cost was $1.78 million more than its proposal cost.  
Of this amount, $[deleted] represented the correction of an error in 
the cost proposal of one of the awardee's subcontractors.  The error 
was the subject of post-BAFO communications between RAM and the 
contract specialist, and the awardee provided a written response 
reflecting the $[deleted] error, which was "utilized in the 
evaluation" of RAM's probable cost.

After the probable cost adjustments were made, RAM's higher-rated 
proposal enjoyed an evaluated $390,000 cost advantage.  As a result, 
the SSA determined that RAM's proposal represented the best value to 
the government.  This protest followed.

THE STAFFING EVALUATION

JTS protests that the agency misevaluated its staffing approach under 
both the cost and management factors.  JTS argues that the RFP 
required the agency to evaluate staffing based upon the test schedules 
appearing at enclosure 8, which showed a substantial reduction in the 
test requirements for the option years and which dictated the staffing 
approach in its BAFO.  The protester claims that, instead, OPTEC 
improperly evaluated its staffing approach based upon the historical 
requirements shown at enclosure 5.  JTS therefore protests the 
agency's evaluation of its management proposal as "marginal" and the 
agency's decision to add the cost of the personnel cut during the 
option years to its proposal's MPC.

The evaluation of proposals is a matter within the discretion of the 
contracting agency.  Our Office will question the agency's evaluation 
only where it lacks a reasonable basis or conflicts with the stated 
evaluation criteria for award.  SC&A, Inc., B-270160.2, Apr. 10, 1996, 
96-1 CPD 197 at 7.  Further, when an agency evaluates proposals for 
the award of a cost reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed 
estimated costs are not dispositive because regardless of the costs 
proposed, the government is bound to pay the contractor its actual and 
allowable costs.  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  15.605(c) 
(June 1997).  Consequently, a cost realism analysis must be performed 
by the agency to determine the extent to which an offeror's proposed 
costs represent what the contract should cost, assuming reasonable 
economy and efficiency, and we limit our review in these matters to 
determining whether the agency's cost evaluation was reasonably based 
and not arbitrary.  CACI, Inc.-Fed., 64 Comp. Gen. 71, 75 (1984), 84-2 
CPD  para.  542 at 5; Geo-Centers, Inc., B-276033, May 5, 1997, 97-1 CPD  para.  
182 at 9. 

We do not agree with JTS that the enclosure 8 test schedules were to 
serve as the basis for the agency's cost realism analysis or its 
management evaluation.  Although JTS asserts that the RFP required 
staffing to be evaluated against the enclosure 8 test schedules, JTS 
has not identified, nor can we find, any RFP provision which indicated 
such an approach; for example, the enclosure 8 schedules were never 
mentioned in the RFP evaluation scheme or the performance work 
statement.[5]  Based upon our review, we agree with the agency that 
the evaluation scheme contemplated an evaluation of the offeror's 
ability "to execute the technical requirements" as stated in the RFP 
as a whole, not simply as stated in enclosure 8.[6]

Here, the agency does not expect any precipitous decline in its 
testing requirements between the base and option years of the instant 
contract, but anticipates that the requirements under the instant 
contract will follow the historical patterns reflected in enclosure 5, 
which reveals continuous, often overlapping, testing requirements.  
Indeed, the technical committee, unaware of the proposed option year 
staffing reductions, rated JTS' technical proposal as "good," based, 
in part, upon the belief that JTS' ostensibly level staffing approach 
would satisfy comparable base and option year requirements.  JTS has 
not established, either in its proposal or during this protest, that 
it can satisfy the continuous testing requirements anticipated by 
OPTEC for the base and option years based upon a truncated staff of 
[deleted] FTEs.  To the contrary, JTS' staffing reductions presuppose 
that minimal testing will be required during the option years; for 
instance, to the extent that testing is required, JTS offered to 
augment its staff by drawing on personnel from an unrelated DynCorp 
contract at Ft. Rucker.  Furthermore, the affidavit submitted by the 
individual who prepared JTS' initial and BAFO staffing proposals 
essentially confirms that JTS cannot perform the contract with 
[deleted] FTEs unless the enclosure 8 testing schedules "prove[] to be 
an accurate portrayal of the actual test work load," which the 
government does not expect to be the case.

Based upon our review, the agency reasonably found that JTS' proposal 
to perform the option years requirements with [deleted] FTEs was 
unrealistic, both from a management and cost perspective, particularly 
since JTS' technical proposal was facially premised on a level 
[deleted] FTE approach.  Because JTS failed to present the promised 
"in-depth analysis" substantiating its ability to perform successive 
testing requirements with fewer than [deleted] FTEs per year, we find 
reasonable the SSEB's conclusion that the proposed option years 
staffing reductions were "flawed, unrealistic and risky" and the SSA's 
conclusion that a staff of [deleted] FTEs represented JTS' MPC of 
performing the contract.  In addition, JTS' failure to disclose the 
proposed staffing reductions in its technical proposal undermined its 
proposal's "good" technical rating.

ALLEGED INADEQUATE DISCUSSIONS 

The protester argues that OPTEC should have discussed JTS' proposed 
use of Ft. Rucker pilots to augment its staff since OPTEC viewed this 
as a weakness in JTS' initial proposal.  Had the agency raised this 
issue during discussions, JTS argues, it could have avoided the 
downgrade to its management proposal and the adjustment to its MPC 
stemming from the proposed use of the Ft. Rucker pilots.

We review the adequacy of discussions to ensure that agencies point 
out weaknesses that, unless corrected, would prevent an offeror from 
having a reasonable chance for award.  Department of the Navy--Recon., 
72 Comp. Gen. 221, 222 (1993), 93-1 CPD  para.  422 at 3.  An agency is not 
required to afford offerors all-encompassing discussions, nor is it 
required to discuss every aspect of an offeror's proposal that 
receives less than the maximum score.  Volmar Constr. Inc., B-270364, 
B-270364.2, Mar. 4, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  139 at 4; DAE Corp., B-259866, 
B-259866.2, May 8, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  12 at 4-5.  In addition, an agency 
is not obligated to reopen negotiations so that an offeror may remedy 
defects first introduced in its BAFO, since the offeror assumes the 
risk that changes in its final offer might raise questions about its 
ability to meet the solicitation requirements.  Cubic Field Servs., 
Inc., B-247780, June 17, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  525 at 6 n.10.

While the record confirms that the agency considered the proposed use 
of Ft. Rucker pilots an undesirable feature in the protester's initial 
proposal, the agency reports that it did not discuss the issue because 
JTS initially proposed a large enough pilot staff (i.e., [deleted] 
pilots) that the agency doubted that JTS would require pilot support 
from Ft. Rucker.  This assumption changed when the protester seriously 
diminished its proposed pilot staff in its BAFO, which made it 
probable that JTS would rely upon the Ft. Rucker pilots and that the 
agency would incur the training costs and inefficiencies associated 
with that approach.

JTS has provided no basis to object to OPTEC's evaluation of its 
proposed use of the Ft. Rucker pilots, which we find to be supported 
by the record.  As noted above, JTS, in its initial proposal, proposed 
to augment a [deleted]-person pilot staff with [deleted] Ft. Rucker 
pilots only during the simultaneous operations scenario, but not 
during the normal testing requirements that JTS admits "constitute the 
bulk of the day to day requirements in this procurement."  Because the 
[deleted]-person pilot staff was deemed adequate for the performance 
of most contract requirements, the agency did not view the possible 
sporadic use of Ft. Rucker pilots as a material weakness in JTS' 
proposal, as evidenced by the fact that the agency made no MPC 
adjustments based upon this approach during the initial cost 
evaluation and did not mention it in the letter rejecting JTS' initial 
proposal from the competitive range.

In its BAFO, JTS proposed in the option years to augment a 
[deleted]-person pilot staff with [deleted] Ft. Rucker pilots not only 
during simultaneous operations, but also to accomplish the day-to-day 
testing requirements.  These BAFO changes led the agency to conclude 
that it would likely endure what it viewed as an inefficient and 
expensive approach to meeting its day-to-day testing requirements.  
Because the proposed use of Ft. Rucker pilots was not a material 
weakness until the staffing changes introduced in JTS' BAFO, the 
agency was not obliged to conduct discussions on this issue.

ALLEGED MISEVALUATION OF  THE AWARDEE'S MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL 

The protester argues that RAM's management proposal did not deserve an 
"excellent" rating because the SSEB considered RAM's proposal (as well 
as JTS') to be understaffed in relation to the government estimate.

Although the SSEB considered RAM's proposal understaffed in relation 
to the government estimate, this weakness was outweighed by numerous, 
uncontested strengths in the proposal, including strengths in the 
staffing area, such as an excellent employee compensation and 
recruitment plan, an excellent discussion of key personnel 
qualifications, an excellent approach to staffing during simultaneous 
operations, the provision of a highly skilled staff, and sufficient 
personnel to support the required tasks despite "an apparent 
understaffing of maintenance personnel."  In addition, RAM added more 
technicians and maintenance personnel in response to concerns raised 
during discussions, which somewhat alleviated the SSEB's concern.  
Finally, the SSA disagreed with the SSEB that the evaluation of RAM's 
proposal disclosed a staffing shortfall sufficient to justify 
normalization of the staffing to the government estimate.  The 
protester has not established that the SSA abused her discretion in 
this regard, particularly given that the protester proposed less staff 
than RAM during the base year and, more significantly, during the 
option years.

The protester also argues that RAM's "excellent" management rating is 
inflated because RAM's proposal was given credit for an excellent 
physical security discussion, which was not encompassed by the RFP 
evaluation criteria.  The record does not support the protester's 
contention.  There is no mention of security issues in the SSEB's BAFO 
evaluation summary report or the source selection decision, and only 
an isolated reference in an individual evaluator's BAFO worksheet, 
which lists RAM's physical security approach as a proposal 
disadvantage.  Although the agency rewarded RAM's initial proposal for 
its physical security approach, we decline to infer that it so 
rewarded RAM's BAFO proposal simply because RAM's BAFO score was not 
decreased from its initial proposal score.  As the record 
demonstrates, RAM improved its proposal in several, properly evaluated 
areas after discussions, which accounts for its slightly higher BAFO 
score.

ALLEGED IMPROPER POST-BAFO DISCUSSIONS  

JTS protests that OPTEC engaged in post-BAFO discussions with RAM and 
allowed the awardee to revise its proposal, an opportunity denied JTS.

Discussions occur when an offeror is given an opportunity to revise or 
modify its proposal, or when information requested from and provided 
by an offeror is essential for determining the acceptability of its 
proposal.  FAR  sec.  15.601 (June 1997); Microlog Corp., B-237486, Feb. 
26, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  227 at 4.  The conduct of discussions with one 
offeror generally requires that discussions be conducted with all 
offerors whose offers are within the competitive range and that the 
offerors have an opportunity to submit revised offers.  Id.  
Discussions are to be distinguished from clarifications, which are 
merely inquiries for the purpose of eliminating minor uncertainties or 
irregularities in a proposal.  Id.  Contracting officers have an 
affirmative obligation to examine proposals for minor informalities 
and irregularities and apparent clerical mistakes, which may be 
corrected through clarifications, rather than discussions.  FAR  sec.  
15.607(a) (June 1997).  Communications with offerors to resolve 
clerical mistakes are clarifications and not discussions, so long as 
they do not prejudice the interests of the other offerors.  Faison 
Office Prods. Co., B-260259, B-260259.2, June 2, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  116 
at 5.

In the instant case, the contract specialist asked RAM to confirm 
whether a subcontractor spreadsheet contained a programming error, 
which had the effect of excluding a liability insurance line item from 
the subcontractor's base and option year costs.  RAM confirmed that 
the spreadsheet formula inadvertently excluded liability insurance 
costs from the subcontractor's proposal costs.  RAM advised that the 
correction of the error would add $[deleted] to its BAFO cost 
proposal.  We have reviewed the subcontractor spreadsheets, and we 
find that both the existence of the mistake and the amount actually 
intended were clear from the face of the spreadsheets and were as 
reported by RAM; specifically, the base and option year spreadsheets 
exclude $[deleted] in liability insurance and $[deleted] in derivative 
profit, resulting in an overall error of $[deleted] for the entire 
contract period.  See FAR  sec.  15.607; E. Frye Enters., Inc., B-258699, 
B-258699.2, Feb. 13, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  64 at 2.  Further, the 
correction of the error did not prejudice JTS, since it had the effect 
of raising, not lowering, RAM's evaluated cost.  Thus, we agree with 
OPTEC that the spreadsheet discrepancy was a clerical error 
correctable through clarifications.[7]

OTHER ISSUES

The protester alleges that the agency misevaluated its approach to 
purchasing foreign parts under the Logistics subfactor and applied an 
unstated, physical security evaluation factor in downgrading its 
proposal under the Management Approach subfactor.  We need not address 
these issues because, even if JTS' proposal had earned perfect scores 
under these subfactors, the combined technical/management score of its 
higher-cost proposal would have been 88.80 points, less than RAM's 
score of 91.40 points.  Competitive prejudice is an essential element 
of every viable protest.  Lithos Restoration Ltd., 71 Comp. Gen. 367, 
371 (1992), 92-1 CPD  para.  379 at 5.  Where the record does not 
demonstrate that, but for the agency's actions, the protester would 
have had a reasonable chance of receiving the award, our Office will 
not sustain a protest, even if a deficiency in the procurement is 
found.  McDonald-Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  54 at 3; 
see Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1996).  In any event, there is no evidence in the SSEB BAFO analysis 
report or the source selection statement that the protested weaknesses 
were proposal discriminators, as was the protester's proposed staffing 
approach.

JTS also protests the agency's cost/technical tradeoff as "cursory" 
and inadequately documented.  There was no requirement for a 
cost/technical tradeoff in this case, because the awardee offered the 
technically superior proposal at a lower probable cost based upon a 
proper evaluation.  See Hughes Missile Sys. Co., B-259255.4, May 12, 
1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  283 at 16.  Further, JTS is wrong that the agency's 
cost/technical tradeoff should have been based upon proposed costs.  
The RFP clearly provided that each proposal's probable cost would 
serve as the basis for the award selection, and, as explained above, 
there was no error with respect to the probable cost adjustments made 
to JTS' proposal.

Finally, JTS contends that the agency made a mathematical error in 
computing its BAFO's MPC.  JTS received the documentation necessary to 
raise this allegation on October 17, but did not protest until filing 
its comments on November 20, which renders the allegation untimely and 
not for our consideration.  4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(2) (1997).[8]

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the Untied States

1. JTS' joint venture partners are Electronic Warfare Associates, 
Nichols Research Corporation, and DynCorp.  A different joint venture, 
which also includes DynCorp as a partner, serves as the incumbent 
contractor for most of the services covered by the instant 
solicitation.

2. RFP enclosure 5 listed a number of threat systems that the offeror 
might be required to operate simultaneously during periods of peak or 
surge requirements.

3. JTS used the term "sustainment level" to refer to periods when 
there is no scheduled testing and the contractor is simply required to 
maintain the equipment.

4. JTS also proposed to detail staff from other JTS departments to 
support the testing and simultaneous operations requirements, e.g.:  
"To meet a [deleted] person test requirement, we will draw on 
[deleted] personnel from the Engineering Department . . . ."

5. If anything, the proposal preparation instructions reasonably 
indicated that offerors should depend upon historical data as the 
basis for projecting the government's requirements:  "Historical and 
projected workloads are given at enclosure 5."  Similarly, the 
performance work statement refers to work load data included in other 
RFP enclosures, such as enclosure 5, but not enclosure 8.

6. We are unpersuaded by the protester's argument that it was 
essentially advised during discussions to base its proposed staffing 
approach on the enclosure 8 test schedules.  As noted above, the SSEB 
chairman allegedly discouraged the protester from developing its 
staffing approach based upon a known requirement not listed on the 
enclosure 8 test schedules because the MOU adding the new requirement 
was not part of the RFP.  We do not view this advice, even if given, 
as a mandate that JTS base its staffing estimates on the enclosure 8 
schedules to the exclusion of other work load data in the RFP, such as 
the enclosure 5 historical data.  Rather, JTS was advised to develop a 
staffing approach based upon the requirements as stated in the RFP, 
which included the historical data that JTS essentially disregarded in 
developing its option years staffing approach.  In our view, JTS 
unreasonably interpreted the advice in a manner inconsistent with the 
RFP requirements.  See Analytical & Research Tech., Inc., B-276064, 
May 7, 1997, 97-1 CPD  para.  200 at 7-8; Nova Research Co., B-270092, 
B-270092.2, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  52 at 5.  In any case, it is 
notable that JTS did not state in its proposal that its staffing plan 
was based on the enclosure 8 schedules.

7. JTS also characterizes as discussions the contract specialist's 
request that RAM "[p]rovide page citations" showing where 
subcontractor costs were incorporated into its BAFO.  There is no 
merit to this contention.  RAM identified the appropriate pages 
without revising its proposal, and the information necessary to judge 
the acceptability of RAM's proposal was readily ascertainable from the 
pages themselves and was not supplied by RAM during the post-BAFO 
communication.

8. We also do not consider several protest contentions that were 
abandoned after the agency addressed them in its report.