BNUMBER:  B-277700 
DATE:  November 13, 1997
TITLE: Chemical Demilitarization Associates, B-277700, November 13,
1997
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Chemical Demilitarization Associates

File:     B-277700

Date:November 13, 1997

Rand L. Allen, Esq., Paul F. Khoury, Esq., Scott M. McCaleb, Esq., 
Kevin J. Maynard, Esq., and David A. Vogel, Esq., Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, for the protester.
Thomas J. Madden, Esq., John Pavlick, Jr., Esq., Jerome S. Gabig, Jr., 
Esq., and Paul N. Wengert, Esq., Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, 
for Raytheon Demilitarization Company, an intervenor.
Joshua A. Kranzberg, Esq., and Bernadine F. McGuire, Esq., Department 
of the Army, for the agency.
Henry J. Gorczycki, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of 
the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the 
decision.

DIGEST

The agency's source selection decision finding proposals equivalent 
under every individual evaluation criterion under technical and 
management, the two most important evaluation areas, and basing the 
selection on a trade-off between past performance and cost/price, 
cannot be determined reasonable where the evaluation record reflects 
differences in the merit of competing technical proposals and the 
agency's rationale for finding the proposals equivalent under every 
criterion is not supported by the record.

DECISION

Chemical Demilitarization Associates (CDA), a joint venture of EG&G, 
Inc. and Morrison Knudsen, protests an award to Raytheon 
Demilitarization Company under request for proposals (RFP) No. 
DAAA09-92-R-0351, issued by the Department of the Army, Armament, 
Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM), Rock Island, Illinois, for 
construction, equipment installation, systemization, operation and 
closure of the Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (PBCDF), 
Arkansas.  CDA alleges that the source selection decision is 
unreasonable.

We sustain the protest.

Demilitarization facilities for destroying chemical weapons have been 
or will be constructed and operated at nine sites where the weapons 
are located.  A contract for the prototype chemical demilitarization 
facility was awarded in 1986 to Raytheon for the Johnston Atoll 
Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS).  A contract for the second 
facility was awarded in 1989 to EG&G, Inc. for the Tooele Chemical 
Agent Disposal Facility in Utah.  A third contract was awarded in 1996 
to Westinghouse Electric Corporation for the Anniston Chemical Agent 
Disposal Facility in Alabama.  Most recently, a fourth contract was 
awarded in February 1997 to Raytheon for the Umatilla Chemical Agent 
Disposal Facility in Oregon.

The RFP, issued on July 8, 1994, contemplated the award of a 
combination fixed-price and cost-plus-award-fee contract.  The RFP 
stated that award would be made on a best value basis considering the 
areas of technical, management, past performance, and cost/price.  The 
RFP, as amended, stated the relative importance of each of these areas 
as follows:

     Technical approach is more important than management.  Management 
     is somewhat more important than either of past performance or 
     cost/price.  Past performance and cost/price are of equal 
     importance.

The technical and management areas were divided into elements, which 
in turn were divided into factors and, in the case of one factor, 
subfactors--this amounted to 27 constituent evaluation criteria in 
these two areas whose relative importance was stated in the RFP.[1]  
As stated in the RFP, the technical and management areas would be 
numerically scored and assessed for proposal risk.

Past performance had no stated subordinate elements or factors 
(although the RFP stated in narrative what would be considered under 
this area).  A performance risk assessment group (PRAG) was to 
evaluate the quality of an offeror's past performance and assign a 
risk rating of low, moderate, high, or unknown (i.e., no relevant 
experience).

Cost/price was to be evaluated, but not numerically scored.  The 
cost/price evaluation would also include an integrated assessment of 
proposal risk.

CDA, Raytheon, and Westinghouse responded to the RFP.[2]  The agency 
conducted multiple rounds of discussions and ultimately requested two 
rounds of best and final offers (BAFO).  Offerors submitted their 
second round of BAFOs by April 28, 1997.  

The source selection evaluation board (SSEB) evaluated the proposals 
under the technical and management areas by assigning adjectival 
ratings and corresponding scores on a 100-point scale.[3]

The evaluation resulted in CDA's proposal receiving a technical score 
of 90.6 compared to 84 for Raytheon.  Within the technical area, CDA's 
proposal received a higher score than Raytheon's under 12 of the 16 
constituent criteria, of which the difference between the two 
proposals' scores for about half of these was 15 or more points.  
Raytheon's proposal did not receive a higher score than CDA's under 
any of the technical criteria.  This difference in scores resulted in 
CDA's proposal receiving a higher score than Raytheon's under every 
evaluation element of the technical area.

Under the management area, Raytheon's proposal received a score of 
89.8 compared to 84.6 for CDA.  In contrast to the technical area, the 
margin here resulted solely from Raytheon's proposal receiving a 
higher score for one of the constituent criteria, corporate baseline 
management, which was the most important element in the management 
area and had no subordinate factors.  This was the only criterion in 
the management area for which Raytheon's proposal received a higher 
score than CDA's proposal.

In addition to the scores and ratings, the SSEB identified and 
described with narrative comments the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with each proposal under each constituent criterion.  A 
panel then determined which of these advantages and disadvantages were 
considered "programmatic" (i.e., whether an advantage or disadvantage 
enhanced or degraded performance, or reduced or increased performance 
risk).  The programmatic advantages and disadvantages were those 
presented to the source selection authority (SSA) as those that were 
important.  Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 28, 482-83.  The following 
table shows the number of advantages and disadvantages, both overall 
and programmatic (prog.), found for each proposal:  

        Technical  AdvantagesTechnical DisadvantagesManagement 
                                  Advantages   Management 
                                               Disadvantages

Offeror Total  Prog. Total  Prog. Total  Prog. Total Prog.

CDA     22     7[4]  0      0     3      2     2     1

Raytheon4      3     3      0     4      1     2     1
The overall combined weighted score under the technical and management 
areas was 88.1 for CDA's proposal and 86.4 for Raytheon's proposal.  
Both were rated "outstanding" overall with low proposal risk.  Under 
past performance, CDA was rated a moderate performance risk and 
Raytheon a low performance risk.  The cost/price evaluation assessed a 
moderate risk to both cost proposals.  The evaluated prices and costs 
follow (in millions of dollars):

Offeror   Fixed Price  Proposed Cost  Upward Cost AdjustmentTotal

CDA       $217.6       $276.5         $5.8        $499.9

Raytheon   $206.5      $305.1         $3.0        $514.6
The SSEB reported its findings to the source selection advisory 
council (SSAC).  The SSAC analyzed the SSEB's findings and reported to 
the SSA.  The SSAC report stated the following conclusions:

     All offerors determined to be outstanding, based on evaluation of 
     their proposals against [technical/management] criteria.
     
     CDA and [Raytheon] determined to represent equivalent, lowest 
     proposal risk, based on [Technical/Management] Tradeoff Analysis.
     
     [Raytheon] determined to represent lowest performance risk, based 
     on Past Performance Assessment.

The SSAC report then analyzed the cost/price evaluations showing that 
CDA was lowest overall and stated the following conclusion:

        [Raytheon] represents best value to the Government:
        -Compared to CDA: [Raytheon's] lower performance risk offsets 
        2.9 [percent] cost advantage of CDA . . .

The SSA determined that there were no meaningful differences under any 
of the 27 technical and management evaluation criteria between 
Raytheon's and CDA's proposals.  Tr. at 608.  The SSA's source 
selection decision document stated:

     a.  All offerors' Technical and Management proposals are 
     outstanding.  First, I reviewed Technical and Management areas, 
     which had been individually evaluated and scored.  In order to 
     determine the overall integrated benefits offered by the 
     proposals, I also assessed Technical and Management as a whole, 
     considering the relative weights of the two areas, as well as 
     each offeror's unique set of programmatic advantages and 
     disadvantages, and the relative importance of those programmatic 
     advantages and disadvantages.  As a result of this review, I find 
     that CDA and [Raytheon] are equivalent in Technical/Management 
     approaches, and also provide the lowest overall integrated 
     Technical/Management proposal risk. . . .  CDA represents a 
     higher performance risk based on EG&G's past performance at 
     Tooele . . . .

     5.  This contract award is one of a succession of contract awards 
     for the [Chemical Stockpile Demilitarization Program]. . . .  
     Because of the successive solicitations including discussions and 
     debriefings, all the offerors have been able to improve their 
     technical and management proposals and produce 
     technical/management plans which are overall considered 
     outstanding.  Similarly, the offerors' cost proposals have also 
     become extremely competitive. . . .  CDA and [Raytheon] each have 
     one of [the two currently] operating plants. . . .  At this point 
     in time, the Government has more confidence in the performance 
     potential for [Raytheon] than it does for CDA, based on current 
     activities and experiences at these two facilities.

     6.  Award Decision:  After carefully reviewing and assessing the 
     results of the Technical, Management, Past Performance, and 
     Cost/Price evaluations of the three offerors, I find that 
     [Raytheon] represents the best value to the Government for the 
     PBCDF project.  When compared to CDA, both have outstanding and 
     low risk technical/management approaches.  However, [Raytheon's] 
     lower performance risk clearly justifies the cost premium. . . .

The agency awarded the contract to Raytheon on July 25.  After 
requesting and receiving a debriefing, CDA filed this protest.  The 
protest challenges the source selection decision with respect to the 
determination of technical/management equivalence and the relative 
assessments of performance risk.  The agency has stayed performance 
pending resolution of this protest.

TECHNICAL/MANAGEMENT EQUIVALENCE

CDA first alleges that the determination that proposals were 
equivalent under the technical and management areas is unreasonable.  
CDA explains that despite the clear evaluated differences between 
CDA's and Raytheon's proposals, the agency unreasonably determined 
that the proposals were equivalent under every individual technical 
and management evaluation criterion.  Thus, CDA alleges that the 
source selection decision improperly failed to give any weight to the 
technical and management evaluation areas, even though they were 
supposed to account for 60 percent of the evaluation weight.

In response, the agency contends that the disparity in scores in and 
of itself does not evidence an evaluated superiority of either 
proposal under any criterion.  Rather, the agency asserts that the 
design and operation restrictions of the RFP, combined with both 
offerors' having competed in several similar procurements, allowed 
little margin for differentiation under any evaluation area other than 
past performance.  

In a negotiated procurement with a best value evaluation plan, point 
scores and adjectival ratings are only guides to assist contracting 
agencies in evaluating proposals; they do not mandate automatic 
selection of a particular proposal.  Grey Advertising, Inc., 55 Comp. 
Gen. 1111, 1118 (1976), 76-1 CPD  para.  325 at 9; PRC, Inc., B-274698.2, 
B-274698.3, Jan. 23, 1997, 97-1 CPD  para.  115 at 12.  Source selection 
officials have broad discretion in determining the manner and extent 
to which they will make use of the technical and cost evaluation 
results, subject only to the tests of rationality and consistency with 
the evaluation criteria.  Grey Advertising, Inc., supra; A & W 
Maintenance Servs., Inc.--Recon., B-255711.2, Jan. 17, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  
24 at 4.

Where, as here, the agency determines that a higher technical score 
does not reflect actual technical superiority, it must show that the 
agency reasonably concluded that no such technical superiority exists.  
DynCorp, 71 Comp. Gen. 129, 133-34 (1991), 91-2 CPD  para.  575 at 6-7.  
Such a showing must be sufficiently detailed to permit our Office to 
review the determination for reasonableness.  Id.; compare Dayton T. 
Brown, Inc., B-229664, Mar. 30, 1988, 88-1 CPD  para.  321 at 5-7 
(reasonable justification for determining that evaluated merit did not 
reflect significant actual difference) with DLI Eng'g Corp., B-218335, 
June 28, 1985, 85-1 CPD  para.  742 at 6-8 (unreasonable justification).

In the course of a hearing conducted by our Office, the evaluation and 
source selection officials provided testimony on the determination of 
equivalence under the technical and management areas.  All agreed that 
the proposals were found equivalent under the technical area as well 
as under the management area.  Tr. at 355, 484, 575, 614-15.  The SSA 
testified that the two proposals had no meaningful differences under 
any of the 27 technical and management evaluation criteria. Tr. at 
608.  He confirmed this judgment with regard to his assessment of 
various individual elements and factors.  Tr. at 511-12, 540-50, 575, 
596-98.  In our view, the evaluation and hearing records do not 
support this determination.  

The most marked difference between the proposals is under technical, 
the most important area, where CDA's proposal received a higher raw 
score under three quarters of the criteria, a large number of which 
reflected a significant difference in score, and Raytheon's proposal 
did not receive the higher score on any of the criteria.[5]  Although 
these scores are only guides, our review of the detailed evaluation 
narratives describing the advantages and disadvantages showed that the 
higher scores appear to reflect actual qualitative differences between 
the two proposals.

The evaluation and source selection personnel recognize that 
differences exist, but state that such differences are not meaningful 
or significant.  Tr. at 344, 488, 542, 546-48, 655.  However, when 
explaining why the proposals are equivalent with no meaningful or 
significant differences under any given criterion, the witnesses 
responded in very general terms, essentially stating without further 
elaboration that the agency considered the differences and did not 
find them meaningful; that equivalence was to be expected because of 
the procurement history, detailed RFP requirements, and successive 
rounds of discussions; or that the similarity of adjectival ratings 
showed equivalence.  Tr. at 339-41, 356-57, 420-22, 486-88, 540-43, 
545-50, 576-81, 588-98, 653-60.  

Where, as here, the evaluation record evidences relative differences 
in proposal merit, such general statements are inadequate to show 
equivalency; the agency must compare the relative merits of the 
proposals in a manner that reasonably supports a determination of 
equivalency.  See Matrix Int'l Logistics, Inc., B-272388.2, Dec. 9, 
1996, 97-2 CPD  para.  89 at 9-10.

Although the agency's position is that the procurement history, the 
detailed requirements of the RFP, and the successive BAFOs support a 
conclusion that proposals are equivalent in merit,[6] these events 
themselves do not show that the proposals actually are equivalent.  
Nor is similarity in the adjectival ratings proof of technical 
equality because the pre-established large range of scores within each 
adjectival rating allowed for large variations in evaluated merit 
between proposals receiving the same rating.  Since the evaluation 
record shows documented differences in merit between these two 
proposals, the similarity of adjectival ratings here does not 
establish that the proposals are equivalent.  See Matrix Int'l 
Logistics, Inc., supra, at 8-9.

To the extent the SSA could be said to have substituted his judgment 
for that documented by the evaluators, the record shows that he may 
not have reasonably considered the relevant information.  In this 
regard, although the SSA's testimony was for the most part not 
specific enough for us to assess the basis of his judgment, in the one 
instance where he did specifically explain relative proposal merits, 
his explanation does not establish that the proposals are equivalent.  
In that specific instance, i.e., Quality Assurance/Quality Control 
(QA/QC), a factor under the most important technical element, CDA's 
proposal was scored at 92 and Raytheon's proposal was scored at 60.  
In terms of adjectival ratings, these scores placed CDA's proposal 
above the middle of the "Outstanding" range, while Raytheon's was at 
the bottom of the "Excellent" range (bordering on "Satisfactory").  
CDA's identified programmatic advantage was that "[DELETED]."  CDA was 
also found to have a [DELETED], which was likewise determined to be a 
programmatic advantage, although this was inadvertently omitted from 
the final list of programmatic advantages presented to the SSA.  Tr. 
at 126.  

On the other hand, Raytheon's proposal had one nonprogrammatic 
advantage attributed to [DELETED] when that change occurs.  Raytheon's 
proposal also had the following nonprogrammatic disadvantage:

     [DELETED]

     [DELETED]

     [DELETED]

     [DELETED]

During the hearing conducted by our Office, the SSEB chairperson 
testified that the SSEB never characterized the two proposals as 
equivalent under this factor.  Tr. at 134.  The stated reason that 
Raytheon's disadvantage was not designated as programmatic (and 
therefore not included in the SSAC report to the SSA) was that the 
cognizant evaluators decided to designate such advantages or 
disadvantages as either a programmatic advantage for one proposal, or 
a programmatic disadvantage for another, but not as programmatic for 
both, so as to avoid "overly penaliz[ing] for a particular finding if 
it applied to a single attribute like quality."  Tr. at 131.  Thus, 
the SSAC report to the SSA showed only a programmatic advantage for 
CDA under this criterion and no programmatic disadvantage for 
Raytheon.

Although we think that this evaluation documentation evidences a 
significant difference between the proposals on QA/QC, the SSA stated 
that this was not a meaningful difference.  He understood the 
evaluated difference to be that [DELETED], and he thought the 
differences "could be easily - not easily but certainly handled 
administratively once you assign the contract."  Tr. at 511.  This 
explanation does not address the totality of the problems found in the 
evaluation of Raytheon's QA/QC approach, in that it does not account 
for [DELETED].  We also note that, but for CDA's programmatic 
advantage under this criterion, the concerns with Raytheon's QA/QC 
plan should have been designated a programmatic disadvantage for 
Raytheon.  Tr. at 131-32.  Thus, the SSA's specific testimony suggests 
that he was not cognizant of, or did not understand, the evaluated 
differences between the proposals with regard to QA/QC, and that he 
may not have fully understood how programmatic differences were 
designated.  In any event, the determination that the proposals are 
equivalent under QA/QC was not supported by the evidence.[7]

Similarly, the agency has not explained why the documented differences 
in the evaluation of the proposals for the other criteria, 
particularly those where CDA's proposal received a notably higher (15 
points) score (general approach, laboratory operations, environmental 
compliance, and utilization of core employees) were not meaningful.[8]  

The agency and intervenor state that the differences on any given 
criterion are not significant because the weights of the individual 
criteria are low overall, considering the presence of so many other 
criteria.  This argument fails to account for the underlying rationale 
of the equivalence determination and the ultimate selection 
decision--that is, that the two proposals were equivalent on every 
technical and every management criterion--because the designated 
weight of any given criterion is irrelevant in determining whether two 
proposals are or are not equivalent under that criterion.  

Here, once the proposals were found equivalent under the technical and 
management areas, the source selection decision was based on a 
trade-off between past performance risk and cost/price.  Tr. at 
503-05, 565, 614-18.  In other words, the two most heavily weighted 
evaluation areas, technical and management, were ultimately discarded 
from the source selection decision.  Since the agency has not 
reasonably determined that the proposals are equivalent under the 
technical and management areas, the agency has not meaningfully 
assessed the relative merits of the proposals under the stated 
evaluation plan.  The trade-off analysis was thus unreasonable and 
inconsistent with the stated selection plan and cannot be the basis 
for awarding the contract.  See Matrix Int'l Logistics, Inc., supra, 
at 10.

Counsel for the agency and the intervenor contend, in the alternative, 
that even if CDA's proposal is technically superior to Raytheon's 
proposal, Raytheon's proposal is superior to CDA's under the 
management area and, applying the established factor weights, the 
overall weighted technical/management scores are so close as to 
indicate overall equivalence attributable to offsetting proposal 
strengths and weaknesses.  Although we will consider information 
submitted during a protest, including the parties' arguments, 
explanations, and hearing testimony, in considering the entire record 
we accord greater weight to contemporaneous evaluation and source 
selection material.  See Matrix Int'l Logistics, Inc., supra, at 5-6.  
A finding of equivalence based on offsetting merit may be reasonable 
where the source selection officials have made such a determination.  
See, e.g., Employee Assistance Serv., B-207057, July 19, 1982, 82-2 
CPD  para.  56 at 3.  A properly documented, considered judgment of the 
source selection authority is critical in this case, however, since 
the evaluation results, when correctly considered under the stated 
evaluation criteria, are so close as to make selection of either 
offeror a reasonable possibility.

The SSA testified that he did not perform a trade-off analysis along 
the lines of the alternative defense suggested by counsel.  Tr. at 
596-98.  Moreover, although the SSEB chairperson initially testified 
that meaningful evaluated differences between CDA's and Raytheon's 
proposals existed, Tr. at 117-18, 145-48, 152-53, the agency recalled 
the witness on a later date to deny that any meaningful differences 
existed.  Tr. at 342-44.  This alternate technical/management 
trade-off rationale thus does not appear to be the view of the 
evaluation and source selection officials, but rather that of counsel 
seeking to defend the agency's source selection.  Because it has been 
offered in the heat of an adversarial process and may not represent 
the fair and considered judgment of the agency, which is a 
prerequisite of a rational evaluation and source selection process, we 
accord this alternate rationale little weight.  Boeing Sikorsky 
Aircraft Support, B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997,
97-2 CPD  para.  91 at 15.

PAST PERFORMANCE RISK

CDA also protests that the past performance risk evaluations and the 
assessment of those evaluations by the SSA are unreasonable.  CDA 
essentially contends that not enough significance was accorded in 
Raytheon's risk assessment to the release of a chemical agent at 
JACADS in 1994, and that too much significance was accorded in CDA's 
risk assessment to recent unfavorable customer satisfaction 
assessments of EG&G's performance at Tooele.  We believe that the 
record does not demonstrate that the past performance risk ratings are 
unreasonable.  

Raytheon's actions were apparently not the sole cause for the chemical 
agent release at JACADS.  The agency identified a government design 
defect as playing a significant role in the release, and that defect 
has been corrected at JACADS as well as in the design of other 
facilities.  Although Raytheon's staff reportedly did not properly 
execute relevant procedures at the time, such lapses have not occurred 
since.  The SSA was aware of the design defect and the lapse in 
following procedure.  Ultimately, he determined that the correction of 
the design defect will prevent the same type of release from happening 
at any facility.  This, in his view, together with the quality 
performance of Raytheon at JACADS since 1994, provides a sufficient 
level of confidence to reduce the level of risk that would usually 
attach to a contractor's release of a chemical agent.  Tr. at 495-97, 
520-24.

In contrast with this problem from 1994, the customer satisfaction 
issues for EG&G at Tooele have occurred in the last year.  The 
concerns were associated with cost overruns, a failure to follow 
procedures resulting in a plant shutdown, the failure to implement 
required systems such as a cost control system, and a general lack of 
corporate support.  Tr. at 269-70.  Although some of the agency's 
concerns have been corrected, and EG&G has discussed with the agency 
the contractor's plans for addressing the other concerns, the agency 
has determined that an increased level of risk will remain until all 
of the proposed action is successfully implemented.  Tr. at 498-502, 
557-61.  

Neither of these risk assessments is unreasonable.  An agency may 
reasonably give less weight to older performance problems where the 
contractor's subsequent performance has been good.  E. Huttenbauer & 
Son, Inc., B-257778, B-257779, Nov. 8, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  206 at 7.  An 
agency may also place more significance on recent performance 
problems.  See Federal Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-250135.4, May 24, 1993, 
93-1 CPD  para.  398 at 9.  To the extent the agency's concerns here became 
the significant discriminator in the past performance area, the RFP 
specifically advised offerors that such a finding in any element of an 
offeror's performance history could be "an important consideration in 
the source selection process." 

CONCLUSION

Since the agency did not reasonably consider the relative merits of 
the proposals under the technical and management areas, we cannot find 
that the source selection decision is reasonable and consistent with 
the terms of the RFP.  We recommend that the agency make and document 
a new source selection decision consistent with the stated evaluation 
criteria.  If an offeror other than Raytheon is selected, the agency 
should terminate Raytheon's contract and make award accordingly.  We 
also recommend that the protester be reimbursed the reasonable costs 
of filing and pursuing its protest, including attorneys' fees.  4 
C.F.R.  sec.  21.8(d)(1) (1997).  The protesters certified claim for costs 
must be submitted to the agency within 60 days of receiving this 
decision.  4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.8(f)(1).

The protest is sustained.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. The record refers to 28 criteria.  One of these criteria covering 
facility closure was evaluated under another criterion (i.e., general 
approach) and was not separately scored.

2. Because Westinghouse's proposal is not at issue in this protest, it 
is not discussed further.

3. The source selection plan, which was not released to the offerors, 
identified the following rating and point scale:
            
 Score         Rating

 80 - 100      Outstanding

 60 - <80      Excellent

 40 - <60      Satisfactory

 20 - <40      Poor

   0 - <20     Unacceptable

4. The report carried forward to the SSA identifies only six technical 
               programmatic advantages for CDA.  The SSEB chairperson 
               stated that the seventh programmatic advantage was 
               inadvertently omitted.  Tr. at 126.

5. The reasonableness of the underlying evaluations is not challenged 
by any party.  

6. The SSA described his "mind-set" when he reviewed the technical and 
management evaluations as expecting the proposals from these offerors 
to be outstanding.  Tr. at 548-49.

7. Although an SSAC member testified about another aspect of 
Raytheon's proposal that was rated as a programmatic advantage under 
another criterion that had some application to QA/QC, he stated that 
this crossover was "very small."  Tr. At 667.

8. For example, protester's counsel questioned the SSA about the most 
important evaluation element, i.e., operations conceptual approach 
(under which 4 of the constituent criteria CDA had a higher score of 
at least 15 points), going through numerous examples of evaluated 
differences, and the SSA only acknowledged advantages in CDA's 
proposal not present in Raytheon's (e.g., [DELETED]).  In response to 
this questioning, the SSA did not provide a specific explanation as to 
why those differences are not significant or meaningful.  See, 
e.g.,Tr. at 576-81.  While the SSEB chairperson later denied that 
there were meaningful differences between the proposals under any of 
the criteria, Tr. at 342-344, he initially testified that the 
proposals were not equivalent with regard to QA/QC, Tr. at 134, and 
that there were meaningful differences favoring CDA under laboratory 
operations, Tr. at 117-18, and the utilization of core employees, Tr. 
at 145, and that, considering the entire basis for the evaluation, 
CDA's and Raytheon's proposals were not equivalent under either the 
technical or management area, Tr. 152-53.  Finally, when questioned 
about specific evaluated differences between the two proposals, an 
SSAC member testified that there was a difference under laboratory 
operations, but he could not say whether it was significant, Tr. at 
653-54, and that the proposals were not equivalent under QA/QC, Tr. at 
655.