BNUMBER: B-277700
DATE: November 13, 1997
TITLE: Chemical Demilitarization Associates, B-277700, November 13,
1997
**********************************************************************
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Chemical Demilitarization Associates
File: B-277700
Date:November 13, 1997
Rand L. Allen, Esq., Paul F. Khoury, Esq., Scott M. McCaleb, Esq.,
Kevin J. Maynard, Esq., and David A. Vogel, Esq., Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, for the protester.
Thomas J. Madden, Esq., John Pavlick, Jr., Esq., Jerome S. Gabig, Jr.,
Esq., and Paul N. Wengert, Esq., Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti,
for Raytheon Demilitarization Company, an intervenor.
Joshua A. Kranzberg, Esq., and Bernadine F. McGuire, Esq., Department
of the Army, for the agency.
Henry J. Gorczycki, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of
the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the
decision.
DIGEST
The agency's source selection decision finding proposals equivalent
under every individual evaluation criterion under technical and
management, the two most important evaluation areas, and basing the
selection on a trade-off between past performance and cost/price,
cannot be determined reasonable where the evaluation record reflects
differences in the merit of competing technical proposals and the
agency's rationale for finding the proposals equivalent under every
criterion is not supported by the record.
DECISION
Chemical Demilitarization Associates (CDA), a joint venture of EG&G,
Inc. and Morrison Knudsen, protests an award to Raytheon
Demilitarization Company under request for proposals (RFP) No.
DAAA09-92-R-0351, issued by the Department of the Army, Armament,
Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM), Rock Island, Illinois, for
construction, equipment installation, systemization, operation and
closure of the Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (PBCDF),
Arkansas. CDA alleges that the source selection decision is
unreasonable.
We sustain the protest.
Demilitarization facilities for destroying chemical weapons have been
or will be constructed and operated at nine sites where the weapons
are located. A contract for the prototype chemical demilitarization
facility was awarded in 1986 to Raytheon for the Johnston Atoll
Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS). A contract for the second
facility was awarded in 1989 to EG&G, Inc. for the Tooele Chemical
Agent Disposal Facility in Utah. A third contract was awarded in 1996
to Westinghouse Electric Corporation for the Anniston Chemical Agent
Disposal Facility in Alabama. Most recently, a fourth contract was
awarded in February 1997 to Raytheon for the Umatilla Chemical Agent
Disposal Facility in Oregon.
The RFP, issued on July 8, 1994, contemplated the award of a
combination fixed-price and cost-plus-award-fee contract. The RFP
stated that award would be made on a best value basis considering the
areas of technical, management, past performance, and cost/price. The
RFP, as amended, stated the relative importance of each of these areas
as follows:
Technical approach is more important than management. Management
is somewhat more important than either of past performance or
cost/price. Past performance and cost/price are of equal
importance.
The technical and management areas were divided into elements, which
in turn were divided into factors and, in the case of one factor,
subfactors--this amounted to 27 constituent evaluation criteria in
these two areas whose relative importance was stated in the RFP.[1]
As stated in the RFP, the technical and management areas would be
numerically scored and assessed for proposal risk.
Past performance had no stated subordinate elements or factors
(although the RFP stated in narrative what would be considered under
this area). A performance risk assessment group (PRAG) was to
evaluate the quality of an offeror's past performance and assign a
risk rating of low, moderate, high, or unknown (i.e., no relevant
experience).
Cost/price was to be evaluated, but not numerically scored. The
cost/price evaluation would also include an integrated assessment of
proposal risk.
CDA, Raytheon, and Westinghouse responded to the RFP.[2] The agency
conducted multiple rounds of discussions and ultimately requested two
rounds of best and final offers (BAFO). Offerors submitted their
second round of BAFOs by April 28, 1997.
The source selection evaluation board (SSEB) evaluated the proposals
under the technical and management areas by assigning adjectival
ratings and corresponding scores on a 100-point scale.[3]
The evaluation resulted in CDA's proposal receiving a technical score
of 90.6 compared to 84 for Raytheon. Within the technical area, CDA's
proposal received a higher score than Raytheon's under 12 of the 16
constituent criteria, of which the difference between the two
proposals' scores for about half of these was 15 or more points.
Raytheon's proposal did not receive a higher score than CDA's under
any of the technical criteria. This difference in scores resulted in
CDA's proposal receiving a higher score than Raytheon's under every
evaluation element of the technical area.
Under the management area, Raytheon's proposal received a score of
89.8 compared to 84.6 for CDA. In contrast to the technical area, the
margin here resulted solely from Raytheon's proposal receiving a
higher score for one of the constituent criteria, corporate baseline
management, which was the most important element in the management
area and had no subordinate factors. This was the only criterion in
the management area for which Raytheon's proposal received a higher
score than CDA's proposal.
In addition to the scores and ratings, the SSEB identified and
described with narrative comments the advantages and disadvantages
associated with each proposal under each constituent criterion. A
panel then determined which of these advantages and disadvantages were
considered "programmatic" (i.e., whether an advantage or disadvantage
enhanced or degraded performance, or reduced or increased performance
risk). The programmatic advantages and disadvantages were those
presented to the source selection authority (SSA) as those that were
important. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 28, 482-83. The following
table shows the number of advantages and disadvantages, both overall
and programmatic (prog.), found for each proposal:
Technical AdvantagesTechnical DisadvantagesManagement
Advantages Management
Disadvantages
Offeror Total Prog. Total Prog. Total Prog. Total Prog.
CDA 22 7[4] 0 0 3 2 2 1
Raytheon4 3 3 0 4 1 2 1
The overall combined weighted score under the technical and management
areas was 88.1 for CDA's proposal and 86.4 for Raytheon's proposal.
Both were rated "outstanding" overall with low proposal risk. Under
past performance, CDA was rated a moderate performance risk and
Raytheon a low performance risk. The cost/price evaluation assessed a
moderate risk to both cost proposals. The evaluated prices and costs
follow (in millions of dollars):
Offeror Fixed Price Proposed Cost Upward Cost AdjustmentTotal
CDA $217.6 $276.5 $5.8 $499.9
Raytheon $206.5 $305.1 $3.0 $514.6
The SSEB reported its findings to the source selection advisory
council (SSAC). The SSAC analyzed the SSEB's findings and reported to
the SSA. The SSAC report stated the following conclusions:
All offerors determined to be outstanding, based on evaluation of
their proposals against [technical/management] criteria.
CDA and [Raytheon] determined to represent equivalent, lowest
proposal risk, based on [Technical/Management] Tradeoff Analysis.
[Raytheon] determined to represent lowest performance risk, based
on Past Performance Assessment.
The SSAC report then analyzed the cost/price evaluations showing that
CDA was lowest overall and stated the following conclusion:
[Raytheon] represents best value to the Government:
-Compared to CDA: [Raytheon's] lower performance risk offsets
2.9 [percent] cost advantage of CDA . . .
The SSA determined that there were no meaningful differences under any
of the 27 technical and management evaluation criteria between
Raytheon's and CDA's proposals. Tr. at 608. The SSA's source
selection decision document stated:
a. All offerors' Technical and Management proposals are
outstanding. First, I reviewed Technical and Management areas,
which had been individually evaluated and scored. In order to
determine the overall integrated benefits offered by the
proposals, I also assessed Technical and Management as a whole,
considering the relative weights of the two areas, as well as
each offeror's unique set of programmatic advantages and
disadvantages, and the relative importance of those programmatic
advantages and disadvantages. As a result of this review, I find
that CDA and [Raytheon] are equivalent in Technical/Management
approaches, and also provide the lowest overall integrated
Technical/Management proposal risk. . . . CDA represents a
higher performance risk based on EG&G's past performance at
Tooele . . . .
5. This contract award is one of a succession of contract awards
for the [Chemical Stockpile Demilitarization Program]. . . .
Because of the successive solicitations including discussions and
debriefings, all the offerors have been able to improve their
technical and management proposals and produce
technical/management plans which are overall considered
outstanding. Similarly, the offerors' cost proposals have also
become extremely competitive. . . . CDA and [Raytheon] each have
one of [the two currently] operating plants. . . . At this point
in time, the Government has more confidence in the performance
potential for [Raytheon] than it does for CDA, based on current
activities and experiences at these two facilities.
6. Award Decision: After carefully reviewing and assessing the
results of the Technical, Management, Past Performance, and
Cost/Price evaluations of the three offerors, I find that
[Raytheon] represents the best value to the Government for the
PBCDF project. When compared to CDA, both have outstanding and
low risk technical/management approaches. However, [Raytheon's]
lower performance risk clearly justifies the cost premium. . . .
The agency awarded the contract to Raytheon on July 25. After
requesting and receiving a debriefing, CDA filed this protest. The
protest challenges the source selection decision with respect to the
determination of technical/management equivalence and the relative
assessments of performance risk. The agency has stayed performance
pending resolution of this protest.
TECHNICAL/MANAGEMENT EQUIVALENCE
CDA first alleges that the determination that proposals were
equivalent under the technical and management areas is unreasonable.
CDA explains that despite the clear evaluated differences between
CDA's and Raytheon's proposals, the agency unreasonably determined
that the proposals were equivalent under every individual technical
and management evaluation criterion. Thus, CDA alleges that the
source selection decision improperly failed to give any weight to the
technical and management evaluation areas, even though they were
supposed to account for 60 percent of the evaluation weight.
In response, the agency contends that the disparity in scores in and
of itself does not evidence an evaluated superiority of either
proposal under any criterion. Rather, the agency asserts that the
design and operation restrictions of the RFP, combined with both
offerors' having competed in several similar procurements, allowed
little margin for differentiation under any evaluation area other than
past performance.
In a negotiated procurement with a best value evaluation plan, point
scores and adjectival ratings are only guides to assist contracting
agencies in evaluating proposals; they do not mandate automatic
selection of a particular proposal. Grey Advertising, Inc., 55 Comp.
Gen. 1111, 1118 (1976), 76-1 CPD para. 325 at 9; PRC, Inc., B-274698.2,
B-274698.3, Jan. 23, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 115 at 12. Source selection
officials have broad discretion in determining the manner and extent
to which they will make use of the technical and cost evaluation
results, subject only to the tests of rationality and consistency with
the evaluation criteria. Grey Advertising, Inc., supra; A & W
Maintenance Servs., Inc.--Recon., B-255711.2, Jan. 17, 1995, 95-1 CPD para.
24 at 4.
Where, as here, the agency determines that a higher technical score
does not reflect actual technical superiority, it must show that the
agency reasonably concluded that no such technical superiority exists.
DynCorp, 71 Comp. Gen. 129, 133-34 (1991), 91-2 CPD para. 575 at 6-7.
Such a showing must be sufficiently detailed to permit our Office to
review the determination for reasonableness. Id.; compare Dayton T.
Brown, Inc., B-229664, Mar. 30, 1988, 88-1 CPD para. 321 at 5-7
(reasonable justification for determining that evaluated merit did not
reflect significant actual difference) with DLI Eng'g Corp., B-218335,
June 28, 1985, 85-1 CPD para. 742 at 6-8 (unreasonable justification).
In the course of a hearing conducted by our Office, the evaluation and
source selection officials provided testimony on the determination of
equivalence under the technical and management areas. All agreed that
the proposals were found equivalent under the technical area as well
as under the management area. Tr. at 355, 484, 575, 614-15. The SSA
testified that the two proposals had no meaningful differences under
any of the 27 technical and management evaluation criteria. Tr. at
608. He confirmed this judgment with regard to his assessment of
various individual elements and factors. Tr. at 511-12, 540-50, 575,
596-98. In our view, the evaluation and hearing records do not
support this determination.
The most marked difference between the proposals is under technical,
the most important area, where CDA's proposal received a higher raw
score under three quarters of the criteria, a large number of which
reflected a significant difference in score, and Raytheon's proposal
did not receive the higher score on any of the criteria.[5] Although
these scores are only guides, our review of the detailed evaluation
narratives describing the advantages and disadvantages showed that the
higher scores appear to reflect actual qualitative differences between
the two proposals.
The evaluation and source selection personnel recognize that
differences exist, but state that such differences are not meaningful
or significant. Tr. at 344, 488, 542, 546-48, 655. However, when
explaining why the proposals are equivalent with no meaningful or
significant differences under any given criterion, the witnesses
responded in very general terms, essentially stating without further
elaboration that the agency considered the differences and did not
find them meaningful; that equivalence was to be expected because of
the procurement history, detailed RFP requirements, and successive
rounds of discussions; or that the similarity of adjectival ratings
showed equivalence. Tr. at 339-41, 356-57, 420-22, 486-88, 540-43,
545-50, 576-81, 588-98, 653-60.
Where, as here, the evaluation record evidences relative differences
in proposal merit, such general statements are inadequate to show
equivalency; the agency must compare the relative merits of the
proposals in a manner that reasonably supports a determination of
equivalency. See Matrix Int'l Logistics, Inc., B-272388.2, Dec. 9,
1996, 97-2 CPD para. 89 at 9-10.
Although the agency's position is that the procurement history, the
detailed requirements of the RFP, and the successive BAFOs support a
conclusion that proposals are equivalent in merit,[6] these events
themselves do not show that the proposals actually are equivalent.
Nor is similarity in the adjectival ratings proof of technical
equality because the pre-established large range of scores within each
adjectival rating allowed for large variations in evaluated merit
between proposals receiving the same rating. Since the evaluation
record shows documented differences in merit between these two
proposals, the similarity of adjectival ratings here does not
establish that the proposals are equivalent. See Matrix Int'l
Logistics, Inc., supra, at 8-9.
To the extent the SSA could be said to have substituted his judgment
for that documented by the evaluators, the record shows that he may
not have reasonably considered the relevant information. In this
regard, although the SSA's testimony was for the most part not
specific enough for us to assess the basis of his judgment, in the one
instance where he did specifically explain relative proposal merits,
his explanation does not establish that the proposals are equivalent.
In that specific instance, i.e., Quality Assurance/Quality Control
(QA/QC), a factor under the most important technical element, CDA's
proposal was scored at 92 and Raytheon's proposal was scored at 60.
In terms of adjectival ratings, these scores placed CDA's proposal
above the middle of the "Outstanding" range, while Raytheon's was at
the bottom of the "Excellent" range (bordering on "Satisfactory").
CDA's identified programmatic advantage was that "[DELETED]." CDA was
also found to have a [DELETED], which was likewise determined to be a
programmatic advantage, although this was inadvertently omitted from
the final list of programmatic advantages presented to the SSA. Tr.
at 126.
On the other hand, Raytheon's proposal had one nonprogrammatic
advantage attributed to [DELETED] when that change occurs. Raytheon's
proposal also had the following nonprogrammatic disadvantage:
[DELETED]
[DELETED]
[DELETED]
[DELETED]
During the hearing conducted by our Office, the SSEB chairperson
testified that the SSEB never characterized the two proposals as
equivalent under this factor. Tr. at 134. The stated reason that
Raytheon's disadvantage was not designated as programmatic (and
therefore not included in the SSAC report to the SSA) was that the
cognizant evaluators decided to designate such advantages or
disadvantages as either a programmatic advantage for one proposal, or
a programmatic disadvantage for another, but not as programmatic for
both, so as to avoid "overly penaliz[ing] for a particular finding if
it applied to a single attribute like quality." Tr. at 131. Thus,
the SSAC report to the SSA showed only a programmatic advantage for
CDA under this criterion and no programmatic disadvantage for
Raytheon.
Although we think that this evaluation documentation evidences a
significant difference between the proposals on QA/QC, the SSA stated
that this was not a meaningful difference. He understood the
evaluated difference to be that [DELETED], and he thought the
differences "could be easily - not easily but certainly handled
administratively once you assign the contract." Tr. at 511. This
explanation does not address the totality of the problems found in the
evaluation of Raytheon's QA/QC approach, in that it does not account
for [DELETED]. We also note that, but for CDA's programmatic
advantage under this criterion, the concerns with Raytheon's QA/QC
plan should have been designated a programmatic disadvantage for
Raytheon. Tr. at 131-32. Thus, the SSA's specific testimony suggests
that he was not cognizant of, or did not understand, the evaluated
differences between the proposals with regard to QA/QC, and that he
may not have fully understood how programmatic differences were
designated. In any event, the determination that the proposals are
equivalent under QA/QC was not supported by the evidence.[7]
Similarly, the agency has not explained why the documented differences
in the evaluation of the proposals for the other criteria,
particularly those where CDA's proposal received a notably higher (15
points) score (general approach, laboratory operations, environmental
compliance, and utilization of core employees) were not meaningful.[8]
The agency and intervenor state that the differences on any given
criterion are not significant because the weights of the individual
criteria are low overall, considering the presence of so many other
criteria. This argument fails to account for the underlying rationale
of the equivalence determination and the ultimate selection
decision--that is, that the two proposals were equivalent on every
technical and every management criterion--because the designated
weight of any given criterion is irrelevant in determining whether two
proposals are or are not equivalent under that criterion.
Here, once the proposals were found equivalent under the technical and
management areas, the source selection decision was based on a
trade-off between past performance risk and cost/price. Tr. at
503-05, 565, 614-18. In other words, the two most heavily weighted
evaluation areas, technical and management, were ultimately discarded
from the source selection decision. Since the agency has not
reasonably determined that the proposals are equivalent under the
technical and management areas, the agency has not meaningfully
assessed the relative merits of the proposals under the stated
evaluation plan. The trade-off analysis was thus unreasonable and
inconsistent with the stated selection plan and cannot be the basis
for awarding the contract. See Matrix Int'l Logistics, Inc., supra,
at 10.
Counsel for the agency and the intervenor contend, in the alternative,
that even if CDA's proposal is technically superior to Raytheon's
proposal, Raytheon's proposal is superior to CDA's under the
management area and, applying the established factor weights, the
overall weighted technical/management scores are so close as to
indicate overall equivalence attributable to offsetting proposal
strengths and weaknesses. Although we will consider information
submitted during a protest, including the parties' arguments,
explanations, and hearing testimony, in considering the entire record
we accord greater weight to contemporaneous evaluation and source
selection material. See Matrix Int'l Logistics, Inc., supra, at 5-6.
A finding of equivalence based on offsetting merit may be reasonable
where the source selection officials have made such a determination.
See, e.g., Employee Assistance Serv., B-207057, July 19, 1982, 82-2
CPD para. 56 at 3. A properly documented, considered judgment of the
source selection authority is critical in this case, however, since
the evaluation results, when correctly considered under the stated
evaluation criteria, are so close as to make selection of either
offeror a reasonable possibility.
The SSA testified that he did not perform a trade-off analysis along
the lines of the alternative defense suggested by counsel. Tr. at
596-98. Moreover, although the SSEB chairperson initially testified
that meaningful evaluated differences between CDA's and Raytheon's
proposals existed, Tr. at 117-18, 145-48, 152-53, the agency recalled
the witness on a later date to deny that any meaningful differences
existed. Tr. at 342-44. This alternate technical/management
trade-off rationale thus does not appear to be the view of the
evaluation and source selection officials, but rather that of counsel
seeking to defend the agency's source selection. Because it has been
offered in the heat of an adversarial process and may not represent
the fair and considered judgment of the agency, which is a
prerequisite of a rational evaluation and source selection process, we
accord this alternate rationale little weight. Boeing Sikorsky
Aircraft Support, B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997,
97-2 CPD para. 91 at 15.
PAST PERFORMANCE RISK
CDA also protests that the past performance risk evaluations and the
assessment of those evaluations by the SSA are unreasonable. CDA
essentially contends that not enough significance was accorded in
Raytheon's risk assessment to the release of a chemical agent at
JACADS in 1994, and that too much significance was accorded in CDA's
risk assessment to recent unfavorable customer satisfaction
assessments of EG&G's performance at Tooele. We believe that the
record does not demonstrate that the past performance risk ratings are
unreasonable.
Raytheon's actions were apparently not the sole cause for the chemical
agent release at JACADS. The agency identified a government design
defect as playing a significant role in the release, and that defect
has been corrected at JACADS as well as in the design of other
facilities. Although Raytheon's staff reportedly did not properly
execute relevant procedures at the time, such lapses have not occurred
since. The SSA was aware of the design defect and the lapse in
following procedure. Ultimately, he determined that the correction of
the design defect will prevent the same type of release from happening
at any facility. This, in his view, together with the quality
performance of Raytheon at JACADS since 1994, provides a sufficient
level of confidence to reduce the level of risk that would usually
attach to a contractor's release of a chemical agent. Tr. at 495-97,
520-24.
In contrast with this problem from 1994, the customer satisfaction
issues for EG&G at Tooele have occurred in the last year. The
concerns were associated with cost overruns, a failure to follow
procedures resulting in a plant shutdown, the failure to implement
required systems such as a cost control system, and a general lack of
corporate support. Tr. at 269-70. Although some of the agency's
concerns have been corrected, and EG&G has discussed with the agency
the contractor's plans for addressing the other concerns, the agency
has determined that an increased level of risk will remain until all
of the proposed action is successfully implemented. Tr. at 498-502,
557-61.
Neither of these risk assessments is unreasonable. An agency may
reasonably give less weight to older performance problems where the
contractor's subsequent performance has been good. E. Huttenbauer &
Son, Inc., B-257778, B-257779, Nov. 8, 1994, 94-2 CPD para. 206 at 7. An
agency may also place more significance on recent performance
problems. See Federal Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-250135.4, May 24, 1993,
93-1 CPD para. 398 at 9. To the extent the agency's concerns here became
the significant discriminator in the past performance area, the RFP
specifically advised offerors that such a finding in any element of an
offeror's performance history could be "an important consideration in
the source selection process."
CONCLUSION
Since the agency did not reasonably consider the relative merits of
the proposals under the technical and management areas, we cannot find
that the source selection decision is reasonable and consistent with
the terms of the RFP. We recommend that the agency make and document
a new source selection decision consistent with the stated evaluation
criteria. If an offeror other than Raytheon is selected, the agency
should terminate Raytheon's contract and make award accordingly. We
also recommend that the protester be reimbursed the reasonable costs
of filing and pursuing its protest, including attorneys' fees. 4
C.F.R. sec. 21.8(d)(1) (1997). The protesters certified claim for costs
must be submitted to the agency within 60 days of receiving this
decision. 4 C.F.R. sec. 21.8(f)(1).
The protest is sustained.
Comptroller General
of the United States
1. The record refers to 28 criteria. One of these criteria covering
facility closure was evaluated under another criterion (i.e., general
approach) and was not separately scored.
2. Because Westinghouse's proposal is not at issue in this protest, it
is not discussed further.
3. The source selection plan, which was not released to the offerors,
identified the following rating and point scale:
Score Rating
80 - 100 Outstanding
60 - <80 Excellent
40 - <60 Satisfactory
20 - <40 Poor
0 - <20 Unacceptable
4. The report carried forward to the SSA identifies only six technical
programmatic advantages for CDA. The SSEB chairperson
stated that the seventh programmatic advantage was
inadvertently omitted. Tr. at 126.
5. The reasonableness of the underlying evaluations is not challenged
by any party.
6. The SSA described his "mind-set" when he reviewed the technical and
management evaluations as expecting the proposals from these offerors
to be outstanding. Tr. at 548-49.
7. Although an SSAC member testified about another aspect of
Raytheon's proposal that was rated as a programmatic advantage under
another criterion that had some application to QA/QC, he stated that
this crossover was "very small." Tr. At 667.
8. For example, protester's counsel questioned the SSA about the most
important evaluation element, i.e., operations conceptual approach
(under which 4 of the constituent criteria CDA had a higher score of
at least 15 points), going through numerous examples of evaluated
differences, and the SSA only acknowledged advantages in CDA's
proposal not present in Raytheon's (e.g., [DELETED]). In response to
this questioning, the SSA did not provide a specific explanation as to
why those differences are not significant or meaningful. See,
e.g.,Tr. at 576-81. While the SSEB chairperson later denied that
there were meaningful differences between the proposals under any of
the criteria, Tr. at 342-344, he initially testified that the
proposals were not equivalent with regard to QA/QC, Tr. at 134, and
that there were meaningful differences favoring CDA under laboratory
operations, Tr. at 117-18, and the utilization of core employees, Tr.
at 145, and that, considering the entire basis for the evaluation,
CDA's and Raytheon's proposals were not equivalent under either the
technical or management area, Tr. 152-53. Finally, when questioned
about specific evaluated differences between the two proposals, an
SSAC member testified that there was a difference under laboratory
operations, but he could not say whether it was significant, Tr. at
653-54, and that the proposals were not equivalent under QA/QC, Tr. at
655.