BNUMBER:  B-277994; B-277994.2 
DATE:  December 18, 1997
TITLE: PRB Associates, Inc., B-277994; B-277994.2, December 18, 1997
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:PRB Associates, Inc.

File:     B-277994; B-277994.2

Date:December 18, 1997

Pamela G. Sosne, Esq., David R. Johnson, Esq., and Kathleen C. Little, 
Esq., McDermott, Will & Emery, for the protester.
Karen C. Coe, Esq., and Robert A. Klimek, Jr., Esq., Klimek, Kolodney 
& Casale, P.C., for AMEWAS, Inc., an intervenor.
Daniel A. Laguaite, Esq., Department of the Navy, for the agency.
Tania L. Calhoun, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protest alleging that contracting agency unreasonably evaluated 
protester's proposal in identifying certain weaknesses is denied where 
the record shows the evaluation was reasonable and in accordance with 
the stated evaluation criteria; since these weaknesses did not prevent 
protester from having a reasonable chance for award, contracting 
agency's failure to point them out did not deprive the protester of 
meaningful discussions.

2.  Regulatory requirement that contracting agencies recognize the 
integrity and validity of contractor teaming arrangements does not 
require these agencies to resolve disputes arising from allegations 
that a party has breached a teaming agreement; such disputes are 
properly resolved between the private parties.

3.  Protest that contracting agency's management personnel exercised 
undue influence on the evaluation board and contracting officer to 
effect award to a particular firm is denied where the record shows 
that, even if these personnel did prefer that award be made to the 
eventual awardee, there is no evidence that preference translated into 
action which unfairly affected protester's competitive position.

4.  Protest alleging that contracting agency engaged in technical 
leveling, technical transfusion, and unequal discussions with the 
awardee is denied where the record does not support the allegation.

DECISION

PRB Associates, Inc. protests the award of a contract to AMEWAS, Inc. 
under request for proposals (RFP) No. N00421-95-R-5022, issued by the 
Department of the Navy's Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division 
(NAWCAD) to obtain simulation and stimulation development and 
operations engineering and technical support services.  PRB alleges 
various improprieties with respect to the Navy's evaluation of 
proposals, conduct of discussions, actions regarding one of PRB's 
proposed subcontractors, and best value determination.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

NAWCAD's Air Combat Environment Test and Evaluation Facility (ACETEF) 
exposes aircraft under test to an electronic simulation of air combat 
situations.  According to the RFP, aircraft systems are deceived 
through a combination of simulations by digital computers and through 
stimulation by computer-controlled environment generators that provide 
radio frequency, electro-optical, and laser stimuli which duplicate, 
as closely as possible, real signals.  The flight crew is provided 
very high fidelity visual, aural, and motion sensory cueing, as well 
as realistic workload conditions, to simulate the total environment an 
aircraft/aircrew would experience during combat.

ACETEF consists of seven integrated component laboratories, each of 
which  contributes specific functions to support the prescribed combat 
scenario.  The laboratories relevant to these protests are the 
Operations and Control Center (OCC) and the Offensive Sensors 
Laboratory (OSL).  The OCC facility provides scenario control of all 
other ACETEF laboratories, using "man-in-the-loop" and 
computer-controlled simulation as played out by the Simulated Warfare 
Environment Generator (SWEG).  The OCC facility's functional areas 
include the ACETEF/range command and control center, the center of all 
ACETEF testing; two command and control centers; and a systems 
analysis center.  OSL's mission is to provide developmental test and 
evaluation of aircraft offensive sensors by means of stimulated 
complex combat scenarios in which aircraft sensors are realistically 
stimulated with actual electro-optical and radar signals.

This solicitation, issued June 14, 1996, contemplated the award of a 
4-year, cost-plus-fixed-fee indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity 
contract.  Award was to be made to the firm whose proposal was the 
best value to the government, considering technical factors and cost.  
The technical factors were more important than evaluated costs, but 
these costs would be considered of greater importance as the degree of 
equality between the technical proposals increased.  The RFP 
identified six technical factors:  corporate experience, technical 
approach, past performance, personnel, management approach, and 
facilities.[1] 

The Navy received proposals from four offerors by the August 19 
closing date.  Each offer was submitted by a team consisting of a 
prime contractor and numerous subcontractors.  After reviewing the 
technical source selection evaluation board's (TSSEB) initial 
evaluation report, the contracting officer established a competitive 
range of two proposals, those of AMEWAS and PRB.  In response to 
written discussion questions, both offerors submitted revised 
proposals on May 5, 1997.  An evaluation of these revisions spurred 
additional written discussion questions and second revised proposals 
on June 9.  Best and final offers (BAFO) were submitted on July 1.  In 
the final evaluation, the TSSEB rated both proposals "good" 
overall.[2]  AMEWAS's proposal was rated "good" under each technical 
factor and its evaluated cost was $141,434,394.  PRB's proposal was 
rated "good" under each technical factor except management approach, 
under which it was rated "excellent," and its evaluated cost was 
$143,098,966.

To determine which offeror provided the maximum benefit to the 
government, the TSSEB looked behind the adjectival ratings to review 
and compare the strengths and weaknesses of the two proposals, which 
were considered to be "very close."  The TSSEB set forth its 
conclusions in a detailed final evaluation report which can be 
summarized as follows.  

First, the TSSEB believed that both proposals were essentially equal 
under all areas of corporate experience except the OCC and OSL 
laboratories.  In the TSSEB's view, AMEWAS demonstrated a higher 
degree of corporate experience related to the systems analysis and 
command and control requirements of the OCC laboratory, and PRB 
demonstrated a higher degree of corporate experience related to the 
airborne radar stimulators requirements of the OSL laboratory.  The 
TSSEB considered AMEWAS's strengths to be more valuable than PRB's 
strengths because the OCC laboratory's command and control and systems 
analysis requirements are integral to the overall ACETEF process, 
while the OSL area has less influence on the overall process.  Second, 
the TSSEB believed that AMEWAS was superior under the personnel factor 
because its proposed personnel were strong across the board and PRB's 
proposed personnel strengths were limited to certain areas.  Finally, 
the TSSEB acknowledged PRB's superiority under the management approach 
factor but noted that AMEWAS's proposed management approach would 
ensure successful accomplishment of the SOW tasks; the TSSEB 
considered both proposals to be essentially equal under the remaining 
factors.  Considering the superiority of the AMEWAS proposal under the 
corporate experience and personnel factors, as well as its $1.4 
million cost advantage, the TSSEB recommended award to AMEWAS.  The 
source selection official concurred and award was made to AMEWAS on 
September 3. 

PRB argues that the Navy improperly evaluated its proposal under the 
corporate experience and personnel factors; failed to conduct adequate 
discussions with the firm; violated regulatory policy on subcontractor 
teaming agreements in connection with one of its proposed 
subcontractors; countenanced undue influence by Navy personnel to 
effect award to AMEWAS; conducted improper discussions with AMEWAS; 
and conducted a flawed best value determination.  As set forth below, 
our review of the written record, the pleadings, and testimony 
elicited at a hearing in this matter leads us to deny the protests.

DISCUSSION

The PRB Proposal

PRB argues that the Navy improperly evaluated its proposal under the 
corporate experience and personnel factors by identifying three 
weaknesses which PRB contends are not weaknesses at all.  

In reviewing protests against allegedly improper evaluations, it is 
not our role to reevaluate proposals.  Rather, our Office examines the 
record to determine whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and 
in accord with the RFP's stated evaluation criteria.  ESCO, Inc., 66 
Comp. Gen. 404, 410 (1987), 87-1 CPD  para.  450 at 7.  A protester's mere 
disagreement with the agency's conclusions does not render the 
evaluation unreasonable.  Id. 

The corporate experience factor contained two equally important 
subfactors, the first of which required the Navy to review the 
offeror's performance of tasks within the last 7 years to ascertain 
the degree to which its corporate experience demonstrated its 
knowledge and capability to perform the tasks in the statement of work 
(SOW) or similar programs.[3]  Offerors were to provide the requested 
information on corporate data forms (CDF).

In connection with the OCC laboratory's requirements to develop and 
operate command and control centers, the Navy believed that PRB had 
referred to several efforts that exactly matched the government's 
requirements, but had also included a large number of CDFs that were 
weak and showed minimal command and control experience.  In connection 
with this laboratory's systems analysis requirements, the Navy 
believed that PRB's many CDFs demonstrating experience with 
traditional systems engineering processes were not relevant to the 
SOW's systems analysis requirements.  Each finding was considered a 
minor weakness.

PRB does not take issue with the substance of the Navy's views, but 
argues that since some of the information it provided exactly matched 
the requirements it was unreasonable for the Navy to find its proposal 
weak here.  Given the RFP's specific requirement to assess the degree 
to which PRB's experience demonstrated its knowledge and capability to 
perform the relevant tasks, we cannot fault the Navy for concluding 
that the nonrelevant or marginally relevant data PRB submitted 
detracted from the degree to which the firm demonstrated its 
experience.     

Under the personnel factor, the Navy was required to determine how 
well the offeror's proposed personnel met the educational 
requirements, experience level, and appropriate number of personnel 
proposed to support the requirements.  The Navy concluded that some 
PRB personnel were proposed for small units of time and appeared 
allocated to current ongoing efforts, and considered this a minor 
weakness because it believed there is a link between how available 
personnel are to work on tasks and how familiar and proficient they 
will become with the tasks.  PRB's argument that its proposal pledged 
to adequately staff the tasks under this requirements contract does 
not address the Navy's concern, which we find reasonable.

PRB asserts that the Navy's failure to raise these weaknesses during 
discussions was improper since each weakness was associated with the 
OCC laboratory, the area which was a determinative factor in the 
source selection decision.

The applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provision, FAR  sec.  
15.610(c)(2) (June 1997), requires that a contracting agency "[a]dvise 
the offeror of deficiencies in its proposal so that the offeror is 
given an opportunity to satisfy the Government's requirements."  We 
review the adequacy of discussions to ensure that agencies point out 
weaknesses that, unless corrected, would prevent an offeror from 
having a reasonable chance for award.  Department of the Navy--Recon., 
72 Comp. Gen. 221, 223 n.2 (1993), 93-1 CPD  para.  422 at 4 n.2; Brown & 
Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture, B-270505.2, B-270505.3, 
Sept. 12, 1996, 96-2 CPD  para.  143 at 6.  An agency is not required to 
afford offerors all-encompassing discussions, however, nor is it 
required to discuss every aspect of an offeror's proposal that 
receives less than the maximum score.  DAE Corp., B-259866, 
B-259866.2, May 8, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  12 at 4-5.  Neither is an agency 
required to advise an offeror of minor weaknesses that are not 
considered significant, even where the weaknesses subsequently become 
a determinative factor between two closely ranked proposals.  Brown & 
Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture, supra.  Contracting 
agencies have wide discretion in determining the nature and scope of 
discussions, and their discretion will not be questioned unless it is 
clearly shown to be without a rational basis.  Textron Marine Sys., 
B-255580.3, Aug. 2, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  63 at 24.

The Navy conducted two rounds of written discussions with PRB wherein 
the protester was apprised of the principal areas of concern regarding 
its proposal, e.g., all areas where deficiencies were noted.  The 
relative weaknesses that caused PRB's proposal to be rated less than 
excellent were not pointed out to the protester, just as such relative 
weaknesses were not pointed out to AMEWAS; both proposals were rated 
at least "good" for all subfactors.  The existence of these weaknesses 
did not keep PRB from having a reasonable chance for award; PRB was 
very much in the competition, and ultimately was not selected for 
award simply as a result of a best value determination in this "very 
close" competition.  Since the principal concerns about its proposal 
were brought to PRB's attention, and since the various other concerns, 
both individually and in toto, did not prevent PRB from having a 
reasonable chance for award, the agency's failure to point out those 
other concerns did not deprive PRB of meaningful discussions.  See 
Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture, supra, at 6-7.

Subcontracting Teaming Agreement

Amherst Systems, Inc. was one of PRB's proposed subcontractors.  After 
the submission of BAFOs, Amherst called PRB for assistance in 
answering a rate verification request posed by the Defense Contract 
Audit Agency (DCAA).  PRB understood the request to concern Amherst's 
labor rates on an existing PRB contract delivery order and on PRB's 
proposal under this RFP, and provided Amherst a memorandum responsive 
to the question.  PRB later learned that the request also concerned 
Amherst's submission in connection with the AMEWAS proposal--as 
discussed below, AMEWAS proposed Amherst as a subcontractor in its 
first revised proposal.  In a letter to Amherst, PRB asserted that 
Amherst may have violated their teaming agreement by submitting a 
proposal to AMEWAS.

PRB provided a copy of this letter to the contracting officer and 
telephoned her regarding the topic.  She advised PRB that she viewed 
the matter as a private dispute between the two parties.  PRB sent her 
a copy of the teaming agreement and asserted its belief that FAR  sec.  
9.603--which states in part that "[t]he Government will recognize the 
integrity and validity of contractor team arrangements"--must mean 
that the government cannot countenance conduct by a team member that 
directly violates a teaming agreement.  The contracting officer again 
advised PRB that she considered any alleged breach to be a matter to 
be resolved between PRB and Amherst, and took no further action.

PRB argues that the Navy's failure to respond to PRB's concerns 
constituted a knowing violation of the regulatory policy set forth in 
FAR  sec.  9.603 to uphold the validity of contractor teaming agreements.    

The purpose of FAR subpart 9.6 is to permit the recognition of teaming 
agreements between government contractors and their prospective 
subcontractors.  FAR  sec.  9.602; see also Northrop Corp. v. AIL Sys., 
Inc., 959 F.2d 1424, 1428 (7th Cir. 1992); Brent E. Newton, Note, The 
Legal Effect of Government Contractor Teaming Agreements:  A Proposal 
for Determining Liability and Assessing Damages in Event of Breach, 91 
Colum. L. Rev. 1990, 2005 (1991).  While a contracting agency is not 
precluded from inquiring into the details of such agreements, we know 
of no requirement that a contracting agency resolve disputes arising 
from these agreements; an allegation that a teaming agreement has been 
breached is a dispute between private parties.  Ideamatics, Inc., 
B-220074, Oct. 2, 1985, 1985 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 448.  

The record does not support PRB's claim that there was a "clear 
breach" of the agreement; at most, the record shows that the matter is 
a subject of dispute between the parties.  The AMEWAS-Amherst teaming 
agreement acknowledges that Amherst is teamed with PRB on this 
effort,[4] but its statement that the agreement "does not bind Amherst 
Systems exclusively to the PRB Team" is a clear indication that 
Amherst did not believe its teaming agreement with PRB to be the 
exclusive agreement which PRB purports it to be.  Indeed, the 
agreement between PRB and Amherst explicitly permits Amherst to submit 
standard documentation and/or offer standard articles including, but 
not limited to, CDFs and PDFs, to any third party to perform any of 
the work identified.

It is not at all clear that the documents provided by Amherst to 
AMEWAS--CDFs, PDFs, past performance information, and pricing--fall 
outside the scope of that permitted under the agreement.  Since PRB's 
request that the contracting officer respond to its concerns would 
require her to first resolve the dispute, we cannot fault her for 
declining to do so.  See id.  The contracting officer here complied 
with the requirement to recognize the integrity and validity of 
contractor team arrangements by recognizing both the PRB-Amherst 
agreement and the AMEWAS-Amherst agreement absent any compelling 
reason to do otherwise.[5]

The AMEWAS Proposal

PRB alleges that two Navy management personnel exercised undue 
influence on the TSSEB and the contracting officer to effect an award 
to AMEWAS.  Specifically,  after the evaluation of initial proposals, 
these managers expressed concern that award of the contract would 
create a break in support for various ongoing projects, including a 
SWEG project, which were being performed by employees of various 
firms, one of them AMEWAS.  Both managers testified at a hearing on 
this issue that, since there is no perfect team, it was likely that 
the awardee--whoever it was--would not have proposed all of these 
personnel or firms.  See Videotape Transcript (VT) 197 at 20-24; 224 
at 23-25; 225 at 1-7; 265 at 18-25; 268 at 17-24.  This concern 
increased when the contracting officer advised that the RFP did not 
allow the Navy to direct the eventual awardee to add or substitute 
these personnel and/or firms after award.  VT 198 at 14-23; 199 at 
4-16; 265 at 8-17; 267 at 17-23.  PRB posits that this concern arose 
because the managers knew that PRB was "ahead" after the evaluation of 
initial proposals and the only way to ensure that the AMEWAS personnel 
working on ongoing SWEG projects would remain on the job was to award 
the contract to AMEWAS.  PRB asserts that this concern "shaped the 
procurement."

Government officials are presumed to act in good faith, and we will 
not attribute unfair or prejudicial motives to them on the basis of 
inference or supposition.  Ameriko Maintenance Co., B-253274; 
B-253274.2, Aug. 25, 1993, 93-2 CPD  para.  121 at 5.  In addition to 
producing credible evidence showing bias, the protester must 
demonstrate that the agency bias translated into action which unfairly 
affected the protester's competitive position.  Id.  Our review of the 
record, including the hearing testimony elicited from the contracting 
officer, each TSSEB member, and both Navy managers in question, shows 
that the protester has not met its burden.  

There is no dispute that these managers were concerned about a 
possible break in support for ongoing projects, including an ongoing 
SWEG project utilizing some AMEWAS personnel.[6]  We need not address 
the genesis or extent of this concern further because even if the 
record showed that the managers wanted AMEWAS to receive the 
award--which it does not--there is no evidence that this desire was 
translated into action which unfairly affected PRB's competitive 
posture.  

Each factor cited by PRB in support of its argument that this concern 
"shaped the procurement" is without merit.  PRB's claim that this 
concern kept the contracting officer from making award to PRB on the 
basis of initial proposals overlooks the fact that PRB's initial 
proposal contained multiple deficiencies, and the source selection 
plan precluded award unless all deficiencies were discussed and 
resolved.  PRB's claim that the TSSEB improperly discussed this 
concern is based upon one TSSEB member's statement that, in TSSEB 
meetings, "there occasionally were discussions about key, the SWEG 
people, yes."  VT 318 at 12-14.  In our view, this is not evidence 
that the TSSEB improperly considered this concern, but that it 
properly considered personnel proposed for the SWEG effort.  Finally, 
PRB's apparent claim that the TSSEB did not consider that 19 of 31 
AMEWAS CDFs were weak or nonrelevant as opposed to a few such CDFs in 
PRB's proposal, and thus must have actually relied upon AMEWAS's SWEG 
personnel as the distinguishing factor, is unsupported.  The 
underlying evaluation documentation shows that more than 30 of PRB's 
CDFs were considered weak or nonrelevant, and despite its access to a 
voluminous evaluation record, PRB has pointed to nothing in support of 
its contention that AMEWAS's SWEG personnel were the distinguishing 
factor between the two proposals.[7]

PRB next contends that the Navy's discussions with AMEWAS were unequal 
and constituted both technical transfusion and technical leveling.  In 
a series of tenuously linked suppositions, PRB argues that Amherst was 
not proposed as a subcontractor in AMEWAS's first revised proposal; 
the concern noted above motivated the TSSEB to find a way to raise 
AMEWAS's proposal rating to the level of PRB's; adding Amherst as a 
subcontractor would enhance AMEWAS's technical proposal; and 
suggestive questions raised during discussions would compel AMEWAS to 
do so.  The premise underlying PRB's allegation--that Amherst was not 
proposed as a subcontractor in AMEWAS's first revised proposal--is 
without merit, and the remainder of its argument is without support.

In discussions with competing offerors, agencies must avoid unfairness 
and unequal treatment.  CBIS Fed., Inc., 71 Comp. Gen. 319, 325 
(1992), 92-1 CPD  para.  308 at 8.  Disclosure of one offeror's approach to 
another is unfair and is prohibited as technical transfusion.  See FAR  sec.  
15.610(e)(1) (June 1997).  Similarly, technical leveling is to be 
avoided.  This situation arises where an agency, through successive 
rounds of discussions, helps to bring a proposal up to the level of 
another proposal by pointing out weaknesses that remain in the 
proposal due to an offeror's lack of diligence, competence, or 
inventiveness after having been given an opportunity to correct them.  
FAR  sec.  15.610(d) (June 1997); CBIS Fed., Inc., supra.

During the first round of discussions, AMEWAS was advised that the 
Navy had received a negative past performance survey for one of its 
proposed subcontractors and was asked what steps would be taken to 
ensure adequate performance by this subcontractor.  In its first 
revised proposal, AMEWAS stated that, while it intended to retain that 
subcontractor as a team member, it proposed to add a team 
member--Amherst--to mitigate performance and cost risks.  According to 
AMEWAS, the addition of Amherst to the AMEWAS team would ensure that 
the team provided the depth and breadth of personnel and corporate 
resources necessary to address potential surge requirements.  The 
first revised proposal included a copy of the AMEWAS-Amherst teaming 
agreement, but did not include CDFs, PDFs, past performance 
information, or cost data as required by the solicitation.

In evaluating the first revised proposals, the TSSEB noted that AMEWAS 
had not submitted these documents for Amherst.  Since these were 
required documents, the Navy asked AMEWAS several pertinent questions 
during the second round of discussions:

     Section L, of the solicitation instructs the offeror to provide 
     Corporate Data Forms (CDF) for the prime and all proposed 
     subcontractors.  AMEWAS has identified an addition of Amherst 
     Systems to the AMEWAS team.  AMEWAS has failed to provide CDFs 
     relative to corporate experience for Amherst Systems.  Please 
     provide the appropriate CDFs for the aforementioned company in 
     accordance with the solicitation requirements.

     Section L, of the solicitation instructs the offeror to provide 
     Personnel Data Forms (PDF) for all key labor categories for the 
     prime and all proposed subcontractors.  AMEWAS has identified an 
     addition of Amherst Systems to the AMEWAS team.  However, upon 
     review of the revised technical proposal, no PDFs have been 
     proposed for Amherst Systems.  Based upon the significant role of 
     Amherst Systems in support of this requirement, please advise if 
     Amherst Systems personnel will be utilized as key personnel.  
     Please provide the appropriate PDFs for the proposed 
     subcontractor.[8]

In its second revised proposal, AMEWAS provided CDFs, PDFs, past 
performance information, and cost information for Amherst, and 
effectively substituted Amherst for the previously mentioned 
subcontractor.

AMEWAS clearly proposed Amherst as a subcontractor in its first 
revised proposal.  The absence of the required documentation from this 
proposal is not evidence to the contrary given the express language in 
the proposal; moreover, the record shows that both AMEWAS and PRB 
failed to submit such documentation for some subcontractors in their 
initial proposals.  PRB also argues that AMEWAS was prodded into 
substituting Amherst for the other firm because one question 
referenced Amherst as playing a "significant role."  However, we do 
not find this evidence of technical leveling or technical transfusion, 
as the question and phrase were part of a standard format utilized for 
all offerors, including PRB.  Since AMEWAS had already provided the 
agency with the identity of Amherst, we think it was proper for the 
agency to request these documents without concern about improperly 
disclosing aspects of PRB's technical approach (transfusion) or 
improperly coaching AMEWAS (technical leveling).  See CBIS Fed., Inc., 
supra; see also Battelle Memorial Institute, B-259571.3, Dec. 8, 1995, 
95-2 CPD  para.  284 at 6. 

Best Value Determination

PRB contends that the Navy's best value determination was flawed.  The 
protester principally asserts that the Navy unduly elevated the OCC 
area over the OSL area under the first corporate experience subfactor 
in making its best value determination.  We disagree.

The first corporate experience subfactor required the Navy to review 
the offeror's performance of tasks to ascertain the degree to which 
its corporate experience demonstrated its knowledge and capability to 
perform the tasks in the SOW or similar programs.  The solicitation's 
description of the subfactor is followed by an outline of the SOW 
tasks, laboratory by laboratory.  PRB's apparent belief that this 
outline required the TSSEB to give each laboratory equal weight, as if 
they were formal subfactors, is misplaced.  In context, the outline is 
clearly meant as further explanation of "tasks in the SOW or similar 
programs" at issue in this procurement.  Since the SOW describes the 
OCC laboratory as providing scenario control of all other ACETEF 
laboratories and as being the focus of command and control of all 
ACETEF testing, we have no basis to find unreasonable the TSSEB's view 
that the OCC's systems analysis and command control requirements are 
integral to the overall electronic combat test process, and hence of 
more importance than the OSL requirements.  

PRB finally complains that the TSSEB need not have gone back to the 
proposals to look behind the adjectival ratings in view of the fact 
that PRB's proposal had received an "excellent" rating under the 
management approach factor.  However, adjectival ratings are used as a 
guideline for intelligent decision-making by source selection 
officials, and award should not and need not be based solely on these 
ratings.  A selection should reflect the procuring agency's considered 
judgment of whether significant technical differences exist in the 
proposals that identify a particular proposal as technically superior 
regardless of close ratings among proposals.  AlliedSignal, Inc., 
B-272290, B-272290.2, Sept. 13, 1996, 96-2 CPD  para.  121 at 7.  The 
TSSEB's careful consideration of the differences underlying the 
adjectival ratings here was entirely appropriate.

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. The corporate experience factor was more important than the 
technical approach factor, which was slightly more important than the 
past performance factor.  The past performance factor was slightly 
more important than the personnel, management approach, and facilities 
factors, all of which were equally important. 

2. Pursuant to the source selection plan, the technical factors and 
subfactors were adjectivally rated as "excellent," "good," "average," 
"marginal," or "unsatisfactory."  A "good" rating meant that the area 
of the proposal evaluated had no deficiencies and few minor 
weaknesses; an "excellent" rating meant that the area of the proposal 
evaluated had no deficiencies and essentially no weaknesses. 

3. PRB's assertion that it was rated higher than AMEWAS under the 
second corporate experience subfactor mistakenly relies upon the 
individual evaluator ratings, not the consensus ratings, under which 
both proposals were rated "good" in this regard.

4. PRB's assertion that AMEWAS's knowledge that Amherst had teamed 
with PRB for this effort is evidence of a procurement integrity 
violation ignores the fact that the PRB-Amherst agreement is not 
marked as proprietary and is, presumably, a public document.  The 
memorandum that PRB provided to Amherst in response to the DCAA 
request is similarly unmarked.

5. PRB also asserts that the contracting officer improperly failed to 
consider the risk that PRB could seek a court injunction barring 
Amherst from performing on the AMEWAS contract due to this alleged 
breach of agreement.  We find that such action would be entirely 
speculative based upon the unsettled nature of the dispute. 

6. However, PRB's allegation that this concern arose because these 
managers learned of the TSSEB's informal consensus that PRB was 
"ahead" after the initial evaluation is specifically refuted by both 
managers, who state that they did not know which firm was "ahead."  VT 
195 at 2-7; 303 at 21-25. 

7. PRB also argues that the TSSEB makes an "unsupported claim" that 
AMEWAS's proposed personnel demonstrate a relatively greater knowledge 
and understanding of ACETEF's capabilities and functionality than 
PRB's proposed personnel.  Since PRB points to no aspect of this 
voluminous and meticulously detailed evaluation record in support of 
its argument, we have no basis upon which to find the Navy's 
evaluation unreasonable.

8. The Navy also asked AMEWAS to provide past performance information 
and cost information for Amherst.