BNUMBER:  B-278044.4; B-278044.6 
DATE:  June 12, 1998
TITLE: Source One Management, Inc., B-278044.4; B-278044.6, June 12,
1998
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Source One Management, Inc.

File:     B-278044.4; B-278044.6

Date:June 12, 1998

Alexander J. Brittin, Esq., and Margaret C. Rhodes, Esq., McKenna & 
Cuneo, L.L.P., for the protester.
William W. Goodrich, Jr., Esq., Matthew S. Perlman, Esq., Richard J. 
Webber, Esq., Alison Micheli, Esq., and Tenley A. Carp., Esq., Arent, 
Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, for Advanced Integrated Management 
Services, Inc., an intervenor.
Gena E. Cadieux, Esq., and John D. Bremer, Esq., Department of Energy, 
for the agency.
Paul Jordan, Esq., and Paul I. Lieberman, Esq., Office of the General 
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Evaluation of protester's proposal was reasonable where it was 
performed in accordance with stated evaluation criteria and reflected 
valid criticisms of protester's proposed subcontract management and 
past performance.

2.  Where offeror proposed certain employees' wage rates less than 
comparable Service Contract Act and general schedule wages, without 
fully supporting feasibility of that approach, agency properly 
assessed a weakness under evaluation criterion concerning offerors' 
projected success in obtaining and retaining a highly skilled 
workforce.

DECISION

Source One Management, Inc. (SOM) protests the award of a contract to 
Advanced Integrated Management Services, Inc., (AIMSI) under request 
for proposals (RFP) No. DE-RP65-97WA14007, issued by the Western Area 
Power Administration, Department of Energy (DOE) for technical support 
services.  SOM challenges the agency's technical evaluation of AIMSI's 
and SOM's proposals and the cost/technical tradeoff. 

We deny the protest. 

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this procurement is to provide technical support 
services for DOE's Corporate Services Office (CSO) in Golden, 
Colorado.  The technical support services to be acquired include 
realty management (Task A); power system training and video production 
(Task B); engineering support (Task C); three information services 
support tasks:  CSO support (Task D1), Corporate Applications Support 
(Task D2), and Financial Management System Transition support (Task 
D3); and project management (Task E).  The procurement consolidates 
four existing support services contracts and aligns them with changes 
in DOE's organization that have occurred in the past 3 years.  The 
solicitation was issued as a total small business set-aside and 
contemplated award of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for a base year 
with 4 option years.

Section L of the RFP advised offerors that their proposals would 
consist of an oral presentation of delineated technical information, 
supplemented by written documentation.  According to section M of the 
RFP, technical proposals were to be evaluated on the basis of three 
technical criteria:  project management (50 percent), past performance 
(25 percent), and understanding and approach (25 percent).  The 
project management criterion was divided into four subcriteria:  
projected degree of success of phase-in and start-up staffing plans, 
including subcontractors (20 percent); appropriateness and projected 
degree of success of personnel management programs to ensure a highly 
skilled workforce and retention of contract staff, including 
subcontractors (15 percent); anticipated effectiveness of management 
approach (10 percent); and anticipated effectiveness of proposed 
on-site organization structure (5 percent).  Additional evaluation 
credit was available under the first and third subcriteria to offerors 
that proposed to subcontract with small disadvantaged businesses 
participating in the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program.

Cost, while not scored, was used in determining the offeror's 
understanding of the requirements, in assessing the validity of the 
offeror's approach to managing and performing the work, and in 
determining the best overall value to the government.  The RFP advised 
that the proposed cost estimate would not be controlling and that the 
government's estimate of the most probable cost (MPC) would be used 
for evaluation purposes. 

While technical factors were more important than cost, the RFP advised 
that "apparent technical advantages will be weighed against the 
evaluated price" and "[a]n offer exceeding technical requirements will 
have an advantage over offers which meet requirements with lower cost, 
only insofar as the offer exceeding technical requirements is 
considered to be worth the price differential, if any."  Award was to 
be made to the offer providing the best overall value to the 
government. 

Twelve proposals, including those of SOM and AIMSI, were submitted by 
the May 20, 1997 closing date.  After initial review, the source 
selection official (SSO) excluded certain offers from the competitive 
range, and the remaining offerors, including SOM, made oral 
presentations between July 8 and July 18, 1997.  The technical 
evaluation panel (TEP) evaluated the oral presentations and written 
proposals and conducted discussions with each offeror immediately 
following its oral presentation.  The cost analyst reviewed offerors' 
costs and made adjustments to calculate an MPC for each offer.  The 
agency requested and obtained best and final offers (BAFO) from the 
competitive range offerors.  In the final evaluation, AIMSI's proposal 
received a score of 825 points with an MPC of $16.9 million and SOM's 
proposal received a score of 800 points with an MPC of $16.4 million.  

Based on the evaluation, the SSO agreed with the TEP's recommendation 
to award the contract to AIMSI.  After receiving notice of the 
selection decision and a debriefing, SOM filed a protest with our 
Office (B-278044).  Among other evaluation issues, SOM challenged 
DOE's upward adjustment of the firm's proposed labor costs for certain 
personnel whom the agency considered to be subject to the Service 
Contract Act (SCA).  Since the wage rates for these personnel were 
lower than the applicable Department of Labor wage determination, DOE 
adjusted SOM's wage rates upward.  The agency determined to take 
corrective action and our Office dismissed the protest as academic.[1]  
SOM filed a subsequent protest challenging the agency's decision to 
limit discussions (B-278044.3).  Our Office dismissed this protest as 
academic when the agency decided to allow offerors to completely 
revise their proposals and/or BAFOs. 

DOE conducted additional discussions and reviewed the offerors' 
proposal revisions and BAFOs.  The results of the final evaluation 
were as follows:

Criteria (Possible Points)SOM         AIMSI

Project Mgmt (500)
(+ 90 Bonus Points) 445               580

  Phase-in/Start up (200)
   8(a) Bonus (60)  160 + 60          200 + 60

  Personnel Mgmt (150)90              150

  Mgmt Approach (100)
   8(a) Bonus (30)  70 + 30           90 + 30

  On-site Structure (50)35            50

Past Performance (250)200             175

Understanding (250) 250               225

Total (1090)        895               980

MPC[2]              $16,252,782       $17,097,042
Based on the TEP's evaluation and recommendation, the SSO again 
selected AIMSI for award as providing the best value to the 
government.  After receiving notice of the award and a debriefing, SOM 
filed this protest challenging the agency's evaluation of its and 
AIMSI's technical proposals.[3]

Where there is a challenge to the evaluation of proposals in a 
negotiated procurement, it is not the function of our Office to 
evaluate the proposals de novo.  Rather, we will examine an agency's 
evaluation only to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with 
the stated evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and 
regulations, since determining the relative merit of competing 
proposals is primarily a matter within the contracting agency's 
discretion.  Advanced Tech. and Research Corp., B-257451.2, Dec. 9, 
1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  230 at 3; Information Sys. & Networks Corp., 
B-237687, Feb. 22, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  203 at 3.

EVALUATION OF SUBCONTRACTORS

In evaluating SOM's proposal under the project management criterion 
and its subcriteria, the evaluators identified several weaknesses 
associated with SOM's proposed subcontractors, [deleted], an 8(a) 
contractor, and [deleted].  SOM contends that these assessed 
weaknesses and their impact on its evaluation score under the project 
management criteria (worth 50 percent of the total available points) 
are improper because they unfairly penalize SOM simply for proposing 
subcontractors.  Our review of SOM's proposal and the evaluation 
discloses that SOM's contentions are unfounded.  While SOM asserts 
that the weaknesses are attributable to the mere use of 
subcontractors, the record shows that the weaknesses are actually 
attributable to management issues attendant to SOM's proposed team. 

For example, the TEP assessed the following weaknesses under 
subcriterion A (Phase-in/Start-up Staffing):  "[c]onfusion may exist 
with rolling out the separate company policies for initial 
orientation, for Tasks D1, D2, and D3 with three firms" and "[u]nclear 
alignment of [deleted] policies and different benefits as compared to 
[SOM] and [deleted], which may impact phase-in and start-up."  Under 
subcriterion B (Personnel Management), the TEP noted "[d]ifferent 
benefits for [deleted] employees."  These weaknesses are attributable 
to SOM's decision to add [deleted] to perform a portion of Task D1.  
SOM had overcome earlier assessed weaknesses concerning benefit 
differences by ensuring that SOM's and [deleted] benefit plans were 
comparable.  This change was reflected in SOM's revised Executive 
Summary in which it stated that [deleted].  However, when SOM added 
[deleted] to its team, no apparent effort was made to conform 
[deleted] benefit plan to the SOM-[deleted] plans.  In this regard, 
[deleted] benefit plan differs from the SOM-[deleted] plans in 
virtually every area including leave, health insurance, retirement, 
and disability plans.  Since all three team members will perform 
various parts of the information services functions (Tasks D1, D2, and 
D3), the TEP reasonably was concerned with the potential impact of 
different benefit plans on phase-in and start-up and properly assessed 
the challenged weaknesses.[4]

We reach the same conclusion with regard to the TEP's assessment of 
weaknesses under the other "Project Management" subcriteria.  Under 
subcriterion C (Management Approach), the TEP noted that SOM proposed 
"[t]hree firms providing information services tasks [D1-D3] . . . 
[which could] contribute to inefficiencies, reduced responsiveness, 
and lack of flexibility" and under subcriterion D (Organization 
Structure), they found "[i]nformation [s]ervices tasks are split 
between two subcontractors and prime, reducing effectiveness of 
on-site organization."  Under these subcriteria, the TEP evaluated the 
efficiency and responsiveness of the proposed project management 
approach, including the authority of the project manager, and the 
effectiveness of the on-site organization structure proposed to manage 
the work performed.  Here, SOM proposed to share task D1 with 
[deleted] and have [deleted] perform tasks D2 and D3.  Further, while 
SOM's revised proposal showed that the project manager had hiring and 
firing authority over all other employees, it is not clear from the 
revised proposal that he had this authority with respect to the 
[deleted] employees.  Contrary to the protester's assertion, these 
evaluated weaknesses are not attributable to the mere proposal of 
subcontractors; rather, they are attributable to how SOM intends to 
use and manage those subcontractors.  We find nothing unreasonable in 
the TEP's assessment that sharing various parts of three related tasks 
among three contractors could lead to organizational and management 
problems.

SOM also contends that the TEP improperly penalized it by 
double-counting through references to the same weaknesses under 
different subcriteria.  It is improper for an agency to exaggerate the 
stated importance of a single evaluation criterion by considering an 
identical element of that criterion under other evaluation criteria.  
J.A. Jones Management Servs., Inc., B-254941.2, Mar. 16, 1994, 94-1 
CPD  para.  244 at 6.  However, an agency is not precluded from considering 
an element of a proposal under more than one evaluation criterion 
where the element is relevant and reasonably related to each criterion 
under which it is considered.  Teledyne Brown Eng'g, B-258078, 
B-258078.2, Dec. 6, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  223 at 4-5.  Here, the alleged 
examples of multiple counting of the same weaknesses did not reflect 
an improper over-emphasis because the agency legitimately concluded 
that those weaknesses had an impact under more than one subcriterion.  
For example, use of the three team members to perform portions of 
three related tasks was reasonably viewed by the evaluators as 
affecting both SOM's management approach and its on-site structure.[5]

EVALUATION OF "EXEMPT" EMPLOYEES

An agency may properly use SCA wage rates in determining the realism 
of proposed wage rates in a cost-reimbursement contract, even where 
the offeror contends that the employees are exempt.  T&M Joint 
Venture, B-240747, Dec. 19, 1990, 90-2 CPD  para.  503 at 4; see DIGICON 
Corp., B-275060, B-275060.2, Jan. 21, 1997, 97-1 CPD  para.  64 at 4 
(comparison of offerors' wage rates appropriate for determining risk 
of performance).  While the agency did not adjust the offerors' MPC in 
this evaluation, we believe it reasonably applied the GS and SCA rates 
as a benchmark for determining whether the rates were sufficient to 
obtain and retain the necessary highly skilled workforce to perform 
this contract.[6]

In discussions with SOM, DOE identified 11 computer systems analyst, 
programmer, and technician job categories which it believed were 
subject to SCA minimum wages and for which SOM's proposed wage rates 
were below the SCA minimums.  The agency also identified four job 
categories, not subject to the SCA, but for which it had provided 
equivalent general schedule (GS) wage rates, and for which SOM had 
proposed lower wage rates.  DOE requested SOM to "explain [its] 
ability to pay wages lower than SCA minimums" and "equivalent federal 
hires," and to "explain how the payment of the lower wages can still 
provide [DOE] with an adequately skilled staff."  

In response, SOM outlined its process for determining when particular 
labor categories or positions were exempt from the SCA.  Specifically, 
SOM used criteria from a "number of sources" including the Mountain 
States Employers Council (MSEC) to analyze the positions, including 
the character of the work, knowledge to perform, exercise of 
discretion and independent judgment, and amount of time spent on 
professional activities.  Based on this analysis, SOM concluded that 
all the questioned positions were exempt.  SOM also relied on the 
eligibility for exemption of computer systems analysts, computer 
programmers, software engineers, and other similarly skilled workers 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  SOM also matched the RFP 
categories with existing [deleted] labor categories and wage rates, 
noting that the salary structure was annually updated using sources 
such as the MSEC and the Economic Research Institute.  In addition, 
SOM stated that it used the actual salaries of proposed key personnel.  
With regard to those employees being paid less than that of equivalent 
federal hires, SOM noted that Federal Acquisition Regulation  sec.  
52.222-42 provided that such equivalent rates were identified only for 
"information" and were not intended to be considered a wage 
determination.  SOM explained that one of these employees was an 
incumbent whose wage rate was the same as his current rate, and the 
other three categories' wage rates were set using the same methodology 
as that to determine the exempt employees' wage rates. 

Notwithstanding SOM's explanation of its wage rate methodology, the 
TEP assessed a weakness under the Personnel Management subcriterion 
(under the Project Management criterion), on the basis that SOM's 
"[w]age strategy may reduce ability to recruit and retain highly 
skilled workforce based upon comparison to average labor rates 
proposed by others and Government initial estimate."  SOM challenges 
the propriety of this assessed weakness, since it believes it fully 
supported its determination that the employees in question are exempt 
and thus not entitled to the higher wages.  We have reviewed SOM's 
revised proposal and the agency's rationale for downgrading it based 
on the lower proposed wage rates and find nothing unreasonable in the 
agency's action.  

According to the agency, and undisputed by the protester, in Golden, 
Colorado (part of the Denver metropolitan area), where this contract 
is to be performed, the labor market is large and diverse and includes 
a large federal employment sector.  Thus, in the agency's view, an 
employer who pays its employees less than a GS or SCA wage rate risks 
loss of the employee to a federal agency willing to pay more.  SOM 
recognized the state of the labor market in its proposal, stating:  
"Currently, the labor market in Denver is tight and unemployment is 
low and workers are harder to obtain."  SOM even criticized its 
competitors stating that they would: 

     lose large percentages of the incumbent work force through 
     inadequate compensation, and [would] incur large opportunity 
     costs to [DOE] through loss of technical expertise, reduced 
     levels of customer service, delays in contract deliverables, 
     reduced productivity and quality, poor morale, and increased 
     training costs.

SOM Revised Proposal at 47 (emphasis added).

Despite this recognition by SOM, it proposed some rates which were 
significantly below SCA minimums, equivalent GS rates, and rates 
proposed by other offerors.  In this regard, SOM's final proposed 
rates for 9 of the 11 SCA job categories in question ranged from 
approximately [deleted] percent (computer systems analyst III) to 
approximately [deleted] percent (computer systems analyst II) below 
the minimum SCA wages for these categories.  With regard to the other 
four categories, SOM's proposed wages were from [deleted] percent 
(senior electrical engineer) to [deleted] percent (engineering 
technician VI) below the equivalent GS rate.  In addition, SOM's 
rates, on average, range from approximately [deleted] percent below to 
[deleted] percent below the rates proposed by the other offerors in 
the competitive range.

SOM nonetheless contends that some of the wages upon which its 
proposal is based are equal to those the same employees received under 
the incumbent contract.[7]  In SOM's view, if its proposed employees 
will be paid the same wages they already make, it is unreasonable for 
the agency to conclude that there is any risk associated with 
retaining them at those rates.  In this regard, the record shows that 
the agency questioned some 15 job categories under Tasks A, B, C, D1, 
and D2.  Of these 15, in SOM's response to the agency's questions, the 
firm identified only 7 key personnel positions as being based on 
incumbent salaries.  The remainder were based on SOM's determination 
that the positions were exempt, based primarily on [deleted] 
experience.  However, as the agency points out, some of these 
positions, e.g., the realty appraiser, did not represent positions 
performed by [deleted]-incumbent personnel.  Thus, simply stating that 
the wages represent incumbent wage rates is neither fully accurate, 
nor sufficient to support the adequacy of the low rates in question. 

In this regard, the assessment of this weakness was also based on 
SOM's lack of adequate support for its lower wages.  While SOM argues 
that the agency was aware of the incumbent's payment of lower than SCA 
and GS rates, its evidence of that awareness is unpersuasive.  For 
example, in response to the agency report, SOM submitted to our Office 
the salary structure it proposed in 1993 allegedly showing below-SCA 
rates and a 1995 detailed salary report.  The salary structure 
reflects a lowest and highest salary range without identifying the 
specific wage rate to be paid for any particular position.  While the 
lower end of the salary ranges appears to be lower than the SCA rates, 
the higher end appears to exceed those rates.  Such a presentation of 
broad ranges in a salary structure does not evidence that the agency 
was on notice that incumbent personnel were being paid less than SCA 
rates.[8]  The 1995 salary report lists annual salaries, while SCA 
rates are expressed as per-hour rates.  Without an explanation of how 
the hourly rate was to be calculated from the annual salaries, the 
agency was not necessarily on notice that these wage rates represented 
below-SCA rates.  Moreover, the salary report identifies the salaries 
by noting only that they are "counted for" various GS grades, without 
denominating the job responsibilities as properly falling within the 
"counted for" GS level.[9] 

In sum, our review of the entire record leads us to conclude that the 
agency's concern about SOM's wage strategy was reasonable and its 
assessment of a weakness under the Personnel Management subcriterion 
was unobjectionable.[10] 

EVALUATION OF PAST PERFORMANCE

In evaluating SOM's past performance, the TEP noted that SOM, which 
was responsible for performance of Task A (realty management), had 
"[l]imited realty experience in federal acquisition[s]" and that SOM's 
subcontractor, [deleted], had "failed to comply with contract 
administration requirements to provide indirect rate packages 
(1994-96) to [DOE] within 90 day[s] of contract period completion."  
SOM challenges the assessment of these weaknesses and the consequent 
downgrading of its proposal.[11]  SOM argues that its proposal 
provided ample evidence of its and [deleted] experience with realty 
tasks and an adequate explanation for the late submissions of its rate 
information.  In view of the discretion afforded contracting officials 
in the evaluation of past performance, our review of the record 
reveals nothing improper or unreasonable in the agency's evaluation.  
University of Dayton Research Inst., B-260709, July 10, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  
17 at 7.  

The realty task under the incumbent contract was performed by another 
contractor.  In its proposal, SOM stated that it would use the 
incumbent realty personnel in performing the contract.  It also noted 
its and [deleted] own prior experience with realty tasks.  In response 
to evaluators' questions, SOM's first BAFO provided more detail about 
its and [deleted] realty experience.  The evaluators continued to view 
this as limited experience and so scored SOM's past performance at 200 
out of 250 possible points.  In its second BAFO, SOM stated that it 
was providing "substantially more information on its extensive realty 
experience highlighting Federal Acquisition experience specifically."  
In this regard, SOM's proposal showed that it had 1 year of realty 
experience in a contract performed at DOE's Rocky Flats Field Office 
and that it had realty-task experience on an engineering design 
contract with the City of Broomfield.  [deleted] had some 15 years of 
realty experience in two different contracts.  Notwithstanding this 
additional information, the TEP did not eliminate the lack of 
experience weakness from the evaluation.  

While SOM complains that the assessed weakness is unfair, the record 
fully supports the TEP's assessment that SOM had "limited" realty 
experience on federal contracts.  Its sole federal contract at Rocky 
Flats involved what DOE terms "clerical work."  While there is no 
reason to doubt that SOM performed some realty related tasks as part 
of this contract, they were not the major emphasis of the contract 
and, in any event, represented only 1 year of experience.  With regard 
to the Broomfield experience, the contract was for engineering design 
services that involved some realty related tasks (e.g., appraisal, 
land acquisition, and record maintenance), but that experience was 
limited and was nonfederal.  Although [deleted] has more experience, 
the agency correctly observes that SOM proposed itself, not [deleted], 
to perform the realty tasks.  The fact that [deleted] is available to 
provide advice does not change the fact that SOM is ultimately 
responsible for the performance of these tasks.  Similarly, while SOM 
planned to hire incumbents to perform the realty tasks and the TEP 
noted this as a strength under the project management criterion, this 
does not equate to anything more than "limited" contract management 
experience.  In this regard, although our Office has recognized that 
an agency properly may consider the experience of supervisory 
personnel in evaluating the experience of a new business, see 
Technical Resources, Inc., B-253506, Sept. 16, 1993, 93-2 CPD  para.  176 at 
5, an agency certainly is not compelled to attribute personnel 
experience to the contractor.  Atlantic Coast Contracting, Inc., 
B-270491, B-270590, Mar. 13, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  147 at 3. 

The other assessed weakness was based on [deleted] late submission of 
indirect rate information.  Under the terms of [deleted] prior 
contract with DOE, it billed indirect costs using a provisional rate.  
Within 90 days after the close of each fiscal year, [deleted] was 
required to submit a final indirect rate package to the agency so that 
it could determine the final rate.  Prompt determinations were 
important because the agency had obligated reserve funds to cover any 
reasonable increase in final rates over provisional rates.  Until the 
matter was settled each fiscal year the agency could not use the 
reserved funds for other requirements.  In mid-1995, DOE learned that 
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) had questioned indirect rates 
associated with an [deleted] ([deleted] parent corporation) contract 
for fiscal years 1991-93.  DCAA also audited [deleted].  Because the 
amounts involved were substantial and due to the potential for payment 
of penalties if [deleted] did not prevail, [deleted] did not submit 
its indirect rate packages for fiscal years 1993 through 1996.  
Beginning in November 1995, DOE requested [deleted] to comply with its 
obligation to submit its indirect packages on six contracts.  When the 
agency learned that [deleted] was concerned about penalties for 
submitting unallowable costs to DOE, the agency advised [deleted] that 
it would not forward the rate packages to DCAA for audit until after 
[deleted] resolved the dispute with DCAA.  However, DOE advised 
[deleted] that it still needed the overdue packages.  Ultimately, in 
the summer of 1997, [deleted] settled with DCAA for a fraction of the 
original disputed costs from 1991.  Subsequently, DOE agreed to a 
schedule for submission of the overdue rate packages:  fiscal year 
1994, due in August 1997, fiscal year 1995 by the end of fiscal year 
1997, and fiscal year 1996 in December 1997/January 1998.  [deleted] 
met these deadlines.

SOM admits that [deleted] was overdue in submission of the rate 
packages, but argues that due to the special circumstances surrounding 
its late submissions, including its positive settlement with DCAA, and 
because it submitted the rate packages within the time frames agreed 
to by DOE, the agency should not have assessed a weakness for past 
performance.[12]  We disagree.  As explained by the agency, until 
final indirect rates are settled, it must continue to obligate 
additional funds in case the final rates legitimately exceed the 
provisional rates.  Thus, in addition to representing a failure to 
comply with its contractual responsibilities, [deleted] delayed 
submissions caused DOE additional administrative and fiscal 
responsibilities.  While it was more convenient for [deleted] to wait 
until it had settled with DCAA, it could have submitted its rate 
packages, with the caveat that those rates might be reduced if DCAA 
did not agree with its position in the ongoing audit.  Under these 
circumstances, the TEP reasonably concluded that [deleted] late 
submissions were relevant to the past performance evaluation and 
justified the assessment of a weakness.  In this regard, despite the 
assessment of this weakness, SOM's proposal received a higher past 
performance score than AIMSI's. 

Further, we note that SOM was aware of the agency's assessment of both 
these weaknesses and attempted to resolve them through multiple 
proposal revisions.  However, with each revision, SOM failed to 
provide any appreciable new information which would have warranted 
elimination of the weaknesses.  An offeror is responsible for 
affirmatively demonstrating the merits of its proposal, DBA Sys., 
Inc., B-241048, Jan. 15, 1991, 91-1 CPD  para.  36 at 4, and here SOM, in 
revising its proposal, did not eliminate the basis for the agency's 
assessment of past performance weaknesses.  

COST/TECHNICAL TRADEOFF

Finally, SOM argues that the cost/technical tradeoff was suspect 
because of the evaluation errors it alleged in its protest.  Agency 
officials have broad discretion in determining the manner and extent 
to which they will make use of technical and cost evaluation results.  
Cost/technical tradeoffs may be made; the extent to which one may be 
sacrificed for the other is governed by the test of rationality and 
consistency with the established evaluation factors.  General Servs. 
Eng'g, Inc., B-245458, Jan. 9, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  44 at 9.

Based on the detailed analysis and evaluation performed by the TEP on 
the competitive range proposals, the SSO selected AIMSI's proposal for 
award.  In this regard, the TEP observed that AIMSI had submitted the 
proposal with the highest technical score with all evaluation criteria 
rated "successful" to "outstanding."  AIMSI's proposal had the highest 
project management score, received additional points for proposal of 
an 8(a) subcontractor, and represented the second lowest MPC.  The TEP 
noted that SOM's proposal was technically very good with the highest 
rating under the understanding and approach criterion, and the lowest 
MPC.  The TEP also observed that SOM had improved its score by 
proposing an 8(a) subcontractor, but found SOM's technical weaknesses 
could cause technical problems in the future, which would outweigh the 
estimated cost savings.  

In selecting AIMSI, the SSO noted that AIMSI was very strong in all 
phases of project management and was highly rated in understanding and 
approach.  While AIMSI's past performance was rated relatively lower, 
the SSO concluded that the overall technical advantages of its BAFO 
were "clearly superior to the other three firms seeking the CSO's 
technical support service contract."  While AIMSI's MPC was higher 
than SOM's, the SSO found that the technical superiority reflected in 
AIMSI's higher score (85 points higher than SOM's) "more than 
outweighs the additional estimated cost of the contractual services."  
Since, as discussed above, there was nothing unreasonable or 
objectionable in the agency's evaluation, we have no basis to question 
the award determination.

The protest is denied. 

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. L&M Technologies, Inc. also filed a protest challenging its 
evaluation.  Its protest was rendered academic by the agency's 
original corrective action.  L&M filed a subsequent protest 
(B-278044.5), which was denied in a separate decision. 

2. Each offeror's MPC was the same as its proposed cost.

3. SOM raised a number of arguments in support of its protest.  We 
have considered them all and find none of them has merit.  This 
decision will address only the more significant matters raised by SOM.  

4. The fact that only two [deleted] employees are proposed to work on 
the contract does not change our view.  While two employees receiving 
less generous benefits than the majority of employees may be viewed by 
SOM as a minor problem, that does not mean that it will not be a 
problem during phase-in or start-up, or in fact throughout contract 
performance.  To the extent the two employees have better benefits 
than the majority of employees, there is reason for legitimate concern 
with future management of the contract by SOM. 

5. In a related argument, SOM asserts that AIMSI's proposal was 
improperly evaluated more favorably under criterion one.  In this 
regard, SOM observes that AIMSI's proposal received the full 90 points 
for proposal of an 8(a) subcontractor and, while assessed a weakness 
for lack of a past relationship with that subcontractor, AIMSI's 
proposal was not downgraded for this weakness.  There is no evidence 
of unequal treatment here.  Both SOM and AIMSI received 90 points for 
proposing 8(a) contractors.  Likewise, under subcriterion C, both 
proposals were assessed weaknesses for lack of a prior relationship 
with the 8(a) subcontractor, but the evaluators specifically noted for 
both offerors that the 8(a) subcontractors were performing limited 
aspects of the contract.  While SOM's proposal received only 100 
points under this subcriterion and AIMSI's proposal received 120 
points, the difference in scores is attributable to the number of 
other strengths and weaknesses:  AIMSI's proposal had eight strengths 
and two weaknesses, while SOM's proposal had only three strengths and 
three weaknesses.   

6. SOM notes that, prior to its first protest, the agency adjusted 
SOM's MPC to reflect the disagreement with SOM's proposed wage rates, 
and only in the subsequent evaluation of revised proposals did the 
agency assess a weakness in the technical evaluation (rather than 
adjust SOM's proposed costs).  Section M clearly advised offerors that 
the agency intended to evaluate their proposed approach to hiring, 
benefits package, and leave policies in its determination of the 
"[a]ppropriateness and projected degree of success of . . . personnel 
management programs to assure . . . a highly skilled workforce and 
retention of contract staff, including proposed subcontractors."  
Accordingly, and regardless of how the proposal was evaluated prior to 
the first protest, there was nothing unreasonable or inappropriate in 
the agency's evaluation of low wage rates as a matter of technical 
weakness. 

7. SOM also points out that, during the pendency of this protest, 
[deleted] is performing tasks under an interim contract and that the 
agency is aware that [deleted] is paying the employees in question the 
same (relatively low) wages as proposed by SOM.  SOM contends that the 
agency has thereby agreed that the wages are appropriate.  Contrary to 
SOM's view, the agency denies any awareness that [deleted] is paying 
sub-SCA wages.  In this regard, the agency states that the only 
evidence it has of [deleted] interim contract wages is a salary report 
which identified employee wages by comparison to GS wages.  The agency 
compared this information with SOM's BAFO wages for the same employees 
and found that the average wage rate for those employees was higher 
than that reflected in the BAFO.  To the extent the agency may have 
been aware that any employees working on the interim contract were not 
being paid SCA or GS-equivalent wages, this does not mean that it 
agrees that those wages are appropriate or likely to result in the 
employees' long-term retention during the new contract period.  In 
this regard, the agency points out that its most important 
consideration in the interim contract was continuation of Task D3 work 
and that [deleted] is paying those employees at the SCA rates.  While 
the agency states that it would have preferred to have had an 
alternative for work on Tasks D1 and D2, a "lack of time and 
contracting efficiency made [deleted] the best choice for those tasks 
also."  The agency's choice of [deleted] for those tasks does not 
constitute an agency determination that [deleted] wages for the 
affected employees are adequate for a long-term contract.  

8. For example, the salary structure table shows that in 1993 a 
"systems analyst III" was paid at a rate ranging from [deleted] per 
hour to [deleted] per hour, while the (current) SCA hourly wage rate 
for this position is $26.84, less than the 1993 "highest" rate--but 
the table does not indicate whether any incumbent was paid above or 
below the SCA rate.  SOM proposed this position at [deleted] per hour.

9. In addition, while SOM outlined its methodology for calculating 
wage rates, it did not submit any of the salary surveys on which it 
relied.  In the absence of any evidence that the lower wages proposed, 
even those actually paid to some incumbent employees, were 
commensurate with other local wages for comparable positions, the 
agency reasonably concluded that SOM had failed to adequately support 
its proposed rates.  An offeror is responsible for providing 
sufficient information in its proposal to support its approach.  While 
agency evaluators may consider evidence from sources outside the 
proposals, Continental Maritime of San Diego, Inc., B-249858.2, 
B-249858.3, Feb. 11, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  230 at 6, agencies are not 
obligated to go in search of information which the offeror has omitted 
or failed to adequately present.  Telos Field Eng'g, B-251384, Mar. 
26, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  271 at 6.  

10. In this regard, we note that SOM's evaluation score of 90 out of 
150 points under this subcriterion was also based on other weaknesses, 
including different benefits of [deleted] employees and the cost of 
family health insurance premiums paid by employees.  

11. SOM also contends that the agency improperly evaluated AIMSI's 
past performance because the agency failed to take AIMSI's past 
performance weaknesses into account under the project management 
criterion.  As the agency correctly observes, since past performance 
was not part of the evaluation factors to be used under the project 
management criterion, it would have been improper to consider it under 
that criterion.  J.A. Jones Management Servs., Inc., supra.  

12. SOM also argues that it understood that an agency cost analyst 
agreed to advise the TEP not to consider the matter negatively.  We 
have reviewed declarations from both the cost analyst and [deleted].  
Although [deleted] representative requested the cost analyst to talk 
with the TEP, the cost analyst denies agreeing to advise the TEP how 
they should view [deleted] late submissions.  Rather, the analyst 
states that he was not aware of the rating system and did not get 
involved in telling the technical evaluators how to score proposals.  
Instead, he told [deleted] that once [deleted] became current, he 
would so inform the TEP.  However, at the time of that discussion, 
[deleted] was not current and did not become current as to fiscal year 
1996 until January 1998.  The fiscal year 1997 package was not 
submitted until March 1998 (beyond the 90-day deadline after the 
beginning of fiscal year 1998).  Since the submissions, even under the 
"agreed to" deadlines, were extremely late, and in view of the 
analyst's position that he would not advise evaluators how to score a 
proposal, we believe the analyst's statement represents the more 
likely scenario.  On balance, it appears that the [deleted] 
representative simply misunderstood the cost analyst's stated 
intentions.