BNUMBER:  B-277988 
DATE:  December 16, 1997
TITLE: SEEMA, Inc., B-277988, December 16, 1997
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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:SEEMA, Inc.

File:     B-277988

Date:December 16, 1997

William E. Franczek, Esq., and Michael L. Sterling, Esq., Vandeventer, 
Black, Meredith & Martin, L.L.P., for the protester.
Kenneth B. Weckstein, Esq., Epstein Becker & Green, P.C., for 
Centennial Contractors Enterprises, an intervenor.
Col. Nicholas P. Retson, and Maj. Michael J. O'Farrell, Department of 
the Army, for the agency.
Mary G. Curcio, Esq., Andrew T. Pogany, Esq., and John M. Melody, 
Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the 
preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Discussions regarding protester's low price were adequate where 
agency did not specifically tell protester that its price was 
unrealistic, but did tell protester that its price was significantly 
below the government estimate and not supported by the proposal.

2.  Agency decision to award to higher cost, higher technically rated 
offeror was proper where awardee's proposal was rated more 
advantageous under each       nonprice factor, awardee's price was 
reasonable and supported by its proposal, and protester's price was 
deemed too low and not adequately supported.

DECISION

SEEMA, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Centennial Contractors 
Enterprises, Inc. under request for proposals (RFP) No. 
DABT57-96-R-0021, issued by the Department of the Army for facility 
maintenance and repair, and minor construction projects at Fort 
Eustis, Fort Monroe and Fort Story, Virginia.  SEEMA argues that the 
agency misevaluated proposals, failed to hold meaningful discussions 
with the protester, and did not perform a proper price/technical 
trade-off.

We deny the protest. 

BACKGROUND

The solicitation called for the award of a job order contract (JOC)[1] 
and stated that award would be made to the responsible offeror whose 
offer was the best overall value to the government.  The solicitation 
provided that offerors would be evaluated against four equally 
weighted factors:  management, past performance, small business 
participation, and price; subfactors and elements to be evaluated were 
listed under each factor.  The solicitation included a unit price book 
which listed individual unit prices for all types of construction and 
repair work.  The unit prices included labor, material, and equipment 
for completing the job orders.  The Army used a factor of 1 to 
represent the unit prices.  Offerors were required to propose a 
coefficient to be applied to the prices in the unit price book for 
work performed during normal and other than normal working hours, a 
non-prepriced rate for work not included in the unit price book and a 
bond factor to be applied to the project price to cover the cost of 
performance and payment bonds.  The coefficients proposed by the 
offerors were required to include all costs for project management and 
supervision, overhead, profit, labor burden, contingencies and 
subcontractor profit and overhead.

The Army received and evaluated seven proposals, held discussions, and 
requested best and final offers (BAFO) from all seven offerors.  The 
BAFOs were evaluated as  follows:

Offeror      Total Weighted Tech. Score[2]Avg. Weighted 
                                           CoefficientAvg. 
                                           Non-Prepriced Rate

Centennial   68.13             1.078       0.42

Offeror A    62.19             1.019       0.26

Offeror B    62.14             1.064       0.15

Offeror C      62.1            1.127       1.22

SEEMA        61.91             0.948        0.2  

Offeror D    58.88             1.136       0.22

Offeror E    54.18              1.07       1.15
The Army performed a price/technical trade-off and concluded that 
Centennial's proposal represented the best value, since it had no 
weaknesses and offered a price that was supported in its proposal.  
SEEMA's proposal was rated a lesser value despite its lower proposed 
price, since it had weaknesses under each nonprice factor, and its 
offered price appeared too low for adequate performance and the 
proposal did not explain how SEEMA would be able to perform at its 
proposed price.  Based on these findings, the Army chose Centennial 
for award.  This protest followed.  

EVALUATION OF TECHNICAL PROPOSALS

Contractor Office Staffing

The Army found that under contractor office staffing, a subfactor of 
the management factor, Centennial's proposal was more advantageous 
than SEEMA's, which was found to contain weaknesses.  The protester 
argues that the alleged weakness in its office staffing levels was 
"minuscule" in terms of the agency's technical scoring (Centennial 
received 23.38 points while SEEMA received 22.91 points) and that this 
evaluation subfactor only "concerns how many people will be available 
to push the paper to run the contract."  In short, SEEMA argues that 
"more or less people [do] not automatically translate into more or 
less service."

The record shows the agency found that the protester did not have 
sufficient office staff to prepare and negotiate work orders.  
Further, SEEMA stated in its proposal that it would rely on "corporate 
staff" to assist its on-site staff during busy periods, but did not 
further identify the corporate staff at issue or state whether they 
would be dedicated to this effort.  Nor did SEEMA indicate that it had 
a system in place to track the need for further staffing.  [Delete].  
Based on these findings, the Army reasonably found that Centennial's 
proposal offered a significant advantage in ensuring that task orders 
would be negotiated and carried out quickly and efficiently.

Small Business Participation

SEEMA acknowledges that Centennial's proposal was "marginally" 
superior to its own under the small business participation factor, but 
argues that this superiority was not significant.

The record shows that the Director of the Army Small and Disadvantaged 
Business Utilization (SADBU) program had denied an appeal by the Small 
Business Administration to set the procurement aside under the 8(a) 
program.  SADBU required however, that the contracting officer make 
small business participation a significant consideration in the award 
decision.  Thus, the solicitation specifically advised offerors that 
the aggressiveness of their small business participation plan and past 
compliance with small business participation goals would be evaluated.   
The Army found that Centennial's proposal was more advantageous than 
SEEMA's under this factor because, while the protester merely 
committed to meeting the  small and small disadvantaged business (SDB) 
market shares identified in the RFP, Centennial's plan committed to 
exceeding them, and therefore was rated more aggressive and 
comprehensive.  Specifically, Centennial proposed to subcontract 95 
percent of the work to small businesses, compared to SEEMA's 93 
percent, and proposed to subcontract 20 percent to SDBs, compared to 
SEEMA's 12 percent.  In addition, Centennial's proposal contained 
information showing that it had met or exceeded its goals in the past; 
SEEMA had been an SDB until recently and thus had little past 
performance history of meeting small business participation goals.  

We disagree with SEEMA's characterization of Centennial's 
subcontracting goals as "marginally" superior.  While its small 
business goal was only about 2 percent greater than SEEMA's, its SDB 
goal was two-thirds (67 percent) greater; the agency reasonably could 
view this difference in goals as significant for purposes of rating 
the aggressiveness of the two proposed plans.  Further, while SEEMA 
believes it should not be penalized for its lack of experience meeting 
subcontracting goals (i.e., since until January 1997 it was an SDB 
itself), the RFP specifically advised that past compliance with 
subcontracting goals would be considered.  Thus, whatever the reason 
for SEEMA's (or any other offeror's) lack of a track record, there is 
no basis for finding that the agency was precluded from recognizing 
Centennial's superiority in this area.

Past Performance

SEEMA argues that the Army improperly applied an undisclosed 
evaluation criterion--past performance on JOCs in general and on Army 
JOCs specifically--in determining that Centennial's past performance 
was superior to SEEMA's.

This argument is without merit.  Centennial's proposal showed it 
performed 19 JOCs and that 9 of those were Army JOCs.  In contrast, 
SEEMA's past performance consisted of 4 Air Force SABER contracts.  
The Army did not rate Centennial superior to SEEMA based on a 
JOC/SABER distinction;[3] it considered performance on the SABER 
contracts equivalent to work on the JOCs.  Rather, Centennial's 
superior rating was based primarily on the fact that it had performed 
substantially more of this type of contract than SEEMA--19 versus 
4--and that this greater experience would minimize performance risk.  
There is nothing unreasonable in this conclusion.

PRICE EVALUATION

Alleged Unstated Evaluation Criterion

SEEMA argues that the Army improperly evaluated its proposal for price 
realism--finding that its proposed coefficient was unrealistically 
low--since price realism was not a stated evaluation factor.  
According to SEEMA, since the RFP only indicated that a price analysis 
would be performed, and a fixed-price (rather than a cost 
reimbursement) contract was to be awarded, price should have been 
evaluated only for reasonableness, to ensure it was not too high.[4]

We reject this argument.  In our view, it was reasonable for the 
agency to consider the risk associated with low proposed prices here, 
where the RFP contained an evaluation factor, management, under which 
offerors were to be comparatively evaluated based, among other things, 
on the "understanding of the work tasks required."  Where an RFP 
either expressly or implicitly encompasses offeror understanding in 
its evaluation factors, the agency's consideration of an unreasonably 
low price pursuant to a price analysis is unobjectionable, since it 
relates to the evaluation of the offeror's understanding.  See ENCORP 
Int'l, Inc., B-258829, Feb. 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  100 at 5-6; 
Mid-Atlantic Forestry Servs., Inc., B-217334, 85-2 CPD  para.  279 at 10.  
Accordingly, we find no merit to the protester's argument that, in 
considering whether SEEMA's proposed coefficient was unrealistically 
low, the agency was applying an unstated evaluation criterion.

Realism of Coefficient Price

As to the substance of the agency's price analysis, SEEMA challenges 
the determination that its coefficient price was too low.  However, 
the record shows that SEEMA's coefficient remained below 1 in its 
BAFO, and we find reasonable the agency's determination that SEEMA's 
proposal did not adequately explain how it would be able to perform at 
its proposed coefficient.  In this regard, the proposal merely stated 
generally that the proposed price assumed a high work efficiency for 
strong team building with subcontracts and a familiarity factor for 
long-term contract involvement, as well as economies of scale and 
prompt payment discounts with subcontractors and suppliers.  The 
proposal did not include any details or supporting data whatsoever 
showing how SEEMA would be able to perform the contract at its offered 
price, or explaining the specific efficiencies or economies of scale 
or how they would be realized.  Without this explanation, the agency 
perceived a risk that SEEMA's price was too low for adequate contract 
performance.  We see nothing unreasonable in this conclusion; SEEMA's 
disagreement with the Army, without any supporting details or data, is 
not sufficient to bring the evaluation into question.  See Creative 
Management Tech., Inc., B-266299, Feb. 9, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  61 at 6.                       

PRICE/TECHNICAL TRADE-OFF

SEEMA challenges the price/technical trade-off, noting that there was 
only a 7-point difference in SEEMA's and Centennial's nonprice 
ratings, while Centennial's proposal is potentially $5 million higher 
in price.[5]  SEEMA argues that the difference in the technical scores 
is not worth the additional cost. 

Price/technical trade-offs may be made in deciding between competing 
proposals;  the propriety of such a trade-off turns not on the 
difference in technical scores or ratings, per se, but on whether the 
agency's judgment concerning the significance of the difference was 
reasonable and adequately justified in light of the RFP evaluation 
scheme.  AAA Painting and Janitorial Contractors, Inc., B-270168, Feb. 
13, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  72 at 3.  In this regard, evaluation scores are 
merely guides for the selection official, who must use his or her 
judgment to determine what the technical difference between competing 
proposals might mean to contract performance.  R&A Technical Servs., 
B-270988, May 7, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  238 at 4.  The record shows that the 
Army chose Centennial's proposal over SEEMA's because Centennial's 
proposal was superior under each nonprice evaluation factor, had no 
disadvantages, and offered a coefficient that was justified and 
supported by the proposal.  In contrast, the agency found that SEEMA's 
proposal, while acceptable, contained a number of weaknesses and a 
coefficient too low to ensure adequate performance; specifically, the 
Army believed SEEMA's low price could lead to additional 
administrative burdens as well as a risk of bill padding, the use of 
inferior materials or problems with subcontractors.  Given the 
evaluation results, the Army's concerns, and the fact that the 
evaluation factors were weighted 75 percent nonprice, 25 percent 
price, the Army reasonably could determine that Centennial's superior 
proposal was worth its higher proposed cost. 

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States 

1. A JOC is an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) 
contract for accomplishment of small- and medium-sized real property 
maintenance and repair, and minor construction projects.    

2. The total weighted technical score attainable was 75 points.

3. Even had the evaluation been as SEEMA alleges, an agency, under 
generally worded experience/past performance criteria, properly may 
consider the extent to which an offeror has experience directly 
related to the work required by the solicitation.  Systems Integration 
& Dev., Inc., B-271050, June 7, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  273 at 4; Human 
Resource Sys., Inc.; Health Staffers, Inc., B-262254.3 et al., Dec. 
21, 1995, 96-1 CPD  para.  35 at 3.  This being the case, we think the Army 
reasonably could consider the offerors' experience under JOC and Army 
JOC contracts.

4. SEEMA also argues that, assuming a realism analysis was 
permissible, the Army failed to hold meaningful discussions because 
the agency did not specifically tell SEEMA that its price was 
unrealistically low.  This argument is without merit.  By informing 
SEEMA that its price was significantly below the government estimate 
and that its cost savings measures were not supported by data, the 
Army led SEEMA into the area of the deficiency, as required in order 
for discussions to be meaningful.  Medland Controls, Inc., B-255204, 
B-255204.3, Feb. 17, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  260 at 7.

5. The Army explains that the actual difference in cost will be 
between $208,000 and $5.2 million, depending upon whether all options 
are exercised and how much work is ordered.